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This book initially was published by Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press in 1998. In 
2014, at my request, the publisher returned to me all publication rights. Not sur-
prisingly, Palgrave Macmillan concluded that the book no longer had any profi t 
potential. Given that, why would I want to recover publication rights? Well, cer-
tainly not for economic profi t (after all, I’ve placed the book into the Creative 
Commons). But I do believe the book can still profi tably be read by environmental 
policy makers in China and other countries for whom this book’s lessons remain 
relevant.
Ostensibly, it is a book about the failure of environmental protection in Com-
munist Poland. But it was never just a book about Poland. Poland was merely the 
object case to illustrate more general, systemic impediments to pollution control in 
single-party states with socialist economic systems. Those impediments include, 
most prominently, endemic soft budget constraints of state-owned enterprises, con-
fl icts of interest faced by environmental regulators attempting to control emissions 
from enterprises in which the state has a direct fi nancial stake, and bureaucratic 
career incentives that always seem to favor economic production over environ-
mental protection in single-party states. 
Consider China. For decades now, China has proclaimed improved environ-
mental protection as a high-level national goal. New policies are announced, which 
receive widespread media attention. And it is taken as an article of faith that Chi-
na’s Communist Party can more or less easily accomplish whatever policy goals it 
enunciates. That is simply not the case.
This seventeen-year-old book about Poland provides an ongoing cautionary 
tale for China. It shows that even well-intentioned environmental policies of totali-
tarian states are likely to face substantial, systemic impediments. The combination 
of soft budget constraints and regulatory confl icts of interest presents a formidable 
obstacle that Communist Poland was unable to overcome, and so far has stymied 
China’s Communist Party/state.
Of course, China in 2016 is not Poland in 1985. The differences are too 
numerous to mention, ranging from the cultural to the structural. For instance, 
most sectors of China’s economy have been opened to competition among private 
producers—something that did not happen in Poland before the fall of the Com-
munist Party. To the extent China’s markets are subject to market competition, the 
Preface to the 2016 Creative Commons Edition
Preface to the 2015 Creative Commons Editionxiv
problems identifi ed in this book have little relevance. But, and this is the crucial 
point, several of the most heavily polluting sectors of the Chinese economy, includ-
ing for example energy production and steel manufacturing, remain dominated 
by state-owned enterprises, which are not subject to competitive pressures. With 
respect to those sectors—the last vestiges of China’s socialist economic  system—
there is every reason to believe that the experiences of Communist Poland have 
at least some relevance. The Chinese Communist Party has, in fact, found it dif-
fi cult to make environmental penalties stick against its biggest polluters and to 
create career incentives for the bureaucrats that manage big polluters (China’s ver-
sion of Poland’s nomenklatura) to implement offi cial state environmental policy. 
When push comes to shove, China’s economic production and growth imperatives 
always seem to override environmental protection mandates, however sincerely 
intended. In that respect, China suffers from precisely the problems I write about 
in this book.
Poland in 2016 does not suffer from those problems, which is not to say that 
it has ‘solved’ all of its environmental problems—no country can claim to have 
accomplished that feat. Poland today has similar pollution problems to other indus-
trial democracies with similar per capita incomes. The environmental improve-
ments that began virtually as soon as the socialist economic system fell (as 
recounted in Chapter 7) have continued as the country’s economy (and industrial 
output) have grown. Poland is no longer mentioned as among the most polluted 
counties on earth, even if its environmental performance still lags (marginally) that 
of more affl uent EU member states. At a personal level, I no longer worry, as I did 
in 1989 or 1990, of returning from every visit to Poland with a case of acute bron-
chitis. (By contrast, I would worry about the respiratory consequences of a trip to 
any major city in China today.) 
I have made no substantive changes to the original text. Several typographi-
cal and other minor errors have been corrected. My Ostrom Workshop colleague, 
Patty Lezotte, has done a brilliant job redesigning and typesetting the text. And I 
am grateful to Palgrave Macmillan for returning to me the publication rights. 
When I initially completed the book, I dedicated it to my wife Izabela and our 
daughter Marysia. By the time the book was in print, Marysia’s brother Stefan had 
joined the family. He is now eighteen years old and preparing to start college at 
Indiana University. I am very happy to have the opportunity to dedicate this Cre-
ative Commons edition of the book to him along with his sister and mother. 
         
Daniel H. Cole
Bloomington, Indiana
March 2016
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1A Failed Promise: Socialist Environmental Protection
In 1971, during an environmental conference sponsored by the United Nations 
in the former Czechoslovakia, Mayor Zdeněk Kupka of Ostrava (that country’s 
second-largest city) proclaimed socialism to be superior to capitalism in environ-
mental protection. Pointing fi rst to the old capitalist-era factories belching plumes 
of black smoke and then to the newer and apparently cleaner factories built by the 
Communist Party/state, the mayor declared that ‘the new system is solving the 
city’s environmental problems’ (New York Times, May 16, 1971).
Mayor Kupka’s proclamation met with little dissent on either side of the Ber-
lin Wall. No one denied the ecological failings of capitalism, which were well and 
frequently publicized by the American and European media. Meanwhile, through-
out the 1970s and into the 1980s reports of environmental problems in Commu-
nist Eastern Europe were few and far between. For some (including a fair number 
of Western economists) this simply confi rmed the inherent environmental supe-
riority of the socialist system. It stood to reason: socially owned industries did 
not operate from an environmentally harmful profi t motive; and central socioeco-
nomic planning presumably ensured the rational utilization and conservation of 
natural resources. As Karl-Heinrich Hansmeyer and Bert Rürup (quoted in Zwei-
gert and Gessner, 1976, 93) suggested, ‘[i]ndustry working under an ideal central 
plan for the economy should not create any specifi c environmental problems.’ In 
the Communist Party states, this became an ideological truth as certain as any 
Aristotelian syllogism. From the premise that environmental problems stemmed 
from capitalist relations and modes of production, Party/state leaders logically 
deduced that pollution could not even exist under socialism.1 But, as with all logi-
cal proofs, the conclusion was only as sound as the premises. 
During the 1970s, mounting evidence of substantial and increasing pollution 
levels in the socialist economies eroded the premise that environmental problems 
arose only under conditions of industrial capitalism. By the late 1970s, Party/
state offi cials were compelled to concede that environmental problems existed 
but, they maintained, such problems were not endemic to socialism, as they were 
to capitalism; on the contrary, only the progress of scientifi cally planned social-
ism could and ultimately would eradicate pollution and other negative effects 
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of industrialization and economic growth. In other words, pollution in socialist 
economies was viewed, in Charles Ziegler’s (1987, 26) words, as a ‘temporary 
anomaly, a deviation from the environmentally benign norm that will be resolved 
as socialism advances.’ But that claim exploded in 1986, along with the nuclear 
power plant at Chernobyl in the former Soviet Ukraine. After Chernobyl, the 
environmental policies and practices of Communist countries came under intense 
domestic and international scrutiny. Apparently government ownership, control 
and planning did not guarantee environmental preservation after all. 
Three years after Chernobyl, all remaining myths of socialism’s inherent envi-
ronmental superiority fell along with the Berlin Wall. Behind the iron curtain stood 
another curtain of poisonous smog so dense that in some places sunlight could not 
pierce it.2 Between 1971 (when Mayor Zdeněk Kupka declared that the socialist 
system was solving all of Ostrava’s environmental problems) and 1985, sulfur 
dioxide concentrations in the region increased by more than 50 percent (Vavroušek 
1990, 23, table 3). By the late 1980s, Ostrava was a poisoned city located within 
the most heavily polluted region on earth, the ‘Black Triangle’ of southeastern East 
Germany, southwestern Poland and the northern Czechoslovakia.
In the Black Triangle and throughout the former Soviet Bloc, severe pollution 
had (and continues to have) catastrophic impacts on natural resources, national 
economies and public health. During the late 1980s in Poland, for example, half 
of all river water was unfi t for industrial use, let alone for human consumption; in 
Kraków, Poland’s medieval ‘city of kings,’ acid rain was literally dissolving one 
of the greatest collections of Renaissance architecture in Europe; 60 percent of all 
food produced in the Kraków region was considered unfi t for human consump-
tion because of massive concentrations of metals that contaminated the soil; in 
the industrial region of Katowice, 40 miles to the west of Kraków, two-thirds of 
all 10-year-olds suffered from mental and physical disabilities as a result of pol-
lution; and some Polish scientists predicted that by the year 2000, one-quarter of 
the country’s population would develop some form of pollution-related cancer.3 
Meanwhile, Poland’s ecological crisis was costing the Polish economy between 
10 and 20 percent of gross national income (see Radio Free Europe/Report on 
Eastern Europe, October 5, 1990). These shocking, almost inconceivable statistics 
may appear to make People’s Poland an extreme or unique example, but its expe-
rience was, in fact, representative of the former Soviet Bloc as a whole. From all 
appearances, the extent of environmental devastation in the socialist East at least 
matched, and probably exceeded, anything ever experienced in the capitalist West.
Subject and Object
This book’s purpose is to explain the failure of environmental protection under 
socialism. This purpose has both positive and normative components. The posi-
tive goal is to describe comprehensively the causes of the failure of environmental 
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protection in People’s Poland. The normative goal is to derive some lessons from 
this failure about systemic or institutional prerequisites for more effective envi-
ronmental protection. The thesis underlying both goals is that the environmental 
failure of socialism was inevitable given certain features of the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, the socialist economic system and single-party rule. 
Although Poland is the object of study, the book’s subject is Marxist socialism, 
a political-economic system that precipitated similar ecological problems through-
out the former Soviet bloc. Indeed, this book might have been written about any 
country in Eastern Europe. It could not, however, have been written about any 
country in Western Europe. And that distinction gives this book its impetus. The 
thesis is that system-specifi c features of real existing socialism caused or exacer-
bated ecological crises in People’s Poland and throughout the socialist world. This 
is not to say that the Communist system functioned in precisely the same way in 
Poland and all other countries of the former Soviet bloc. Although those countries 
are often lumped together for the sake of academic expediency (and to some extent 
this book is no exception to that), each developed its own socioeconomic and cul-
tural idiosyncrasies. Few (perhaps only Hungary and the former Yugoslavia) were 
more idiosyncratic than Poland, which was always among the least doctrinaire and 
most political unstable. For that reason Poland may seem a poor choice for a case 
study of environmental protection under socialism. However, for this type of study 
Poland’s exceptional characteristics make it particularly apt. It is, as John Clark 
and Aaron Wildavsky (1990, 5) have written, ‘the toughest test case.’ 
People’s Poland had (relatively speaking) the most sophisticated environmental 
protection regime of any Soviet Bloc country (see Juergensmeyer et al. 1991; Cum-
mings 1993). At the same time, Communist ideology and Stalinist institutions were 
only weakly established there (again, relatively speaking). The Polish Party/state 
failed to collectivize agriculture; it suffered a powerful oppositionist Church; and 
it did not repress its population, including environmentalists, nearly as much as did 
other Communist regimes. Orthodox Marxist ideology (the Marxism of Marx and 
his most infl uential Russian interpreters) did not dominate Poland’s legal system to 
the same extent it did others in the former Soviet bloc (see Biernat and Wasilewski 
1992, 9). So, if environmental protection failed for systemic reasons in Poland, 
where environmental protection was relatively well developed and the ‘system’ 
relatively weakly established, then what holds true for Poland certainly should hold 
true for the other former socialist countries. Nevertheless, this book does not focus 
exclusively on Poland; the analysis (particularly in Chapters 5 and 6) compares and 
contrasts the experiences of other socialist and non-socialist countries.
Marxist Ideology and the Socialist System 
Already, in the fi rst few pages of this Introduction, I have referred to the subject 
by various names: ‘socialism,’ ‘the Party/state,’ ‘Marxist socialism,’ ‘real existing 
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socialism’ and ‘the Communist system.’ There are, in fact, many labels for the sys-
tem (or systems) implemented in Marx’s name, all of them somehow controversial.
People’s Poland was, of course, established on the Soviet model of Marx-
ist ideology. Marx, as is well known, wrote little about the socialist system he 
espoused, perhaps because he saw it as only a transitional phase between capital-
ism and stateless communism (so argues Pashukanis 1951, 270–1). He did not 
provide a recipe for the socialist state, only a partial list of ingredients: (1) the 
socialist state should be a workers’ state, led by the ‘revolutionary dictatorship of 
the proletariat’ (Marx 1938, 18); (2) the ‘anarchy’ of the free market should be 
replaced by a scientifi cally planned economy;4 and (3) the state should control the 
means of production, including property, until the process of re-socialization (that 
is, de-alienation) is complete and the state withers away.5 
From Marx’s occasional statements about socialism, Lenin elaborated an 
entire political-economic system. In substantial accordance with Marx’s incom-
plete directions, Lenin’s system (1) established the workers’ state under the 
‘leading role’ of the vanguard Communist Party, (2) abolished (most) private 
ownership of land and the means of production, and (3) instituted central planning 
as the mechanism for ordering economic relations in socialist society. The result, 
however, was a totalitarian state that Marx might not have recognized as his own 
design. Inevitably perhaps, political and economic expediency altered Marxist 
theory on its way to becoming practice. Or were Lenin’s interpretations of Marx 
simply vulgar and self-serving? 
This is not the place to decide, once and for all, whether Lenin was faithful 
to Marx. From the perspective of this book, the answer is not important. What 
is important is the fact of Marxism–Leninism. It is worth noting, however, that 
the debate is by no means one-sided. On the one hand, Lenin seemed to collapse 
Marx’s entire theory of history into two simple goals: secure power and maintain 
Party rule. Before the Communists came to power, Lenin judged all ideas good or 
bad according to their impacts on the revolutionary struggle; after the revolution, 
the primary criterion for decision making became the good of the Party. However, 
Lenin’s myopic focus on revolution and Party was not clearly inconsistent with 
Marx’s writings. As Leszek Kołakowski (1978b, 383) has noted, Lenin may have 
been even more faithful to Marx’s theory of historical materialism than Marx 
himself was.
Stalin’s conception of ‘Marxism–Leninism’ was for the most part a ‘perfec-
tion’ of Lenin’s principle of the Party-above-all; his dictatorial rule was the logical 
conclusion and ultimate manifestation of the totalitarian system Lenin conceived. 
It was a short and direct trip down the road of ‘democratic centralism’ from Lenin’s 
conception of Party infallibility to Stalin’s ‘cult of personality.’6 Stalin’s Marxism 
was both an ideology and the antithesis of ideology. Under his rule, ‘Marxism’ 
came to mean ‘nothing more or less than the current pronouncement of the author-
ity in question, that is, Stalin himself’ (Kołakowski 1978c, 4). At the same time, 
Stalin institutionalized within the political-economic structures of socialism what 
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might be called the architectural principles of Marxism, as specifi ed by Marx 
or derived from his writings by Lenin. These principles included ‘the workers’ 
state,’ ‘nomenklatura,’ ‘socialist democracy,’ ‘democratic centralism,’ ‘socialist 
legality,’ ‘central planning,’ ‘socialist property’ and ‘technological determinism.’ 
I address each of these institutions at various points in this book, as they relate to 
environmental protection. Together, they determined the design and function of 
the socialist system and its organizational units, and they continued to do so long 
after the ideology on which they were based had fallen into disrepute. It may be, 
as some have said, that no one in Poland, including the Communists, believed in 
Marxism after about 1970. But the institutions and organizations founded (rightly 
or wrongly) on his theories persisted.7 
‘Socialism,’ in any case, is more than just an ideological label; it signifi es 
‘certain formations in existing societies’ (Kornai 1992a, 9). These formations 
share economic systems constructed on an administrative, rather than a market, 
model, which assumes social ownership and control of the means of production, 
and entails centralized resource allocation, with prices and production targets 
established by commands from above, rather than by demand from below. The 
formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe all conformed to this model, albeit 
to different extents and with idiosyncratic variations. This book is about environ-
mental protection within that model. 
Socialist Legal Analysis 
A cursory glance at the Table of Contents of this book might leave some tradi-
tional legal scholars scratching their heads in dismay. The book ostensibly is about 
environmental law and administration, but the majority of the chapters seem to be 
about subjects other than law, such as history, politics, economics and philosophy. 
Fortunately, legal scholars are no longer constrained to write about the law as if 
legislators, judges and lawyers operated within a social vacuum. I seriously doubt 
any legal scholar now living would be shocked to discover extensive treatments 
of history, politics and economics in a legal study. But there is a fi ner point to be 
made here concerning the nature of socialist law and legal studies. An examination 
of environmental law under socialism that restricted itself to narrowly doctrinal 
legal analysis would be thoroughly unilluminating because in the socialist system 
the law had no autonomy; it was little more than a manipulable set of politically 
and economically determined rules.8 The socialists viewed law as an instrument 
of social engineering; it was an integral and integrated part of the sociopolitical 
superstructure constructed upon the economic base of socialist society to support 
the aims of the ruling class and their vanguard party. Distinctions between law, 
politics and economics were blurred and sometimes obliterated. Consequently, in 
studying socialist law, political and economic conditions are at least as signifi cant 
as literal statutory requirements. 
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This remains, however, a work of legal scholarship in a meaningful sense. 
Law and the legal system were central to the socialist regime for environmental 
protection. As I explain in Chapter 4 (§4.2), to the extent there was any meaning-
ful environmental protection in People’s Poland, it resulted from legislation and 
the enforcement of legal rules. But, as we shall see, the failure of environmental 
protection in People’s Poland was not so much a legal failure as a wider systemic 
failure.
My law-oriented analysis distinguishes this book from earlier works on envi-
ronmental protection under socialism, written predominantly by political scien-
tists who have tended to treat law (if at all) as something peripheral or incidental 
to the subject. I do not mean to disparage their works, all of which have con-
tributed signifi cantly to our understanding of socialist environmental efforts and 
problems. I believe, however, that this book’s law-oriented analysis fi lls a void. 
Paradoxically perhaps, my focus on environmental law and its enforcement may 
facilitate a more comprehensive analysis than earlier works have provided, for it 
must address all of the social and systemic forces that combined to render envi-
ronmental protection efforts (such as they were) ineffectual. 
The Parameters
The Communist Party ruled in Poland from the end of the World War II until 
1989. This book will treat that entire time period and beyond. Chapter 2, which 
presents a history of Polish environmental law and administration, begins with 
pre-socialist environmental protection efforts. At the other end of the time line, 
Chapter 7 addresses the important systemic changes that have occurred since the 
fall of communism in 1989, and their implications for environmental protection in 
the democratic Republic of Poland. The analysis focuses, however, on the enact-
ment, implementation and enforcement of the 1980 Environmental Protection and 
Development Act (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6), People’s Poland’s fi rst and only 
comprehensive environmental protection statute.
Dating the end of socialism in Poland is problematic because at least fi ve 
different dates could be chosen. First, in December 1988 Poland’s Parliament 
enacted a Law on Economic Activity (1988 Dz.U. No. 41, item 324) which, upon 
taking effect on January 1, 1989, freed most of the economy from central plan-
ning and centralized resources allocation. As I suggest in Chapter 7, this change 
may have been even more radical than the ‘Balcerowicz Plan’ of ‘shock therapy’ 
reforms that were introduced at the beginning of 1990. If the 1988 Law on Eco-
nomic Activity did not, in itself, mark the end of socialism in Poland, it certainly 
marked the beginning of the end. Second, we might date the end of socialism to 
April 1989, when the Party/government signed the ‘Round Table’ accords with 
the previously outlawed Solidarity trade union. Those accords called, among 
other things, for free elections, which led directly to the demise of Communist 
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Party rule. Third, the elections themselves, which were held in July 1989, might 
be taken to date the end of the Communist era in Poland. Despite the fact that 
the ‘Round Table’ accords reserved 65 percent of seats in the Sejm (the lower 
house of Poland’s Parliament) to me mbers of the Polish Communist Party (Pol-
ska  Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza or PZPR), the elections constituted a public 
referendum on Party rule in Poland. Solidarity-backed candidates won every seat 
open to them (except for one seat, which won by an independent candidate), plac-
ing the outcome of the referendum beyond dispute. Still, the Communists held on 
to power for a few months following the elections. Fourth, the Communist era in 
Poland could be said to have ended when the fi rst post-Communist government of 
Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki took offi ce in September 1989. Shortly after 
that, the PZPR dissolved itself. Even then (as I suggested earlier), many institu-
tions of the socialist system remained in place. The fi nal plausible date for the end 
of the Communist era in Poland would be January 1, 1990, the date the ‘Balcero-
wicz Plan’ (named for Mazowiecki’s Vice-Premier and Finance Minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz) of economic reforms took effect.
For purposes of this book, socialism is treated as if it ended on the fi nal day 
of 1988 (the day before the 1988 Law on Economic Activity took effect). This 
selection makes the most sense from the perspective of environmental protection, 
where only few and mostly minor changes were introduced between 1985 and the 
end of 1988, but a good deal of legislative and administrative activity ensued in 
1989.
A Road Map to the Analysis
Chapter 1 begins the book with a description of Poland’s ecological crisis circa 
1988. That crisis signifi ed a failure of environmental protection under socialism. 
Chapter 2 then presents a history of environmental law and administration in 
Poland, which demonstrates that the failure of environmental protection in Peo-
ple’s Poland was not a matter of benign neglect or malign intent. The Polish Party/
state undertook serious efforts to design and implement stringent environmental 
policies. But, as the story of environmental devastation presented in Chapter 1 
illustrates, those efforts all failed. Chapters 3–6 seek to explain that failure. Chap-
ter 3 focuses on problems in the laws themselves, including ambiguous legal man-
dates, lax standards, weak penalties and discretionary exceptions from liability. 
I consider these to be problems of law enforceability, as distinct from problems 
of law enforcement, which relate to exogenous political and economic consider-
ations. Chapter 3 concludes that, despite certain problems, Poland’s environmen-
tal laws were not the primary cause of the failure of environmental protection. The 
laws certainly might have been better drafted, for instance to be less ambiguous, 
but they were not patently unenforceable; they might have been more effectively 
enforced to provide greater environmental protection.
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The primary cause of the failure of environmental protection under socialism 
was the chronic underenforcement of environmental laws. Chapters 4 and 5 inves-
tigate the political and economic causes, respectively, of that under enforcement. 
In Chapter 4, the focus is on four interrelated political impediments to environ-
mental protection in the ‘rule of Party’ state: (1) the continual friction between the 
needs of environmental protection and certain legitimacy principles, such as the 
commitment to full employment and maximal production, that served to justify 
Party rule; (2) the structure of the Party/state’s administrative hierarchy which 
provided leverage to industrial ministers and economic planners over environ-
mental protection offi cials; (3) the structure of law enforcement and the judicial 
system in the Party/state, especially the broad discretion of prosecutors and the 
relative incompetence of environmental investigators; and (4) the Party/state’s 
control over, and manipulation of, environmental information. Those political 
impediments to environmental law enforcement were complemented by struc-
tural impediments in the socialist economic system, addressed in Chapter 5, most 
notably the lack of scarcity pricing for natural resources (under the infl uence of 
Marx’s labor theory of value), which obstructed conservation efforts, and the 
socialist property rights system, which created an endemic confl ict of interest for 
the Party/state as environmental regulator and nominal owner of regulated indus-
tries. That regulatory confl ict of interest led the Party/state to soften budget and 
law constraints on enterprises, reducing the overall effectiveness of environmen-
tal fees and fi nes.
Many of the systemic impediments to effective environmental protection dis-
cussed in Chapters 3–5 had roots in so-called ‘orthodox’ (or ‘classical’) Marxist 
theory. Chapter 6 examines elements of that theory with implications for environ-
mental protection, including (1) the Marxist–Leninist attitude toward nature, (2) 
the conception of socialist property, (3) Marx’s labor theory of value, and (4) the 
Marxist–Leninist conceptions of state and law. Regardless of whether Marx was 
in any way ‘responsible’ for the implementation of his ideas in the former Soviet 
Bloc, the point remains that orthodox Marxist theory is fundamentally incompat-
ible with environmentalism; and, as a matter of fact, the institutions and orga-
nizations Marxist theory gave rise to (with or without Marx’s approval) under 
Soviet-style communism impeded effective environmental protection. The nor-
mative implications of this for neo- and post-Marxist theories of socialism are 
addressed, along with other implications of the analysis, in Chapter 8.
The analysis in Chapters 3–6 suggests that features of the socialist system 
and even elements of Marxist theory are to blame for the poor environmental 
performance of People’s Poland (among other former Soviet bloc countries). If 
so, we might reasonably expect Poland’s environmental performance to improve 
once those institutions were eliminated or substantially altered. Chapter 7, which 
examines environmental protection in post-Communist Poland, confi rms that 
expectation. Poland’s environmental performance has improved dramatically 
since 1989, and much of that improvement is due to systemic reforms that have, 
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among other things, hardened budget constraints on polluters and reduced the 
state’s regulatory confl ict of interest, resulting in more active and effective envi-
ronmental law enforcement. 
In light of that analysis, Chapter 8 adduces some normative implications for 
an institutional theory of (effective) environmental protection. Specifi cally, I out-
line three institutions that Poland’s case suggests may be necessary (though, per-
haps, not suffi cient) for effective environmental protection: (1) a property rights 
structure that minimizes regulatory confl icts of interest by disaggregating the 
interests of polluters and government regulators; (2) a pricing mechanism that 
values resource scarcity, thereby inducing economic actors to conservation; and 
(3) an institutionalized rule of law ideology to support environmental regulation. 
To the extent these are truly institutional prerequisites for effective environmental 
protection , they raise serious issues for environmental protection under any form 
of neo- or post-Marxist socialism. They may even signify what Lewis (1992) calls 
a ‘capitalist imperative’ for environmental protection.
Notes
1. As stated in a report by the Czech Republic Ministry of the Environment (Vavroušek 
1990, 15), ‘the offi cial ideology . . . held for a long time that nothing like a polluted envi-
ronment can exist under socialism.’
2. Indeed, in the late 1980s the heavily polluted city of Kraków, Poland, received 
approximately 20 percent less sunlight than other parts of the country (see Reuters North 
European Service, August 23, 1985).
3. Chapter 1 presents a more complete and detailed picture of Poland’s crisis at the 
end of the Communist era.
4. In The Civil War in France (1940, 61), Marx wrote that in the socialist system 
‘united cooperative societies are to regulate national production under a common plan; thus 
taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical 
convulsions which are the fatality of capitalist production.’ Marx certainly seems to have in 
mind here precisely the kind of central planning system that Lenin institutionalized, rather 
than some more Utopian conception of unalienated people organizing their lives together 
in peace, harmony and goodwill.
5. Marx and Engels (1978, 484) wrote that ‘the theory of communism may be summed 
up in a single sentence: Abolition of private property.’ State control over property was also 
implicit in Marx’s call for a planned economy; after all, the state could not effectively plan 
economic relations if it did not control property. 
6. Kołakowski (1978c, 4) draws the connection from Marx’s epistemology through 
Lenin to Stalin this way: ‘trust = the proletarian world-view = Marxism = the party’s 
world-view = the pronouncement of the party leadership = those of the supreme leader.’ 
7. I have much more to say about the relationship between Marx’s writings and social-
ist institutions relating to environmental protection in Chapter 6.
8. In effect, socialist legal theorists were operating at the opposite end of a single 
continuum from traditional (Langdellian) American legal scholars. Where American legal 
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scholars traditionally treated law as a thoroughly autonomous discipline, completely ignor-
ing its political and economic content, socialist legal scholars treated law as if there were 
nothing more to it than political and economic content. Few legal scholars today would 
subscribe to either view of law. Most have come to recognize that the law contains sub-
stantial political and economic content, but that it is not wholly reducible to politics and 
economics. I take up the subject of socialist law and legality in detail in later chapters, 
especially in Chapters 4 (§4.2) and 6 (§6.5).
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Wokulski reached the Vistula bank, and looked about in surprise. Here, occu-
pying several acres of space, was a hill of the most hideous garbage, stinking, 
almost moving under the sun, while only a few dozen yards away lay the reser-
voirs from which Warsaw drank.
‘Here,’ he thought, ‘is the center of all infection. What a man throws out of 
his house today he drinks tomorrow. Later he’s moved to the Powazki cemetery, 
and then again from the other side of the city he infects those of his dear ones 
who are still alive. . . . A boulevard here, drains and water from the hill-top—
several thousand people could be saved from death, and tens of thousands from 
diseases. . . . Not much work, but an inestimable profi t; nature would know how 
to compensate for it.’
Bolesław Prus, Lalka ([1890] 1972)
1.1. Pollution and Communism in Poland
Poland suffered from pollution before it suffered communism. In the late nine-
teenth century, like most other European capitals,1 Warsaw struggled with the 
combined environmental effects of rapid population growth and industrial devel-
opment. Prus’s dreary description of unsanitary conditions in Warsaw resembles 
nothing so much as Friedrich Engels’ earlier descriptions of London’s working-
class boroughs (1958, 64–5).2 The most that can be said about Poland’s environ-
mental problems in the era before communism is that they were little better, but 
no worse, than those of most other countries in Europe.3 
Although the Communists did not invent pollution in Poland, they may be 
said to have perfected it. By the 1980s some were calling Poland the most pol-
luted country in the world (see, e.g., UPI, Feb. 9, 1986 and Sept. 13, 1986). Dur-
ing the four-plus decades of Communist rule, industrial development and full 
employment were virtually exclusive priorities; environmental problems, at least 
initially, were ignored. This neglect was rational because, according to social-
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ist theory, pollution was a phenomenon of industrial capitalism that would sim-
ply vanish once the means of production were brought under social ownership 
and central socioeconomic planning (see Zweigert and Gessner 1976; Fullenbach 
1981; Kabala 1985). Meanwhile, air and water quality in People’s Poland rapidly 
deteriorated. It did not take Poland’s Communist rulers long to realize that social-
ism was not immune, after all, to environmental problems, and beginning in the 
1960s they undertook substantial efforts to protect the environment; the Party 
made environmental protection a national priority and the legislature (Poland’s 
Sejm) enacted stringent laws. Nevertheless, environmental problems proliferated. 
By 1989, when the Communists relinquished power, pollution posed a serious 
public health threat; according to some commentators the ‘biological existence’ of 
the Polish nation was in jeopardy (Dagens Nyheter, Jan. 28, 1982; Marcinkiewicz 
1987, 42; Bochniarz and Bolan 1991, 337).
 What follows is a verbal snapshot of the almost indescribable ecological con-
ditions in People’s Poland in the late 1980s, just before the fall of communism.4 
 
1.2. Poland’s Geography, Climate and Resource Base 
Poland is East-Central Europe’s largest country with a land area of 120,350 square 
miles (about half the size of Texas). It is a vast fertile plain running from Germany 
in the west to the republics of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine in the east. Its 
main river, the Wisła (Vistula), meanders the entire length of the country from the 
Tatras mountains on Poland’s southern border with the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics, through the historic capital of Kraków and the modern capital of Warsaw, to 
the Baltic Sea near Gdańsk. 
Poland’s natural resources base combines a unique mix of plenty and scar-
city. The country is rich in mineral resources, including hard and brown coal, oil, 
natural gas, copper, zinc and lead ores, halite, phosphate and building stones, but 
water poor; among European countries, it ranks 20th in available water per cap-
ita (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1992, 
8–9).5 In years of low rainfall, certain areas of the country, including Upper and 
Lower Silesia (in southwestern Poland), Łódź (in central Poland) and Lublin (in 
eastern Poland), suffer acute shortages of drinking water.6 Forests, predominantly 
coniferous, cover about 28 percent of the country. They include the last rem-
nant of the primeval European forest at Białowieża (in eastern Poland, border-
ing Belarus), which is home to more than 3,000 plant and 8,500 animal species, 
including rare mammals like the European bison. All told, Poland provides habitat 
for 30 percent of Europe’s mammals, 16 percent of its bird species, and 40 per-
cent of its higher plants. And as a lowland country, subject to the infl uence of both 
continental and oceanic climates, Poland is especially inviting to many migratory 
species (see PAP Polish Press Agency, Aug. 28, 1992).
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During its brief period of independence between the wars, Poland was a pre-
dominantly agricultural country with a widely dispersed populous. After World 
War II, it developed rapidly (pursuant to Soviet industrial policy) into one of the 
most industrialized countries in the world. By the late 1980s, 61 percent of its 
38 million inhabitants lived in the major industrial centers of Warsaw, Kraków, 
Katowice, Gdańsk, Łódź, Szczeciń and Wrocław. And half of that number were 
imperiled by severe air and water pollution. 
1.3. Ecological Danger Zones
In 1983, Poland’s Communist government listed 27 offi cial ‘ecological danger 
zones,’ encompassing 11 percent of the nation’s territory and 35 percent of its 
citizens (UPI, Feb. 9, 1986). The worst of these danger zones were in southern 
Poland, in the neighboring voivodships (administrative regions) of Katowice (in 
the area historically known as Silesia or Śląsk) and Kraków (in western Galicia 
or Małopolska). Katowice is Poland’s largest industrial province. Though it com-
prises only 3 percent of Poland’s land area, it is home to more than 10 percent of 
the nation’s people, and its 1,700 industries, mining operations and other enter-
prises generate almost a third of the country’s total annual income (see Hinrichsen 
1987, 14). The region coincidentally produces an immense share of Poland’s pol-
lution. Forty miles to the east of Katowice and Poland’s industrial heartland lies 
Poland’s jewel, Kraków, the medieval city of kings. In 1978, the United Nations 
declared Kraków (Poland’s third-largest city with a population of over 700,000) 
a World Heritage Site to be preserved as a cultural treasure for all mankind (Hin-
richsen 1987, 13). Founded in the eleventh century, Kraków served as Poland’s 
capital for nearly 500 years (until 1596). Its Jagiellonian University, established 
in the fourteenth century, is Eastern Europe’s second oldest (after Prague), and its 
town square is among the largest in all of Europe. The quantity and quality of its 
Gothic and Renaissance architecture rival those of Italian cities. In the words of 
Czesław Miłosz (1983, 353), Poland’s Nobel Prize winning poet, Kraków is ‘one 
solid museum.’ Indeed, it was ‘solid’ enough to survive World War II virtually 
unscathed, but by the 1970s it was literally dissolving in acid rain. Kraków sits 
in a damp valley in south-central Poland, with Katowice to the west, the Tatras 
Mountains to the south, and the huge Lenin Steelworks in neighboring Nowa 
Huta (‘New Steelworks’) to the northeast. In the late 1980s, about 50 percent of 
Kraków’s air pollution was home grown; the rest was carried on the prevailing 
winds from Katowice, Czechoslovakia and East Germany (Fura 1985, 4; Reuters 
North European Service, June 20, 1985). Airborne chemicals lingered in the stag-
nant, humid air above Kraków until the rains carried them to earth, turning the 
city, in the words of one Polish scientist, into a virtual ‘chemical cauldron’ (quoted 
in Hinrichsen 1987, 14).
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1.4. Sources of Pollution in Poland
Pollution in People’s Poland primarily came from four sources: (1) industry; (2) 
mining operations; (3) inadequate sewage treatment; and (4) agricultural chemi-
cal runoff.
Industrial Pollution
 
Industry was the largest source of pollution in Kraków and throughout Peo-
ple’s Poland, producing 65 percent of the nation’s air effl uents. Transportation 
yielded most of the other 35 percent.7 The vast majority of Poland’s industries 
ran on domestically mined, high-sulphur coal, which supplied fully 80 percent of 
Poland’s energy. Oil and natural gas imports from the Soviet Union and domestic 
small-scale hydropower development made up most of the remaining 20 percent 
(see Kabala 1985, 10). Unfortunately, fewer than 10 percent of Poland’s 1,362 
major industrial facilities had any kind of pollution-control equipment (Boch-
niarz and Bolan 1991, 338). During the late 1980s, they emitted nearly 13 mil-
lion tons per year of air pollutants, including 3.4 million tons of dust, 4.2 million 
tons of sulphur dioxide, 1.5 million tons of nitrogen oxides, and 3.2 million tons 
of carbon oxides (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and 
Forestry 1992b, 12, table 1). The majority of these emissions came from smoke-
stacks in Silesia, where most of Poland’s coal, a third of its coke, half its steel, 
and a third of its electricity were (and are) produced (Bochniarz and Bolan 1991, 
338). Katowice’s industries emitted fi ve times more sulphur dioxide per square 
mile than the industrial belt of West Germany’s Ruhr Valley, one of most heavily 
industrialized, and highest polluting, areas in Western Europe (Hinrichsen 1987, 
14). Nationwide, Polish industries emitted up to 4 million metric tons of sulphur 
dioxide each year, more than four times total US sulphur dioxide emissions per 
square mile (Kabala 1985, 11).8 And People’s Poland was among the world lead-
ers in carbon dioxide emissions, producing two to three times more per unit of 
national income than other countries with well-developed economies. In 1988, 
Polish industries emitted 457 million tons of carbon dioxide, accounting for 2.3 
percent of the world total (PAP Business News from Poland, Aug. 28, 1992). Pol-
ish industries also emitted dusts containing heavy metals, including lead, cad-
mium, zinc, uranium and copper, which contaminated food and water supplies. In 
1979, Kraków’s huge Lenin Steelworks alone emitted dust containing 7 tons of 
cadmium, 170 tons of lead, 470 tons of zinc and 18,000 tons of iron (UPI, Feb. 9, 
1986).9 Measurements of lead and cadmium taken from soil in the region were the 
highest ever recorded anywhere in the world, up to 200 times the maximum con-
sidered safe by the Polish government (Kabala 1985, 12; Hinrichsen 1987, 14).
In addition to air pollution, Poland’s industries also produced tremendous 
quantities of solid wastes—more than 170 million tons and over 46 million cubic 
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meters per year. Only about 60 percent of those wastes were recycled; of the rest, 
approximately 1.5 percent was considered hazardous (Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1992b, 21–3). 
Pollution from Mining Operations 
Coal mining created special environmental problems in People’s Poland. In the 
effort to supply the nation’s energy needs, miners continually pumped untreated, 
highly salinized water from coal pits into local rivers. Each year during the 1970s 
and 1980s, they dumped up to 9,000 tons of salts into Polish rivers, ‘enough to fi ll 
450 20 ton railway wagons’ (Nowicki 1993, 23). The salts interfered with the pro-
cess of water self-purifi cation, caused river vessels and plants to corrode, and low-
ered the water table, causing area farmlands to dry up and subside. In the six years 
between 1975 and 1981, 300,000 parcels of land were destroyed by subsidence. 
Land in some places sank as much as 20 meters (about 70 feet). Mining operations 
also were responsible for about 40 percent of all industrial wastes produced and 
dumped in Poland (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and 
Forestry 1992b, 21). And old abandoned mining sites resembled lunar landscapes. 
Existing environmental regulations required that they be returned to pre-mining 
conditions, but reclamation activities proceeded at a snail’s pace. By 1988, only 
3,714 hectares (about 1,486 acres) had been reclaimed out of a total of 100,000 
hectares (40,000 acres) where mining operations had been completed (Bochniarz 
and Bolan 1991, 338). 
Inadequate Sewage Treatment
Poland’s foremost ecological problem at the end of the Communist era was water 
quality (Kabala 1985, 9). The Wisła, which for centuries carried Polish products 
to the world, became a ‘garbage carrier from Silesia to the Baltic Sea’ (UPI, Feb. 
9, 1986; also see Daily Telegraph, Nov. 18, 1989). Forty-four percent of Poland’s 
800 cities had no sewage treatment facilities (Nowicki 1993, 22), and 30 percent 
of Polish factories were not connected to a sewer system (Przegląd Polski, Sept. 
14, 1989). Consequently, almost half of the more than 4 billion tons of sewage dis-
gorged annually into Polish rivers was entirely untreated; and most of the rest was 
only partially treated (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources 
and Forestry 1992, 16–17). Amazingly, until 1989 the nation’s capital and larg-
est city, Warsaw, had no sewage treatment facilities. Each day Warsaw’s factories 
and residents dumped 1 million cubic meters of untreated sewage directly into 
the Wisła. When Warsaw’s fi rst sewage treatment plant fi nally opened in 1989 to 
serve about one-third of the city on the east bank of the Wisła, it had to be shut 
down almost immediately because of operating diffi culties. It reopened in 1990.
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Agricultural Chemical Runoff
For three decades the Polish Party/state sought to modernize agriculture in order to 
increase food production to meet the needs of the vast urban workforces spawned 
by its development programs. One aspect of modernization, the increased use of 
chemicals in farming, polluted every river in the country, as well as the Baltic 
coastline, with nitrogen and phosphorous-contaminated runoff. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, the Polish government attempted to reduce the surface runoff by bury-
ing pesticide wastes in concrete containers at special burial sites called mogilniki. 
More than 100,000 metric tons of pesticides, including more than 50,000 metric 
tons of highly toxic organochlorides, were buried in mogilniki around the country, 
with little or no regard for long-term environmental threats, including soil and 
groundwater contamination (BNA International Environment Reporter, Oct. 21, 
1992).
 
1.5. The Environmental Consequences
The environmental consequences for Kraków of Poland’s development policies 
were not different in kind from the experiences of American cities, such as Los 
Angeles or New York; it was simply a matter of degree. But differences in degree 
can be, and in Kraków’s case were, profound.
Air Quality
Like Los Angeles, the city of Kraków (and hundreds of square miles around it), 
became blanketed with a veil of poisonous smog that exacerbated health problems 
and caused aesthetic blight (see Daily Telegraph, Nov. 18, 1989). But, unlike Los 
Angeles, the smog in Kraków often grew so dense that sunlight could not pierce 
it. In fact, Kraków received 20 percent less sunlight than other parts of Poland 
(Reuters North European Service, Aug. 23, 1985). Each day, water trucks would 
drive about the city, spraying the streets to keep the dust down (Timberlake 1981, 
249). But the dust continued to fall at a rate of 550 tons per square kilometer, more 
than twice the maximum safe limit set by the Polish Party/government (Przegląd 
Polski, Sept. 14, 1989). Kraków’s air was also fi lled with sulphur dioxide, nitro-
gen oxide and other gases, which fell to earth in the form of acid rain. The rain in 
and around Kraków was so acidic that it corroded railway tracks—trains passing 
through Silesia and western Galicia were not allowed to go more than 40 km per 
hour (25 mph) (Timberlake 1981, 249). The acid rain also infl icted tremendous 
damage on Kraków’s historic legacy, its art and architecture. The great Wawel 
Castle, once the home of Poland’s kings, was literally burned away at a rate of 2.5 
millimeters per decade. The gold roof on Wawel Cathedral had to be completely 
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replaced after it was transformed into soluble chlorides by acid rain and fl uo-
rine gas, which combined to form a highly corrosive mixture of hydrochloric and 
hydrofl uoric acids (Timberlake 1981, 249). Throughout Kraków,  centuries-old 
statues lost their faces; steeples fell off churches; and, by 1989, ‘the view down 
every street [was] disrupted by the scaffolding of workers trying to hold the build-
ings together’ (Timberlake 1981, 249). According to one report from the late 
1980s (Radio Free Europe/Report on Eastern Europe, Aug. 31, 1990), construc-
tion materials in Kraków decayed 40 times more rapidly than normal. All told, 
by the end of the Communist era 80 percent of Kraków’s most valued buildings 
required immediate renovation (UPI, Feb. 6, 1986). In addition to the purely aes-
thetic costs of Krakow’s rapid disintegration, the psychological effect on the Pol-
ish people was devastating. In the words of Dr. Piotr Gliński (conversation of Jan. 
21, 1990), an environmental sociologist with the Polish Academy of Sciences, 
‘[i]t hurt our feelings to watch the destruction of the nation’s cultural identity.’
Air pollution also had an immense impact on agriculture in the Kraków area 
and throughout People’s Poland. Fifty percent of Poland’s forests were signifi -
cantly damaged by exposure to air pollution and acid rain (Ministry of Envi-
ronmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1992b, 33); in the area 
surrounding Kraków, 180,000 hectares (450,000 acres) of evergreen forests were 
reported to be dead or dying, and scientists predicted a loss of up to 3 million 
hectares (7.5 million acres) of trees over the next 20 years, at a cost of 120 bil-
lion zlotys (1.5 billion 1985 USD) (Kabala 1985, 12). The Nowa Huta Steelworks 
alone were responsible for killing more than 25 percent of the trees in the 11,000 
hectare (27,500 acre) Niepołomicki Forest outside Kraków (Kabala 1985, 12). 
Area farmlands were in even worse shape. In 1980, the Polish Ecological Club 
recommended that 17 percent of Silesia’s farmlands be taken out of production 
because of the dangerous build-up of heavy metals in the soil and on vegetation. 
On small farms near Kraków, ‘10 percent of the cattle suffer[ed] from fl uorosis, 
and the farmers had to give up growing sugar beet because the leaves, used as 
fodder, poisoned livestock’ (Timberlake 1981, 248–9). Vegetables grown in the 
area contained 2.4 times more uranium, 134 times more lead, 21 times more cop-
per, 220 times more cadmium, and 165 times more zinc than ‘normal’ (UPI, Feb. 
6, 1986). As a result, as much as 60 percent of all food produced in the Kraków 
area was deemed unfi t for human consumption (Rosik-Dulewska et al. 1991, 22).
Although Kraków, Silesia and many other industrialized regions of People’s 
Poland were heavily damaged by air pollution, it is important to realize that other 
parts of the country—most notably the northeast region—remained virtually 
unscathed by industrial development. According to a recent report by the Orga-
nization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 27 percent of Poland’s 
territory survived communism ‘in natural or close to natural state’ (OECD 1995, 
88). This was due in part to Poland’s system of central socioeconomic planning, 
which focused industrial development in highly populated urban areas. In 1980, 
for example, 600 of 931 plants considered ‘especially harmful to the air’ were 
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concentrated in 19 urban centers (Wiadomości Statystyczne, March 1980). Mean-
while, less densely populated regions, amounting to about 8.5 percent of Polish 
territory, were left almost entirely undeveloped. In addition, by 1989, 17 percent 
of Polish territory was under legal protection from development as national parks, 
nature reserves, landscape parks or areas of protected landscape (Nowicki 1993, 
28). These areas preserved (and continue to preserve) natural assets that other 
European countries no longer possess (Żylicz 1995a, 65).
Water Quality
If that is possible, Kraków’s water pollution problems were even worse than its air 
pollution problems. By the late 1980s, the stretch of the Wisła that fl owed through 
the city was ‘virtually devoid of biological life’ (Kabala 1985, 9). Like more than 
60 percent of the rivers in neighboring Katowice voivodship, this stretch was unfi t 
for any use, except as a sewer. It was useless even for industrial purposes because 
the chemicals and metals in the water corroded machinery (W. Brzeziński 1974, 
80–1). Water quality was little better throughout the rest of Poland. In 1989, the 
World Bank’s Director of East European operations, Eugenio F. Laris, reported 
that 95 percent of Poland’s drinking water was polluted (New York Times, Dec. 12, 
1989). And 70 percent of the water supply posed an immediate threat to human 
health (Przegląd Polski, Sept. 14, 1989). Nationwide, more than 40 percent of 
river water was too polluted for any use (Kabala 1985, 9); for 60 percent of its 
length, the Wisła river was so polluted that it could not be used even for indus-
trial purposes (Kurier Polski, Apr. 23, 1979). In addition, 300 of Poland’s 500 
larger lakes were endangered by municipal and agricultural wastes (Bochniarz 
and Bolan 1991, 337). Twenty percent of Poland’s groundwater supply was esti-
mated to be contaminated by pesticide residues leaching from chemical burial 
sites around the country; surveys taken at several sites detected concentrations of 
toxic compounds in groundwaters that exceeded European Community standards 
by 1,500 times. In the words of one Dutch researcher, these pesticide cemeteries 
were (and remain) ‘chemical time bombs’ (quoted in BNA International Environ-
ment Reporter, Oct. 21, 1992). 
With Poland’s rivers so highly polluted, it is no surprise to fi nd that their 
ultimate destination, the Baltic Sea, was also severely degraded. The Baltic was 
(and is) ‘one of the most heavily traffi cked and polluted bodies of water in the 
world’ (Kabala 1985, 10). According to offi cial government statistics from the 
late 1980s, Polish rivers carried about 4.1 billion cubic meters of waste to the 
Baltic each year (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and 
Forestry 1992b, 16). As a consequence, Poland’s Baltic coast was virtually unus-
able for recreation. Some summers, up to 27 miles of the most popular beaches 
along the Baltic were closed because chemicals in the water caused severe skin 
infections (Reuters North European Service, Aug. 23, 1985). Indeed, according 
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to a 1981 report appearing in the newspaper Głos Robotniczy (May 7, 1981), ‘[a] 
bacteriological and epidemiological threat exist[ed] in the bay’s entire area.’
Health Consequences
The health effects of Poland’s pollution extended far inland from the Baltic Sea 
coast. In the late 1980s, the physical and mental health of almost every Pole was 
threatened by pollution-related diseases and conditions. The effects were most 
pronounced in the highly industrialized regions of Kraków and Katowice.
In 1990, the average Pole could expect to live to age 71 or 72;10 and in the 
more heavily polluted regions of Silesia and western Galicia, life expectancy was 
a full two years lower (Jonderko 1990, 8, table 1). By contrast, life expectancy 
in the former West Germany and the United States averages between 74 and 76 
years. In the years preceding the fall of communism in Poland, 70 percent of Sile-
sians and Krakovians lived in health-threatening conditions. They suffered from 
‘15 percent more disease of the circulation, 30 percent more tumors and 47 per-
cent more respiratory disease than other Poles’ (Timberlake 1981, 248). The can-
cer rate was 30 percent higher than the national average (Reuters North European 
Service, Aug. 23, 1985).11 Twenty-four percent of Poland’s occupational illnesses 
occurred in Kraków (Daily Telegraph, June 17, 1990). And inhabitants of Kraków 
and Katowice suffered comparatively high rates of heart defects, pneumonia, pre-
mature births and miscarriages (Przegląd Polski, Sept. 14, 1989; Gazeta Wybor-
cza, June 21, 1990). The miscarriages and premature births, in particular, were 
linked to chronic lead and cadmium exposure (Norska-Borówka et al. 1990, 49). 
For the country as a whole, some doctors were predicting that one Pole in four 
would contract some form of pollution-related cancer by the year 2000 (Daily 
Telegraph, June 17, 1990).12 
Even more frightening were the statistics concerning the very youngest mem-
bers of Polish society, who were most susceptible to pollution-caused diseases. 
At the end of the Communist era, infant mortality in Silesia was 17.6 per 1,000 
live births, as compared with 16.1 for Poland as a whole, 7.7 in France and 5.8 in 
Sweden (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 
1992b, 38). Two-thirds of all Silesian children suffered by the age of ten from 
‘serious mental and physical disabilities’ (The Daily Telegraph, Nov. 18, 1989). 
In all, some 60,000 Polish children suffered from pollution-related mental and/
or physical disabilities (Gazeta Wyborcza, June 21, 1990). As if to underscore the 
correlation between pollution levels and disabilities, 54 of Poland’s 102 schools 
for the disabled were located in Katowice (Timberlake 1981, 248). Indeed, the 
highest levels of infant mortality and the highest rate of respiratory tract diseases 
in children corresponded closely with the areas of the highest air and soil contami-
nation in Silesia (Norska-Borówka et al. 1990, 49). For example, 300 children 
living close to a single metallurgical factory near Katowice were diagnosed with 
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clinical cases of lead poisoning (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural 
Resources and Forestry 1992b, 38). In overall physical and mental development, 
the children from Poland’s industrial belt were two to three years behind children 
raised in areas remote from pollution sources (Reuters Library Report, May 20, 
1988). Throughout Poland, the childhood leukemia rate doubled during the 1980s 
(Daily Telegraph, June 17, 1990).
Poland’s ecological devastation also exacted a severe toll on the health and 
stability of many plant and animal species. Of 714 registered mammal, bird, rep-
tile, amphibian and fi sh species in Poland, 15 became extinct, 41 were ‘dying out’ 
and 174 others were threatened (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural 
Resources and Forestry 1992b, 33). Only 10 percent of Poland’s 430 native (and 
non-migrating) vertebrate species were not endangered (Bochniarz and Bolan 
1991, 339).
These statistics, grim as they are, do not begin to paint a complete picture of 
the unlivable living conditions in some parts of Silesia and western Galicia in the 
fi nal years of People’s Poland. During the late 1980s, residents of Kraków suf-
fering from respiratory ailments took refuge in salt mines. Each day, hundreds of 
men, women and children descended 650 feet below the earth’s surface because 
it was the only place near Kraków with air clean enough to breathe deeply (see 
New York Times, Apr. 8, 1990). The air pollution in Katowice grew so severe at 
one point that the regional government actually considered issuing gas masks to 
hundreds of thousands of area residents (see Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1990). 
And whenever the rains fell in southern Poland, everything literally turned to 
black—the sky, the streets, even the people. 
Economic Consequences
The environmental and health effects of pollution in Poland entailed enormous 
economic costs, though quantifying those costs is enormously tricky. A great deal 
depends on the factors and criteria economists select to calculate.13 Economic 
costs from environmental degradation can include, among others, pollution dam-
ages to infrastructure (plants, machinery, transportation and communications 
systems, etc.), increased health care costs and lost worker-hours resulting from 
pollution-caused illnesses, lowered standards of living, and depletion of the 
country’s natural resource base. On any standard, the economic consequences 
of Poland’s ecological destruction were severe. A 1987 government study set the 
environmental price tag at 800 billion zlotys per year (approximately 3.4 billion 
1987 USD) (Radio Free Europe/Report on Eastern Europe, Oct. 5, 1990). That 
study, along with several others that were conducted in Poland between 1986 
and 1990, were synthesized by Professor Antoni Symonowicz, under auspices of 
the Polish Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 
(Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1992b 
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40–3). Symonowicz’s fi ndings confi rmed that environmental losses during the 
1980s cost the Polish economy approximately 10 percent of annual gross national 
income (see Famielec et al. 1991, 44).14 Professor Symonowicz was able to attri-
bute 46 percent of these losses to air pollution, 39 percent to land degradation and 
15 percent to water pollution. Table 1.1 allocates the pollution costs by sector.
These ecological damage fi gures do not include the costs of the tremendous 
ecological damage that the Soviet Red Army infl icted during the four decades it 
maintained bases in Poland. According to Poland’s State Environmental Inspec-
torate, the Red Army contaminated groundwater with petroleum-derived products, 
set thousands of acres of forests ablaze during training exercises, and dumped 
chemical, industrial and sewage wastes in industrial landfi lls. After 18 months of 
inspections, covering all 173,000 acres of 59 former Red Army sites in Poland, 
the Inspectorate estimated the total losses at 52.2 trillion (old) zlotys (about 2.5 
billion 1994 USD) (PAP News Wire, Aug. 3, 1994), an amount equal to 8.4 per-
cent of Poland’s 1994 budget (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 5, 1994).
The enormous economic and non-economic costs of environmental degrada-
tion  in People’s Poland describe an ecological crisis unmatched in world history, 
expect perhaps by other countries of the former Soviet Bloc. The purpose of this 
book is to explain the systemic causes of that crisis, causes rooted in the social-
ist economic system, in the totalitarian political structures of communism, and in 
the ideological principles of orthodox Marxism. Contrary to conventional under-
standing, the crisis was not caused by simple neglect or malign intent. In fact, as 
the next chapter shows, successive governments in People’s Poland undertook 
serious, if thoroughly unsuccessful efforts, to protect the environment.
Table 1.1. Percentage share of environmental costs by sector
Sector Percentage share of environmental costs
Agriculturea
Forestry
Corrosion
Natural resource management
Mining damage
Human health
Other lossesb
28
11
32
10
2
7
10
a Including losses due to reductions in arable acreage, crop yields and fi sh stocks.
b Including losses due to diminished water self-purifi cation capacity, environmental 
impacts of tourism, and effects of noise pollution.
Source: Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry (1992b, 
41–2).
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Notes
1. Warsaw was not, strictly speaking, a European capital at the time Prus penned 
Lalka. Poland had been partitioned in 1795 by Russia, Prussia and Austria/Hungary, and 
Warsaw came under Russian rule. Poland did not regain its independence until after World 
War I.
2. On Engels’ attitude toward nature, see Chapter 6 (§6.2).
3. On pre-Communist environmental protection efforts in Poland, see Chapter 2 
(§2.1).
4. Environmental conditions in Poland have improved remarkably since 1989. Those 
improvements are discussed and explained in Chapter 7.
5. According to another report, Poland ranks 22nd among European countries in per 
capita water availability (PAP Polish Press Agency, Aug. 28, 1992).
6. This problem was exacerbated during the Communist era by the low prices charged 
for water use and consumption, which resulted in waste and insuffi cient investment in 
water supply system maintenance (see PAP Polish Press Agency, Aug. 28, 1992). On the 
relationship between natural resources pricing and environmental protection under social-
ism, see Chapter 5 (§5.4).
7. The Polish government has published annual pollution statistics since the early 
1970s. I have relied heavily on the annual statistical surveys for 1989 and 1990 (GUS 1990, 
1991). In subsequent textual citations and footnotes, I refer predominantly to secondary 
sources, including periodicals, which, during the 1970s and 1980s, provided a good deal of 
information that was unavailable from offi cial sources. Two secondary sources in particu-
lar (Nowicki 1993 and Carter 1993) provide excellent overviews of Poland’s environmen-
tal problems at the end of the Communist era. 
 On the relative allocation of air pollution emissions between industry and transporta-
tion, see Fura (1985, 4). In addition, coal-fi red furnaces used for heating houses and apart-
ments were an important source of pollution in places like the Stare Miasto (Old Town) 
section of Kraków. An estimated 230,000 stoves and 1,200 small boiler houses were used 
to heat the apartments of Kraków. In winter, these sources helped to bring sulphur dioxide 
concentrations in the old city to 3 to 4 milligrams per cubic meter, the highest in Poland 
(Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1992a, 16; also see 
Hughes 1990, 153).
8. In absolute terms, American industries emit far more sulphur dioxide into the 
atmosphere—23 million tons (about 21 metric tons) in 1990—than Poland. However, the 
United States is 30 times larger than Poland and has 6.5 times more inhabitants.
9. Emissions from Nowa Huta actually declined during the 1980s, however, after 
the plant switched to low-sulphur coal and because of Poland’s decade-long economic 
downturn.
10. Broken down by gender, mean life expectancy in Poland was 75.1 years for 
women and 66.9 years for men. 
11. To some extent, the geographical distribution of cancer in Poland can be explained 
by lifestyle choices (e.g., cigarette smoking), patterns of reproduction, and professions, 
all of which vary by region (see Zatoński and Tyczyński 1990). One study of the relation-
ship between air pollution and lung cancer in Kraków concluded that cigarette smoking 
remained the single strongest predictor of lung cancer risk (Jędrychowski et al. 1990). 
Researchers, nevertheless, have found a positive statistical correlation between air pollu-
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tion and lung cancer rates in Kraków, especially among older residents (Jędrychowski et 
al. 1990, 39).
12. It should be noted that ‘pollution-related,’ in this context, includes cigarette smok-
ing, which remains something of a national pastime in Poland (conversation with Dr. Piotr 
Gliński, July 19, 1993).
13. For a survey of research on the economic costs of environmental degradation 
in Poland, and the methodological problems of calculating environmental damages, see 
Śleszyński (1995).
14. Other studies put the cost higher, between 13 and 21 percent of GNP. Signifi cant 
discrepancies in cost estimates result from factor choices. For example, the studies with 
lower cost estimates of around 8–10 percent of GNP typically did not incorporate public 
health expenditures (see Radio Free Europe/Report on Eastern Europe, Oct. 5, 1990). 
I examine the economic costs of environmental degradation in People’s Poland in more 
detail in Chapter 5 (§5.2).
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The balance of this book seeks to explain the ecological crisis described in Chap-
ter 1. One obvious, but inaccurate, explanation is that the Communists simply did 
not care about protecting the environment. There is a kernel of truth in that story: 
Party leaders initially assumed that pollution problems, as endemic features of 
capitalism, would simply disappear under scientifi c socialism (see Zweigert and 
Gessner 1976, 93). But once it became apparent that pollution problems could 
not be planned out of existence, the Party/state acted to protect the environment. 
Those efforts, while obviously unsuccessful, were substantial and appear to have 
been seriously intended. 
What follows is a brief history of environmental law and administration in 
Poland from pre-socialist times to the end of the Communist era.1 The history 
demonstrates that the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland can-
not be attributed to simple neglect. On the contrary, Poland’s Communist Party, 
the Polish United Worker’s Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza or 
PZPR), made environmental protection a national political priority and spurred 
substantial legislative efforts. But those efforts were hindered by legal, politi-
cal, economic and ideological attributes of the (real) socialist system, which are 
treated, respectively, in Chapters 3–6. In the fi nal analysis, the Party/state was 
unable to overcome systemic obstacles, many of which were created for its own 
preservation, to protect the environment.
2.1. Pre-Socialism 
Just as pollution in Poland predated communism (see Chapter 1, §1.1), so did 
environmental protection. Polish legal historians trace environmental protection 
efforts to medieval statutes restricting hunting of foxes, bison and other animals.2 
But these were not, strictly speaking, ‘nature protection’ laws, designed to pre-
serve species for their own sakes—it would be anachronistic to impute a naturalist 
or environmentalist intent to legislators of the tenth or fi fteenth centuries. Early 
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hunting laws were intended to secure the King’s property rights. Still, their practi-
cal signifi cance should not be underestimated: today Poland is the only country 
in Europe where wild herds of bison still roam free. In addition to restricting 
hunting, Poland has for several hundred years regulated mineral extraction, tim-
ber harvesting and water use. Early sanitation laws regulated city sewer systems 
(Deja 1992). During the Partitions (the period 1795–1918, when Polish territories 
were divided under Russian, Prussian and Austrian rule), some Polish landown-
ers took it upon themselves to preserve endangered species and a few unspoiled 
forests (Szafer 1973, 12–13). Their efforts notwithstanding, the modern history of 
Polish environmental protection realistically dates from the end of World War I, 
when Poland regained its independence.
In 1919, the newly reborn Polish state created a Provisional State Commis-
sion for Nature Protection (Tymczasowa Państwowa Komisja Ochrony Przyroda) 
within the Ministry of Religion and Public Education. Its purpose was advisory 
and educational, rather than regulatory. It advised the government on matters 
relating to nature protection, and promoted environmental awareness in the Pol-
ish educational system. The Commission infl uenced two important pieces of envi-
ronmental legislation from the interwar period, the 1922 Water Law and the 1934 
Nature Protection Act.
The 1922 Water Law (1922 Dziennik Ustaw [Dz.U.] No. 102, item 936) may 
be considered Poland’s fi rst environmental law, though its primary purpose was 
to regulate water use—always an important issue in water-poor Poland. The stat-
ute specifi ed that all waters, except those already recognized as privately owned, 
belonged to the public (art. 2), and that all citizens had equal rights to use the 
waters ‘in the ordinary way’ without any kind of prior approval or permit (art. 21). 
However, the statute also included substantive provisions to protect water quality. 
The scope of these protections marks the 1922 statute as an early example of pol-
lution control legislation.
 The 1922 Water Law regulated the discharge of industrial effl uent into 
water bodies. Any user wanting to discharge pollutants or waste water ‘in excess 
of general usage’ had to obtain prior approval from the appropriate administra-
tive authority (art. 25). The administrator could issue a permit only if the pro-
posed drainage was in the ‘public interest,’ as ambiguously defi ned in article 48 
of the statute: if the administrator found that a proposed discharge would have 
a negative impact on water quality that could not be prevented by the installa-
tion of available and effective purifi cation equipment, the administrator ‘should’ 
not permit it. This foreshadowed the technology-based standards that became a 
prominent feature of American environmental laws in the 1970s. If the adminis-
trator determined that a proposed discharge did not contravene the public inter-
est, that is, the discharge would not be unduly harmful or could be purifi ed with 
the use of existing technologies, a permit could be issued. The administrator 
then could require compensation for any resulting water pollution damage (art. 
47, sec. 5 and art. 51, sec. 1) or assess a fee for the mere privilege of using the 
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public’s waters for the ‘non-ordinary’ purpose of discharging effl uents (art. 32). 
These fees and fi nes created, at least potentially, an incentive to conserve both 
water quality and quantity. 
Too little information exists about the implementation of the 1922 Water Law 
to determine its actual impact on pollution discharges and water quality. Given 
the state of environmental science, enforcement capabilities and environmental 
awareness in the fi rst decades of the twentieth century, its impact was probably 
quite limited. As commentators have noted (for instance, W. Brzeziński 1974, 87), 
the Act’s ambiguous terminology provided administrators with substantial leeway 
to permit any amount of industrial discharges; the compensation and user fee pro-
visions were discretionary. Despite these shortcomings, the 1922 Water Law was 
clearly a pollution control statute ahead of its time, and it remained in force until 
1962, when it was replaced by a new and, in some respects, regressive water law 
(which is discussed later in this chapter, §2.3).
In 1925, the Provisional State Commission for Nature Protection was trans-
formed into the State Council for Nature Protection (Państwowa Rada Ochrony 
Przyrody or PROP), a group that survived the destruction of the interwar republic, 
reappearing after World War II in People’s Poland as an offi cially recognized (i.e., 
Party-approved), though nominally ‘independent,’ organization. Like its prede-
cessor, PROP was a quasi-governmental agency organized within the Ministry of 
Religion and Public Education. From its headquarters in Kraków, the 22-member 
Council advised the government on environmental policy and drafted legislation. 
It also supervised the activities of branch units located in Lwów (today Lviv), 
Warsaw, Poznań, and Wilno (today Vilnius). 
PROP greatly infl uenced the history of nature protection in Poland through 
its scientifi c, educational and legislative works. Between the wars, six national 
parks were established on the Council’s plans. PROP also organized 180 nature 
reserves and inventoried approximately 4,500 natural monuments (Szafer 1973, 
14–15). Under the infl uence of PROP and early conservationist writers such as 
Jan Gwalbert Pawlikowski (1927), the subject of nature conservation became a 
mandatory part of the secondary school curriculum in 1933, and nature conser-
vation lectures became regular features at universities in Warsaw, Kraków and 
Poznań. Most importantly, PROP played a central role in drafting the 1934 Nature 
Protection Act (1934 Dz.U. No. 31, item 274). 
The 1934 Act closely resembled nature protection legislation enacted in 
other European countries during the same decade. The law sought to protect 
natural areas of special scientifi c, aesthetic and historic value, as well as endan-
gered species of animals and plants (see Szafer 1973, 14–15). Article 1 of the 
statute established a system for designating national parks: any area at least 300 
hectares (approximately 740 acres) in size with special natural beauty or a wealth 
of rare natural features could be designated a national park by order (dekret) of 
the Council of Ministers. Article 2 prohibited activities that might damage pro-
tected areas or species, except as permitted by the appropriate state authorities. 
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Among other things, the law banned the use, alteration or contamination of pro-
tected ‘objects,’ prohibited the hunting or killing of protected animal species and 
prohibited the removal of protected plant species. These prohibitions applied on 
private as well as on public lands (see W. Brzeziński 1949, 7–8). Violators were 
subject to prison terms (art. 24) and fi nes (arts. 24 and 28), with proceeds ear-
marked for a special Nature Protection Fund (art. 15) created to fi nance a nature 
protection police force.
Unfortunately, the 1934 Nature Protection Act was never implemented. In 
the fi ve years before Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939, only two imple-
menting decrees were issued, and they concerned administrative housekeeping 
matters. Not only did state authorities fail to implement the law; they completely 
ignored its restrictions and prohibitions. For example, in 1936 the Polish govern-
ment began a campaign to develop the tourism potential of the Tatras Mountains 
in southern Poland. As part of this effort, an aerial tramway was constructed in 
a protected area, in clear contravention of the 1934 Act. The entire membership 
of PROP resigned in protest. This suited the state authorities well enough; the 
government did not bother to appoint new members, and the Council simply was 
left unstaffed between 1936 and the end of World War II. PROP was not legally 
abolished, but for all practical purposes it no longer existed. The same might be 
said of Poland’s entire system of environmental protection. 
During the Nazi occupation of World War II, nature protection obviously 
was not anyone’s concern. The rapacious German and Soviet armies, along with 
Polish civilians struggling to survive, felled whole forests, slaughtered protected 
animal species and decimated nature preserves. However, the war’s most signifi -
cant effect on nature protection in Poland may not have been the damage infl icted 
on natural resources, but the loss of human lives. Many prominent leaders of 
Poland’s nature protection movement were among the millions of Polish Jews and 
tens of thousands of Polish inteligencja murdered by Hitler’s forces. Only ten of 
PROP’s pre-war members survived to attend the Council’s fi rst post-war meeting 
in September 1945. 
2.2. 1945–19603
Nature protection activities resumed quickly after the war. The 1934 Nature 
Protection Act was still in force on paper, but it was considered a dead let-
ter. That law had been based on a preservationist concept of nature protection 
that was no longer acceptable in post-war Poland. The Communist Party/state 
quickly came to own, by systematic expropriation, more than 85 percent of the 
forests (1944 Dz.U. No. 15, item 82; also see Radecki 1990a, 93), and it planned 
to manage these and other so-called ‘productive forces of nature’ rationally (i.e., 
economically), in accordance with Marxist–Leninist ideology. Since the pre-
war Nature Protection Law did not provide for economic exploitation of natural 
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resources, a new nature protection statute was needed that would refl ect the new 
dominant ideology. This was made clear at PROP’s fi rst post-war conference 
in 1945, in a speech by the Minister of Education, Czesław Wycech. Noting 
that nature protection was inextricably intertwined with the economic life of 
the country, Wycech stressed that economic exploitation of natural resources 
was vital to the nation’s economic well-being. This sent a clear message to the 
traditionally preservation-oriented members of PROP. In a response designed 
to reassure the government and the ruling party, Władysław Szafer, chair of the 
conference, stated:
Because we, the nature protectors, were in the pre-war period sometimes unfairly 
accused of acting in opposition to the country’s industrialization, I must declare 
now that we were never opposed to national needs for transportation or industry, 
and we will never object in the future. We think that our activity will be right in 
line with the government of the Polish People’s Republic. (Quoted in Radecki 
1990a, 94)
Although PROP’s fi rst post-war conference signaled a dangerous (from the 
point of view of environmental protection) change in focus from resource preser-
vation to economic exploitation, it also provided some reason for optimism about 
the future of environmental protection in socialist Poland. The very fact that the 
new government paid any attention at all to issues of nature protection as it con-
fronted the daunting task of reconstructing Poland’s decimated infrastructure 
suggested that the Communist authorities might be more active protectors of the 
environment than earlier governments had been. A more specifi c cause for opti-
mism was PROP’s adoption at the 1945 conference of a resolution broadening the 
concept of nature protection to include entire ecosystems (see Radecki 1990a, 95; 
Sommer 1993a, 19). This resolution led ultimately to the enactment of new nature 
protection legislation in 1949.
Local government activities following the war also provided nature protec-
tion advocates with reason for hope. In Zakopane (south of Kraków in the Tatras 
Mountains), the People’s Council (local legislature) appointed a committee for 
nature protection to prepare forest protection regulations. Meanwhile, the regional 
governor (wojewoda) of Poznań (in west-central Poland) published a general 
nature protection regulation. In fact, local regulation of nature protection became 
‘a universal practice in the fi rst years of the Polish People’s Republic’ (Radecki 
1990a, 97). 
In the midst of all these hopeful developments, however, the Party/govern-
ment issued a 1947 decree establishing central economic planning, which was 
silent on the issue of nature protection (1947 Dz.U. No. 64, item 373). This was 
an ominous signal that the Party/state would design and implement economic 
plans without regard for the natural environment. From the point of view of PROP 
and other nature protection advocates, this made quick enactment of new nature 
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protection legislation imperative. And within two years, the Sejm (Poland’s parlia-
ment) enacted a new nature protection law.
The 1949 Nature Protection Act (1949 Dz.U. No. 25, item 180) closely resem-
bled its 1934 predecessor but, in keeping with the resolutions adopted at the 1945 
PROP conference, it expressly broadened the focus of nature protection from pro-
tecting individuals to preserving entire ecosystems (Sommer 1993a, 19); article 
1 specifi ed that the goal of the statute was to protect not only ‘separate individu-
als’ but also ‘their complexes and communities.’ Also in keeping with the 1945 
PROP conference, the new law contained an implicit but unmistakable shift in 
philosophy refl ecting the changed political-economic circumstances of the Polish 
state following World War II. Whereas the 1934 Nature Protection Act spoke only 
of resource protection, its 1949 replacement introduced ‘rational use’ as an equal 
goal.4 Under article 1 of the 1949 Act, the purposes of nature protection included 
‘preservation, restoration, and proper use’ of nature. It is important to recognize 
that this did not refl ect a uniquely socialistic approach to nature protection; it 
was equally consistent with the conservationist (in contrast to preservationist) 
approach to nature protection advocated by Theodore Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot 
and the American Progressive Conservationists of the early twentieth century. It 
is also worth noting that article 1 of the 1949 Act called for the establishment of a 
general policy on environmental protection, though this mandate was not imple-
mented before the 1960s.
Primary administrative responsibility under the 1949 Nature Protection Act 
was removed from the Ministry of Education to the economically oriented For-
estry Ministry (art. 2, sec. 1; also see W. Brzeziński 1949, 4). However, article 9 
of the statute enjoined the administrator to ‘ensure that the management of natu-
ral resources is consistent with principles aimed at protecting and strengthening 
nature’s creative powers.’ The Forestry Ministry thus was responsible for preserv-
ing and, at the same time, exploiting forest resources (much like the United States 
Forest Service). In order to fulfi ll the nature protection mandate of article 9, the 
Forestry Minister was obligated to appoint a Chief N ature Conservator within 
the Forestry Ministry (art. 5, sec. 1); subordinate nature conservators were to be 
appointed to deal with regional nature protection issues (art. 5, sec. 2). At the local 
(gmina) level, the law required the local administrator (starost) to act through a 
state forest inspector or national park director (art. 5, sec. 3). Article 6 provided 
for the appointment, by the Forestry Minister, of regional committees for nature 
protection to serve as consulting agencies. 
The 1949 Act specifi ed an important administrative role for PROP, extending 
far beyond its quasi-governmental advisory and education role under the 1934 
Act. According to article 9, section 2, of the 1949 Act, state authorities were ‘obli-
gated to consult with the State Council for Nature Protection on matters which 
could signifi cantly affect the balance of nature.’ This mandate was similar to the 
one the United States Congress enacted 20 years later in the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.),5 with PROP in the role 
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of the Council on Environmental Quality.6 However, this obligation may have 
amounted to very little since, under article 3, section 3, of the Nature Protection 
Act, the Minister of Forestry served ex offi cio as President of PROP. In effect, the 
statute’s consultation mandate required the Minister of Forestry to consult himself 
on forestry matters.7 PROP’s statutory role in the administrative process should 
not, however, be underestimated. It had the right to offer its opinion on draft 
laws, regulations and candidates for administrative positions. Any administrative 
orders issued without a prior opinion from PROP expired automatically after three 
months (see W. Brzeziński 1949, 6). But while PROP’s opinion had to be sought, 
its opinions did not have to be followed; the Party/state authorities were always 
free to ignore or reject PROP’s advice. In this regard, the 1949 Act was, again, 
quite similar to the American NEPA, which is a purely procedural law.
The 1949 Nature Protection Act provided four different legal categories for 
protecting natural resources: (1) natural monuments, defi ned as individual forma-
tions or groups of formations, could be initiated by regional authorities, that is, 
the regional governor or People’s Council, and designated by court order (art. 11, 
secs. 1 and 12); (2) nature reserves (or sanctuaries), relatively small areas with 
natural features (including aesthetic considerations) worthy of protection, could 
be designated by regulation of the Forestry Minister (art. 11, sec. 2); (3) national 
parks could be established by the Council of Ministers8 in areas of special value to 
the public interest at least 500 hectares (1,235 acres) in size (art. 11, sec. 3); and (4) 
endangered species of plants and animals could be protected by order of the For-
estry Ministry, in cooperation with the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform 
and the Minister of Health (art. 11, sec. 4). Once areas or species were designated 
through one of these legal mechanisms, they were protected in accordance with 
article 18, which ‘prohibited’ activities, including hunting, fi shing and develop-
ment activities, that might harm protected species or pollute protected areas (art. 
18, secs. 2, 3 and 6). In keeping with its broadened concept of ecosystem protec-
tion, the 1949 Act sought to protect the habitats of endangered plant and animal 
species, for example by prohibiting water pollution or changes in water courses 
in designated areas (art. 18, secs. 2 and 3). Criminal sanctions for violations of 
article 18 regulations were provided in chapter 7 of the Act (arts. 28–32). Know-
ing violators were subject to arrest, imprisonment for three months and fi nes of up 
to 150,000 zlotys (approximately 3,400 1980 USD) (art. 28). It should be noted 
that these sanctions were transplanted from the 1934 Nature Protection Act. One 
important difference, however, was that the 1949 Act did not continue the special 
Nature Protection Fund established under the 1934 Act to fi nance the enforcement 
of nature protection activities. Instead, all fi nes levied under the 1949 Act became 
general revenues of the State Treasury (Radecki 1990a, 107).
The Party/state’s implementation of the 1949 Nature Protection Act was a 
mixed-bag of real achievements and utter disdain for statutory directives. Achieve-
ments included the appointment of regional nature conservators (1950 M.P. No. 
1–132, item 1646), the formation of regional advisory committees for nature pro-
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tection (1952 Dz.U. No. 16, item 99) and the establishment of a registry of natu-
ral monuments (1952 M.P. No. A–27, item 376). In addition, between 1949 and 
1960, nine new national parks, a network of nature reserves and numerous natural 
monuments were designated (Radecki 1990a, 110). However, many of the stat-
ute’s most important provisions were simply ignored. For example, the Forestry 
Minister never appointed the Chief Nature Conservator as mandated by article 9 
of the 1949 Act. This left the regional nature conservators without any connection 
to central state authority, greatly limiting their potential effectiveness. What little 
independent authority they possessed was stripped in 1950, when the Communist 
Party/state curtailed local and regional autonomy in a new law designed to cen-
tralize regulatory decision making (1950 Dz.U. No. 14, item 130).
Although PROP was supposed to play an important procedural role in nature 
protection matters under the 1949 Act, it was in practice isolated from nature pro-
tection policy making. Almost before the ink was dry on the new statute, PROP 
members were notifi ed that their organization’s role under the statute had been 
abolished. Its advisory and educational functions were taken over by a new Nature 
Protection Committee of the Polish Academy of Knowledge (Komitet Ochrony 
Przyrody Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności).9 This ‘reorganization’ (‘co-optation’ 
may be a more appropriate expression) made sense given the Party/state’s politi-
cal-economic priorities. As Wojciech Radecki (1990a, 108) notes, ‘[t]here was no 
place in the new centralistic and increasingly bureaucratic administrative system 
for an independent, self-governing organization such as PROP.’ As a result of 
PROP’s disenfranchisement, the Forestry Minister never implemented the statu-
tory provisions requiring government agencies to consult with PROP on matters 
relating to nature protection. His inaction, which also refl ected the Forestry Min-
istry’s own weak position in an administrative hierarchy dominated by industrial 
ministries, permitted the Party/state’s industrialization plans to proceed unfettered 
by nature protection considerations.
Despite the proliferation of national parks and nature reserves between 1949 
and 1960, the period was characterized mainly by the Polish Party/state’s strong 
emphasis on natural resources development over nature protection (Radecki 
1990a, 110). In the same year that the new Nature Protection Act took effect, 
Poland adopted wholesale the Soviet system of investment planning (see Montias 
1962, 148), with its built-in bias toward heavy industrial development. From this 
point on, concern for economic development eclipsed nature protection consider-
ations, as evidenced by the few nature protection regulations issued in the wake 
of the 1949 Act. 
 In 1952, the Polish government enacted a new hunting law designed primar-
ily to protect state property from expropriation (1952 Dz.U. No. 44, item 300) 
and new endangered species regulations (1952 Dz.U. No. 45, item 307). Both of 
these enactments were based on the framework of the 1949 Nature Protection Act, 
but they took entirely different approaches to the issue of protection. Whereas the 
new hunting law focused on protecting state property rights in wild game against 
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expropriation, the endangered species regulation focused on preservation. In com-
paring the two laws and the penalties they provided for violations, it is clear that 
the Polish Party/state was far more interested in protecting its property interests 
than in preserving endangered species: a violation of the hunting law constituted 
a felony whereas killing an endangered species was only a misdemeanor. Thus, to 
borrow Wojciech Radecki’s (1990a, 113) example, a poacher convicted of killing 
an endangered mountain hare was punished much less severely than a poacher 
found guilty of taking a common grey hare. The incentives created by these 
laws obviously were not geared toward species preservation, but they accurately 
refl ected the Party/state’s priorities.
Following the 1949 Nature Protection Act, the Party/state for the fi rst time 
turned its attention to problems of pollution control. New water pollution dis-
charge standards were issued in 1950 (1950 Dz.U. No. 41, item 371), but they 
unfortunately did not include effective enforcement provisions. Meanwhile, 
Poland’s forced industrialization drive proceeded in accordance with central eco-
nomic plans that contained absolutely no environmental protection conditions. 
This neglect led to increasing environmental degradation, which became the sub-
ject of studies and investigations as early as 1953 (see Nowe Drogi, July 1978). 
According to a 1956 report by the State Council for Nature Protection (1957), 
central economic plans permitted heavy industrial enterprises to be located with-
out regard for environmental impacts, and industries were being allowed to dump 
raw sewage directly into receiving waters with impunity. As so often happened in 
the history of People’s Poland, the environmental regulations that did exist were 
undermined by economic plans that had at least equal legal status, higher political 
priority and greater compliance incentives. When confl icts arose, the economic 
plans were sure to prevail over environmental requirements. Consequently, by the 
mid-1950s, water and air pollution reached alarming levels.
On January 1, 1957, a State Inspectorate for Water Protection (Państwowa 
Inspekcja Ochrony Wód) was established within the Ministry of Navigation (Min-
isterstwo Żeglugi).10 The Inspectorate became the chief water protection agency in 
the state apparatus. Its job was to ensure that industrial enterprises and municipal-
ities complied with the provisions of the still lingering 1922 Water Law. Accord-
ing to critics, however, the Water Protection Inspectorate’s sole concern was to 
protect water quantities for the sake of further industrial development; sanitation 
and nature protection considerations took a back seat (see Radecki 1990a, 114).
In May 1957, the Ministry of Navigation was transformed into the Minis-
try of Navigation and Water Management (Ministerstwo Żeglugi i Gospodarki 
 Wodnej) (1957 Dz.U. No. 31, item 130). This new ministry became the chief 
administrative agency responsible for water resources management and protec-
tion in Poland. Its responsibilities included fl ood control, coastal zone manage-
ment, long-term planning of water use and protection, management of municipal 
sewer systems, and water quality monitoring. For the fi rst time in People’s 
Poland, a departmental minister with a seat on the Council of Ministers had some 
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responsibility for environmental protection. Unfortunately, this did not portend 
the emergence of pollution control and nature protection as political priorities of 
the Party/state. 
2.3. The 1960s 
In 1960, three years after its creation, the Ministry of Navigation and Water 
Management was stripped of its environmental protection responsibilities and 
reconstituted as the Navigation Ministry. At the same time, a new Central Water 
Management Board (Centralny Urząd Gospodarki Wodnej) was created to take 
over the old ministry’s environmental protection responsibilities. The new Board 
was instituted not as a ministry but as a lower-level government agency; its chief 
did not sit on the Council of Ministers (1960 Dz.U. No. 29, item 163). This con-
stituted a political demotion of sorts for environmental protection, which, at least 
in theory, had been represented on the Council of Ministers between 1957 and 
1960. As a ‘central’ but not ‘supreme’ organ of state administration, the Central 
Water Management Board was subordinated to higher ministerial departments. 
Nevertheless, it constituted the fi rst central agency in the state with a distinct 
pollution control mandate. As such, its creation marked a turning-point in the 
history of environmental law in People’s Poland (see Radecki 1990a, 116). Ini-
tially the responsibilities of the Central Water Management Board included all 
the non- navigation-related tasks exercised by the former Ministry of Navigation 
and Water Management. It prepared and administered long-term water manage-
ment and protection plans. It also had legal authority, delegated by the Coun-
cil of Ministers, to coordinate activities of other state agencies relating to water 
management. But confl icts arose whenever the Central Water Management Board 
attempted to impose conditions on water-use activities governed by other central 
and supreme Party/state organs. Industrial ministries in particular paid little atten-
tion to principles of environmental protection or to the Central Bureau.
Between 1960 and 1966, the Polish parliament was very active in the area 
of environmental protection. First, on January 31, 1961, the Sejm enacted a new 
Water Pollution Protection Act (1961 Dz.U. No. 5, item 33), which authorized the 
Council of Ministers to set norms for water pollution discharges. That same day, 
the Sejm enacted a land-use planning law that, among other things, expressly rec-
ognized the importance of natural resources, and established their protection as 
one of the purposes of land-use planning (1961 Dz.U. No. 7, item 47). 
In May 1962, the Water Pollution Protection Act was subsumed by a new 
general Water Law that fi nally replaced the 1922 Water Law (1962 Dz.U. No. 34, 
item 158). More than anything else, the 1962 statute subjected the management 
and protection of water to central planning (arts. 22–24). Although certain pro-
visions of the 1962 law ostensibly permitted state agencies to regulate pollution 
discharges ‘independently’ of the central plan (art. 88, sec. 2; also see Tarasiewicz 
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1965, 113–15), plan compliance alone determined whether or not a water-use 
permit would be issued (art. 46). The permitting agency (which was the ministry 
with jurisdiction over the particular development) was authorized to attach pol-
lution control conditions to the permit, but the Central Water Management Board 
had no independent authority to do so (W. Brzeziński 1974, 91). Industrial min-
isters almost never exercised their authority to impose environmental conditions 
in permits; such conditions only added to the costs of construction and operation 
without providing any ‘productive’ benefi ts within the socialist accounting sys-
tem (which is discussed in Chapter 5, §5.4). And if a permitting agency ever did 
impose water pollution conditions, compliance was not guaranteed. The permit-
ting agency (or the Council of Ministers) could revoke the permit in case of a 
violation, but revocation was neither automatic nor mandatory. In extreme cases, 
violations of plan-based regulations or permit conditions could lead to criminal 
sanctions, including fi nes and imprisonment, under chapter 10 of the 1962 Water 
Law (arts. 151–160). But sanctions were rarely imposed for illegal discharges. 
Most cases were dropped by either the prosecutor or the court on a fi nding that the 
violations resulted from ‘activities dictated by higher reasons,’ namely fulfi llment 
of plan production targets (W. Brzeziński 1974, 111).11 It should be kept in mind 
that economic plans were also promulgated as legal acts; in virtually every case, 
compliance with planning mandates became a complete defense of violations of 
water pollution control laws.
The same problem plagued Poland’s fi rst air pollution prevention law, which 
was enacted in 1966 (1966 Dz.U. No. 14, item 87). The Party’s newspaper, Try-
buna Ludu (quoted in translation in Carter 1993, 122), referred to the 1966 Air 
Pollution Act as ‘the best formulated and most progressive law of this sort in the 
world.’ In reality, the law was virtually without normative content. It defi ned ‘air 
pollution’ as emissions of substances ‘which may result in violations of permissi-
ble concentrations in the air’ (art. 1, sec. 2). On this defi nition, air pollution could 
not exist in the absence of regulations defi ning permissible concentrations. And 
the 1966 Air Pollution Act did not require the Council of Ministers to promulgate 
‘permissible concentrations.’ It only enabled the Council of Ministers and other 
state agencies to impose air pollution requirements and restrictions at their discre-
tion. As it happened, the Council of Ministers did adopt fairly stringent norms for 
air pollution concentrations (1966 Dz.U., No. 42, item 253), but not because of 
any statutory mandate.12 It retained authority to rescind or suspend the regulations 
at any time. 
Once permissible concentrations were established, the 1966 Air Pollution 
Act was potentially enforceable. Article 3, section 1, expressly required new and 
expanding industrial facilities to install available emissions control equipment, if 
their uncontrolled emissions would or could cause a violation of permissible con-
centrations. However, it was left to the administrator’s discretion to demand pol-
lution abatement (art. 11, sec. 1). If emissions posed an imminent threat to human 
life, the State Health Inspector could close down the industrial facility entirely 
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(art. 11, sec. 3). However, this kind of administrative authority over industrial 
production was only rarely exercised because of its potential effect on economic 
production. The Polish environmental law scholar Wacław Brzeziński (1973, 87), 
writing about the 1966 statute, noted the ‘frequent collisions’ between air pollu-
tion prevention and production that administrators had to solve on a case-by-case 
basis ‘from the point of view of state policy.’ Thanks to the vast administrative 
discretion afforded by the 1966 Air Pollution Act, administrators could in every 
case decide that production concerns took priority over pollution control (see W. 
Brzeziński 1974, 129).
Administrative responsibilities under the 1966 Air Pollution Law were vested 
in a new Offi ce of Air Pollution Control (Biuro do Spraw Ochrony Powietrza 
Atmosferycznego) established within the Central Water Management Board, 
which became, as a result, Poland’s fi rst comprehensive environment agency 
(albeit with substantial economic responsibilities, for example for water manage-
ment). The Central Board promulgated emissions standards under the 1966 Air 
Pollution Act and discharge standards under the 1962 Water Law. But under both 
laws it had trouble enforcing its authority against central and supreme organs of 
state authority. This foreshadowed a chronic problem for environmental protec-
tion in People’s Poland: the relative lack of authority of environmental ministries 
over industrial ministries (a problem discussed at length in Chapter 4, §4.3).
While the Sejm enacted new legislation, Poland’s Party/government also was 
active in environmental protection during the 1960s. The 1961 fi ve-year socioeco-
nomic plan, written by the Communist Party, adopted by the Council of Ministers 
and ratifi ed by the parliament, for the fi rst time included provisions concerning 
water and air pollution (see Bochniarz and Kassenberg 1988, 18). In the middle of 
the decade, the Council of Ministers exercised its independent regulatory author-
ity, issuing rules to protect, respectively, forests and agricultural lands against air 
pollution (1966 M.P. No. 40, item 200; 1966 M.P. No. 50, item 247; 1970 M.P. 
No. 4, item 35). Of course, Council decrees and socioeconomic plans carried a lot 
more weight with industrial ministries than did environmental agency regulations, 
but they too went largely unenforced. From the 1960s to the end of the Commu-
nist era in Poland, lack of enforcement, more than lack of regulation or the poor 
quality of regulations, obstructed effective environmental protection. 
In 1964, the State Council for Nature Protection attempted to reinvigorate 
the concept of nature preservation by designing new categories of protected 
areas, including landscape parks and areas of protected landscape. The Council 
ultimately sought to amend the 1949 Nature Protection Act, but its proposals 
were rejected summarily by the Party/government, which, by that time, was less 
interested in setting aside protected areas and more interested in reducing levels 
of pollution and waste (as evidenced by the two fi ve-year socioeconomic plans 
for 1961–70). But in one respect, 1964 was a landmark year for environmental 
protection in People’s Poland. That year, the Sejm enacted a new Civil Code, 
which, for the fi rst time, permitted individuals to bring lawsuits to stop or control 
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pollution (1964 Dz.U. No. 16, item 93).13 Under article 222 of the Code, prop-
erty owners had the right to sue any person whose activities caused excessive 
property damage. In addition, a plaintiff could sue to preempt prospective harm 
(art. 439). These provisions remained potential sources of individual redress for 
environmental harm even after comprehensive environmental legislation was 
enacted in 1980. However, they were rarely utilized. Environmental lawsuits 
under the Civil Code were infrequent and, of those that were brought, relatively 
few were successful. 
Finally, in 1969, a new Penal Code was adopted that provided criminal sanc-
tions for specifi c environmental harms (1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94).14 Under this 
Code, individual persons (but not enterprises or organizations) could be fi ned or 
imprisoned for environmental crimes. Specifi ed offenses included air-, water- and 
soil-polluting activities that endangered human life and health (art. 140) and ille-
gal timber harvesting (art. 213). As with the Civil Code, few criminal cases were 
ever brought, and many complaints received by prosecutors were summarily dis-
missed for reasons of ‘higher necessity’ (see Biernat and Wasilewski 1992, 44).
2.4. The 1970s
It is somewhat of a misnomer to speak of ‘environmental protection’ in Poland 
before the 1970s. The concept of ‘nature protection’ had been well understood 
since the 1920s (see Pawlikowski 1927) and pollution threats had been taken seri-
ously since the 1950s. But there was scant understanding before 1970 of how 
nature protection and pollution control fi t together. This was not just a Polish 
problem, of course; throughout the world, the concept of ‘environmental protec-
tion’ was just beginning to be defi ned in the early 1970s. 
Between 1971 and 1972, two important events facilitated the development of 
environmental protection in Poland. The fi rst was the PZPR’s Sixth Party Con-
gress in 1971, where for the fi rst time environmental protection emerged as a 
national political priority. In its resolution the Congress called for a complete 
program of environmental protection to be prepared within two or three years (VI 
Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe materiały i dokumenty, 1972, 252). However, this pro-
posed ‘environmental’ program was also to include, among other things, plans for 
a national network of superhighways. The second important event for the devel-
opment of environmental protection in Poland was the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. This may seem 
odd since Poland did not actually attend the conference; it boycotted it, along 
with all the Soviet bloc countries, ostensibly because non-members of the UN 
were not invited to participate. However, the Polish government had prepared to 
attend, and those preparations greatly infl uenced the theory, if not the practice, of 
environmental protection in Poland. New scientifi c committees were appointed to 
study environmental problems, and scholars began to explore potential legal solu-
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tions. In March 1971, the Polish Academy of Sciences (Polska Akademia Nauk or 
PAN) Scientifi c Committee ‘Man and Environment’ (Komitet Naukowy ‘Człowiek 
i Środowisko’) convened a conference of lawyers from around the country to dis-
cuss the methods and goals of what was just beginning to be called ‘environmen-
tal protection’ (ochrona środowisko15). Before the close of 1971, the Scientifi c 
Committee issued a report entitled ‘Programme of environmental protection in 
Poland to the year 1990.’ The Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the Polit-
buro of the PZPR’s Central Committee adopted this report in 1975.
Meanwhile, member countries of the Soviet Bloc’s Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) began to cooperate more closely on matters of 
environmental protection. From the start of the 1970s, one sees a great deal of 
coordination in their environmental policies. New environmental legislation 
began appearing in each country at roughly the same time, and one country’s 
environmental statutes began closely to resemble another’s. However, Poland was 
a bit out of step (as it was in so many respects) with its ‘fraternal allies.’ Its envi-
ronmental laws were distinctive and, in many ways, more sophisticated than those 
of other Soviet bloc countries (see Juergensmeyer et al. 1991, 832; Cummings 
1993, 380).
Poland was poised at the start of the 1970s to pursue a fresh approach to prob-
lems of environmental protection. But almost immediately there were setbacks. 
The fi rst was in 1972 when the Central Water Management Board proposed to 
transform itself into a new Ministry of Water Management and Environmental 
Protection (Ministerstwo Gospodarki Wodnej i Ochrony Środowiska) in order to 
give environmental protection a more prominent place in the agency’s mission 
and to raise the status of the environmental agency to the ministerial level; the 
proposed change would have given environmental protection advocates a voice 
on the Council of Ministers for the fi rst time since the late 1950s. Agricultural and 
industrial ministries objected to the change, which they correctly perceived as 
threatening their hegemony. And, as usual, the industrial interests prevailed. Not 
only was the Central Water Management Board’s proposal rejected, but on March 
29, 1972, the Board itself was abolished (1972 Dz.U. No. 11, item 79) and its vari-
ous responsibilities were scattered among the Agriculture Ministry, the Naviga-
tion Ministry and a newly created Ministry of Local Economy and Environmental 
Protection (Ministerstwo Gospodarki Terenowej i Ochrony Środowiska) (1972 
Dz.U. No. 11, item 77). This new ministry became responsible for city planning 
and development, urban land-use management, public utilities regulation, hous-
ing, property expropriation, and environmental protection of water, air and ‘green 
areas’ (zieleń) within cities and towns. Interestingly, the diffusion of environmen-
tal protection responsibilities, which appeared to constitute a political defeat for 
environmental protection interests, may have been purely coincidental: according 
to one former offi cial of the Central Water Management Board, the administra-
tive reform resulted from a personal vendetta against the Board’s chief by other 
high-ranking Communist Party members (conversation with Andzrej Deja, Chief 
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of the Water Management Offi ce, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural 
Resources and Forestry, June 9, 1992). 
The 1972 reorganization of environmental protection administration was not 
the only administrative change during the 1970s. In 1975, the Ministry of Local 
Economy and Environmental Protection was replaced by the Ministry of Admin-
istration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection (Ministerstwo Adminis-
tracji, Gospodarki Terenowej i Ochrony Środowiska) (1975 Dz.U. No 16, item 
90). The addition to the title was signifi cant. As Wojciech Radecki (1990a, 122) 
has noted, the new ministry’s duties were predominantly administrative, with 
environmental protection responsibilities ‘added as an afterthought.’
The 1970s was also a busy decade of substantive legislative and regulatory 
activity on environmental protection. In 1970, the Council of Ministers promul-
gated a regulation to protect forests from air pollution that required industrial 
enterprises to compensate for forest damage caused by their emissions (1970 M.P. 
No. 4, item 35). In addition, polluters could be forced to restore damaged forests 
to their pre-existing state. In 1971, this regulation was subsumed into a new law to 
protect agricultural and forest lands (1971 Dz.U. No. 27, item 249), which sought 
to promote conservation of productive agricultural lands by preventing their con-
version to non-agricultural uses (except in cases of economic necessity), limiting 
soil erosion, reclaiming agriculture lands previously converted to industrial uses, 
and reducing waste in land use (see Stełmachowski 1984, 347–8). 
The most signifi cant new environmental statutes of the 1970s were the Water 
Law (1974 Dz.U. No. 38, item 230) and the Building Law (1974 Dz.U. No. 38, 
item 229), both enacted on October 24, 1974. The Building Law contained a spe-
cial ‘chapter’ (rodział) devoted to ‘[e]nvironmental protection in building con-
struction.’ Article 113, section 8, provided that buildings should be designed, built 
and used in such a way that ensured ‘water, air soil, nature and landscape protec-
tion, as well as protection against noise, vibrations, radioactivity, and electromag-
netic radiation.’ The 1974 Water Law did not so much replace the 1962 Water 
Law, as consolidate it with other statutes regulating various aspects of water use. 
The 1974 Water Law more comprehensively treated all aspects of water manage-
ment, including municipal and rural water supplies, irrigation and drainage (see 
Surowiec and Deja 1978, 1738). The main focus of water management remained 
the water supply, and the permitting process stayed much as it had been under the 
1962 law. The 1974 Water Law did, however, make a substantial contribution to 
water quality protection by requiring the establishment of protective zones around 
water intakes (arts. 59–61) and authorizing the Council of Ministers to institute a 
classifi cation system for water quality (art. 62, sec. 3). Most importantly, the 1974 
Water Law created for the fi rst time in People’s Poland, and perhaps the world, 
a system of fees for water consumption and disposal. This was signifi cant for a 
variety of environmental, economic and ideological reasons.16 The fees were to 
be set (by the Council of Ministers) at levels exceeding the cost of water treat-
ment in order to encourage water conservation and reduce waste, and they were 
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to be paid into a Water Management Fund to fi nance water improvement and 
water quality protection projects (art. 56). Finally, the 1974 Water Law attempted 
to ensure greater compliance with its environmental requirements by beefi ng up 
criminal sanctions for violations. The fi nancial penalties remained the same as 
under the 1962 Water Law (50,000 zlotys), but the possible term of imprisonment 
was increased from two to fi ve years (art. 122). 
Despite the new laws and changes in administration during the fi rst half of 
the 1970s, the PZPR apparently was dissatisfi ed with the piecemeal approach to 
environmental protection. At its Seventh Party Congress in December 1975, the 
issue of environmental protection rose from third (in 1971) to fi rst on the list of 
political priorities. The 1975 resolution stated:
We must give more attention than before to the protection and shaping of the 
environment. With this in view we must build our towns and villages and protect 
the aesthetic values of the countryside. This should be an important part of devel-
opment planning, investment programming and technology preference. Taking 
into account the importance of the problem there should be prepared, with the 
help of scientists, a bill regulating environmental protection. (Quoted in Sommer 
1988, 26–7)
The 1975 resolution ultimately led to passage of the 1980 Environmental Protec-
tion and Development Act. It is signifi cant that the increased focus on environ-
mental protection in Poland during the 1970s did not result from any particular 
catalytic event or grass-roots political movement. Rather, the impetus for increased 
environmental protection came from the highest echelons of the PZPR. Thus, 
claims that the Party did not concern itself with environmental protection are, at 
the least, exaggerated.
As if to codify the PZPR’s 1975 resolution, the Polish Constitution was 
amended in 1976 (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36) to include, among other new pro-
visions, two articles raising environmental protection ‘to the highest level of law 
and politics’ (Radecki 1990a, 122):
Article 12, paragraph 2: The Polish People’s Republic ensures the protection 
and rational shaping of the environment.
Article 71: Citizens of the Polish People’s Republic have the right to utilize 
the values of the natural environment and the obligation to protect it. 
It is unclear just what these provisions were intended to accomplish. As Jerzy 
Sommer (1988, 28–9) has pointed out, the very fact of their inclusion seemed to 
elevate environmental protection as ‘one of the basic aims of the socialist state.’ 
However, Professor Sommer (1988, 33) also recognized that ‘[t]he real signifi -
cance’ of the new constitutional provisions could not be determined before they 
were implemented through subordinate legislation. In People’s Poland, as in all the 
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former Soviet bloc countries, constitutional provisions were not self- executing; 
they had to be given legal effect by parliamentary legislation (see Brzeziński and 
Garlicki 1995a, 24). Unless and until the Sejm enacted a law specifi cally imple-
menting articles 12 and 71, the constitutional rights they supposedly guaranteed 
were, legally speaking, meaningless. Consequently, the provisions had no imme-
diate impact on environmental protection in Poland. The real test of their legal 
meaning had to wait four years for the enactment of the 1980 Environmental 
Protection and Development Act. In the meantime, there was a great deal of con-
versation about what form new environmental legislation should take. Should it 
be comprehensive (as argued, for example, by Radecki 1978) or should nature 
protection be separated from pollution control (as argued by Łenkowa 1977 and 
Jastrzębski 1979a)? Should it be in the form of a code (like the Civil Code, for 
example), a general framework act with more specifi c legislation to be promul-
gated later, or something in between, such as an ‘omnibus’ act? As legal scholars 
(including Łustacz 1980) debated these questions, drafts of the new law were pre-
pared, beginning in May 1976. The fi rst draft bill combined all elements of envi-
ronmental protection, including nature conservation; it would have replaced the 
1949 Nature Protection Act. Subsequent drafts from March and April of 1976 and 
December 1977 refi ned the defi nition of ‘environment’ to make it more inclusive 
in some respects but less inclusive in others. These later drafts excluded nature 
protection, so as to maintain the 1949 Nature Protection Act. 
In 1976, the Polish Academy of Sciences founded a Research Group on Envi-
ronmental Law within its Institute of State and Law. This was the fi rst offi cially 
established environmental law bureau in the Soviet bloc and, perhaps, the whole 
of Europe. It included many of Poland’s top environmental law scholars, includ-
ing Jerzy Sommer, Wojciech Radecki and Jerzy Jendrośka. Over the years, they 
and their colleagues have published literally hundreds of books and thousands of 
articles in Polish, German, English and other languages about environmental law 
and administration. This record has earned them considerable respect and infl u-
ence, especially since the fall of communism. 
Despite the legislative and administrative efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, 
Poland’s pollution problems continued to mount. Air pollution emissions rose rap-
idly despite improvements in monitoring, the imposition of emissions limitations, 
the application of available emissions reduction technologies, and increased pen-
alties (see Aura, Nov. 1979; Gospodarko Planowa, Mar. 1980; and Wiadomości 
Statystyczne, Dec. 1979). Water quality also deteriorated (see Wiadomości Stat-
ystyczne, Nov. 1979). In a resolution adopted on December 11, 1978, the State 
Council for Nature Protection concluded that industries habitually were ignor-
ing both the harmful environmental impacts of their activities and ‘the need to 
respect binding law’ because government environmental programs were not being 
adequately implemented (Nowe Drogi, July 1980). For environmental protection 
advocates, this resolution underscored the urgent need for comprehensive new 
environmental legislation.
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2.5. The 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act
Structure and Defi nitions
On January 31, 1980, the Sejm enacted the new Environmental Protection and 
Development Act (EPDA) (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6).17 Its title, ‘Ustawa o 
ochronie i kształtowaniu środowiska,’18 signifi ed that its purpose was not only 
protection but economic use of the natural environment. The Act consisted of 
eight titles containing 118 articles:
Title I: General provisions.
Title II: Substantive provisions on air and water pollution, protecting 
‘green areas,’ waste management, noise and radiation pollution.
Title III: General directives on land use and development, forest manage-
ment, public works construction, building and other potentially 
environmentally destructive economic practices.
Title IV: Liability provisions with reference to the Penal Code, Civil Code 
and Code for Petty Offenses.
Title V: Economic measures for environmental protection, including a 
schedule of fees for resource use and pollution charges to fi nance 
new state environmental protection funds.
Title VI: Organization and administration of environmental protection. 
Title VII: Penal provisions.
Title VIII: Transitional and fi nal provisions.
The 1980 EPDA was a comprehensive statute designed to deal with the whole 
panoply of environmental media and their problems. Only specifi c nature protec-
tion responsibilities were excluded (art. 13, sec. 2; art. 35, sec. 1; and art. 39), 
thereby preserving the 1949 Nature Protection Act. Otherwise, the new Environ-
mental Protection and Development Act blanketed the entire fi eld of environ-
mental protection. Article 1, section 2, defi ned ‘environment’ broadly to include 
‘the totality of natural elements, including the surface of the earth together with 
the minerals, water, air, fl ora and fauna, and the landscape as found in its natural 
state and as transformed by human activity.’ In keeping with this broad defi nition, 
article 111 expressly preempted confl icting provisions of other resource-use stat-
utes, including the 1974 Water Law, and economic statutes with environmental 
mandates, such as the 1974 Building Law. 
The 1980 EPDA defi ned ‘environmental protection’ broadly enough to cover 
any activity having anything to do with nature and its resources, including all 
‘actions or restraints necessary to restore or maintain the balance of nature’ (art. 
2, sec. 1), which the Act defi ned as ‘equilibrium in the reciprocal infl uences of 
people, the elements of living nature and the habitat conditions produced by ele-
ments of inanimate nature’ (art. 3, sec. 1). This general defi nition was followed 
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by a list of four categories of environmental protection activities: (1) rational 
environmental ‘development,’ (2) rational natural resources management, (3) 
measures to prevent harmful environmental effects causing damage, destruction, 
pollution or changes in the physical features of character of its natural elements, 
and (4) restoration of natural elements to their proper state (art. 2, sec. 1). These 
categories clearly indicate that the 1980 EPDA’s focus was not preservationist; 
use and development of the environment also constituted a major part of ‘envi-
ronmental protection,’ as the Act’s title suggested. The apparent confl ict in the 
statute’s ultimate aims supposedly was minimized by language narrowly defi n-
ing  ‘rational use’ (eksploatacja) to cover only those uses consistent with both 
economic and extra-economic values, such as quality of life. Any decision to use 
natural resources was supposed not to diminish the quality of the environment 
(art. 2, sec. 2). However, this language was merely precatory. The phrase ‘quality 
of the environment’ is ambiguous, and most any ‘use,’ rational or otherwise, has 
some detrimental impact on environmental values. It certainly was not a well-
defi ned legal test for determining whether development activities could proceed.
Environmental Protection and Central Planning
The most signifi cant new features of the 1980 Environmental Protection and 
Development Act concerned the relationship between environmental protection 
and central economic planning. Before 1980, socioeconomic planners paid no 
attention to the environmental consequences of their decisions, and this obviously 
hampered protection efforts. The new law required socioeconomic plans to give 
due consideration to environmental protection: 
Art. 5 sec. 1: Environmental protection constitutes an essential element of 
national socioeconomic policy. Matters pertaining to environmental protec-
tion shall be included in the national socioeconomic plans, land use plans, 
and normative statutes, and will be taken into account in the activities of 
national organs, national economic units and social organizations. 
Art. 5, sec. 3: The national socioeconomic plans shall take into account, as 
an integral part of the planning provisions, tasks and means to ensure effec-
tive environmental protection and the effective elimination of activities with 
negative environmental impacts.
In addition, environmental protection considerations were to become an integral 
part of land-use plans that were the basis for development and investment location 
decisions. Under the 1980 EPDA, land-use plans had to ‘guarantee conditions 
for maintaining the balance of nature, rational economic management of natural 
resources and protection of landscape and climatic values’ (art. 6, sec. 2). Admin-
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istrative decisions that violated land-use plan mandates were void automatically 
(art. 7, sec. 2). 
Although these provisions undoubtedly constituted a signifi cant and benefi -
cial addition to the planning process, it is important to note that the new restric-
tions on socioeconomic planners were purely procedural. The 1980 EPDA did 
not shackle them with substantive environmental mandates, but required planners 
only to ‘consider’ environmental protection in the planning process. Article 4 sug-
gested that environmental protection standards were just as important as planning 
mandates: ‘The resources of the natural environment may be used to serve socio-
economic needs to the extent permitted by the socioeconomic plans, land-use 
plans, and environmental protection standards.’ On a plain reading of this provi-
sion, natural resources could be utilized only to the extent permitted by plans and 
environmental standards. However, neither article 4 nor any other provision of the 
1980 EPDA specifi ed what would happen if the plan called for a use inconsistent 
with environmental norms.
Additional provisions on environmental protection in planning activities 
were located in articles 68–70 of title III, chapter 2, concerning environmental 
aspects of capital investment. 
Specifi c Environmental Protection Provisions 
Title II of the 1980 EPDA included nine chapters dedicated to accomplishing spe-
cifi c environmental protection goals:
Chapter 1: Protection of the earth’s surface and minerals (arts. 13–17),
Chapter 2: Protection of waters and the marine environment (arts. 18–24),
Chapter 3: Protection of the atmosphere (arts. 25–32),
Chapter 4: Protection of fl ora and fauna (arts. 33–37),
Chapter 5: Protection of landscape values and rest environments (arts. 38–41),
Chapter 6: Protection of green areas in cities and villages (arts. 42–48),
Chapter 7: Protection of the environment against noises and vibrations (arts. 
49–52),
Chapter 8: Protection of the environment against waste and other forms of 
pollution (arts. 53–58),
Chapter 9: Protection against radiation (arts. 59–63).
Generally speaking, these chapters restated for each environmental medium the 
general goals outlined in title I, articles 1 and 2. Although they did not include 
specifi c environmental norms, such as emissions standards or discharge limits, the 
chapters of title II provided the framework for further regulation by appropriate 
ministerial departments. Article 15 was the central provision of title II, chapter 
1, on protecting the earth’s surface and minerals. It required anyone using land 
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to ensure its protection against pollution. More specifi cally, article 15 obligated 
farmers and forestry workers to use chemicals, such as pesticides, only in quanti-
ties that would not disturb the balance of nature, for instance by contaminating 
the soil or water or poisoning plants, animals or ecosystems. Detailed controls on 
chemical use were to be established by regulation of the Ministers of Agriculture 
and Forestry, in consultation with the Minister of Administration, Local Economy 
and Environmental Protection and the Minister of Health and Social Welfare. 
Chapter 2, on protection of waters and the marine environment, required that 
waters be managed rationally; responsible agencies and users were to ‘prevent or 
control’ any changes rendering waters unfi t for human consumption, plant and 
animal life or economic use (art. 18). Measures for preserving ‘the balance of 
nature’ had to be designed and implemented when a proposed water use threat-
ened signifi cant environmental harm (art. 19). Similar measures were required for 
land-based activities (irrigation and drainage, among others) that, without protec-
tive measures, could have substantially affected water quality (art. 20, sec. 1). The 
newly created (in arts. 94 and 95) State Environmental Protection Inspectorate 
(Państwowa Inspekcja Ochrony Środowiska or PIOŚ) could impose mandatory 
conditions on the construction and operation of waterworks in areas requiring 
special protection from water pollution (art. 20, sec. 2). Article 22 provided that, 
before any economic activity could proceed in such areas, an expert analysis of 
environmental impacts was required. In order to preserve drinking water sup-
plies, article 21 placed groundwater under ‘special protection’ from pollution, and 
the Ministry of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection 
was instructed to restrict or prohibit the use of waters when necessary to protect 
water quality (sec. 23, sec. 1). That ministry and others with authority over water 
resources were to issue specifi c regulations implementing these statutory man-
dates (art. 24). 
The goal of chapter 3 on protection of the atmosphere was to keep air pol-
lution concentrations at or below levels established by regulation, and to limit 
emissions from production facilities, automobiles, waste dumps and other emis-
sions sources (art. 25). In regulating non-specifi c sources of air pollution, such as 
landfi lls, the 1980 EPDA was ahead of its time. Article 26 of the Act defi ned the 
phrase ‘air pollution’ inclusively as ‘the emission into the air of solid, liquid or 
gaseous substances in quantities which may adversely affect human health, the 
climate, fl ora and fauna, the soil or waters.’ This constituted a radical and progres-
sive departure from the old defi nition under the 1966 Air Pollution Act. 
The 1980 EPDA’s requirements for air-polluting activities were contained 
in articles 27 and 28, which, respectively, obliged individuals and organizations 
engaging in economic activities to take appropriate measures to control air pollu-
tion emissions and monitor them on site. Under article 29, the Council of Ministers 
was authorized to promulgate regulations establishing permissible concentrations 
of air pollutants and guidelines for measuring and monitoring pollutant levels in 
the atmosphere. The regional (wojewódstwa) authorities also were given a sub-
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stantial role to play in air pollution control. Article 30 authorized them to regulate 
categories and levels of air pollutants. Interestingly, under section 2 of that provi-
sion, compliance with established standards did not relieve individuals and organi-
zations of civil liability for the environmental harm they caused.19 In the event of a 
violation of air pollution norms (established in accordance with the 1980 EPDA), 
the organ of state administration at the regional level could suspend indefi nitely the 
activities causing the violation until they were brought within the standards (art. 
31, sec. 1). It is important to note, however, that the authority to suspend polluting 
activities was discretionary. Only in cases where the polluting activities combined 
with ‘especially disadvantageous atmospheric conditions’ to pose a direct threat to 
human life or health were the regional authorities required to shut down polluters 
(art. 32). In such cases, the agencies also could restrict the use of internal combus-
tion motor vehicles; and they had discretion to suspend polluting activities where 
necessary to protect designated monuments (art. 32, sec. 2). Finally, the Minister 
of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection, in cooperation 
with the Minister of Health and Social Welfare, was instructed to establish more 
specifi c limitations for air pollutants emitted by internal combustion vehicles, and 
was authorized to prohibit the use of fuels, raw materials and technological pro-
cesses that produced health-threatening levels of air pollution.
Despite strong language in the air pollution provisions about suspending pol-
luting activities that posed a direct threat to human life and health, it is impor-
tant to note that the Environmental Protection and Development Act provided 
administrators with a way to avoid imposing that sanction. Under article 71, if 
the harmful environmental impacts of an activity could not be reduced by avail-
able technologies, but the activity ‘fulfi lls a social need,’ instead of shutting down 
the facility the administrator could order that a ‘protective zone’ be constructed 
around it. 
Chapter 4 of title II of the EPDA contained measures to protect plant and 
animal species through land-use planning (art. 34, sec. 1), proper forest man-
agement (art. 34, secs. 2–4) and the preexisting Nature Protection Act of 1949 
(referred to in art. 35). The goals of these protective measures were to (1) create 
conditions under which plants and animals could fulfi ll ‘their biological functions 
for the benefi t of the environment,’ (2) prevent or control harmful environmental 
impacts on plants and animals, (3) prevent the intrusion of outside threats into 
ecosystems that have exceptional social and scientifi c value, and (4) ensure the 
balance of nature to preserve species from extinction and overexploitation (art. 
33, sec. 2). Article 34, section 4, authorized the Council of Ministers to issue spe-
cifi c regulations for protecting forests from air pollution, and article 36, section 2, 
empowered the Minister of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental 
Protection to establish rules for protecting botanical and zoological gardens. The 
most legally signifi cant provision of chapter 4, however, was article 37 which 
‘prohibited’ the destruction of plants that bond to the soil and the destruction of 
plants and animals contributing to a clean environment in general and water qual-
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ity in particular. This provision might have become a powerful tool for protecting 
wetlands and other natural resources.20
Chapter 5 on the protection of landscape values and rest environments incor-
porated by reference the provisions of the 1949 Nature Protection Act, adding 
only a few signifi cant new features to landscape protection. Article 40 required 
that landscape values and their protection be considered in socioeconomic and 
land-use plans, and article 41 authorized the regional People’s Councils to pro-
hibit or enjoin, as necessary, activities threatening destruction or deterioration of 
regional landscapes.21
Chapter 6 concerned protection of ‘green areas’ in cities and villages, includ-
ing urban parklands, lawns, workers’ garden plots, and small undeveloped spaces 
between buildings (art. 42, sec. 2). The goal was to preserve ‘appropriate condi-
tions of sanitation, climate and recreation’ for city dwellers and workers (art. 43, 
sec. 1). Any decision to alter green spaces for other uses had to be consistent with 
local land-use plans, and changes planned for areas containing old-growth forests 
required approval from the regional governor and the Ministry of Administra-
tion, Local Economy and Environmental Protection. One important provision of 
chapter 6 restricted the use of chemical substances in urban areas to prevent harm 
to existing green spaces (art. 44). In villages, the People’s Town Councils were 
authorized to designate rural parks, even on privately owned properties (art. 47, 
sec. 2). Private property rights also were restricted under article 48, which required 
landowners to maintain undeveloped properties ‘in their proper states.’ Before 
removing living trees and other vegetation in the course of developing land, prop-
erty owners had to receive permission from the local offi ce of the regional organ 
of state administration, which could require replacement or relocation of removed 
trees (art. 48, sec. 2). 
Chapter 7 of title II included provisions to protect the environment against 
excessive noise and vibration. Article 49 required individuals and economic units 
to protect the environment from excessive noise by refraining from noisy activi-
ties or by applying appropriate technologies to reduce noise levels. Article 50 
called on the Council of Ministers to defi ne ‘excessive noise’ by establishing per-
missible ambient noise and vibration levels. Authorities at the regional level were 
authorized to assign noise limitations to specifi c facilities, and when violations 
occurred, to suspend noise-generating activities (art. 51). Under article 52, local 
authorities could even restrict the use of trucks and other means of transportation 
at night to minimize noise pollution.
Chapter 8 concerned measures to protect against pollution from waste. This 
marked Poland’s fi rst ever attempt to regulate waste disposal and treatment (see 
Jendrośka and Radecki 1991, 70). It required, among other things, that waste-
generating facilities and individuals take measures to reduce waste (art. 53). Any 
wastes not amenable to recycling or reuse had to be destroyed, rendered harmless 
to the environment, or collected and removed to designated disposal sites under 
conditions ensuring environmental protection (art. 54). The methods of disposing 
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of particularly harmful (contaminated or infectious) wastes had to be approved 
by the appropriate regional authorities. Local governments were responsible 
for ensuring appropriate conditions for waste disposal (art. 56), and they were 
required to pick up and dispose of household wastes (art. 57). 
Chapter 9, the last in title II of the 1980 EPDA, concerned environmental 
protection against radiation. This was an interesting addition to Poland’s environ-
mental law because the number of nuclear activities in Poland was quite low—
Poland had (and has) no nuclear power plants. There were a substantial number 
of nuclear weapons in Poland, but these were under the control of the Soviet 
Red Army and, thus, beyond the regulatory reach of the Polish government. The 
Polish Party/state was appropriately concerned, however, with the environmen-
tal threat posed by low-level radioactive waste from sources including medical 
institutions. Articles 59 and 60 on protection against radiation required the safe 
generation, use and disposal of radioactive substances and equipment. Buildings 
housing radioactive substances and associated activities were to be constructed, 
maintained and decommissioned in a manner designed to protect public health 
(art. 60). Regional administrators also could require the construction of protective 
zones around the buildings (in accordance with art. 71 of chapter 3). Under article 
61, radioactive wastes were to be recycled, when possible, under supervision of 
the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate. Finally, article 62 provided that 
all organizations utilizing or producing substances or equipment emitting harmful 
radiation were obliged to monitor and measure radiation levels in the immediate 
ambient environment. 
As noted earlier, the various chapters of title II did not provide specifi c stan-
dards to accomplish any of the goals they established. That task was left primarily 
to the Council of Ministers, which, before the end of 1980, issued more than one 
dozen regulations implementing various provisions of the Act. By 1981, most 
(though not all) provisions of the 1980 EPDA were implemented (see Radecki 
1990a, 131n140). 
Environmental Duties and Liabilities 
Title III, chapter 1 of the 1980 EPDA established environmental protection duties. 
All economic enterprises and persons engaged in economic activities were obliged 
to ensure environmental protection (art. 64). Individuals also were responsible for 
protecting the environment when using it for non-economic purposes, such as 
tourism and recreation (art. 65). Under article 66, government agencies, enter-
prises and individuals all had a duty to ensure environmental protection by: 
1. carefully siting production facilities to minimize environmental impacts;
2. taking protective measures during economic activities;
3. restoring environmental conditions damaged by economic activities;
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4. making use of new technologies to reduce environmental impacts of 
economic activities, especially waste reduction and waste prevention 
technologies;
5. constructing, installing and maintaining appropriate environmental pro-
tection equipment;
6. installing monitoring equipment and conducting necessary measurements;
7. complying with environmental protection requirements in planning, 
designing and manufacturing machinery, equipment, etc.;
8. recycling wastes and effl uents, or ensuring their effective neutralization or 
disposal; and
9. making use of scientifi c and technical progress and legal, economic and 
administrative means of environmental protection.
Section 67 specifi ed additional duties of plant managers and workers. It is not at 
all clear, however, that the term ‘duty,’ as used throughout chapter 1 of title III, 
was meant to signify legal liability, which is addressed separately in title IV of the 
EPDA (arts. 80–85). Those liability provisions are remarkable in that they were 
premised on the so-called ‘polluter pays principle,’ which in 1980 was a relatively 
new and untested concept of environmental policy.22 Unfortunately, the ‘polluter 
pays principle’ was ill suited to a command economy in which the Party/state 
was ultimately responsible for virtually all pollution. Nevertheless, according to 
article 80 of the EPDA, the person or organization responsible for pollution dam-
age was supposed to bear the cost. Article 82 reiterated the mandate of article 66 
requiring enterprises and individuals engaging in economic activities to eliminate 
environmental threats and to restore preexisting environmental conditions. The 
regional authorities were authorized to specify requirements under these provi-
sions, and could levy fi nes for non-compliance. In addition, article 83 required the 
Minister of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection to rec-
ommend that other ministerial departments with authority over specifi c economic 
activities close down any plants causing serious environmental damage while in 
chronic violation of administrative regulations. 
In addition to economic penalties, polluters could be subject to sanctions 
under the Penal Code of 1969 (1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94) or the Petty Offenses 
Code of 1971 (1971 Dz.U. No. 12, item 114). Under the Penal Code, polluters 
who intentionally created a great threat to human life, health and property could 
be imprisoned for up to ten years, or fi ve years for negligently created threats 
(1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94, art. 40, secs. 1 and 2). The 1980 EPDA added to 
these provisions new offenses punishable by three years’ imprisonment for (1) 
pollution causing ‘potential danger’ (art. 107), (2) negligence in the utilization 
or maintenance of pollution control equipment (art. 108), (3) violation of duties 
with respect to environmental protection of agricultural and forestry lands (art. 
109), and (4) waste imports from abroad (art. 108a). For lesser offenses involving 
mistreatment of animals (art. 62), water pollution (art. 109), contamination of real 
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estate (art. 117), destruction of plants (art. 144) and damage to fi elds, forests or 
gardens (arts. 148–157), the EPDA stipulated prosecution under the 1971 Petty 
Offenses Code. Conviction for a petty offense could result in a three-month prison 
term, plus fi nes. However, throughout the Communist era, penal sanctions were 
rarely imposed on polluters (for reasons to be addressed in Chapters 5 and 6).
Administrative Fees and Fines 
The liability provisions of the EPDA were not the only economic mechanisms 
in the statute. Title V created a system of resource-use fees and title VII required 
economic penalties for violations of environmental norms. The resource-use 
fees mandated in article 86 were to be imposed on all resource-consuming and 
polluting activities. Air pollution fees were to be exacted per unit of emissions, 
including emissions within legal (i.e., permitted) levels. This was a novel mecha-
nism for emissions reductions in 1980. At that time, few countries used effl uent 
taxes to control pollution; even today, American air pollution laws impose no 
fees on emissions within legal limits. Poland’s Council of Ministers established 
the fee schedule by regulation. Emissions exceeding legal limits were subject to 
additional penal fi nes, under article 110. Regional authorities were to institute 
schedules of fi nes for effl uent discharges, pollution emissions, noise-producing 
activities, chemical uses and waste-dumping activities that violated environmen-
tal conditions. The collected fi nes and fees were earmarked for a new Environ-
mental Protection Fund (art. 87), which would fi nance construction of sewage 
treatment facilities and other public environmental projects specifi ed under arti-
cle 88. Poland’s system of fees and fi nes became the Party/state’s primary tool 
of environmental protection during the 1980s; civil and criminal liability were 
only of secondary importance. Unfortunately, as already suggested, the EPDA’s 
economic mechanisms were ill suited to the socialist economic system with its 
endemic soft budget constraints.23 
Administrative Responsibilities
We already have seen that article 66 of the EPDA imposed a general duty on 
government agencies as well as enterprises and individuals to ensure environ-
mental protection in implementing Party/state economic policy. Regulations 
implementing these duties were to be issued by the Ministry of Administration, 
Local Economy and Environmental Protection. Additional administrative respon-
sibilities were set forth in chapter 1 of title VI of the EPDA on ‘[o]rganization of 
environmental protection.’ The most important of these additional responsibilities 
concerned the newly created State Environmental Protection Inspectorate (art. 
94). Under article 95, the Inspectorate was responsible for (1) supervising compli-
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ance with environmental conditions established under the Act, (2) monitoring the 
state of and changes in the environment, (3) initiating activities of environmental 
protection and restoration, and (4) ‘popularization’ of environmental protection 
principles. The Inspectorate was not, however, an ‘enforcement’ agency; it had 
no independent statutory authority to levy fi nes or shut down harmful polluting 
activities. The Inspectorate was subordinated to both the Minister of Administra-
tion, Local Economy and Environmental Protection and the Council of Ministers, 
either of which could override decisions of the Chief Inspector. In addition to 
the Inspectorate, a new State Environmental Protection Council was established 
under article 97 as an advisory body to the Council of Ministers on environmental 
protection matters.
Public Participation in Environmental Protection
Before the 1980 EPDA, non-governmental organizations in Poland had virtually 
no role to play in environmental protection, such as it was. Even quasi-offi cial 
groups, such as the State Council for Nature Protection and the Nature Protec-
tion League, were reduced to playing only insignifi cant roles in the system. The 
1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act was a fi rst step toward giv-
ing independent ‘social organizations’ at least a limited role in the administrative 
process. Article 100 authorized them to fi le lawsuits to suspend environmen-
tally threatening economic activities and order restoration. In addition, before an 
administrative authority could approve any new economic activity likely to have 
substantial environmental impacts, the social organizations had to be informed 
and their comments and objections had to be considered. As we shall see in Chap-
ter 4, these provisions were never fully implemented, and to the extent they were 
implemented their value was limited. Nevertheless, non-governmental environ-
mental organizations became increasingly active in Poland, asserting consider-
able political, if not legal, infl uence.24
Environmental Research
Various provisions of the 1980 EPDA were designed to further scientifi c under-
standing and public awareness of environmental values and problems. Article 10 
of the statute required educational institutions and research facilities to conduct 
research into environmental conditions and ways to improve environmental per-
formance in production through technological innovation. Article 11 mandated 
that environmental protection be added to the curriculum in schools at all levels 
and in worker training courses. Article 12 required the mass media to disseminate 
information on environmental protection, but did not assure the media access to 
environmental information.25
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2.6. The Administration of Environmental Protection 
in Poland: 1980–8
The Birth of an Independent Environmental Movement
The enactment of the 1980 EPDA constituted only the fi rst event of what was to 
be a very active period for environmental protection in Poland. The year 1980 
also marked the birth of Solidarity and a critical, if too brief, period of political 
liberalization in Polish politics. Environmental information, traditionally guarded 
as a state secret (see Chapter 4, §4.5), was more widely publicized, albeit in lim-
ited quantities. The government and the Sejm ordered detailed investigations 
into the state of the environment, investigations which led, by the middle of the 
decade, to offi cial disclosures of widespread environmental devastation. In 1985, 
for example, the offi cial Communist Party daily, Trybuna Ludu (People’s Tri-
bune), reported that 35 percent of Poland’s population lived in exceptionally bad 
environmental conditions that would require at least 25 years to correct (Uncen-
sored Polish News Bulletin, Aug. 8, 1985). Meanwhile, new ‘social organizations’ 
appeared under the banner of Solidarity, including the National Commission for 
Environmental Preservation, established in July 1981, and the Polish Ecology 
Club (Polski Klub Ekologiczny or PKE), which became the fi rst truly independent 
pro-ecological organization in People’s Poland.26 
At its founding in Kraków in September 1980, the PKE was an illegal protest 
organization, comprised of academics, journalists, scientists, farmers and work-
ers. Thanks to its affi liation with Solidarity, by the middle of 1981 the PKE had 
more than 1,000 members and was registered as a legal social organization. This 
enabled the PKE to operate through offi cial political and legal channels, as well 
as through grassroots protest actions. The PKE became a force in Polish politics, 
accomplishing real and lasting achievements for environmental protection before, 
during and after the period of Martial Law (from December 1981 to December 
1982). Among its notable early accomplishments was a series of protests and a 
lawsuit against the Skawina aluminum works near Kraków, which, along with 
the factory’s poor economic performance, led the government to close the plant 
permanently in January 1981. This single event gave the PKE popular exposure 
and credibility, which greatly facilitated its efforts to increase public awareness 
of environmental issues. The PKE conducted scientifi c investigations, published 
reports and newsletters, and held weekly public meetings in Kraków. These vari-
ous information gathering and disseminating activities also helped to inform local 
political leaders. On December 2, 1981, Kraków’s People’s Council passed a res-
olution with the following introduction:
The People’s Council of the City of Kraków has determined that the degradation 
and devastation of the resources and assets of its natural environment have been 
growing steadily worse over a period of many years. It has found in particular 
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that the level of air pollution has reached a critical point, especially in the city of 
Krakow, that there is a growing shortage of water for residential and agricultural 
users, that lands under cultivation are being steadily degraded, that plant and ani-
mal life is in danger, that the landscape is being scarred, and, above all, that there 
is a direct threat to human life and the historical monuments of the Old Town. 
The resolution called for a review of local and regional socioeconomic and land-
use plans. More specifi cally, it recommended revising the plans to provide for 
the phased shut-down, by 1985, of the raw materials production divisions of two 
large polluters, the Kraków Sodium Products Plant and the Kraków plant of the 
‘Bonarka’ Inorganic Chemicals Industry (Walewski, Rada Narodowa Gospodarka 
Administracja, May 17, 1982). 
When Martial Law was declared in December 1981, the PKE was not out-
lawed, though its publishing and protesting activities were forced underground. 
Unlike Solidarity, the PKE remained a legal, offi cially registered ‘social organiza-
tion.’ The PZPR’s apparent tolerance of the PKE supports the view that the Party 
was, at least to some extent, sincerely interested in improving environmental pro-
tection. When Martial Law was lifted in December 1982, the PKE emerged larger 
and more infl uential than ever. By the mid-1980s, it had 3,000 members and 17 
branches throughout Poland, and it continued to exert substantial infl uence over 
the Party/state. Polluting factories built without facilities for waste disposal or 
sewage treatment were forced to close by PKE protests. On one occasion, the 
Club persuaded the Party/government to relocate a bitumen processing plant that 
was polluting water used by another enterprise for making fruit juice (Fura 1985, 
5). These successes spurred on other groups of what became, by the end of the 
decade, a diverse environmental movement consisting of more than 135 (mostly 
informal) organizations (Gliński 1996, 155–6), including the Party/government-
sponsored Social Movement for Ecology, the Catholic Church-affi liated Francis-
can Ecology Movement, and the green–pacifi stic Freedom and Peace group.
The few but remarkable successes of Poland’s environmental movement, par-
ticularly the Polish Ecology Club, were especially impressive given the political 
climate in which they operated. People’s Poland was far from an open, pluralistic 
democracy in which interest groups are not only tolerated but expected to partici-
pate in policy making. The members of the PKE and other environmental organi-
zations risked their freedom and (infrequently) their lives in protest actions. Even 
after Martial Law, police sometimes responded to protests with violence, as in 
Kraków in 1987 when a crowd of about 500 members of the Freedom and Peace 
environmental group gathered in the Market Square for a peaceful protest against 
air pollution from the Lenin Steelworks in neighboring Nowa Huta. According to 
published accounts, police dragged away several protestors, arrested ten, struck 
one in the face and kicked another (Reuters N orth European Service, March 
27, 1987). Environmental protestors were charged with taking part in an illegal 
assembly, a misdemeanor under Poland’s Petty Offenses Code, which brought the 
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case within the jurisdiction of Poland’s infamous lay courts, the kolegia. In these 
thoroughly non-professional courts, the judges were untrained, the proceedings 
were devoid of legal process and, not coincidentally, defendants had virtually no 
chance of acquittal. Of 230 citizens tried before kolegia during November and 
December of 1986, 229 were convicted. The kolegia were empowered to send 
environmental ‘criminals’ to prison for up to three years; they levied stiff fi nes 
and seized any property used in committing the offense—bad news for an envi-
ronmental protestor caught distributing leafl ets from her car.27 
The threats faced by environmental protestors should not be exaggerated, 
however. The Party/state in People’s Poland usually tolerated environmental pro-
tests, which often took place without incident, as in 1988 when 1,500 members 
of Freedom and Peace staged a protest against a toxic chromium factory that was 
contaminating Wrocław’s water supply (reported in Reuters Library Report, Sept. 
16, 1988). By tolerating environmental protests and occasionally acquiescing in 
protestors’ demands, the Party/state demonstrated a limited commitment to envi-
ronmental protection. However, that commitment extended only so far. The Party/
state never acted to protect the environment at the cost of its own political author-
ity or the ideological principles that legitimized Party rule (at least for the Party 
itself), including the commitment to full employment and high rates of production 
and economic growth.28 Coincidentally, enterprises closed following environmen-
tal protests always happened to be ineffi cient and obsolete. Enterprises that were 
profi table or signifi cant either for national defense or for the economy never were 
closed or even signifi cantly restrained following environmental protests. That 
does not mean, however, that the environmental protests were irrelevant. On the 
contrary, without them it is quite unlikely that any plants would have been closed. 
The Communist authorities virtually never shut down plants simply because they 
were economically ineffi cient or obsolete, so long as they met production targets. 
Environmental protests did, therefore, play a signifi cant role in closure decisions.
Environmental Protection in Socioeconomic and Land-Use Planning 
Spurred by the emerging environmental movement, the Party/state continued to 
move forward with its own agenda for environmental protection. In July 1981, at 
the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR, environmental protection con-
cerns were once again at the top of the agenda. The Congress adopted a resolution 
reiterating the ‘polluter pays principle’ for enterprises, and called for the increased 
use of ‘legal-fi nancial mechanisms’ to support the implementation and administra-
tion of the environmental laws (PZPR 1983, 676). Beginning in 1982, economic 
reforms included substantial environmental components, and new laws enacted 
to implement the reforms contained environmental provisions. The 1982 Law on 
Socioeconomic Planning (1982 Dz.U. No. 7, item 51, art. 9, sec. 3), for example, 
expressly required the inclusion of environmental concerns in planning processes. 
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As a result, environmental requirements began appearing in socioeconomic plans. 
The three-year plan for 1983–5 included a section on environmental protection 
that ‘recommended’ actions to (1) avoid spreading contamination to still pristine 
areas of the country, (2) preserve areas of special beauty and endangered species, 
and (3) stop further degradation of already devastated areas. Even more signifi -
cantly, this three-year plan, which had the force of law, designated four areas of 
the country, including Gdańsk and Kraków, as environmentally ‘endangered.’ In 
those areas, the plan banned further industrial development that might exacer-
bate environmental conditions, and instructed the Council of Ministers to develop 
detailed plans for protecting and restoring environmental conditions. Neverthe-
less, as Ludwik Jastrzębski (1990, 82) noted, the 1982 Socioeconomic Planning 
Law did not ‘create a balance between the interests of industry and environmen-
tal protection.’ It did not mandate the imposition and implementation of envi-
ronmental protection conditions by economic planners, but mandated only their 
‘consideration.’
Two years after the new Socioeconomic Planning Law, still more signifi cant 
environmental requirements were included in the 1984 Land Use Planning Act 
(1984 Dz.U. No. 35, item 185). Land-use planning serves an important regula-
tory function in all countries to ensure that diverse activities in any given area are 
compatible. In the socialist system, land-use planning was even more important; 
indeed, it was unavoidable. Because the Party/state owned all the means of pro-
duction and centrally planned the entire economic system, there was no way for 
it to avoid responsibility for development decisions and other important land-use 
considerations. Rather than deal with those issues as part of a single plan, People’s 
Poland, like the other socialist countries of Europe, adopted a bifurcated planning 
system. Socioeconomic plans set levels of production, resources allocation and 
prices, while separate and distinct land-use plans determined where economic 
activities and other developments could be located. In theory, land-use and socio-
economic plans had equal legal status, but in practice the bifurcated planning 
scheme resulted in the subordination of land-use plans to socioeconomic plans, 
with predictable results for environmental protection requirements.
The goal of land-use planning under Poland’s 1984 statute was the ‘com-
prehensive management of the territory of the entire country’ (art. 1). Land-use 
plans were to be prepared at three different levels—national, regional and local—
and updated every fi ve years (art. 7, sec. 1 and art. 19, sec. 3). National plans 
included primary environmental protection safeguards, including conditions on 
land use to ensure environmental protection and the ‘proper use’ of resources (art. 
18). Regional plans were supposed to assure achievement, in a given region, of 
the goals outlined in the national plans (art. 20, sec. 1), and local plans were to 
be based similarly on regional and national plans (art. 25, sec. 3). The planning 
process started with research into possible uses of a given area of the country, 
including considerations of present and future needs, followed by preparation of 
specifi c development plans, plan approval and, fi nally, project development. The 
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process was supposed to be inclusive, but in practice the scope of participatory 
rights depended on the type of plan under consideration. For national plans, only 
associations had to be consulted; individuals had no right to participate and no 
specifi c procedures were mandated (art. 19). At the regional level, administrative 
authorities had to provide public notice of the planning process, and specifi ed 
individuals (experts and specialists) had the right to intervene at various stages. 
The authorities had to give due consideration to all recommendations, comments 
and objections before approving a fi nal plan (arts. 21 and 22). The same was true 
at the local level, where participatory rights were even greater—any interested 
individual could intervene—and more detailed procedures were specifi ed (arts. 
27 and 28).29
Changes in the Administrative Structure of Environmental Protection 
As environmental protection was being incorporated to a limited degree into 
socioeconomic and land-use plans, the administrative organization of environ-
mental protection underwent further changes. Responding to a perceived lack of 
progress on environmental protection and pressure from academic and scientifi c 
organizations, the Sejm in 1983 created a new Offi ce of Environmental Protection 
and Water Management (1983 Dz.U. No. 44, item 201). This agency took over 
primary administrative responsibility under the 1980 EPDA, though not for long. 
After only two years it was replaced by a new Ministry of Environmental and 
Natural Resources Protection (Ministerstwo Ochrony Środowiska i Zasobów Nat-
uralnych). This reorganization was signifi cant because, for the fi rst time, it vested 
primary nature protection responsibilities (under the 1949 Nature Protection Act) 
and environmental protection responsibilities (under the 1980 EPDA) in the same 
ministry. This facilitated the coordination of pollution control and nature protec-
tion activities. There was a notable omission, however: silviculture activities in 
national parks were controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food 
Management (Ministerstwo Rolnictwa, Leśnictwa i Gospodarki Żywnościowej) 
(see Radecki 1990a, 135). Consequently, there was some confusion about which 
agency had primary responsibility for national park management (see Lachiewicz 
1986, 9–10). Finally, in 1987 the two ministries agreed on shared responsibility 
for national park supervision; the Forestry Ministry would be in charge of general 
park management, while the Environment Ministry would be the lead agency for 
all nature protection responsibilities within the parks (see Radecki 1990a, 139).
In 1984, the Sejm’s Commission for Administration, Town and Country Plan-
ning, and Environmental Protection conducted its fi rst assessment of the imple-
mentation of the 1980 EPDA. According to reports broadcast on Polish television 
(BBC Monitoring Service, May 31, 1984), the Commission found an ‘alarming 
reduction in the quantity of pure surface waters throughout the country’ and noted 
a 60 percent rise in ‘gas pollution.’ The Commission concluded that ‘the gov-
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ernment’s actions were insuffi cient and not completely successful.’ Neverthe-
less, from 1985 to 1989 the administrative structure of environmental protection 
remained fairly stable, while the Party/state tried other methods for improving the 
implementation, administration and enforcement of environmental laws and regu-
lations. In 1985, the Sejm issued a resolution committing regional People’s Coun-
cils to devote at least 7 percent of their total spending to environmental protection, 
but by 1987 this mandate had been met in only 11 of 49 regions. Consequently, 
the Sejm issued another resolution that year calling on the Council of Ministers 
to improve environmental law enforcement (see Radecki 1990a, 136). Mean-
while, the Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resources Protection prepared 
a ‘National Program for Environmental Protection in Poland to the Year 2010’ 
(Narodowy program ochrony środowiska przyrodniczego do roku 2010, Projekt, 
1988). When completed, this document became the subject of high-level meetings 
organized at the Council of State (see Radecki 1990a, 136). Environmental inter-
ests were critical of the plan and, before the end of that year, new ecological politi-
cal parties appeared, including the Polish Ecological Party and the ‘Green Party.’ 
2.7. Conclusion
Environmental protection remained a nominal political priority right up until the 
end of socialism and the demise of the Polish Communist Party in 1989. But 
for various reasons (described in Chapters 3–5) this did not translate into a high 
level of environmental law enforcement. Violators were not consistently sanc-
tioned, and the elaborate system of environmental fees and fi nes proved ineffec-
tual. Despite the Polish Party/state’s regulatory efforts and its increasing fi nancial 
commitment to environmental protection toward the end of the 1980s, pollution 
levels continued to rise, valuable natural resources increasingly were wasted, and 
Poland’s ecological crisis intensifi ed. 
However, this chapter has demonstrated that these were not the consequences 
of utter neglect and indifference. From the very beginning of the Polish People’s 
Republic, environmental and nature protection concerns received offi cial recogni-
tion and, increasingly, Party/state action. Unless we are prepared to claim that the 
constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations were all intended to accomplish 
nothing more than deception, we will have to look to alternative explanations 
for the failure of environmental protection under socialism. And to claim that 
Poland’s environmental laws were merely disingenuous attempts to deceive, we 
would have to explain why the Party/state took such apparent pains to accomplish 
such a meager goal. Specifi cally, why did the PZPR initiate many environmen-
tal protection efforts in the 1960s and 1970s, long before there was any apparent 
domestic or international political pressure?
The next four chapters of the book attempt to fashion an alternative explana-
tion that is more plausible, comprehensive and, I hope, persuasive. That explana-
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tion views the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland as a systemic 
consequence of totalitarian socialism. Legal, political, economic and ideological 
features of the (real) socialist system combined to impede effective environmental 
protection. To be sure, Poland’s totalitarian rulers might have altered the system to 
better facilitate environmental protection, but that would have required the Party 
to sacrifi ce substantial political and economic authority.
 
Notes
1. This chapter is a revised version of Cole (1995a). Among the best sources on envi-
ronmental law in Poland are Sommer (1993a), Jastrzębski (1990), Radecki (1990a), and W. 
Brzeziński (1974, 1975). Post-Communist developments in environmental law and admin-
istration are treated in Chapter 7.
2. Early legislation and other historical documents relating to environmental protec-
tion in Poland are collected in Boć and Samborska-Boć (1994).
3. In this section and the two that follow, I rely heavily on Radecki (1990a). 
4. On the socioeconomic implications of the 1949 Nature Protection Act, see Nowak 
(1964, 24–30).
5. NEPA requires agencies of the federal government, when contemplating major 
actions that could signifi cantly affect the quality of the human environment, to consider 
potential environmental impacts. For more on the similarities between NEPA and Poland’s 
1949 Nature Protection Act, see Jendrośka (1996a).
6. Congress created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in NEPA to oversee 
the statute’s implementation and administration. The CEQ issued regulations under NEPA 
which specifi ed the procedural requirements for fulfi lling the statute’s mandates (40 C.F.R. 
Part 1500). 
7. On non-forestry matters, the 1949 Act required other ministers to consult with the 
Forestry Minister, but not necessarily with any other representatives of PROP.
8. The Council of Ministers (Rady Ministrów) was the highest administrative organ in 
the state, comprised of ministers from all the ministerial departments. The Prime Minister 
served ex offi cio as chair of the Council. The Council of Ministers was analogous to the 
President’s cabinet in the United States, only more powerful, since it could issue regula-
tions and rescind ministry orders. 
9. This new committee was reorganized in 1951 as the Nature Protection Works 
(Zakład Ochrony Przyrody) located in the Ministry of Education. Two years later, the 
Nature Protection Works was removed to the newly established Polish Academy of Sci-
ences (Polska Akademia Nauk or PAN). Then, in 1957 a new Committee for Nature and 
Natural Resources Protection (Komitet Ochrony Przyrody i jej Zasobów) was created in 
PAN. In 1978, that committee was reorganized into the Commission for Nature Protection 
of the Scientifi c Committee ‘Man and Environment’ (Komisja Ochrony Przyrody Komitetu 
Naukowego ‘Człowiek i Środowisko’). In 1981, this last committee was offi cially acknowl-
edged as the successor to the Nature Protection Committee, which had replaced PROP in 
1949 (see Radecki 1990a, 108).
10. Actually, the available sources confl ict about the location of the State Inspectorate 
for Water Protection. Andrzej Deja (1992, 4), of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
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states that it was established in the Navigation Ministry. Professor Radecki (1990a, 114), 
in contrast, asserts that it was located in the Ministry of Public Utilities.
11. For a discussion of the ‘higher necessity’ defense in Polish environmental law 
enforcement, see Chapter 3 (§3.6).
12. Another problem of the 1966 Air Pollution Act was that it spoke in terms only of 
ambient concentrations (amounts of a pollutant in the atmosphere at a certain location, usu-
ally measured as a fraction of the total chemical make-up of the atmosphere, e.g., parts per 
million or micrograms per cubic meter). The government was left to translate from ambient 
concentrations to emissions levels (amounts of a pollution released into the atmosphere, 
usually measured in tons per year, per day or per hour) for each individual source of air 
pollution in the country. The problem was that Poland did not have the technical capability 
to make these computations. Such technical restraints were a chronic problem of air pollu-
tion legislation and administration until the very end of People’s Poland. 
13. On the utility of the Civil Code for environmental protection, see generally 
Radecki (1987). 
14. Chapter 4 (§4.3) discusses environmental litigation under the civil and criminal 
codes, as well as under Poland’s environmental laws.
15. The Polish term ‘środowisko’ directly translates into the English word ‘envi-
ronment,’ and it was fi rst used in the context of ‘environmental protection’ (ochrona 
środowiska) in the 1970 Academy of Sciences resolution appointing the Scientifi c Com-
mittee ‘Man and Environment’ (see Radecki 1990a, 119).
16. The use of economic instruments (fees and fi nes) in Poland is addressed in Chap-
ters 3 (§§3.3 and 3.4) and 5 (especially §5.5); also see Mazurkiewicz (1986).
17. The fi rst (and apparently only) complete English translation of the 1980 EPDA 
was published in the Joint Publication Research Service, no. 75483, Apr. 11, 1980, at 
34–67. Many commentaries on the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development 
Act have been published (see Ochocki 1980a; Radziszewski 1987; Jastrzębski 1979a; 
Jastrzębski and Rest 1982; Wałaszek-Pyzioł 1982; Jendrośka and Radecki 1991; Biernat 
and Wasilewski 1992).
18. The Polish verb ‘kzstałtować’ literally means to shape, form or mold (see 
Stanisławski 1969). As used in the title of the Environmental Protection and Development 
Act, it has been variously translated as ‘shaping,’ ‘control’ and ‘development.’ I believe 
‘development’ comes closest to describing the meaning of kzstałtować as used in the 1980 
EPDA. 
19. Article 30, section 2, did not change existing law. Long before the 1980 EPDA was 
enacted, the Polish Supreme Court ruled that a glass factory was liable for damages when 
its air pollution emissions destroyed vegetables in neighboring fi elds, even though its emis-
sions were within permitted limits. Uchwała Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 7 kwietnia 1970 r. 
[Resolution of the Supreme Court of April 7, 1970], Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich i Komisji 
Arbitrażowych [Rulings of the Polish Courts and Arbitration Commission or OSPiK] 1971, 
notebook, 9, item 169 (reprinted in Radecki 1991a, 59; also see Skoczyłas 1986, 167).
20. However, article 37’s potential as a source of wetlands protection was never 
tapped; indeed, it was not even recognized by legal scholars in Poland. For example, Jerzy 
Sommer (1991), in an article specifi cally concern wetlands protection in Poland, did not 
even mention article 37 of the Environmental Protection and Development Act.
21. On the relationship between nature conservation and environmental protection in 
the 1980 EPDA, see W. Brzeziński and Kulesza (1982).
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22. On the development of the ‘polluter pays principle,’ see Opschoor and Vos (1989). 
23. For more on the misapplication of market mechanisms for environmental protec-
tion in a non-market economy, see Chapters 3 (§§3.3 and 3.4) and 5 (§5.5).
24. Poland’s independent environmental movement is introduced below in §2.6.
25. Chapter 3 provides a critical assessment of the 1980 EPDA and other environmen-
tal protection laws in People’s Poland.
26. On the history of the Polish Ecology Club, see Fura (1985).
27. For more on environmental protection in Poland’s courts, see Chapter 4 (§4.4). 
For more on the kolegia, see Andrzejewski and Nowicki (1991). 
28. I address these and other Communist Party ‘legitimacy principles’ in Chapter 4 
(§4.2).
29. On public rights to participate in the land-use planning process, see Jendrośka and 
Nowacki (1991, 41–2).
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This chapter begins the comprehensive explanation of Poland’s environmental 
crisis, focusing on specifi cally legal problems of environmental protection. It is, 
in a sense, a critical supplement to Chapter 2’s largely descriptive history of Pol-
ish environmental law. Subsequent chapters will address political, economic and 
ideological impediments to environmental protection. This organizational schema 
is admittedly artifi cial; in the socialist system politics, economics, ideology and 
law were inextricably intertwined in fact and by design. It is no simple matter, 
therefore, to segregate ‘legal’ issues from politics, economics and ideology. But it 
does make some sense to address law as a separate object of analysis, if we distin-
guish between issues of law enforcement and law enforceability. 
3.1. Law Enforcement and Enforceability
The relationship between enforceability and enforcement can be described this 
way: enforceability is a necessary but insuffi cient condition for enforcement, 
so that lack of enforcement may, but does not necessarily, signify unenforce-
ability. Enforceability analysis asks whether a law could be enforced to achieve 
its objectives, while enforcement analysis concerns whether the law is actually 
being enforced to achieve its objectives. On my defi nition, a law that is per-
fectly unenforceable is incapable of actual enforcement. A law that is perfectly 
enforceable still may not actually be enforced for political or economic reasons 
extraneous to the legal text. There are, of course, degrees of enforceability; it can 
be reduced as well as destroyed. Because some legislative ambiguities impair 
enforceability more than others, some laws naturally are more enforceable than 
others. 
Enforceability is a function of what is written into the laws; it is internal 
to the laws themselves. A statute that does not create binding obligations is, of 
course, unenforceable; as a normative matter it might as well not exist (though it 
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may have symbolic value). The same is true for a law that creates a binding obli-
gation, but one that no law enforcement agency could possibly monitor, such as 
thought-crime legislation. Even a law that creates a binding obligation capable of 
oversight is unenforceable if it provides no sanctions for non-compliance; viola-
tion of the law constitutes a crime to be sure, but without consequence. The ulti-
mate question for enforceability analysis is whether the law as written is capable 
of enforcement to achieve its stated objective(s). This question goes not only to 
the text of the statute, but also to the choice of legal strategy. For example, a deci-
sion to regulate with economic incentives rather than administrative commands 
may (or may not) affect enforceability, depending on features of the political- 
economic system in which the laws operate. However, on questions of legal strat-
egy the distinction between law enforceability and enforcement tends to break 
down, as we shall see.
Poland’s environmental laws generally were enforceable (see Kulesza 1988, 
26). Despite many weaknesses, ambiguities, gaps and exceptions, they could have 
been more successfully implemented and enforced than they were in fact. Many, 
if not most, enforcement problems resulted from structural or incidental features 
of the political-economic system—what Jerzy Wróblewski (1991, 259) has called 
‘the sociocultural facts conditioning the origins and operation of statutory law’—
rather than from the laws themselves. That is not to say, of course, that Poland’s 
environmental laws were perfectly enforceable; many features in the laws them-
selves at least hindered enforcement.
The enforceability problems in socialist environmental statutes can be divided 
into fi ve types, which are, in fact, common to virtually every modern legal sys-
tem; they do not necessarily refl ect the role of law in a given society. These prob-
lems include ambiguous drafting, lax standards, weak (or non-existent) penalty 
provisions, limited (or non-existent) participation rights, and provisions creating 
broad exceptions or exclusions from liability. Such ‘problems’ may or may not be 
drafted intentionally into a statute. They may be manufactured, however, to serve 
a variety of purposes, including propaganda. For example, a law that appears 
quite tough may be weakened (intentionally or unintentionally) by lax standards 
or ambiguous drafting.
3.2. Legal Ambiguities
Ambiguous drafting may impede or destroy enforceability, depending on the 
nature or type of ambiguity. It can be intentional or result unintentionally from 
sloppy drafting. And legislative provisions can be ambiguous in a number of 
ways. A common ambiguity in Polish environmental laws concerns the assign-
ment of legal obligations. Consider, for example, the almost unintelligible lan-
guage in article 72 of the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act 
(1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6): 
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In the initiation of the protection of animate natural resources, certain natural cre-
ations or areas of landscape value, which protection is projected in regulations on 
environmental protection, the principles of their utilization and necessary prohibi-
tions and rules applicable to an object of protection and its domain, which princi-
ples enable the preservation of protective natural or landscape values, are defi ned.
This language has been interpreted to require that principles for utilizing pro-
tected resources be promulgated together with protective measures. But even if 
this much can be gleaned from article 72 (and I am not sure it can), the provi-
sion still lacks any indication of the role that these principles are to play and how 
they are to relate to the protective measures. In other cases the statutory language 
may be simple and straightforward, expressing a clear legislative intent to cre-
ate binding legal obligations, but the requirements are insuffi ciently specifi c. In 
other words, there are legislative gaps. This was a common form of ambiguity in 
Poland’s environmental laws. Most environmental laws in People’s Poland were 
mere declarations; they did not set specifi c standards. As Jerzy Sommer (1986b, 
206–7) has put it, parliamentary acts, not only in the environmental fi eld, were 
very general and of a non-specifi c character and sometimes vague. So, in practice, 
the executive rule-making dominated.’ For instance, article 17 of the 1980 EPDA 
provided the following instruction:
2. Organizational units and physical persons that undertake to exploit mineral 
deposits or direct their exploitation have a duty to undertake necessary means 
to protect resource deposits, and also to protect the ground, surface-, and 
groundwaters, gradually to undertake reclamation of the area under exploi-
tation and return elements of the natural environment to their proper states.
3. Rules for managing mineral deposits relative to environmental protection 
in mineral exploitation shall be provided in specifi c regulations. 
Mining enterprises could not possibly have known the extent of their legal obli-
gations for environmental protection just from reading this language. They had 
to await subsequent action by the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Mining 
or the Minister of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protec-
tion. But such gaps in the law do not necessarily create enforceability problems. 
In fact, it is a common practice of law drafters in virtually all countries to codify 
goals, procedures and deadlines but to delegate to expert administrative agen-
cies the task of setting specifi c norms. In the United States, for example, most of 
the federal environmental laws enacted during the 1970s employed precisely this 
approach. In the 1970 Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§7401 et seq.), Congress estab-
lished air quality goals—in the form of ambient pollution concentration standards 
designed to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety (42 U.S.C. 
§7409(b)(1))—and established procedures and deadlines for achieving that goal. 
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But Congress delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the task 
of setting specifi c emissions standards. As with Polish mining enterprises under 
the 1980 EPDA, American industries subject to regulation under the 1970 Clean 
Air Act could not know, just from reading the statute, what was expected of them; 
they had to wait for the EPA to fi ll in the gaps. This did not impede enforceabil-
ity, however, because Congress established clear goals, instituted procedures and 
deadlines for agency action, and provided mechanisms for congressional and judi-
cial oversight of the ongoing regulatory process. From this and numerous other 
examples we can conclude that legislative ambiguities or gaps do not necessarily 
impede enforceability. But they may impede enforceability if the legislature fails 
to specify a responsible agency or to provide suffi cient directions, procedures and 
deadlines concerning what, how and by when the agency is supposed to regulate. 
Unfortunately, gaps in Poland’s environmental laws often created enforce-
ability problems because, unlike their American counterparts, Polish administra-
tors frequently were not given suffi cient directions about what, how and by when 
to regulate. In addition, the laws failed to provide for administrative oversight; 
there was no recourse if the agency simply failed to comply with statutory man-
dates. For example, when article 17, section 3, of the 1980 EPDA called for ‘spe-
cifi c regulations’ to ensure environmental protection in mining activities, it did 
not specify (1) an agency responsible for promulgating those regulations, (2) a 
deadline for issuing standards, (3) means of determining the suffi ciency of stan-
dards, that is, whether they conformed to statutory goals, or (4) consequences for 
failing to issue regulations under the article. Nor were there avenues outside of 
the 1980 EPDA for effectively enforcing article 17’s mandate. Poland established 
a High Administrative Court in 1980 to hear citizens’ complaints against specifi c 
arbitrary and capricious state actions (1980 Dz.U. No. 4, item 8), but that court 
was not authorized to hear complaints concerning agency failures to implement 
laws or promulgate necessary regulations. Even if it had been authorized to order 
agencies to comply with statutory mandates, the High Administrative Court could 
not have salvaged article 17 of the 1980 EPDA because the statute did not even 
specify a responsible ministerial department or set deadlines for regulations. In 
fact, there was not a single instance in the history of People’s Poland where a 
recalcitrant agency was forced by court order to promulgate or rewrite a regula-
tion to comply with the requirements of any environmental law. As Richard Bolan 
(1992, 304) has written, ‘[t]he court system [in People’s Poland] provided no 
recourse. State agencies felt above the law, and a citizen’s right to bring state 
agencies to court was at best a fi ction.’
Ministries were actually accountable only to the Party/government (see 
Rybicki 1984, 98–9), but that hardly constituted a check on administrative irre-
sponsibility. Agency action or inaction presumably refl ected government policy 
to begin with, so limiting agency oversight to the government was tantamount to 
no oversight. The lack of effective agency oversight in People’s Poland was con-
fi rmed by the vast number of cases where ministries avoided or ignored statutory 
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environmental protection responsibilities without consequence. The most glaring 
case concerned article 15 of the 1980 EPDA, which purported to regulate the use 
of agricultural chemicals:
3. Organizational units and physical persons undertaking activities related to 
agricultural or forestry uses can apply chemical and biological agents directly 
or indirectly to the soil only in amounts and ways not injurious to the balance 
of nature, and especially to avoid causing harmful contamination of the soil 
or water, destruction of animals, plants or ecosystems, or deterioration of 
their conditions for living, cultivation or breeding.
Article 15, section 4, further provided that the Agriculture and Forestry Minis-
tries, in cooperation with the Ministry of Administration, Local Economy and 
Environmental Protection ‘shall designate the procedures, the range and condi-
tions for implementing the principles discussed in section 3, in accordance with 
the needs of environmental protection.’ These were not particularly ambiguous 
mandates; they designated responsible agencies and provided suffi cient directions 
for regulatory standards. However, no regulations ever were issued under article 
15, leaving a gaping hole in the law. Despite the clear mandate in the 1980 EPDA, 
there was ‘no environmental regulatory scheme to control pesticides’ in People’s 
Poland (Jendrośka 1990, 31). Administrators also avoided statutory responsi-
bilities under the public participation provisions of the 1980 EPDA. Article 99, 
sections 2 and 4, and article 102 of that statute authorized the creation of new 
institutions for public participation in environmental protection. Up to the end of 
1988, however, these provisions remained, in the words of Jerzy Jendrośka and 
Wojciech Radecki (1991, 67–8), ‘a dead letter’ because the necessary executive 
orders never were issued.
Poland’s environmental laws were rife with unclear provisions, fuzzy man-
dates and far too many holes in administrative authorizations. They also suffered 
from a special type of ambiguity resulting from two or more confl icting legal rules 
(see Bochniarz and Bolan 1991). In some cases, such confl icts may have made it 
diffi cult or impossible to tell, before the fact of actual enforcement, which (if any) 
of the confl icting legal rules would prevail. But in many other cases, confl icts did 
not create much confusion because the outcome was predictable from the circum-
stances. For example, when some provision in a socioeconomic plan confl icted 
with an environmental regulation under the 1980 EPDA, it was clear, given the 
political-economic facts of life in People’s Poland, that the plan would prevail. 
But this was entirely a function of the politics of enforcement; it did not refl ect on 
the enforceability of environmental regulations. The story was different, though, 
when the environmental law itself provided for exceptions or exclusions; that did 
constitute a real limitation on enforceability, as we shall see later in this chapter.
There is no way to ‘keep score’ or draw conclusions about the percentage of 
Poland’s environmental problems resulting from legal ambiguities or any other 
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kind of enforceability problem. But an exhaustive survey of enforceability prob-
lems resulting from ambiguities and gaps in legal rules really is beside the point, 
which is merely to identify and explain the nature and scope of various enforce-
ability problems in Poland’s environmental laws. Ambiguities in the laws ren-
dered specifi c provisions unenforceable and reduced the overall enforceability 
of statutes, but they only rarely nullifi ed entire laws—the non-existent pesticide 
regulations were a glaring but uncommon exception. Even without express and 
defi nite guidelines and directions, administrators for the most part did implement 
the laws; they issued specifi c norms and, as the next section discusses, most of the 
norms they established were not merely enforceable but fairly stringent.
3.3. Lax Environmental Standards in Polish Law
It somehow seems inappropriate to write of lax standards as contributing to prob-
lems of enforceability. All other things being equal, lax standards should be rela-
tively easy to enforce—it is, after all, easier to do a little than a lot. Much depends, 
of course, on the circumstances. Lax standards certainly relate to law enforceabil-
ity to the extent they impede the achievement of environmental protection goals. 
Assuming that the Polish Party/state enacted its environmental laws to achieve 
some level of effective environmental protection (which seems warranted in light 
of the history recounted in Chapter 2), then it makes sense to refer to lax standards 
as potential drags on enforceability. In any case, lax standards are problems in the 
laws themselves, rather than external features related to actual enforcement.
As noted in the preceding section, Poland’s environmental laws contained 
few standards or norms. They mostly declared goals and aspirations that were to 
be achieved in accordance with more detailed environmental regulations, land-use 
plans, and socioeconomic plans.1 In order to judge the effi cacy of environmental 
standards, we must therefore look beyond the statutes themselves to the regula-
tions issued under them. This does not alter the analysis, however, because those 
regulations become part of the law and, as such, part of the enforceability analy-
sis. Poland’s environmental standards (including ambient air quality standards 
and water quality standards) provide little grounds for criticism. They certainly 
did not impede whatever environmental protection goals they were intended to 
achieve. And they compare quite favorably with environmental standards of other 
Communist and capitalist countries, including the United States. For instance, 
Poland’s air quality standards were more inclusive and more stringent than com-
parable American standards. Poland’s Council of Ministers issued air quality 
standards under the 1980 EPDA on September 30, 1980, for 54 pollutants (1980 
Dz.U. No. 24, item 89), compared with only six ‘criteria’ pollutants with national 
ambient air quality standards under the American Clean Air Act. And, as Table 3.1 
shows, comparable Polish standards were more stringent.2 Indeed, all of Poland’s 
pollution standards were fairly stringent, and they were set pursuant to exemplary 
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procedures. For example, Poland established water quality standards, in the form 
of maximum allowable concentrations of various pollutants, based on 49 indica-
tors of water quality that accounted for biological properties of different water 
bodies and projected uses (see Sommer 1984).
Maximum permissible ambient pollution levels do not, of course, tell the 
whole story of pollution control. Ambient concentration levels are largely, though 
not entirely, determined by emissions rates. So, in People’s Poland, as in the United 
States, air quality standards become the reference point for determining neces-
sary emissions limitations. Enterprises were not directly responsible for attaining 
the ambient air quality standards; they were obliged only to meet the emissions 
limitations (if any) included in their individual operating permits. Those limita-
tions were based on the difference between the goals established in ambient stan-
dards and existing concentration levels. This entailed a complicated process of 
translation. First, the administrators had to determine baseline pollution levels, 
which meant monitoring and measuring existing pollution concentrations. They 
then had to calculate the total amount of emissions reduction necessary to reduce 
ambient concentrations to legal levels. Finally, administrators had to allocate nec-
essary emissions reductions among various pollution sources. In other words, 
they had to limit emissions of regulated pollutants from each individual source 
so that emissions from all smokestacks would not cause ambient concentrations 
to exceed permissible levels. For this process to work, environmental regulators 
had to be able to determine some acceptable baseline concentration of each pol-
lutant in the atmosphere (before setting emissions limits); they had to know the 
chemical properties of pollutants, including how pollutants interact with other 
constituent elements of the atmosphere; and they had to understand meteorologi-
cal and topographical features in each region. In addition, the ability to determine 
baseline concentrations of pollutants in the atmosphere required minimal mea-
suring and monitoring capabilities without which neither ambient standards nor 
emissions limits could rationally be set.4 In other words, a regulatory strategy 
based on ambient air quality levels required a fairly high level of technological 
sophistication. However, People’s Poland was operating under severe technologi-
Table 3.1. Comparison of selected ambient air quality standards in People’s 
Poland and the United States in 19803
Pollutant Time average Polish standards American standards
Sulfur dioxide Annual mean 64 μg/m3 80 μg/m3
24-hour 350 μg/m3 365 μg/m3
Nitrogen oxides Annual mean 32 μg/m3 100 μg/m3
Sources: Polish standards—1980 Dz.U. No. 24, item 89; American standards—Anderson 
et al. (1990, 165, table 3.1).
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cal limitations; pollution-monitoring equipment was in short supply, and what 
little equipment was available was faulty and not uniformly calibrated. Unlike the 
United States, for example, People’s Poland did not possess elaborate computer 
models to supplement its monitoring and to aid in relating emissions levels to 
ambient concentration levels (under various atmospheric conditions). Under the 
circumstances, the selection of a regulatory approach based on ambient concen-
tration levels may have been impractical. But those same technological limita-
tions likely would have rendered any strategy of pollution control more or less 
unenforceable. On a purely textual analysis of the laws, however, there surely was 
nothing inherently problematic about regulating emissions on the basis of ambient 
concentration standards. 
Lax pollution control standards were not, in any case, a big problem in Peo-
ple’s Poland; at least it cannot be maintained that Poland’s statutory requirements 
were patently insuffi cient to accomplish minimal environmental protection goals. 
Although the statutes tended to delegate (often in ambiguous mandates) respon-
sibility for setting standards, administrators responded, as a rule, by establishing 
fairly stringent standards, which, had they actually been enforced, could have 
resulted in substantial environmental protection.
There was, however, a different kind of ‘standard’ (broadly understood) in Pol-
ish environmental laws that raised signifi cant enforceability problems: the use of 
resource and pollution fees. Poland fi rst introduced pollution and resource charges 
in the 1974 Water Law (1974 Dz.U. No. 38, item 230); regulations under that stat-
ute instituted a schedule of fees for water consumption and diversion (1975 Dz.U. 
No. 33, item 181; also see Mazurkiewicz 1986, 36). Six years later, in the 1980 
EPDA, the Party/state applied resource-use and pollution fees broadly across the 
whole range of natural resources and economic activities. The EPDA mandated 
per unit fees for air pollution emissions, waste storage, timber harvesting, water 
diversion and consumption, waste water discharges, and the use of agricultural 
lands for non-agricultural purposes. Fees were also charged for driving cars in 
areas under special protection, such as national parks (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6, 
art. 86). This broad application of user and pollution fees was progressive, and 
not only for a Communist country. In the 1980s, other countries in Western and 
Eastern Europe instituted similar fees. Many countries (including France, West 
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and the USA) charged for 
noise generation; some (including Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
USA) imposed waste production fees; a few (such as Australia, France, West Ger-
many, Italy and the Netherlands) charged for the right to use or discharge effl uent 
into water; and only three (France, Japan and the former Czechoslovakia) insti-
tuted fees for air pollution emissions (see Opschoor and Vos 1989, 34, table 3.2; 
Leden 1975, 67). None, however, imposed as many charges, covering as many 
resources and pollution sources, as People’s Poland. Poland’s sweeping applica-
tion of environmental charges was certainly unique in the Soviet bloc. Hungary’s 
1976 Act on the Protection of the Human Environment (The Statutes of the Hun-
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garian People’s Republic, 1978), in contrast to Poland’s 1980 EPDA, introduced 
no resource-use or pollution charges of any kind (see Enyedi and Zentai 1987, 
213). Nor did the Soviet Union’s environmental legislation; on the contrary, up 
to 1990 Soviet land and water laws reiterated the ideologically based mandate of 
free use of socially owned land and water (see 1968 Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 
51, item No. 485, art. 8; 1970 Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 50, item No. 564, art. 
15).5 Perhaps more surprisingly, Poland’s use of market mechanisms for environ-
mental protection exceeded (and still exceeds) the practice in the West. To this day 
the United States, for example, exacts no per unit charges for air pollution emis-
sions or water effl uent discharges within legal limits. 
Poland’s early and extensive use of pollution and resource-use charges under 
the 1980 EPDA was unique and progressive, but it was not an effective policy 
for environmental protection in the socialist economic system. For reasons to be 
discussed in Chapter 5, market mechanisms for environmental protection require 
markets to be effective. But as quasi-legal standards, Poland’s user and pollution 
fees were clearly enforceable; nothing in the 1980 EPDA or administrative regula-
tions created barriers to fee assessment and collection. The law clearly delegated 
authority to the Council of Ministers to establish procedures and, most impor-
tantly, amounts for environmental charges (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6, art. 86, sec. 
3). As we already have seen, such statutory delegations are common and do not 
necessarily indicate enforceability problems. They may, however, if administra-
tors are permitted to set fee levels so low that they cannot possibility achieve 
their statutory purpose(s). Assuming the purpose of fees and fi nes under the 1980 
EPDA was to create an incentive for enterprises to reduce pollution emissions and 
increase conservation of natural resources,6 enforceability would seem to require 
that fees be set at levels that would induce some degree of the desired behav-
ioral changes. It is questionable whether fees at any level could have affected 
enterprise behavior in the socialist economic system, however, given endemic soft 
budget constraints. But that concern (which I address in detail in Chapter 5, §5.5) 
relates not so much to the laws themselves as the choice of regulatory strategy. 
For present purposes it is enough to ask whether the fee schedule, as established 
in regulations under the 1980 EPDA, was suffi cient to accomplish its ostensible 
goal. In the case of People’s Poland, the answer seems to be that the fees were not 
suffi cient to induce pollution reductions and increased conservation of resources.
In his book on environmental fees and fi nes in People’s Poland, Marek 
Mazurkiewicz (1986, 35) noted that ‘[f]ees for the economic use and transfor-
mation of the environment are thought to be a practical means of bringing the 
production costs of single economic units into accord with social costs.’ But this 
could happen only if fees were set high enough to refl ect the social costs of the 
economic activities. And to set fees properly required the ability, fi rst, to deter-
mine social costs and, then, price resources accordingly. Arguably neither of these 
conditions can be met successfully anywhere in the world, let alone in a socialist 
country where costs and prices are arbitrary, that is, set by planners without regard 
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for what someone actually is willing to pay for any given product or commodity. 
No country in the world prices its natural resources (e.g., via user fees or pollu-
tion charges) at levels close to social costs. But is that strictly necessary for envi-
ronmental charges to be useful policy instruments? Perhaps if the goal is some 
Utopian conception of ‘perfect’ environmental protection. If, however, the goal 
is merely to induce polluters and resource users to some incrementally higher 
degree of environmental protection, it should be necessary only to set fees at 
levels that make it too costly for polluters and resource users to continue their 
present production and pollution patterns. In economic terms, fee levels must 
be set higher than (average) abatement costs. This presumes, of course, that 
fi rms operate in competitive markets where profi t determines survival, that is, 
where budget constraints are reasonably hard. And, as we shall see in Chapter 
5, this presumption did not hold for socialist economies. Nevertheless, environ-
mental fees theoretically might have induced the desired behavioral changes 
in socialist enterprises had they impacted on the reward structure, by reducing 
either worker and management bonuses or the production levels on which those 
bonuses were based.7
It goes without saying that where natural resources fees are zero (or close to 
zero), as they were for many years in Poland and throughout the socialist world, 
they cannot affect production levels and, so, must fail to reduce rewards. Even 
after the Polish Party/state introduced environmental fees, fi rst in the 1974 Water 
Law and more broadly in the 1980 EPDA, they tended to be nominal and insuf-
fi cient to induce changes in patterns of resource use and pollution emissions (see, 
e.g., Wajda 1992, 502; Jendrośka 1992, 533). For example, the charge in 1980 
for emitting 1 kilogram of lead into the air was 40 zlotys (approximately 0.008 
1980 USD); the fee for emitting 1 kilogram of sulphur dioxide was much lower, 
only 0.2 zlotys (about 4/1000ths of one 1980 US cent) (1980 Dz.U. No. 24, item 
93).8 These numbers alone do not tell us whether the fees were suffi cient for pur-
poses of environmental protection; we also need information concerning marginal 
abatement costs. Once we knew how much it would cost polluters to reduce pol-
lution emissions (through technological installations or process changes) to a cer-
tain desired level, then we would be in a position to judge whether the fees were 
high enough to alter economic behavior. But even without that information, we 
should recognize at least that Poland’s environmental charges were higher than 
zero, which is what many countries, including the United States, charge today for 
air pollution emissions and water effl uent discharges within legal limits. Never-
theless, Poland’s pollution and resource use fees pretty clearly were insuffi cient 
to induce the desired changes in economic behavior. Some evidence of this comes 
from Polish statistics showing that Polish enterprises became less productive 
throughout the 1980s, while investing more natural resources and emitting more 
pollution.9 This is just the opposite of what we would expect to see from effective 
environmental charges. There was, of course, a variety of systemic and incidental 
reasons for the relative increase in natural resources use and pollution emissions 
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in Poland,10 but among them surely was the fact that fee schedules for resource 
use and pollution emissions were too low to accomplish the statutory goal of 
reducing emissions and increasing conservation.
To be fair, fees under the 1980 EPDA were intended not only to induce 
changes in economic behavior; another goal was to fi nance the new National 
Environmental Protection Fund, established under title V, chapter 2, of the 1980 
EPDA. As far as that goal was concerned, the system of environmental charges 
created no enforceability problems. At any level, assuming actual assessment and 
collection, the fees would (and did) accomplish the purpose. By 1983, fees total-
ing more than 10.5 billion zlotys (approximately 103 million 1983 USD) had been 
paid into the National Environmental Protection Fund (Mazurkiewicz 1986, table 
3). So, it cannot be said that the system of environmental charges created in the 
1980 EPDA was completely unenforceable, that is, incapable of minimally fulfi ll-
ing statutory goals.
Finally, it is important to distinguish between environmental fees and non-
compliance fi nes under the 1980 EPDA. Both are economic mechanisms for 
environmental protection, but from a legal point of view they serve different func-
tions. Fees constitute quasi-legal standards for environmental protection; they are 
charged on a per unit basis for resource use and pollution emissions at all levels. 
Fines, by contrast, are not ‘standards’ in any sense. They are penalties charged 
for violating standards. If an enterprise in People’s Poland exceeded its permitted 
level of emissions, that constituted a violation resulting possibly in fi nes. While 
fees were intended to induce behavioral changes independently of legal stan-
dards for pollution, fi nes were intended merely to induce compliance with the 
legal standards. Despite these important differences, fees and fi nes under Polish 
environmental laws suffered similar enforceability problems, as the next section 
discloses.
3.4. Weak Penalties
If Poland’s environmental standards were fairly stringent and mostly enforceable, 
the same cannot be said, as a rule, for the non-compliance penalties provided 
in statutes and regulations.11 In the same batch of regulations that introduced 
resource-use and pollution fees (1980 Dz.U. No. 24, item 99), the Council of 
Ministers imposed administrative fi nes for violations of pollution control stan-
dards. The goal of the fi nes, of course, was to deter violations. However, in Peo-
ple’s Poland fi nes were not set with reference to the marginal costs of pollution 
control or production; they were established in reference only to resource-use and 
pollution fees. Fines were set at exactly four times the fees charged per unit of 
emissions above permitted levels. They were doubled if the violation continued 
unabated for three straight years or if the violation occurred in the more heavily 
polluted regions of Kraków and Katowice (see Sommer 1990b, 36–9). But the 
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most important question is whether they were suffi cient actually to deter viola-
tions. The consensus is that they were not. As Jerzy Jendrośka (1992, 533) has 
written, the ‘fi nes were low and offered a cheaper option than compliance with 
environmental standards,’ so polluters not surprisingly preferred to pay the fi nes 
rather than abate the pollution (see Mazurkiewicz 1986, 96). Actually, the penal-
ties themselves were easy enough to enforce, but their low levels defi nitely under-
mined the enforceability of goals and standards under the 1980 EPDA and other 
environmental laws. For enterprises it was a matter of simple economic sense: 
why comply with stringent environmental norms when it cost so little to violate 
them? The logic inherent to this question was compelling. Perhaps more than 
any other features in the laws themselves, the low levels of environmental fi nes 
undermined the enforceability of legal standards. But it was not just the low level 
of fi nes that impeded effective environmental protection. Had the fi nes been 100 
times higher, they still would not have accomplished their intended purpose of 
inducing enterprises to comply with environmental standards. However, the rea-
sons for this had nothing to do with the laws themselves (or with enforceability 
as I have defi ned the term), and everything to do with the nature of the socialist 
system, particularly the Party/state’s confl ict of interest as environmental regula-
tor and nominal owner of regulated enterprises, which exacerbated already soft 
budget constraints (see the discussion in Chapter 5, §5.5). Arguably, it was the 
use of market mechanisms per se rather than the level of fi nes that most hampered 
environmental protection in the non-market economy.
Administrative fi nes were not, however, the only penalties provided for vio-
lating environmental rules. The 1980 EPDA incorporated provisions of the 1969 
Penal Code (1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94), which permitted prison terms of up to 
ten years for violators (art. 40, secs. 1 and 2). I take statutory provisions autho-
rizing imprisonment to be inherently enforceable; so long as the duty is clearly 
delineated and a prison term, however long, attaches for specifi ed violations, there 
should be no problem of enforceability. The penal sanctions authorized under 
Poland’s 1980 EPDA were high by international standards. For the sake of com-
parison, in Sweden the maximum term of imprisonment for violating the 1973 Act 
on Products Hazardous to Man or to the Environment was one year (see Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development 1977, 54). The biggest prob-
lem with Poland’s penal sanctions was that they were not actually enforced, as 
we shall see in Chapter 4. There were, however, two signifi cant enforceability 
problems related to penal sanctions under the 1980 EPDA and 1969 Penal Code. 
First, only ‘persons’ could commit crimes, and enterprises were not considered 
legal ‘persons’ (1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94, art. 1). So criminal penalties applied 
in environmental cases only when identifi able individuals, rather than corporate 
entities, were responsible for the violations. This limited the utility of penal sanc-
tions for environmental protection, and so reduced the enforceability of environ-
mental standards. The second enforceability problem raised by penal sanctions 
under the 1980 EPDA concerned exclusions from liability under article 23 of the 
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1969 Penal Code. That and similar exclusionary or exculpatory provisions in the 
1964 Civil Code, the 1980 Code of Administrative Procedure and the 1980 EPDA 
are discussed in section 3.6.
3.5. Limited Citizens’ Participation Rights
The relationship between citizens’ participation rights and law enforceability is 
not so obvious as that between enforceability and substantive legal standards or 
non-compliance penalties. It is possible to conceive, at least, of an enforceable 
environmental law that does not include provisions for citizens’ participation in 
planning, decision making or enforcement. However, in many countries such citi-
zen participation provisions are a regular feature of environmental legislation. 
This refl ects a widespread perception that environmental rules are more enforce-
able with citizens’ participation than without. And that perception stems from the 
fact that there are so many polluters to be watched, while governmental enforce-
ment capabilities necessarily are limited by fi scal constraints. In addition, there is 
the question of administrative oversight: who regulates those charged with regu-
lating the polluters? Public participation provisions serve both purposes. Citizens 
can monitor and, when necessary, sue responsible administrative agencies for fail-
ing to comply with statutory directives, while, at the same time, supplementing 
agency enforcement efforts by monitoring and bringing actions against polluters. 
Besides facilitating law enforcement, public participation provisions can increase 
the universe of available information for environmental policy making; by direct-
ing decision makers to seek public comments and suggestions on environmental 
policy matters, the legislature can promote better informed decision making.
Exemplars of both types of public participation rights are found in Ameri-
can environmental laws.12 In the 1970 Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§7401 et seq.), 
Congress included a prototypical citizen suit provision to facilitate enforce-
ment, that is, to enhance enforceability. ‘Any citizen’ was authorized to sue pol-
luters for violating emission standards or administrators for failing to perform 
non- discretionary duties (42 U.S.C. §7604). A different kind of public partici-
pation provision designed to improve environmental decision making is found 
in the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. §§4321 et 
seq.). NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare elaborate environmental impacts 
assessments (EIAs) for all proposed major actions that could signifi cantly affect 
the quality of the human environment. The EIA process is designed to be open 
and inclusive. Agencies must solicit comments from concerned individuals and 
organizations, and consider all plausible alternatives (including the ‘no action’ 
alternative) to the proposed action. NEPA was intended to improve environmen-
tal decision making but not environmental law enforcement. The statute does not 
mandate any substantive outcome; alternatives must be considered, but the agency 
ultimately can select whatever alternative it prefers, even the most environmen-
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tally harmful. An individual citizen or group can sue for procedural failures under 
NEPA, but they cannot sue the agency for its substantive decision. NEPA’s pur-
pose, then, is not to ensure decisions that are best for the environment but to 
improve the decision- making process by ensuring that environmental impacts 
receive due consideration. The implicit presumption is that, even if NEPA does 
not force certain results, a better-informed agency is likely to reach substantively 
better decisions, including for the environment. Indeed, the information gained 
through environmental impact assessments has led administrators to change and, 
in some cases, drop planned actions (see Funk 1990, 759).
The widespread diffusion of such public participation provisions throughout 
the industrialized world over the past 25 years suggests a common perception 
that they signifi cantly enhance the enforceability of environmental laws. People’s 
Poland fi rst provided limited public participation rights in environmental protec-
tion even before the 1980 EPDA, though these were mostly paper rights; citizens 
could not (in any case, did not), try to make use of them. The lone exception was 
the right to sue to prevent individual harm under the 1964 Civil Code (1964 Dz.U. 
No. 16, item 93, arts. 222 and 439).13 However, that exception was never very 
meaningful for purposes of environmental law enforcement mainly because citi-
zens could sue only for their own harm; one could not sue to prevent or stop harm 
to others. The 1980 EPDA increased the legal, if not the practical, ability of asso-
ciations to sue polluters under the Civil Code. Article 100 of the EPDA provided a 
limited citizen suit provision, which permitted legally recognized organizations to 
sue in civil court to suspend environmentally threatening economic activities and 
to order environmental restoration. As of 1985, six environmental associations—
the League for Nature Protection, the League to Combat Noise, the Polish Tourist 
Association, the Polish Angling Association, the Polish Hunting Association and, 
most signifi cantly, the independent Polish Ecology Club—were on the Ministry 
of Justice’s list of groups authorized to participate in civil proceedings. For a vari-
ety of political and economic reasons (to be discussed in subsequent chapters), 
these groups rarely sued under article 100. In one rare case from 1975 (before the 
1980 EPDA increased the participation rights of recognized environmental asso-
ciations), the League for Nature Protection, an offi cial (i.e., Party-approved) con-
servation association, sued a grocers’ cooperative for water pollution. The civil 
chamber of the Supreme Court ruled without comment for the defendant (this case 
is discussed in Jendrośka and Nowacki 1991, 46). Between 1973 and 1980, a total 
of 4,754 civil lawsuits were fi led in People’s Poland. Of these, only 117—approx-
imately 2.5 percent—were for environmental harm. Plaintiffs won complete vic-
tories in only 5 percent of those 117 cases; they received partial compensation 
in 56 percent (Jendrośka and Nowacki 1991, 46). Given their fi scal constraints 
and poor prospects for success in court, it is not surprising that environmental 
associations did not begin actively participating in civil proceedings against pol-
luters until after the PZPR’s fall from power in 1989. Nevertheless, in the eyes of 
most analysts, the public participation provisions of the 1980 EPDA constituted a 
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potentially far-reaching and effective tool of environmental law enforcement (see 
Jendrośka and Nowacki 1991, 42–3; Nowacki 1993, 73). 
In addition to authorizing recognized associations to sue polluters in civil 
court, Article 100 of the 1980 EPDA allowed them to ‘petition’ administrative 
agencies to stop a polluting activity and bring suit in the High Administrative 
Court. But before 1990, administrators retained unfettered discretion to grant or 
deny association petitions. Thus, the ‘right’ of associations to participate in the 
administrative process was far less substantial (if not completely insubstantial) 
than their right to sue in civil court. The 1980 EPDA also included a (quasi-)
NEPA-like provision authorizing administrators to require that enterprise manag-
ers or developers submit ‘opinions’ on environmental impacts (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, 
item 6, art. 70). But this provision was vacuous. Aside from the fact that adminis-
trators were free not to require environmental impact opinions, the statute failed 
to stipulate content requirements or criteria for determining the suffi ciency of an 
environmental impact opinion. Even more importantly for present purposes, arti-
cle 70 did not really constitute a citizens’ participation provision because, unlike 
NEPA, it did not provide citizens or associations a statutory role in the process. 
For this reason, Jerzy Jendrośka and Jerzy Sommer (1994, 169–70) have con-
cluded that ‘Poland is a typical example of a country in which the legal concept 
of EIA differs substantially from the NEPA process.’ The omission of public par-
ticipation rights in Poland’s EIA process was partly rectifi ed, however, in article 
100 of the 1980 EPDA, which, in addition to authorizing environmental lawsuits 
by recognized associations, included a NEPA-like requirement that administrative 
authorities inform and consider the comments and objections of recognized social 
organizations before approving any new economic activity likely to have substan-
tial environmental impacts. Although this still did not amount to the broad public 
participation rights guaranteed to American citizens under NEPA, the rights cre-
ated in article 100 of the EPDA did enhance to some extent the enforceability of 
environmental law in Poland.
In 1980, besides enacting the EPDA, the Sejm also amended the 1960 Code 
of Administrative Procedure, providing, among other things, for increased par-
ticipation in the administration of environmental protection (1980 Dz.U. No. 4, 
item 8). These amendments did not go nearly so far, however, as article 100 of 
the EPDA. Under the amendments to the Code of Administrative Procedure, rec-
ognized associations were permitted to intervene in administrative court suits 
brought by others; but associations could not initiate administrative court suits of 
their own (art. 31). This basically mirrored the right of associations to intervene 
in civil suits under the 1964 Civil Code.
More important for public participation in environmental protection than the 
provisions of either the Civil Code or the Code of Administrative Procedure were 
the relevant sections of the 1984 Land-Use Planning Act (1984 Dz.U. No. 35, 
item 185). Under article 29 of that statute, any interested individual or group had 
the right to comment on or object to the contents of a local land-use plan within 
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21 days after its promulgation. The law also ostensibly guaranteed public access 
to regional plans (art. 14). Citizens’ comments on land-use plans were in no way 
binding on local or regional authorities, but they were sometimes effective. Of 
course, after the land-use plans were adopted, recognized organizations could 
challenge them in court under article 100 of the 1980 EPDA. That the provisions 
of the 1984 Land-Use Planning Act were only sporadically and incompletely 
implemented did not negate their contribution to the enforceability of environ-
mental protection requirements; they increased (at least in theory) citizens’ and 
social groups’ access to and infl uence over the Party/state’s environmental protec-
tion apparatus.
Ultimately, however, the various public participation provisions discussed 
in this section had only minor impacts on day-to-day enforcement (or lack of 
enforcement) of environmental laws in People’s Poland. This is in stark contrast 
to the experiences of other countries, including the United States, where citi-
zens’ participation provisions have contributed signifi cantly to environmental law 
enforcement. There are at least two reasons similar provisions did not bring simi-
lar results in People’s Poland. First, Poland’s public participation rights were not 
nearly so broad; citizens could intervene only in certain cases, in few forums, and 
in limited ways. Most importantly, citizens were pretty much restricted to taking 
action against polluters. Even after the 1980 amendments to the Code of Adminis-
trative Procedure, citizens had no real recourse against recalcitrant administrators. 
They could sue ministers in the High Administrative Court for harm suffered from 
specifi c administrative decisions in individual cases, such as industrial location 
decisions and pollution permitting. But they could not sue for agency inaction, 
including failure to implement the laws. In short, the public participation provi-
sions in Poland’s environmental laws were insuffi cient to enhance enforceability 
signifi cantly. This conclusion should not come as a surprise, however, given the 
totalitarian structure of the political system in People’s Poland (which is the sub-
ject of Chapter 4).
3.6. Exceptions that Swallowed the Rules
One fi nal enforceability problem of environmental law in People’s Poland resulted 
from the sweeping exceptions and exclusions from liability that were incorporated 
into virtually every piece of legislation. These were political-economic ‘safety 
valves,’ the legal means of last resort by which Party/state authorities could avoid 
their own rules. It was not strictly necessary, of course, to provide such legal 
mechanisms for avoiding environmental rules; the concept of ‘socialist democ-
racy’ (discussed in Chapter 4, §4.1) gave the Party/state an extra-legal justifi cation 
for violating its own laws. But as the socialist system grew increasingly legalistic 
in the years following Stalin’s death, it became common for the Party/state to pro-
vide strictly legal means for avoiding statutory mandates and regulatory norms.
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The relationship between legal exceptions and enforceability is clear. To the 
extent laws provide exceptions from liability, they tend to undermine the purposes 
for which liability was created in the fi rst place. Every exception or exclusion in 
a law affects enforceability; by its own terms, the law cannot be enforced against 
activities or persons exempted or excluded by law from liability. But, of course, 
every law has its limits, and enforceability analysis extends only so far as a law’s 
intended application. We do not conclude, for example, that the American Clean 
Air Act is ‘unenforceable’ because it does not regulate each and every air pollut-
ant or polluter. Enforceability analysis is constrained by what the laws, as written, 
actually set out to accomplish. That said, certain types of exceptions and exclu-
sions from liability do affect enforceability.
We can distinguish between what might be called ‘simple’ exclusions on the 
one hand, and ‘political’ exceptions on the other. An example of a simple exclu-
sion is a statute that provides only limited coverage. For instance, a waste dis-
posal law conceivably could apply to all waste producers, including individuals 
or households. However, no country’s waste regulations require individuals or 
households to obtain waste generation or disposal permits; permitting and licens-
ing requirements are limited to industrial and commercial waste generators and 
disposers. This kind of limitation obviously narrows the coverage of the regula-
tion, but we would not say that it renders regulations ‘unenforceable’ with respect 
to those who are not covered. With a political exception, by contrast, enforce-
ability always is affected because such exceptions can be applied arbitrarily. Con-
sider a hypothetical waste regulation that includes the following provision: This 
regulation shall not apply to waste generators where the state authorities deter-
mine that the national interest dictates otherwise. Such a provision clearly would 
compromise enforceability because it provides a legal means for authorities to 
avoid enforcing the law whenever they choose. Stated generally, legal exceptions 
or exclusions raise problems of enforceability when they provide for political or 
economic expediency to trump legal rules on a case-by-case basis.
The ‘Higher Necessity’ Exception in Poland’s Penal Code
The most prominent example of this kind of broad political exception in Pol-
ish law was the ‘higher necessity’ exception of the 1969 Penal Code. Article 23, 
section 2, of that Code permitted (and still permits today) the courts to waive 
liability where the activity causing the violation furthers some ‘higher neces-
sity.’ In practice, this exception was interpreted to create an economic balance: 
if the ‘value’ of the activity causing the violation was greater than the ‘value’ of 
the environmental harm, then liability could be waived.14 It was an express and 
broad limitation on all criminal liability in People’s Poland, and it constrained 
the enforceability of all substantive Penal Code provisions. Most importantly for 
our purposes, the ‘higher (economic) necessity’ exception limited the enforce-
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ability of other statutes incorporating the Penal Code, including the 1980 EPDA. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the 1980 EPDA expressly incorporated article 140 of the 
1969 Penal Code, which criminalized activities causing intentional or negligent 
threats to human life, health or property (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6, art. 107). The 
EPDA also added new penal sanctions for causing ‘potential danger’ (art. 107), 
negligently using pollution-control equipment (art. 108), and violating duties with 
respect to environmental protection of agricultural and forest lands (art. 109). 
Each of these offenses was subject to the ‘higher necessity’ exception provided in 
article 23 of the Penal Code, which permitted judges and prosecutors to dismiss 
summarily and without judicial review any criminal violation of the EPDA. Pol-
luters could not have known before-the-fact whether they would be saved by the 
‘higher necessity’ exception, but the availability of this broad political exception 
certainly undermined environmental protection, and not just in theory. According 
to one report, the majority of prosecutions for penal violations of the environmen-
tal protection laws were discontinued for reasons of ‘higher necessity’ (Mykietyn 
and Radecki 1985, 38–40). Few criminal cases even made it into court.
Similar political exceptions from liability were written into the penal codes 
of other Communist countries. For example, section 20 of East Germany’s Penal 
Code excepted from punishment criminal conduct aimed at fulfi lling a ‘higher 
duty, that is, conduct that, under the circumstances, was more benefi cial for 
the socialist society and less harmful to state and social interests’ (discussed in 
Radecki 1981, 221). As in Poland, the East German exception subordinated legal 
rules to political decisions, with substantial implications for law enforceability. It 
is interesting to note, by way of contrast, that such broad political exceptions are 
not found in the criminal codes of ‘rule of law’ states. The West German Penal 
Code came the closest, perhaps; it included exceptions from criminal liability 
in sections 34 and 59. But these were different from the broad political exemp-
tions provided for in the Communist penal codes mainly because the discretion 
they provided to courts and prosecutors was clearly and distinctly limited. Sec-
tion 34 was a typical necessity rule found in most contemporary criminal laws. 
It permitted courts (or prosecutors) to excuse an offense, such as trespassing, in 
order to avoid an imminent threat to life, limb or property; the perpetrator could 
be released from criminal liability if the danger averted exceeded the harm caused 
in averting it. Rather than balancing the economic interests of the state, section 
34 merely balanced the harm caused against the harm averted. Section 59 of the 
West German Penal Code permitted courts to let an offender off with a warning in 
cases where (1) a substantial fi ne had already been incurred, (2) the court reason-
ably could anticipate that the perpetrator would, from that point on, lead a ‘law-
abiding life,’ (3) the circumstances of the case suggested that a warning would 
be preferable to punishment, and (4) punishment was not required ‘to defend the 
legal order.’ Section 59 did not relieve perpetrators of liability, but gave courts 
limited discretion in meting out punishments (see RGBI, S. 127, as revised on Jan. 
2, 1975; B.G.B1 ‘I,’ S.1, as amended, as of Dec. 30, 1986).
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Balancing Individual and Social Interests under the Administrative 
Procedures Code
The ‘higher (economic) necessity’ exception to environmental law responsibili-
ties was available only for criminal offenses; it did not relieve polluters of civil 
or administrative liability. But similar exceptions were provided in the Code of 
Administrative Procedure. Articles 7 and 8 of that Code were interpreted in such a 
way as to allow the High Administrative Court, in any environmental case, to bal-
ance individual interests against the public interest. This was problematic because 
in a socialist country such as People’s Poland, the public interest always out-
weighed the private interest. Moreover, in environmental cases the public interest 
commonly was on both sides of the dispute—the public interest in production 
and development versus the public interest in environmental protection. How one 
public interest prevailed over the other in such cases turned out to be a matter of 
pure politics rather than law (or even legal politics).
The Code of Administrative Procedure’s public interest balancing test could 
not take violators completely off the hook; it did not relieve them of liability 
but was used after the fi nding of liability to determine the appropriate remedy. 
The public interest could dictate that compensation be reduced or even denied. 
And this created a disincentive for plaintiffs to sue in the fi rst place, diluting 
the enforceability of the environmental rules. Plaintiffs who took the trouble and 
expense to bring a suit in administrative court could, and sometimes did, come 
away with nothing to show for it but a worthless fi nding of liability. 
Exceptions in the 1980 EPDA
The 1980 EPDA included its own broad political exception from liability. 
Under article 82, every legal person and organizational unit was obligated to 
do everything possible to protect the environment but, under section 3 of article 
82, polluting activities could continue where the environmental harm could not 
be prevented by technological or economic means. This exception was limited, 
however, by the requirement that the polluter had to contribute to the Fund for 
Environmental Protection ‘a sum of money corresponding to the amount of dam-
age resulting from the environmental disturbance.’ Regional Party/state admin-
istrators were authorized to determine the amount of compensation based on the 
same kind of ‘public interest’ analysis provided in the Code of Administrative 
Procedures (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6, art. 82, sec. 2). And it was used to similar 
effect. Legal standards of environmental protection were sacrifi ced by the ‘public 
interest’ determinations of local bureaucrats. In practice, when polluting enter-
prises complained that they did not have the technology or money to avoid or 
reduce the pollution, local administrators typically would let them off the hook if 
they agreed to pay compensation for all environmental harm caused. How much 
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did they have to pay? That was a matter for bargaining between the enterprise 
and the bureaucrats, with no administrative oversight or judicial review. Article 
82 thus undermined the enforceability of virtually all environmental protection 
obligations under the 1980 EPDA, reducing them to matters for private negotia-
tion between polluters and local bureaucrats, both of whom represented the same 
political master.
Another provision of the EPDA had a similar impact. Article 71 permitted a 
polluting activity to continue if it was found to be in the ‘public interest,’ which, 
according to Eduard Radziszewski’s (1987, 141) commentaries on the EPDA, 
meant that the activity was ‘crucial for the national economy.’ In such cases, the 
authorities could (but did not have to) require the polluting facility to construct a 
protective zone around its boundaries (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6, art. 71, sec. 1). 
This provision undermined the enforceability of environmental protection norms 
by giving enterprises, industrial ministries and planners a wedge to use against 
complying with environmental standards. True, it applied only to activities ‘cru-
cial for the national economy.’ But in a planned economy where all economic 
activities were closely integrated, so that bottlenecks in one sector often would 
close down production in all others, what activity was not ‘crucial?’
Exceptions in Regulations
Even when the environmental statutes contained no provisions permitting politi-
cal (i.e., discretionary) exceptions from liability, exceptions sometimes were fash-
ioned in executory regulations. For instance, article 110 of the 1980 EPDA directed 
regional administrative authorities to levy administrative fi nes on polluters for 
violating legal norms under the 1980 EPDA or subsidiary regulations. There were 
no statutory exceptions. The Council of Ministers was given responsibility for 
determining ‘the amount, the principles, and the procedures for assessing fi nan-
cial penalties’ (art. 110, sec. 2). In its 1980 implementing decree, the Council of 
Ministers authorized the environmental protection authorities to reduce adminis-
trative penalties on a case-by-case basis, according to some ‘rather enigmatically 
formulated’ criteria (Sommer 1990b, 38). Under this regulation, bureaucrats had 
complete discretion to reduce or completely rescind fi nes, thereby undermining 
(in some cases completely) the purposes for which fi nes were imposed.
This is not to argue that administrative discretion in assessing penalties 
always or necessarily undermines the law. As we shall see in Chapter 7, in post-
Communist Poland the Ministry of Environmental Protection exercises statutory 
discretion to waive administrative fi nes, but only if the polluting enterprise is in 
the process of installing environmental protection equipment. If the environmen-
tal installations are completed within fi ve years, the penalty is extinguished; oth-
erwise, the penalty is reinstated and doubled (see Sommer 1990b, 38). This kind 
of discretion may actually enhance the enforceability of environmental law. So 
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it is not administrative discretion per se that undermines enforceability, but the 
nature, extent and direction of the discretion.
3.7. Conclusion
Despite the broad political exceptions, the limitations on public participation, 
weak penalties and various ambiguities, gaps and confl icts within the environ-
mental laws of People’s Poland, those laws for the most part were enforceable. 
They established suitable and achievable goals and legal obligations that were, 
with notable exceptions, fi lled in with mostly (though not uniformly) adequate 
administrative regulations. Those regulations were often undercut, however, by 
weak fi nancial incentives and penalties. The laws, no doubt, would have been 
more enforceable had they been less ambiguous, with stronger and more certain 
penalties.
It is interesting, if not particularly  instructive, to wonder why Poland’s envi-
ronmental laws and regulations frequently combined stringent legal standards 
with relatively weak economic standards (fees) and penalties (fi nes). We can 
only speculate about the reasons. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, enterprises 
and their respective ministries exercised a good deal of infl uence over the entire 
process of environmental regulation, including the establishment of both legal 
standards and penalties. That cannot explain, of course, why the legal standards 
were high but penalties low. There are, however, a couple of reasons we might 
expect enterprises to have had more success infl uencing the level of penalties 
than the substantive legal standards. First and foremost, they may have found it 
much easier and more effi cient to lobby only for low penalties. Legal norms were 
the most visible part of the environmental laws, and the Party/state may have 
wanted particularly strict norms to show the world that People’s Poland was at the 
forefront of environmental protection. Meanwhile, the impact of those stringent 
norms could quietly be cushioned by lax enforcement and low penalties. With 
fees and fi nes set low enough, enterprises and industrial ministries would not 
have cared much about relatively stringent legal norms. But this argument proves 
too much. If the Party/state was only, or even primarily, concerned with image 
(rather than effective environmental protection), it could easily have established 
tough- looking penalties along with stringent legal norms. That would have made 
Poland’s environmental laws appear even more impressive, but without conse-
quence for socialist enterprises operating under soft budget constraints. (As we 
shall see in Chapter 5, §5.5, the Party/state regularly reimbursed penalized enter-
prises with increased budget allocations.)
Although political efforts to undermine legal norms undoubtedly had some 
effect on fi nancial penalties and resource-use fees, there is, I think, a more com-
pelling explanation: the low levels of fees and fi nes were incidental (and probably 
unintentional) consequences of the socialist economic system’s endemic inability 
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to price goods and resources accurately. In the absence of markets, it simply was 
much more diffi cult (if not impossible) to determine where fi nes and fees should 
be set to have the desired impact on polluting behavior and resource consump-
tion.15 In theory, the authorities could have kept raising environmental charges 
until they effected some change in enterprise behavior, but, given the soft bud-
get constraints under which socialist enterprises operated, they may have been 
completely insensitive to price signals at any level. No environmental legislation, 
however perfect, could have resolved that problem.
It cannot be maintained, in any case, that the laws themselves were the pri-
mary cause of the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland. As we 
shall see in Chapter 7, the 1980 EPDA is still on the books; it has been amended 
several times since 1989, but remains structurally intact. While work continues 
(as of this writing) on replacement legislation, the 1980 EPDA appears to be func-
tioning much better today than it did in the former system. That in itself suggests 
that Poland’s environmental protection problems had less to do with what the 
laws provided (and failed to provide) than with political, economic and social fac-
tors that interfered with law enforcement. The next two chapters on, respectively, 
the politics and economics of environmental law enforcement in People’s Poland 
confi rm this view.
Notes
1. For a concise exposition of the regulatory process in People’s Poland, see Sommer 
(1984).
2. It is not possible to compare each and every air quality standard because, for some 
standards, the two countries used different time averaging. For instance, in Poland the 
maximum permissible annual mean concentration of airborne lead was 2 micrograms per 
cubic meter; in the United States, the quarterly standard is 1.5 micrograms per cubic 
meter.
3. Polish air pollution emissions standards were most recently amended in 1990 (1990 
Dz.U. No. 15, item 92).
4. Of course, in the absence of monitoring capability, it would not matter whether the 
limits were rational or arbitrary since they would be perfectly unenforceable in either case. 
According to Dr. Jerzy Jendrośka of the Environmental Law Group at the Polish Academy 
of Sciences (conversation of July 6, 1992), the lack of monitoring technologies was a major 
problem for environmental law enforcement in People’s Poland: ‘the government really 
had no means of monitoring emissions or determining when emissions levels from any 
single plant exceeded the maximum.’
5. The ideological underpinnings of Soviet and East European laws on the free use of 
land and water are discussed in Chapter 6 (§6.4). The Soviet Union fi nally instituted land-
use charges shortly before its disintegration in 1990 (see 1990 Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 
10, item No. 129, art. 12).
6. This assumption seems warranted by the analysis in Chapter 2. It also accords with 
the analysis in Mazurkiewicz (1986). 
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7. The socialist reward structure and its implications for environmental protection are 
discussed in Chapter 5 (§5.4).
8. Fee levels were increased a couple of times during the 1980s (see, e.g., 1987 Dz.U. 
No. 41, item 290), but those changes do not affect the analysis.
9. These statistics are discussed in Chapter 5 (§5.3). 
10. These reasons are all discussed in various sections of Chapters 4 and 5.
11. For a general discussion of the purposes, methods and uses of administrative sanc-
tions for environmental protection in Poland and the other formerly socialist countries of 
Europe, see Radecki (1985, esp. chap. 4). 
12. This is not to assert either that America originated these legal forms or that the 
American laws discussed here served as models for Polish law drafters (though they have 
been generally infl uential throughout Europe). They are introduced merely to illustrate the 
form. 
13. On civil liability for environmental harm in Poland, see Radecki (1987).
14. For a more extensive discussion of the ‘higher necessity’ exception from Poland’s 
Penal Code, and its economic interpretation, see Radecki (1981, 220–4). 
15. On the problem of pricing in the socialist economic system, see Chapter 5 (§5.4).
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4.1. The Underenforcement of Environmental Law in People’s Poland
Poland’s environmental laws and regulations were generally enforceable, but that 
was not enough to make them effective. Enforceability is a necessary, but insuf-
fi cient, condition for effective legislation. Enacted laws must actually be imple-
mented and enforced. As the Polish legal scholar Michał Kulesza (1988, 24) has 
written, ‘the best law will be a dead letter unless its fulfi llment is secured by 
appropriate organization, personnel, and fi nancial resources. A legal regulation in 
itself has no causative force—neither in terms of its initial implementation or its 
continuing application. Organization and proper outlays are indispensable.’ And 
they depend, in turn, on the state’s political will; that is, the state must demon-
strate a political commitment to enforce its environmental rules.
The failure of environmental protection under socialism was not a failure of 
law so much as a failure of environmental law enforcement,1 signifying a lack of 
political will, organization and economic investment. As we shall see through-
out this chapter and the next, the Party/state did not suffi ciently enforce its envi-
ronmental regulations against violators. Few lawsuits were fi led, and fewer still 
resulted in judgments against polluters. Party/state authorities failed consistently 
to assess and collect environmental fees and fi nes, which consequently had little 
impact on polluting behavior. The limited potential of Poland’s environmental 
laws was never realized.
In order to explain the failure of environmental protection, it is necessary to 
explain why the laws were underenforced. A conventional explanation is that the 
Party simply did not care about environmental protection despite its policy pro-
nouncements and legislative efforts; to the extent the Communists were interested 
in environmental protection at all, the argument goes, it was only for purposes of 
deception and propaganda. However, as we saw in Chapter 2, this cynical view is 
not supported by history. The Party had little reason, aside from genuine health and 
welfare concerns, to make environmental protection a national political priority 
in the early 1970s. It was under no domestic or international political pressure to 
enact serious environmental legislation, yet it took substantial pains to do so. Any 
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propaganda gains from those efforts would have been minimal since, at that time, 
socialism was widely assumed (including among many capitalist economists) to 
be inherently less destructive of the environment than capitalism. This myth was 
reinforced at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm, when the capitalist countries of Europe and North America essentially 
pleaded mea culpa for contaminating the planet (see Caldwell 1990, 57). Under 
the circumstances, the propaganda value of Poland’s environmental laws would 
have been disproportionate to the Party/state’s apparent efforts. 
This chapter and the two that follow offer an alternative explanation of the 
underenforcement of environmental law based on systemic features of the social-
ist economy, governing ‘principles’ of Party rule, and day-to-day political strug-
gles within the Party/state’s administrative bureaucracy. Relevant economic and 
ideological issues are addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. The present 
chapter, meanwhile, focuses on four interrelated ‘political’ impediments to envi-
ronmental protection under totalitarian socialism. First, there was continual fric-
tion between environmental law enforcement and certain ‘legitimacy principles’ 
that served to justify Party rule, most notably the promise of full employment and 
the commitment to ever-increasing levels of industrial production and economic 
growth; environmental interests necessarily were sacrifi ced to the ‘greater good’ 
of preserving the regime’s legitimacy. Second, those same ‘legitimacy principles’ 
led to an unbalanced power structure within the Party/state’s administrative hier-
archy; industrial ministries and economic planners consistently dominated poorly 
esteemed, paid, trained and equipped environmental protectors. This was espe-
cially and most unfortunately true at the local and regional levels of state admin-
istration, where primary responsibility for environmental law enforcement rested. 
Third, the structure of law enforcement and the judicial system—especially the 
tremendous (political) discretion of prosecutors and the incompetence of envi-
ronmental crime investigators—hindered effective enforcement of environmental 
laws. Fourth and fi nally, the Party/state stymied effective environmental protec-
tion by tightly controlling the fl ow of environmental information through state 
secret and censorship laws.
4.2. Absolute Power, Environmental Corruption
To this point I have treated the law seriously as an integral component of envi-
ronmental protection in People’s Poland; indeed, to the extent there was any 
meaningful environmental protection at all, it came by way of laws and regula-
tions. The fact remains, however, that law under socialism was a pliable instru-
ment of totalitarian politics and economic policy.2 Without pressure from (real) 
competitor parties and (real) public accountability, the signifi cance (or lack of 
signifi cance) of environmental laws depended almost entirely on the Polish 
Communist Party’s own initiative. As we have seen, the Party/state enacted some 
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workable environmental regulations, but for various reasons it lacked suffi cient 
commitment to enforce them.
This section describes how the Polish Communist Party’s quest for total 
power contributed generally to the failure of environmental protection. It begins 
with a historical and ideological discussion of totalitarianism in People’s Poland. 
In practice, totalitarian rule proved to be functionally incompatible with envi-
ronmental protection.3 State environmental concerns consistently confl icted with 
certain ‘legitimacy principles’ of Party rule, including the promise of full employ-
ment, based on the Party’s supposed representation of the working class, and the 
ideological commitment to unsurpassed economic productivity and affl uence 
(defi ned not only in narrow economic terms but more broadly in terms of overall 
quality of life). These ‘legitimacy principles’ trumped environmental protection 
concerns when confl icts arose. 
‘Socialist Democracy’ and Totalitarianism in People’s Poland 
People’s Poland was a totalitarian state founded on the ideological rule of a pre-
sumptively infallible party, rather than on the ‘rule of law.’4 The Polish United 
Workers’ Party (PZPR) held a virtual monopoly on political and economic power 
in the state. As hegemon, it determined not only what the laws said but whether, 
and to what extent, they were implemented and enforced. F. J. M. Feldbrugge 
(1986, 15) has written that under communism ‘the spheres of law and politics are 
not of equal rank; as an instrument of the state, law is subordinate to the Party. 
Strictly speaking, there does not even exist any sector of law which is independent 
of the Party and consequently the sphere of law is totally within the sphere of the 
Party’ (see also Rot 1989, 210). On issues not central to Party concerns, the law 
might be permitted to govern without political interference. But what was ‘central 
to Party concerns’ could change at any time; new policy directives could override 
even well-established laws. The Polish sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis (1992, 81) 
has noted the lack of legal ‘permanence’ in People’s Poland, where rules were 
‘subject to continual modifi cation depending on the current interests of the pre-
rogative state,’ regardless of parliamentary enactments. This subjugation of law to 
politics is an inherent feature of totalitarian rule (see Podgórecki 1996, 12–14). By 
defi nition, totalitarianism cannot coexist with the ‘rule of law,’ which, as Leszek 
Kołakowski (1992, 17) has pointed out, ‘simply contradicts the illimitable and 
arbitrary power of the Party.’
Ironically, the rule of Party over law was the law in People’s Poland and 
throughout the Soviet bloc. The rule of Party was codifi ed in the constitutional 
doctrine of ‘socialist democracy’,5 which has been described as ‘[t]he paramount 
feature of the Constitution,’ the sum total of all its goals (Sądowski 1976, 81). 
‘Socialist democracy’ was a vacuous concept that could justify, however ambigu-
ously, even contradictory Party/state policies. It had nothing to do with ‘democracy’ 
Chapter 488
as that term is commonly understood. Poles used to joke, What’s the difference 
between democracy and socialist democracy? It’s the same difference as between 
a chair and an electric chair. ‘Socialist democracy’ became a euphemism for any-
thing the Party leadership chose to do. As the bearers of ideological truth, any path 
they chose necessarily led to communism, that is, to perfect democracy. Mean-
while, political activities that deviated from the Party line necessarily led away 
from communism and, therefore, from true democracy (see Nowe Drogi, Feb. 
1970). So Poland’s Constitution was truly democratic, according to the doctrine 
of ‘socialist democracy,’ when it prohibited associations ‘whose aim or activities 
[were] directed against the political and social system’ (1952 Dz.U. No. 33, item 
232). Adam Łopatka (1980, 35), a PZPR ideologue, explained: 
Though the Polish People’s Republic is a democratic state, this does not mean it is 
a liberal one which permits emergence in organized form of all political or social 
aims and attitudes which actually exist in society. The Polish People’s Republic is 
a state ruled by the dictatorship of the working class, it attaches the highest rank 
of importance to the aims and interests of the working people which it represents 
and fulfi lls. The state takes all necessary measures to prevent class enemies of the 
working people carrying out their aims and purposes, judging them to be socially 
harmful and detrimental, not only to the working people, but to the whole nation.
The Polish People’s Republic excludes the possibility of organized opposi-
tion to the socialist system and the policy conducted by the state leadership in 
any form whatsoever. It also excludes the possibility of opposition groups of any 
sort and kind taking over political power from the Polish United Workers Party 
and allied parties, in the belief that this would threaten the most vital interests of 
the working class and nation as a whole. The people did not take over respon-
sibility for the country’s future by revolutionary means, only to hand it back 
again to those classes and social strata which brought the Polish nation to the 
very brink of biological extermination—classes and strata which in actual fact 
no longer exist today.
If the Party ever discovered that legal rights, such as the constitutional guarantees 
of free speech and free assembly (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, art. 85), confl icted 
with its current conception of ‘socialist democracy,’ it could simply and justifi ably 
dispense with those rights. Current Party policy, as the embodiment of ‘social-
ist democracy,’ prevailed over the law (see Kamiński 1991, 28). This was, of 
course, consistent with Lenin’s conception of a proletarian dictatorship unfettered 
by (inherently bourgeois) legal constraints (see Parkin 1979, 180).
Although the principle of ‘socialist democracy’ justifi ed direct Party gov-
ernance, the PZPR rarely sought to rule Poland directly; it preferred to operate 
behind the façade of the state structures it created and indisputably controlled. 
The reasons for this were more instrumental than ideological. By separating itself 
from the government while retaining control over government policy, the Party 
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could evade responsibility for policy failures. Thus, for example, the Party could 
maintain that environmental protection was its—and, therefore, the nation’s—top 
priority even while state enterprises and industrial ministries fl outed environmen-
tal rules. Only in times of political crises—during Martial Law for instance—
did the Party ‘take over’ the government. However, the Party and state never 
constituted ‘a dual structure of power,’ as some (such as Groth 1972, 25) have 
maintained. It may have been a dual structure of government, but there was no 
real bifurcation of power. Even when the Party strategically divorced itself from 
day-to-day governance, as it did following Party Plenums in 1963 and 1967 (see 
Taras 1984, 83), this did not constitute a delegation of Party power to state author-
ities; ‘all important political decisions’ continued to be taken ‘outside of the state 
organs,’ that is, by the Party (Pusylewitsch 1986, 319). Each government depart-
ment had a counterpart or mirror in the Party apparatus, and substantive govern-
ment decisions had to be preapproved by the relevant department of the PZPR’s 
Central Committee. So any separation of functions between Party and govern-
ment was more apparent than real. As Marian Rybicki (1982, 41) has observed, 
the Party, in effect, constituted a super-government (see Pusylewitsch 1986, 322). 
That is why I refer to the former Communist regimes as ‘Party/states.’
State institutions were well designed to serve the Party’s interest. The institu-
tion of central economic planning gave the Party plenary control over the national 
economy; high-ranking Party offi cials ultimately decided all important economic 
issues concerning resources allocation, production targets, prices, wages and 
bonuses.6 The Party controlled access to a quarter of a million positions at all 
levels of government, industry and the media through the infamous nomenkla-
tura system of privilege and promotion;7 anyone wishing to serve in any branch 
of government, including environmental protection, could do so only with the 
Party’s blessing. Within its own ranks, the Party leadership maintained strict con-
trol over the rank-and-fi le through the pyramidal structure of the Party and the 
constitutional principle of ‘democratic centralism.’ To Western eyes, this Lenin-
ist principle may appear oxymoronic, as the very concept of democracy suggests 
diffused rather than centralized power. However, all political systems, even open 
and democratic societies, impose limits on democratic participation to enable 
effective governance. In the American and West European systems, democracy is 
limited through the process of electoral representation and rules of legislative (or 
parliamentary) procedure that control debate, ensuring that decisions ultimately 
will be taken. In theory, ‘democratic centralism’ is simply another approach to 
the same problem: all members of the Party may participate in policy discus-
sions; these discussions inform decision makers at the highest echelons of the 
Party hierarchy (as representatives of the rank-and-fi le); the Party leaders then 
make the decisions, which bind all beneath them in the Party pyramid. However, 
the phrase ‘democratic centralism’ is ambiguous at best. It does not tell us how 
to balance the two extremes of untempered democracy and complete centraliza-
tion of decision making. For that, we must look to the practice of socialist coun-
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tries. In People’s Poland and throughout the Soviet bloc, the balance was struck 
consistently far to the ‘centralism’ end of the continuum. In the application of 
‘democratic centralism,’ the term ‘democratic’ came to mean nothing more than 
limited and often meaningless discussion by Party members at various levels. 
Decisions were taken at the top, and Party leaders could reach decisions however 
they pleased, for any reason or no reason at all. The only effective limitation was 
that the decision makers had to be careful to preserve suffi cient support within 
Party ranks to ward off potential intra-Party rivals. ‘Democratic centralism’ in 
practice proved to be a tool of pure authoritarianism (much as Leon Trotsky pre-
dicted it would when Lenin fi rst enunciated the principle: see Waller 1981, 28). In 
the Soviet Union, it led inexorably to Stalin’s ‘cult of personality.’ In Poland, it led 
to what Gramsci called ‘bureaucratic centralism,’ a condition in which the Party 
leadership becomes ‘a narrow clique which tends to perpetuate its selfi sh privi-
leges by controlling or even stifl ing the birth of oppositional forces’ (Hoare and 
Nowell-Smith 1971, 168). This was, in fact, the precise purpose of ‘democratic 
centralism.’ Party leaders sought to maximize Party unity by quelling internal dis-
sent that, if left unchecked, might have led to the formation of factions. Chapter 3, 
article 19, of the PZPR’s party statute clearly articulated this purpose:
Internal party democracy and the freedom to discuss and criticize cannot be hin-
dered and limited, but equally they cannot be taken advantage of for purposes 
confl icting with the ideology and policy of the party as well as its political and 
organizational unity. Particularly inadmissible are activities of a fractional char-
acter, which depend upon the formation of a formalized group within the party 
which popularizes a separate program, political line, or organizational principles 
and which forms an autonomous, discretionary center in relation to the statutory 
party authorities. (Translated in Stanford 1984, 343)
Factions were considered dangerous because they tended to weaken the Party, 
rendering it susceptible to outside challenges. While the Party struggled to extin-
guish (or co-opt) external political opposition, it could hardly have been expected 
to tolerate dissent and opposition within its own ranks. Totalitarian mechanisms 
had to be applied internally as well as externally to ensure the Party’s—and the 
system’s—survival.
Environmental Protection and the Party’s ‘Legitimate’ Claim to Power
Much has been written about Communist parties and their tendency to devolve 
from institutions promoting the advent of communism into giant, self-sustaining 
holding companies of political and economic privilege (see, e.g., Clark and Wil-
davsky 1990, esp. chap. 6). In Poland, the Party’s overriding concern was to per-
petuate and maximize its own political and economic rule. All other goals and 
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aims of the socialist state, including environmental protection, were subordinated 
to that paramount self-interest. This was true, of course, throughout the Soviet 
bloc. In the Czech Republic, a 1990 report prepared for the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment (Vavroušek 1990, 13) concluded that ‘[t]he primary goal of the CPC 
[Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], unambiguously superior to all other goals, 
was, from the beginning, to build up and consolidate totalitarian power.’ 
Ironically perhaps, the Party’s overriding concern with self- preservation 
imposed certain constraints on what the Party itself could do. As Leszek 
Kołakowski (1992, 12) has written, ‘a totalitarian communist regime could not 
survive without taking its legitimacy from the ideological principles that estab-
lished its place in history and its unlimited rights to keep its subjects in eternal 
serfdom and to expand as much as feasible.’ The Party could justify its contin-
ued monopoly on political and economic power only so long as it adhered to the 
ideological principles that legitimized its rule. In this respect, ideology contin-
ued to be vitally important in People’s Poland and the entire Soviet bloc long 
after almost everyone stopped believing in it (accord Pakulski 1987, 140). Certain 
features of the Marxist–Leninist ideology—what I call ‘legitimacy principles’—
continued to serve as justifi cations for Communist Party rule. They included (at 
least) the following three principles: (1) the socialist system’s claimed potential to 
achieve greater economic effi ciency and levels of production than capitalism; (2) 
the promise of full employment, codifi ed in the constitutional right to work; and 
(3) the commitment to egalitarianism and social welfare. These principles were 
important not so much as ends in themselves but as means to the end of justifying 
Party hegemony; they served to legitimize Party rule (at least for the Party itself). 
Confl icting social or economic policies simply had to be sacrifi ced for the greater 
good of Party survival. As Hannah Arendt (1973, 462) noted, the higher legitimacy 
principles fl owing from the totalitarian regime’s ideology trumped ‘petty legality.’
Indeed, that is precisely what happened whenever environmental protection 
concerns confl icted with the legitimacy principles of maximal economic produc-
tion and full employment. Environmental interests simply could not compete—
which is not necessarily to say that the Party was acting disingenuously when it 
adopted environmental protection as the nation’s foremost political priority at its 
1975 Seventh Party Congress. The addition of environmental provisions to the 
Constitution in 1976 and enactment of substantial environmental protection and 
land-use legislation in the 1980s suggest, on the contrary, that the Party sincerely 
sought to improve environmental protection. And it would be a mistake to view 
the ‘legitimacy principles’ of maximal economic production and full employ-
ment simply as competing interests of the Party/state, on a par with environmen-
tal interests. They were ideological imperatives that constituted the Party’s very 
reason for existence.8 
To maximize economic production was the paramount goal of the social-
ist economic system (see Goldman 1972a, 189; Sommer 1991, 109), mandated 
(initially) by orthodox Marxist theory that premised the socialist system’s ‘supe-
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riority’ to capitalism, at least in part, on its greater economic potential (see, e.g., 
S. Gomułka 1986, 42; Grundmann 1991, 147). This ideological imperative, as 
glossed by Lenin and Stalin, became ‘the Soviet-type development strategy,’ 
which was imposed on Poland and the Soviet Union’s other Central and East 
European satellites at the close of the 1940s. The engine of growth in that strat-
egy was heavy industry (see Fallenbuchl 1970, 458–60). The state became the 
‘instrument of the Party par excellence’ (Rensenbrink 1988, 59); its administra-
tive structures and centrally planned economic system were all designed to foster 
heavy industrial production. 
I have much more to say about the nature of economic production under 
socialism and the socialist reward system in Chapter 5, and in Chapter 6 I discuss 
some of the ideological bases of socialism’s production bias in the writings of 
Marx, Engels and Lenin. For now, the important point is that the supposed pro-
ductive superiority of the socialist system supported and legitimized, at least ini-
tially, the Communist Party’s claim to power. As Barbara Jancar (1987, 123) has 
written (of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia), ‘[t]he whole concept of the leading 
role of the party rests on the premise that the party knows best how to increase 
material abundance in preparation for the eventual advent of communism.’
In Poland, up until the mid-1960s, the PZPR could claim some legitimacy 
from socialism’s presumed productive superiority, as Poland’s development gap 
with the West narrowed. However, Poland’s rate of growth soon began to fall, 
and by the middle of the 1970s socialism’s supposed inherent economic superi-
ority was exposed as a myth. Nevertheless, production rates continued to domi-
nate environmental protection interests. Unconvincing Party rhetoric still spoke 
to the superior productive potential of socialism, but from that time to the end 
of the Communist era the primacy of production was justifi ed by reasons of 
national economic necessity (meaning survival) rather than reasons of ideology. 
Meanwhile, the various state and administrative structures established during the 
Stalinist period to support industrial production remained in place.
The effect of Poland’s industrial production bias on environmental protection 
activities was predictable. Environmental law enforcement simply was not per-
mitted to interfere with production that the Party/state considered centrally impor-
tant (see Gustafson 1981, 115). As I indicated in Chapter 3 (§3.5), the authorities 
never closed down or suspended production at enterprises for purely environmen-
tal reasons; economic production was always the paramount consideration. This 
explains why, for example, socioeconomic plans consistently dominated land-use 
plans. As a legal matter, land-use plans were supposed to have equal and, in some 
cases, greater weight, but, in practice, they frequently were ignored; many, if not 
most, economic development activities went forward without regard for environ-
mental consequences.9 Some (such as Jendrośka 1993b, 105–7) have argued that 
this was largely a function of power relations within the administrative hierar-
chy, where industrial interests dominated environmental interests. However, as 
we shall see in the next section of this chapter, those power relationships them-
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selves were consequences of the Party/state’s production bias. And as we shall 
see in Chapter 5 (§5.4), the basic reward (wage/bonus) structure of the socialist 
economic system also promoted production over environmental protection.
If production was the paramount goal of the socialist economic system, full 
employment was the Party’s supreme legitimacy principle, the key platform that 
distinguished the self-appointed ‘workers’ party.’ Only the Communist Party 
promised employment to each and every citizen. Indeed, one of the few mean-
ingful individual rights guaranteed by Poland’s Communist Constitution was the 
right to work (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, art. 68, as amended). Unlike most other 
rights supposedly (but not actually) secured by the Constitution, the right to work 
consistently was interpreted to impose an actual ‘duty’ on the state to secure jobs 
for all citizens (see Matey 1978). People’s Poland labelled itself a ‘workers’ state,’ 
and its leading political force, the Polish United Workers’ Party, could hardly 
claim to represent the working class if it did not espouse the right to work. 
The right to work had various consequences for environmental protection 
in the Party/state. Although a commitment to full employment need not confl ict 
with environmental protection, the two goals certainly did confl ict in People’s 
Poland. In 1983, the Polish government adopted a plan for achieving compliance 
with state air pollution standards in the heavily industrialized and polluted Kato-
wice voivodship. In order to achieve compliance, region-wide emissions had to be 
reduced by more than 90 percent. According to a report issued by the International 
Labour Organization (1989, 11–12), that plan was scrapped after the authorities 
determined that it would cost more than 1 million jobs in the region. It simply was 
not possible for the Party/government to guarantee full employment while enforc-
ing diligently its environmental laws. To a signifi cant extent, environmental law 
enforcement was sacrifi ced to the ‘greater good’ of full employment.
Throughout the Soviet Bloc, the environmental consequences of the ‘right 
to work’ were not just theoretical or statistical. The best illustration comes from 
Siberia where, according to the dissident writer Ze’ev Wolfson (Boris Komarov 
[pseud.] 1980, 69–70), cities of felled trees were left rotting by the train tracks, 
waiting for trains that never came. A Deputy of the Supreme Soviet rationalized 
this wastage by raising the constitutional right to work: ‘There are people out 
there in the taiga and they have to be paid their wages. We set up the lumber camp 
and brought people there. They have the right to work, and they are not respon-
sible for our problems with the railroad cars.’ The effect, for Wolfson, was to 
‘pervert the very notion of work,’ persuading the loggers that ‘turning the majestic 
cedar woods into mold and rot was a decent job.’ 
Environmental Protection and the Party’s Illegitimate Abuse of Power
Environmental law enforcement in People’s Poland was hindered not only by 
fundamental legitimacy principles of Communist Party rule but by personal and 
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bureaucratic corruption. Such corruption is endemic to totalitarian regimes, which, 
by defi nition, exercise power without accountability. Unfortunately, the lack of 
accountability also made acts of corruption diffi cult to trace, but a few cases did 
come to light in People’s Poland. One particularly illustrative case, recounted by 
Maria Łoś (1988, 162–3), concerned the construction of Poland’s giant Katowice 
Foundry in the mid-1970s. The project’s stated goal was environmental: to replace 
several obsolete and highly polluting foundries with a single new one that would 
be cleaner and more effi cient. That ostensible purpose masked ulterior personal 
motives of Party leaders in the Gierek Administration. Gierek’s Deputy Minister 
of Metallurgical Industry, in particular, was determined ‘to leave a lasting monu-
ment to commemorate his triumphant career.’ So he chose his birthplace in the 
Katowice region as the site for the new foundry, without regard for environmental 
conditions or consequences. In fact, the chosen location was just about the worst 
possible from both environmental and economic perspectives. The foundry site 
was economically ineffi cient because it was located far from lines of transportation 
connecting it to the mines that supplied its raw materials. And the area was unsuit-
able environmentally because it was already highly industrialized, congested and 
polluted. The new foundry added to existing environmental problems; it ‘deprived 
the neighboring, highly populated area of drinking water . . . and devastated the 
green belt created purposefully to improve air quality’ in the region. The Deputy 
Minister obviously was unconcerned with such details. Not only was the foundry 
constructed outside of existing land-use plans, it was not even included in national 
or regional socioeconomic plans. The entire 500 billion zloty project was designed 
and constructed outside of the law. A similar episode occurred in 1988, just before 
the end of communism in Poland, when the Deputy President (Vice-Mayor) of 
Warsaw negotiated an agreement with a West German-led consortium to build a 
new international airport (Okęcie II). Warsaw city offi cials agreed, without legal 
authority, to waive statutory environmental conditions for the project.10 The Kato-
wice Foundry and Okęcie II Airport episodes were neither unique nor common. 
But they exemplifi ed the status of law under communism.
4.3. Industrial Interests versus Environmental Protection 
in the Party/State’s Administrative Hierarchy 
The Party/state’s predominant concern for industrial production and full employ-
ment also helps to explain another contributing factor to the underenforcement 
of environmental law in People’s Poland: the utter domination of environmental 
offi cials by industrial ministries and even enterprise managers. Administrative 
posts with responsibilities related to the Party’s ‘legitimacy principles’ were quite 
naturally more powerful and prestigious than positions in ministries dealing with 
issues of secondary concern, such as environmental protection. Environmental 
offi cials were, in comparison, poorly trained, equipped, paid and esteemed. When 
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interministerial confl icts or disputes arose—and they arose often—power and 
prestige mattered a great deal. Such confl icts were resolved not according to spe-
cifi c legal mechanisms or administrative procedures, but by intra-Party politics, 
with the same result in most cases: environmental law enforcement was subordi-
nated to industrial and economic interests. Sometimes the stakes were enormous, 
as in 1972 when the Central Water Management Board was abolished in the wake 
of a reputed intra-Party rivalry. But in most cases the political subordination of 
environmental protection interests may or may not have been deliberate Party 
policy. It was, however, a predictable by-product of the Party/state’s administra-
tive structure (see Kabala 1993a, 55–6).
Where environmental protection was concerned, Poland’s industrial minis-
tries most often exercised their clout to avoid economic charges levied under the 
1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act. As previously discussed in 
Chapter 3 (§§3.3 and 3.4), environmental fees and fi nes were designed to induce 
enterprises to reduce pollution emissions and conserve resources. But collections 
often were impeded or undermined by political interference from industrial 
ministries, enterprise associations and central planners. Enterprises and their 
supporters in the Party/state’s administrative hierarchy frequently lobbied the 
Minister of Environmental Protection to waive assessed fees and fi nes, complain-
ing that they could not avoid violating environmental standards because the central 
authorities failed to allocate funding for environmental protection installations. 
This was a legitimate complaint. Environmental investments depended, in the 
fi rst instance, on administratively allocated resources. If the center did not provide 
the necessary funding for environmental improvements, how could enterprises be 
expected to comply with stringent environmental standards? In the face of such a 
patently reasonable argument, the relatively powerless environmental protection 
offi cials could do little but waive the penalties. Occasionally the Environment 
Minister held fi rm and refused to rescind assessed fees and fi nes, but even then 
the effect often was blunted by planning authorities, who regularly compensated 
penalized enterprises with increased budget allocations or tax deductions (see 
Taga 1986, 75). Article 110, section 4, of the 1980 EPDA expressly prohibited 
the state from compensating self-fi nanced enterprises (rozrachunek  gospodarczy) 
for environmental charges. But this provision was largely unenforced and, in any 
event, it did not apply to the vast majority of polluting enterprises in Poland that 
were not self-fi nanced. There is no question that the Party/government could have 
made environmental fi nes stick, for example by applying them against enterprise 
bonuses. The fact that the Party/government did not do so signifi es its inability or 
unwillingness to put its own house in order. It could not (or would not) balance the 
powers within the administrative structures it created and indisputably controlled. 
The Party could have strengthened environmental protectors within the admin-
istrative hierarchy, but perhaps only by renouncing some of its own ‘legitimacy 
principles.’ That, however, was unacceptable for the obvious reason that it would 
have weakened Party authority.
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4.4. Environmental Law Enforcement and the Judicial System
The Polish judicial system played a central role in environmental law enforce-
ment. The 1980 EPDA created duties and liabilities for environmental protection, 
incorporating provisions from the Civil and Criminal Codes (see the discussion 
of environmental duties and liabilities in Chapter 2, §2.5), and article 100 of the 
EPDA authorized offi cially sanctioned organizations to fi le lawsuits against pol-
luters. These enforcement mechanisms presumed a court system that would apply 
the laws and penalize violators. 
Prior to the 1980 EPDA, Polish courts heard very few environmental cases; 
of 4,754 civil cases brought between 1978 and 1980, only 117 were on matters 
relating (broadly) to environmental protection (Jendrośka and Nowacki 1991, 
46). After the 1980 EPDA was enacted, the number of environmental complaints 
received by prosecutors grew, but they did not lead to more criminal and civil pros-
ecutions. In 1982, regional and local environmental protection authorities noti-
fi ed prosecutors of 110 criminal violations of the EPDA and other environmental 
laws, but formal charges were fi led in only nine cases, and four of those cases 
subsequently were dismissed (Mykietyn and Radecki 1985, 27). Even though the 
EPDA clearly was intended to increase criminal and civil liabilities for environ-
mental offenses, relatively few cases ever made it into court. This was a combined 
consequence of direct and indirect political interference in judicial affairs and the 
sheer incompetence of environmental law enforcement investigators.
The Party and the Courts
Politics intruded into the daily conduct of the judicial system by design. Totali-
tarianism could not, after all, tolerate a truly independent judiciary. As the Italian 
legal scholar Mauro Cappelletti (1985, 8) has written, ‘no effective system of 
judicial control is compatible with, and tolerated by, anti-libertarian, autocratic 
regimes, whether they place themselves at the left or the right of the political 
spectrum.’ In People’s Poland, judges were declared by the Constitution to be 
‘independent’ (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, art. 62), but that was nothing more 
than propaganda. For one thing, it was effectively contradicted by other consti-
tutional provisions stipulating that the courts were to be ‘custodians of the social 
and political system of the Polish People’s Republic’ (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, 
art. 58), which implied that the courts had political and social obligations beyond 
their nominal judicial responsibilities. Poland’s Constitution also provided that 
no right or authority could be exercised contrary to the socialist aims of the Pol-
ish state; and those aims were determined exclusively by the Polish Communist 
Party, the constitutionally anointed ‘leading political force of society in the build-
ing of socialism’ (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, art. 3, sec. 1). Ultimately, it did not 
matter whether the Constitution guaranteed judicial independence for, as we saw 
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in Chapter 2, the Constitution itself was without direct legal force. Constitutional 
provisions were not self-executing, but required activation by parliamentary leg-
islation (see M. Brzezinski 1993a, 167; Frankowski 1987, 1312–13). This was 
confi rmed in 1955, when the Polish Supreme Court ruled that ‘[c]onstitutional 
norms . . . [are] unsuitable for direct practical application in the everyday life of 
society without being expanded in ordinary statutes and other normative acts’ 
(quoted in M. Brzezinski and Garlicki 1995a, 24). Mark Brzezinski (1993a, 168) 
has noted that this ruling placed the legal status of the Constitution beneath that 
of ordinary legislation and even administrative regulations (also see Frankowski 
1988, 743). More accurately, I think, it meant that the Constitution had no real 
‘legal’ status at all.
Regardless of the Constitution, the reality was that everyone working within 
the judicial system, including judges, was subject to various legal, political and 
economic means of Party control. Not only was this true during the Stalinist era, 
but it persisted to the end of communism in Poland. All judicial positions were 
within the nomenklatura system, which gave the Party substantial leverage over 
the entire court system.11 As usual, the main qualifi cation for these posts was Party 
loyalty, rather than legal education, acumen or experience. It was possible for 
non-Party members to become judges, but one could not become or long remain 
a judge without acquiescing to the PZPR. Supreme Court judges were appointed 
for fi ve-year terms, renewable subject to a favorable political evaluation by the 
Minister of Justice and the Council of State. A judge could be dismissed in mid-
term if his or her performance or political reliability was found lacking; this was 
the Party’s means of disposing of pro-Solidarity judges in the wake of Martial 
Law, for example (see Łoś 1984, 196). Politically reliable judges decided cases 
not just on the basis of law but also by applying general policy guidelines and, 
sometimes, specifi c instructions from higher Party organs and offi cials. Party pro-
nouncements were on a par with statutes, regulations and other sources of ‘law’ 
(Groth 1972, 42; Łoś 1988, 49); any judge who disregarded them was subject 
to dismissal and, at least during the Stalinist period, possible imprisonment for 
violating ‘the people’s legality.’ Throughout the history of People’s Poland, the 
judges’ fi rst responsibility was ‘to conscientiously fulfi l their duties to the party’ 
(quoted in Torańska 1987, 51). To ensure that they did, the Party maintained an 
offi ce within each court (and in every other law enforcement body) (Łoś 1988, 
154). Court activities were monitored closely so that the Party knew when judges 
acted independently of the Party line. Maverick judges were quickly and publicly 
reprimanded for deviating from ‘the class approach to the administration of jus-
tice’ (W. Gomułka 1959, 147).
In case these political controls proved insuffi cient, the Party also grasped the 
judiciary by the pocketbook. Judges’ incomes were not fi xed by law, so they could 
be—and were in fact—manipulated according to political criteria  (Kurczewski 
1993, 70). The salaries of Polish judges were tied to performance indicators, 
such as conviction rates and total fi nes levied in a year (Łoś 1988, 49). Another 
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important performance indicator was a judge’s level of servility to Party bosses; 
a  better-behaved judge was likely to be a better-paid judge. Judicial salaries were 
low to begin with, refl ecting the relatively low social status of judges in the social-
ist system. According to government statistics, in the 1980s Polish judges earned 
on average 5 percent less per month than middle-level prosecutors and 40 percent 
less than the General Procuracy (see Kurczewski 1993, 78). The fact that the sys-
tem valued prosecutors more highly than judges was entirely consistent with the 
socialist theory of justice. As Inga Markovits (1978, 626) has put it, ‘[a] socialist 
fi gure of justice would not be blindfolded, but seeing, and she would show the 
way with outstretched arm and pointing fi nger.’ 
Direct Political Interference in Environmental Cases
Despite the fact that PZPR controlled the judiciary, it should not be assumed that 
the Party habitually interfered with judicial proceedings. In environmental cases, 
at least, there seems to have been relatively little direct Party interference. Some 
environmental investigations and cases may have been intentionally derailed, 
though evidence of tampering is hard to come by. Certainly, Party infl uence could 
have been brought to bear in rather subtle ways. For example, in 1985 the League 
for Nature Conservation, an offi cially recognized but nominally independent 
organization, sued a plant in Szczeciń (in western Poland) under article 100 of 
the EPDA to enjoin its emissions of toxic air pollutants. The court declared that 
it did not know enough about environmental protection to decide the matter, so 
it ordered the plaintiff to provide an environmental expert for the court’s benefi t. 
The League could not afford to hire an expert, so it had to drop the suit. Was this 
a case of political interference? Perhaps, if the court knew in advance that the 
League could not afford to hire an expert and so would have to drop the case. 
Anyway, the court probably should have known that its order would have a chill-
ing effect on other environmental plaintiffs. If the Nature Conservation League’s 
case was politically determined, it goes to show just how subtle Party infl uence 
could be in the judicial process. The PZPR never had to announce its position 
(if it had one) publicly to ensure a certain result; it did not have to leave a paper 
trail of memoranda or letters. A quiet behind-closed-doors comment or phone call 
was usually the most that was ever required, and in many cases even that was 
unnecessary. The system itself was designed so that judges, prosecutors and law 
enforcement investigators simply understood how certain circumstances should 
be treated, without shedding the façade of fairness and impartiality.12 
In addition, there were purely legal means for resolving political cases. In 
Chapter 3 (§3.6), I discussed various exceptions and exclusions from liability 
in Polish law. Foremost among them was the ‘higher necessity’ exception from 
article 23 of the 1969 Penal Code (1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94). A prosecutor 
could suspend any criminal suit or investigation, on his own initiative or on the 
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recommendation of Party superiors, simply by deciding that the activity causing 
the environmental violation was of overriding importance to the national econ-
omy. This constituted a fi nal decision terminating all proceedings, usually even 
before formal charges were fi led. The ‘higher necessity’ ruling was not subject to 
judicial review, and it did not have to be published. And though it applied only to 
criminal cases, there were other legal mechanisms for avoiding liability in civil 
and administrative cases. Specifi cally, the courts employed balancing tests, which 
weighed the individual’s interest in seeking civil or administrative redress against 
society’s interest in the polluting activity. These balancing tests served the same 
purpose as the 1969 Penal Code’s ‘higher necessity’ exception. With such simple 
legal mechanisms for avoiding politically (and economically) troublesome envi-
ronmental cases, the Party had little need to resort to extra-legal methods. 
Still, the extent of (direct or indirect) political interference in the adjudication 
of environmental cases should not be exaggerated. Cases that made it into court 
usually were decided strictly by the book. Indeed, the very fact that a case made 
it into court suggested that the Party was not overly concerned, so the law could 
be permitted to govern. Wojciech Radecki (1991a) collected criminal, civil and 
administrative environmental law cases from the 1970s and 1980s in a single slim 
volume. Some of these cases demonstrated the real potential of Poland’s environ-
mental laws. For example, in 1982 the Supreme Court required a chemical storage 
facility to dig a new well for neighboring residents after the plant contaminated 
their existing water supply (see Radecki 1991a, 65–6). In 1986, the High Adminis-
trative Court upheld a fi ne against a regional waterworks and sewage company for 
water pollution discharges. The company argued that the fi ne should be rescinded 
because it did not generate the sewage in the fi rst place, it was not provided with 
funds to install equipment to treat the sewage, and its discharges were necessary 
and unavoidable. But the court found those arguments irrelevant because the law 
was not fault based; so long as the company discharged the waste that caused the 
harm, it was liable (see Radecki 1991a, 17–18). The High Administrative Court 
almost never rescinded environmental fi nes despite repeated protests from pollut-
ers that the fi nes were contrary to ‘social justice’ because they were technically 
unable to comply with the regulations (see Radecki 1991a, 22–5).13 In these and 
many other cases, the courts dutifully applied and enforced the environmental 
laws and regulations. So, Poland’s environmental laws could be effective; the 
main problem was getting cases into court.
The Incompetence of Environmental Law Enforcement Personnel
Political interference was neither the only nor the predominant impediment to 
judicial enforcement of the environmental laws. A more common problem was 
the sheer incompetence of environmental law enforcement personnel and judges. 
This was to some extent an indirect (and perhaps unintended) consequence of 
Chapter 4100
the Party/state’s dedication (for ideological and practical reasons) to industrial 
production and full employment. The best and brightest young aparatczyki were 
attracted to better-paying and more prestigious positions in the Party hierarchy, 
industrial ministries and planning bureaus. Incompetency was also an endemic 
by-product of the nomenklatura system, which valued Party loyalty over edu-
cation, experience and talent. Consequently, many judges, prosecutors and law 
enforcement personnel lacked the necessary skills to handle complex and techni-
cal environmental cases. We have seen (in the 1985 Nature Conservation League 
case) how lack of competence could affect the outcome of environmental law-
suits; the average judge in People’s Poland was poorly equipped to deal with 
technical and complex environmental law issues. This added to the plaintiffs’ 
burden: not only did they have to prove their cases, but they had to educate the 
judges about the law and environmental science at the same time. Incompetence 
was an even greater problem at the initial law enforcement level. Many of those 
responsible for investigating and reporting on environmental complaints simply 
lacked the skill and experience to gather evidence carefully for trials, and their 
lack of competency killed many cases before they ever reached the courts; reports 
were so legally or factually defective that prosecution became impossible. Karol 
Mykietyn and Wojciech Radecki (1985) investigated the disposition of 32 crimi-
nal complaints fi led in 1982 for violations of environmental rules. Among the 
legal problems they catalogued were reports of environmental violations based 
on repealed regulations and investigations that failed to establish the elements of 
a statutory offense. Many reports were factually incomplete, lacking such vital 
information as responsible parties, causes and test data on environmental damage. 
For example, in 1982 a complaint was fi led in Gorzów Wielkopolski about a fi sh 
kill in the Warta River, but the investigator’s report neglected to identify the per-
petrator; the prosecutor who subsequently received the report had no idea whom 
to prosecute. A similar case in Ostroda could not be prosecuted because investiga-
tors failed to take samples of the polluted water or dead fi sh; there was not enough 
evidence for the prosecutor to prove a violation of the environmental laws. In 
Cieszyn, investigators fi led a report about contamination of the Wisła (Vistula) 
River, but failed to include any information about the perpetrator, the extent of 
damage or the level of threat posed by the contamination. In none of these cases 
did investigators consult the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate, despite 
its (supposed) competence and legal responsibility to cooperate with local and 
regional authorities in environmental investigations. On the other hand, in the 
few cases where environmental inspectors did participate, they too seemed bliss-
fully unaware that the purpose of their investigations was to gather evidence for 
criminal trials. These problems so severely impeded effective environmental law 
enforcement that in 1984 Poland’s Chief Prosecutor recommended that environ-
mental investigations be taken over personally by regional and local prosecu-
tors, with the assistance, when necessary, of environmental experts (Mykietyn and 
Radecki 1985, 27, 30–1, 39). This recommendation was never implemented, but 
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it probably would not have made much difference anyway; the number of envi-
ronmental complaints leading to successful prosecutions would likely have stayed 
about the same. Perhaps prosecutors would have done a better job of collecting 
evidence for trial, but given their other responsibilities they would have had much 
less time to spend investigating and reporting on environmental complaints.
Lack of competence was also a problem within regulated enterprises. Work-
ers with pollution control responsibilities were underpaid and underappreciated, 
compared with workers with ‘productive’ responsibilities. Environmental protec-
tion activities were not considered ‘productive’ because they did not contribute to 
the achievement of plan production targets. On the contrary, environmental efforts 
tended to impede the fulfi llment of plan targets, jeopardizing enterprise ‘prof-
its,’ in the form of bonuses that could amount to one-half or more of managers’ 
and workers’ annual salaries.14 In addition to being ‘unproductive,’ environmental 
protection activities were largely unnecessary from the enterprise point of view 
because penalties for non-compliance almost always could be avoided (through 
the political mechanisms already discussed). So environmental protection respon-
sibilities were seen as little more than a nuisance to be avoided. 
Pollution control responsibilities typically were given over to untrained func-
tionaries—the less competent the better, from management’s perspective. Accord-
ing to a 1979 report, 25 percent of air-polluting plants in Poland had no employees 
with special training in environmental engineering (Wiadomości Statystyczne, 
Dec. 1979). John Kramer (1983, 214) tells a story about a worker in Czechoslova-
kia who was publicly honored for his contribution to energy conservation after he 
shut off power to his plant’s pollution-control equipment. That could be a tall tale, 
but it contains more than a hint of truth. In fact, during energy shortages in Poland, 
when enterprises were required to reduce their power consumption, pollution-
control equipment was always switched off fi rst (see Nowe Drogi, July 1980). 
4.5. Environmental Information, State Secrets and Censorship
The very nature of totalitarianism determined that the Party/state would strictly 
control access to information, including environmental information. After all, 
in the history of the world no totalitarian regime ever has coexisted with a free 
press. In People’s Poland, the Communist authorities started from the position 
that everything was a secret unless publication was expressly authorized. Infor-
mation was allocated, like other resources in the Party/state, from the center. That 
was true even for information circulating within the administrative bureaucracy. 
Ministries rarely exchanged information voluntarily; industry offi cials and enter-
prise managers certainly did not willingly provide environmental protection offi -
cials with information about pollution emissions levels. Barbara Jancar (1987, 
163) has referred to this as a ‘game of “territory.”’ Prior to the 1970s, access 
to environmental information was largely irrelevant since there was little use-
Chapter 4102
ful environmental information worth publishing. The Polish Party/government 
fi rst began gathering environmental information during the early 1970s, but the 
information obtained in those early studies was distorted by the incompetence of 
investigators and the poor quality of their monitoring equipment.15 As we have 
seen, the training and skill of environmental investigators left much to be desired, 
and the technology they had to work with was vastly inferior to Western envi-
ronmental equipment. To measure ambient air pollution, for example, they used 
mostly hand-held instruments that were not uniformly calibrated (Nowicki 1992, 
211). There were no regional or national air and water quality monitoring systems, 
although People’s Poland was the fi rst (and only) country in the Soviet bloc to 
undertake ‘substantive initiatives’ to create such a network in the late 1970s (see 
Kramer 1983, 205; Express Wieczorny, Oct. 15, 1979). Enterprises were respon-
sible for reporting emissions levels, but underreporting was universal and rarely 
detected. Environmental inspectors had a diffi cult time proving underreporting 
because enterprise managers typically knew (through channels) when inspectors 
were coming. Before investigators arrived, enterprises would alter their produc-
tion patterns to minimize pollution emissions; then, as soon as the inspectors had 
left, ordinary production would resume. Finally, Poland’s environmental protec-
tion agencies had no uniform standards for compiling and interpreting the infor-
mation their investigations did obtain (see Wiadomości Statystyczne, Dec. 1979).
What little environmental information existed was legally treated as a state 
secret. A government decree from the 1970s provided that: 
All information pertaining to any immediate threat to the life and health of peo-
ple caused by industry and by chemicals used in agriculture must be eliminated 
from all reports on environmental protection and on the threat to the natural 
environment in Poland.
This ban applies to specifi c cases of the pollution of the atmosphere, water, 
earth, and food dangerous to life and health. (Quoted in translation in Hauser 
1984, 49)
In her book on censorship in Poland, Jane Leftwich Curry (1984, 219–20) quoted 
several other Polish regulations limiting the fl ow of environmental information. One 
prohibited the publication of information about Polish water-polluting activities, 
while expressly authorizing the publication of information about water- polluting 
activities in neighboring Czechoslovakia. Others concerned information about spe-
cifi c episodes, suppressing reports that otherwise might have been taken ‘as evi-
dence of far broader problems’ of environmental degradation in People’s Poland. 
One particularly absurd regulation issued in 1975 permanently embargoed informa-
tion about a denuded forest within Warsaw city limits that many Warsaw residents 
saw every day on their journey to work. Nevertheless, information about the forest 
was a state secret and publication was a crime. Indeed, it was a crime even to refer 
to ‘censorship’ (cenzura) because it too was a state secret (Hauser 1984, 50).
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‘Criminals’ charged with illegally publicizing environmental information 
were usually tried before the kolegia, Poland’s notorious lay courts. As we learned 
in Chapter 2 (§2.6), the kolegia heard misdemeanor cases brought under the 1971 
Petty Offenses Code (1971 Dz.U. No. 12, item 114). Professional judges, attorneys 
and prosecutors were prohibited from serving on kolegia by regulation of the Min-
ister of Internal Affairs (1959 Dz.U. No. 15, item 81). Consequently, the kolegia 
were virtually devoid of legal process and, for all practical purposes, the possibility 
of acquittal. By the 1980s, there were approximately 500 kolegia (at various levels 
of administration), deciding half a million cases each year. They were by no means 
an insignifi cant part of judicial administration in People’s Poland. Most kolegia 
cases concerned ‘public order’ offenses, including illegal assembly and illegal dis-
tribution of information, including environmental information. Someone accused 
of distributing secret environmental information, however insignifi cant, could be 
fi ned and thrown into jail; if they used their car to transport and distribute the ille-
gal information, it could be confi scated (see Andrzejewski and Nowicki 1991). 
It needs to be stressed, however, that Party/state censorship of environmen-
tal information was neither complete nor consistent. Beginning in the late 1970s, 
Poles had fairly regular access to detailed accounts of ecological damage and cri-
tiques of environmental policy in the popular press. In July 1978, for example, the 
Party monthly Nowe Drogi published an article detailing environmental problems, 
including statistics on air pollution emissions, water pollution levels and land 
degradation. In March 1981, the Warsaw daily Słowo Pow szechne reported on 
a conference organized by the Scientifi c Committee ‘Man and the Environment’ 
of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The article reported on ‘ecological scandals’ 
threatening the health of Poland’s children, criticized the ‘complete insensitivity 
of the decision makers regarding ecological problems,’ and concluded that ‘eco-
nomic reform in Poland is taking the wrong course because it does not take into 
account the ecology crisis that is rapidly worsening in Poland.’ Even during the 
period of Martial Law, detailed accounts of environmental problems and policies 
continued to appear in Polish newspapers. For example, on November 24 and 25, 
1982, the Warsaw daily Życie Warszawy published a series of articles concerning 
environmental protection. The reports provided detailed economic and environ-
mental statistics, and referred to ‘ecological disaster’ areas in Silesia, Płock and 
Wałbrzych. That same month, Poland’s national newspaper Rzeczpospolita (Nov. 
19, 1982) reported on the failure of inspected enterprises to comply with the man-
dates of the 1980 EPDA. Poles could even view environmental information on 
their television sets. In May 1984, for example, Polish television reported on a 
Sejm commission’s assessment of the 1980 EPDA. The report noted that the Sejm 
commission found ‘an alarming reduction in the quantity of pure surface waters 
throughout the country,’ and a 60 percent increase in air pollution emissions. The 
broadcast further noted that two-thirds of Polish forests were located in areas of 
‘permanent or temporary threat’ (BBC Monitoring Service: Eastern Europe, May 
31, 1984). A June 1986 Polish television report on beach closings along the Baltic 
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Sea coast near Gdańsk disclosed that enterprises in the province were discharging 
270,000 tons of mostly untreated sewage into the Baltic Sea each day (BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, June 19, 1986).
Besides the popular press, specialized environmental publications began to 
appear in the 1970s and 1980s. The journal Aura regularly published accounts of 
environmental problems and policies (see, e.g., Apr. 1978 on sewage treatment; 
Sept. 1978 on water pollution; Nov. 1978 on environmental inspections; Nov. 
1979 on air pollution; and Feb. 1981 on lax environmental protection). In 1981, 
the offi cially recognized Nature Protection League published a special edition of 
its journal Przyroda Polska (Polish Nature) on the threats to public health posed 
by Poland’s environmental problems. The report included ‘the best information 
existing in Poland on the extent of the ecological threat to the country and its 
people’ (see Kabala 1993a, 53). 
Even when the Party/state publicized or allowed publication of environmental 
information, that information remained the property of the Party/state; unauthor-
ized republication was prohibited. This policy sometimes led to absurd situations 
in which the Party/government denied the existence of environmental problems 
that already had been publicized through offi cial (i.e., Party-approved) chan-
nels. On August 1, 1985, the Party’s daily newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, reported 
that 35 percent of Poland’s population lived in exceptionally bad environmental 
conditions which would require at least 25 years to improve. Because the report 
appeared in Trybuna Ludu, it obviously had the blessing of Party authorities, and 
its appearance provoked no offi cial rebuke. The situation was very different later 
that year, however, when the Życie Warszawy daily (BBC Monitoring Service: 
Eastern Europe, Sept. 12, 1985) reported on a study conducted by the Polish 
Chemical Society, under auspices of the Polish Academy of Sciences’ Committee 
on Chemical Sciences. The article summarized the study’s fi ndings, including its 
conclusion that ‘Poland leads Europe in atmospheric pollution.’ At a press con-
ference the next day, the Party/government’s infamous press spokesman, Jerzy 
Urban, denounced not only Życie Warszawy’s article, but the Polish Chemical 
Society’s study, which he called ‘alarmist and exaggerated.’ Urban claimed, con-
trary to the study, that Poland was not an environmental disaster area; other coun-
tries, including (by implication) many in Western Europe and North America, 
suffered from more severe environmental problems than Poland. He also noted 
the Polish government’s great efforts and achievements on behalf of the environ-
ment (Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Eastern Europe, Sept. 11, 1985). 
In response to the offi cial rebuke, Życie Warszawy published a follow-up edito-
rial in which it defended its earlier report and, with biting sarcasm, expressed the 
nation’s gratitude for the government press spokesman’s keen interest in environ-
mental issues (see Rensenbrink 1988, 168). A similar episode took place a year 
later, when Radio Free Europe (RFE) reported on the ‘[a]pocalypse’ of Poland’s 
natural environment. Once again the government’s press spokesman denounced 
the report, calling it a collection of ‘lies, lies and only lies.’ But this time Urban 
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reserved most of his venom for an ad hominem attack on the RFE reporter, a for-
mer government economic planner named Stefan Bratkowski:
The alleged remedial measures aired by the RFE commentator are the same rub-
bish as his diagnoses, while the entire hysterical argument designed to scare 
people uses environmental protection as a pretext alone to express a political 
view that under the existing rule in Poland our people will die with no one to 
come to the rescue because these stupid and ineffi cient authorities deliberately 
aim at society’s destruction.
Free Europe proclaims apocalypse hoping for collective unrest if it manages 
to succeed in giving Poles a good scare and arousing each listener’s anxiety. For-
mer economy rationalizer Bratkowski perished for this kind of service, getting 
poisoned with political venoms of his milieu, while there was born a hysteri-
cal demagogue seeking idiots among listeners. (Foreign Broadcast Information 
 Service—Eastern Europe, Nov. 10, 1986)
It is not diffi cult to understand why the Polish Party/state was sensitive about 
the publication of environmental information; aside from the fact that censor-
ship comes naturally to totalitarian regimes, Poland’s increasingly severe eco-
logical crisis belied the supposed environmental superiority of socialism, thus 
undermining what was, by the 1980s, one of the few remaining sources of Party/
state legitimacy. More diffi cult to understand is the Party/state’s apparent incon-
sistency in controlling environmental information, especially during the 1980s. 
There seemed little rhyme or reason about what information the Party censored 
or authorized for dissemination. Perhaps Party leaders felt that they needed pub-
licly to address environmental problems that were becoming increasingly obvi-
ous as they grew more severe. There certainly was increasing political pressure to 
provide information about environmental problems. When the Solidarity move-
ment emerged in 1980, one of its fi rst demands was that the Polish government 
release classifi ed environmental data (see Ziegler 1987, 150). And throughout the 
1980s, Party/state efforts to keep environmental information secret grew increas-
ingly irrelevant as the Polish Ecology Club (PKE) and other non-governmental 
environmental organizations conducted their own investigations and publicized 
the results in Poland’s irrepressible underground press. These unoffi cial studies 
tended to be methodologically and analytically superior to offi cial Party/govern-
ment environmental studies. And to many Poles they were inherently more cred-
ible than offi cial Party/government studies, which were presumed to be biased to 
minimize the extent of Poland’s environmental problems. 
The Party/state’s inconsistent censorship of environmental information may 
also have refl ected the battle for the ‘soul of the Party’ waged during the 1980s. We 
have already seen some refl ections of that battle. For example, the establishment of 
the High Administrative Court in 1980, and the subsequent establishment of a Con-
stitutional Tribunal in 1985, constituted victories for intra-Party reformers, who felt 
Chapter 4106
that the Party could maintain its ‘leading role’ in society only by loosening (to some 
extent) its stranglehold on political, legal and economic power. Finally, we should 
not overlook the fact, illustrated in Chapter 2, that the Party (or some infl uential 
group within the Party) was genuinely concerned about environmental protection. 
The Party’s lack of consistency on environmental information may have refl ected 
the ongoing confl ict between that concern and the Party’s totalitarian compulsions. 
4.6. Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has addressed a variety of distinct but closely interrelated ‘political’ 
impediments to environmental law enforcement in People’s Poland. Factors includ-
ing the ruling Party’s overriding commitments to full employment and maximal 
economic production, the lack of judicial independence and competence, the rela-
tive weakness of environmental protection agencies in the Party/state’s administra-
tive hierarchy, and the incompetence of environmental law enforcement agents all 
contributed substantially to the underenforcement of Poland’s environmental laws. 
From a normative point of view, a crucial question is whether these were unavoid-
able problems for environmental protection in a ‘Rule of Party’ state. I will reserve 
that question for Chapter 8, which deals extensively with the normative impli-
cations of the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland. Already it 
seems clear, however, that many, if not all, of the ‘political’ problems that hindered 
environmental law enforcement could have been ameliorated only at substantial 
cost to Party authority. For example, the Party/state might have strengthened the 
position of environmental protection offi cials within the administrative hierarchy, 
but only by compromising its commitments to full employment and maximal eco-
nomic production, which would have eroded the legitimacy of its rule. Ultimately, 
behind all the ‘political’ problems of environmental law enforcement lurked a sin-
gle insurmountable obstacle: the Party’s commitment to self-preservation. 
Notes
1. As Jerzy Jendrośka (1 993a, 351) has put it, ‘environmental problems were not 
caused by the absence of environmental laws, but fi rst of all by the fact that these laws 
were not enforced.’ For similar assessments of other former Soviet bloc countries, see, for 
example, Goldman (1972a, 26), Ziegler (1987, 81), French (1990, 34), Pryde (1991, 90–1), 
and Kramer (1983, 217).
2. Kamiński and Sołtan (1989, 381) refer to a ‘soft-law constraint’ under socialism, as 
an analogue to the soft budget constraint that is endemic to socialist economies. 
3. In Chapter 8 (§8.5), I address theoretical issues concerning the relationship between 
totalitarianism and environmental protection.
4. There is disagreement in the academic literature about what constitutes a ‘totali-
tarian’ regime. As I use the term, it is not intended to denote a literal attainment of ‘total’ 
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power, signifying the complete annihilation, suppression or co-optation of actual and 
potential opposition. The concept of ‘total’ power is like infi nity: it can never be reached. 
So there can be no such thing as a perfectly totalitarian society. Even Jozef Stalin, who may 
have come closest to fulfi lling the totalitarian ideal, was only ‘almost perfect’ (Kołakowski 
1977, 284). In the real world, ‘totalitarian’ regimes are denoted by the goal of total rule, 
combined with some substantial (but otherwise ill-defi ned) level of inchoate success, sig-
nifi ed by the effective repression or co-optation of actual or potential political, social and 
economic opposition. This defi nition has the virtue of allowing for degrees of totalitarian-
ism, so that the USSR and People’s Poland can both be described as ‘totalitarian,’ though 
the extent of repression in the former was far greater than in the latter.
5. Article 7 of Poland’s 1952 Constitution (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, as amended) 
provided that ‘[t]he Polish People’s Republic realizes and develops a socialist democracy.’ 
6. Central economic planning, and its impact on environmental protection in People’s 
Poland, is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 (§5.1)
7. The nomenklatura system constituted ‘a major pillar, if not the foundation itself, 
of the party centre’s executive authority and the key to its rule over the party as a whole 
and the whole framework of non-party institutions—and thus to its domination over Polish 
society’ (Kolankiewicz and Lewis 1988, 82).
8. In a similar vein, the fact that ‘legitimacy principles,’ such as the commitment to 
full employment, hindered economic reform efforts does not mean that the Party did not 
really care about improving economic effi ciency (see S. Gomułka 1986, 295).
9. On the relationship between land-use planning and socioeconomic planning in Peo-
ple’s Poland, see Kulesza (1987, esp. chap. 6).
10. I have more to say about the Okęcie airport case in Chapters 7 (§7.4) and 8 (§8.6).
11. Under article 50 of the 1952 Constitution, judges were supposed to be directly 
elected, but the Party/government disregarded that constitutional provision after determin-
ing that the socialist system in Poland was not yet suffi ciently ‘mature’ to permit popular 
election of judges (see Piękałkiewicz 1970, 370–1). The offending provision was subse-
quently removed from the Constitution when it was amended in 1976.
12. The relationship between the Party and the courts in the former Czechoslovakia 
evidently was much the same. According to Otto Ulč (1972, 61), a former Czechoslovak 
judge: ‘[i]n about ninety percent of the court agenda, there was not the slightest sign of 
interference in our decision-making. This observation, however, does not warrant the con-
clusion that some sort of “ninety percent judicial independence and integrity” existed. Both 
the sorry experience with the remaining ten percent and the awareness that someone might 
at any time infl ict his “suggestion” upon us, conditioned all our adjudication.’
13. It should be noted, however, that the courts never disputed the right of the Minis-
ter of Environmental Protection to waive or reduce environmental fi nes. For example, in a 
1983 case, the High Administrative Court upheld a fi ne for water pollution, but noted the 
authority of the government to provide exemptions for technical, economic or social policy 
reasons (see Radecki 1991a, 16–17).
14. The nature of production and pricing under socialism is discussed more exten-
sively in Chapter 5 (§§5.3 and 5.4).
15. The poor quality of pollution-monitoring equipment in Poland remained a prob-
lem to the end of the Communist era (see Nowicki 1992, 211). I have more to say about 
such technical problems of environmental protection in the next chapter (§5.4).
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This chapter continues the explanation of environmental law enforcement prob-
lems in People’s Poland, focusing on economic issues. The analysis is in fi ve sec-
tions, beginning in §5.1 with a structural introduction to the socialist economic 
system; §5.2 relates the underenforcement of environmental law in Poland to stag-
nation in the socialist economic system; §5.3 describes the extensive nature of eco-
nomic production under socialism which led to many of Poland’s environmental 
problems; §5.4 explains how the socialist economic system’s pricing mechanism, 
which ignored resource scarcity, prevented a switch to more intensive modes of 
production; and §5.5 explains how the socialist property rights system created a 
confl ict of interest for the Party/government, which was responsible for enforcing 
environmental regulations against the very enterprises it owned and controlled. 
That regulatory confl ict of interest led the government to soften budget constraints 
on enterprises, reducing the effectiveness of environmental fees and fi nes.
5.1. An Introduction to Poland’s Socialist Economic System
Orthodox Marxist–Leninist theory posits that the economic ‘base’ of a society 
dictates the sociopolitical ‘superstructure’ (including, of course, law). But, as crit-
ics of Marxism–Leninism (and some neo-Marxists) have pointed out, the infl u-
ence is actually reciprocal: politics and ideology greatly infl uence the structure 
and operation of the economy (see, e.g., Kelsen 1955, 26–7). Despite the obvious 
interrelation, it is common, and perhaps necessary as an organizational matter, to 
separate out economic analysis from political and ideological analysis.
The economic structures of socialism were premised on three ‘architectural 
principles’ of Marxism–Leninism: socialist property relations (meaning, primar-
ily, social ownership of the means of production), central economic planning and 
‘technological determinism.’ These principles were constants of Poland’s social-
ist economic system. None of the numerous efforts to reform Poland’s economy 
before December 1988 (with the notable exception of the abandonment of forced 
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collectivization in 1956) sought to abolish central planning or privatize the means 
of production.
Socialist Property
In The Communist Manifesto of 1848, Marx and Engels (1978, 484) wrote that 
‘the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Aboli-
tion of private property.’ In Marx’s view, capitalist socioeconomic relations, based 
on private property and the anarchy of the market, alienated people from each 
other and from nature. The purpose of the socialist system was to harmonize those 
relations, in the fi rst place by abolishing private property in natural resources 
and the means of production. This has proven to be among the least contentious 
aspects of Marxist socialism among Marx’s contemporaries and later Marxists.1 
Consequently, certain fundamental theoretical questions about the nature and use 
of socialist property never have been adequately addressed. For example, neither 
Marx nor his most infl uential followers addressed the basic dilemma that arises 
with the onset of socialism: ‘who controls the great economic power materialized 
in public property and social capital’ (Rusinow 1977, 139).2 In the absence of a 
theoretical treatment of that critical question, the Party/state asserted control by 
default (see Gouldner 1980, 382).
When the Communists seized power in Poland just before the end of World 
War II, they quickly and systematically expropriated land and the means of pro-
duction. Even before declaring itself the Provisional Government of the Polish 
Republic (Rząd Tymczasowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej), the Soviet-sponsored 
Polish Committee for National Liberation (Polska Komitet Wyzwolenia Nar-
odowego) began the process of nationalizing land and the means of production. 
And, it is interesting to note, it did so through legislation (see, e.g., 1944 Dz.U. 
No. 4, item 17), indicating that Communist rule in Poland would be legislistic, 
if not legal. The Constitution enacted in 1952 expressly recognized the ‘social-
ized means of production’ as an important component ‘in the transformation of 
social and economic relations’ (1952 Dz.U. No. 33, item 232). The Constitution 
permitted limited private ownership of land, means of production and personal 
property (narrowly defi ned) (arts. 12 and 13). But the extent of private ownership 
rights was decidedly limited. The Party/state could seize private property without 
compensation ‘in cases established by law’ (art. 74, sec. 3), that is, in accordance 
with Poland’s 1964 Civil Code (1964 Dz.U. No. 16, item 93). The Civil Code 
established a hierarchy of property categories distinguished by varying levels of 
protection from Party/state interference. At the top of the property ladder, state 
property (‘all national property’) and cooperative property received the great-
est legal protection from expropriation and interference—greater than privately 
owned farms, for example. This was nonsense, of course, since ‘all national prop-
erty’ was owned and controlled by the Party/state in the fi rst place. At the bottom 
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of the ladder, ‘individual property of a capitalist character (i.e., involving the use 
of hired labor or the ownership of urban land and buildings)’ received virtually 
no legal protection. The Party/state could expropriate it at any time and for any 
purpose without raising a legal or constitutional issue (Rudziński 1973, 80). By 
the mid-1980s, privately owned land received somewhat greater legal protection 
against expropriation (see Kordasiewicz and Wierzbowski 1995), but it is doubtful 
whether this translated in greater actual security. Aleksander Rudziński’s (1973, 
85) description of Poland’s socialist property regime remained fairly accurate:
Far from being a natural human right preceding the rule of law and recognized 
and regulated by it, ownership no longer represents an area of freedom of action; 
it becomes an authorization granted to the owner to consume the object (personal 
property), or even a duty imposed on him to use the object according to the plan 
(state property).
People’s Poland did not abolish private property per se, just most private 
property rights. From the perspective of the Marxist–Leninists who founded Peo-
ple’s Poland, this was not just a necessary condition for socialism; on a structural 
level, Party/state control of property was a precondition to implementing other 
socialist ‘architectural principles,’ such as central planning. Social ownership 
of the means of production was, as Oskar Lange (1963, 17) put it, ‘the organi-
zational principle’ for productive and distributional relations. Most importantly, 
from a Leninist perspective, Party/state control of the means of production served 
to maximize the Party’s power over individuals and social groups. By owning 
almost all capital assets in the country—more than 85 percent of the means of 
production in the late 1970s and early 1980s—the Party/state became Poland’s 
primary employer, ‘controlling who would be employed and promoted.’ Through 
its control of the economy, the Party/state became ‘the locus of decision making’ 
(Kamiński 1991, 22).
Central Economic Planning
As owner of the means of production, the Party/state was able to direct Poland’s 
economic development. It sought to do this, in accordance with the writings of 
Marx, Engels and Lenin, through scientifi c central planning. The theory was that, 
under conditions of social ownership (and state control) of the means of produc-
tion, central planning was not only a feasible alternative to the market but a more 
effi cient choice. State planners were supposed to provide better-informed eco-
nomic decision making than the anarchic marketplace in which millions of inde-
pendent agents made individualized decisions, admittedly with less than perfect 
information about social costs and benefi ts. Those information constraints led to 
market ineffi ciencies that, by defi nition, should never exist in a planned econ-
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omy. Furthermore, producers in the capitalist system could only predict demand; 
they had to continually adjust production in order to accommodate unanticipated 
changes in the rate of demand. Such post hoc corrections rendered the market 
system highly ineffi cient relative to a theoretical socialist economy within which 
supply and demand would be preplanned. As Engels wrote in the Anti- Dühring 
(1975c, 266), ‘with the taking over by society of the means of productive forces, 
the social character of the means of production and of the products will be uti-
lized by the producers with perfect understanding.’ Instead of the economy 
controlling societal relations, socialist society would control the economy (see 
Engels 1975c, 279).3 
The backbone of socialism’s claim to greater rationality and effi ciency was 
its supposed capacity for ‘full employment of human and material resources’ 
(Brus and Laski 1989, 6). As Joseph Schumpeter (1976, 194) noted, the planned 
economy at least in theory should remain ‘determinate’ in cases where capital-
ist markets fail, so that resource allocation and production can be maintained at 
‘optimal’ levels at all times. In addition, socialism purports to put all economic 
resources to work for the full development of the whole society, whereas, under 
capitalism, many resources may sit idle as a small group of capitalists accumu-
lates great profi ts. In this respect, according to Marxist and neo-Marxist dogma, 
socialist central planning not only is more effi cient than capitalism but also rests 
on a higher moral plane.
A detailed assessment of socialism’s claim to greater economic effi ciency and 
morality is beyond the scope of this project (for the last word, see Kornai 1992a). 
But it is clear that the reality never lived up to the promise. Socialist economies 
did not prove to be more effi cient than their capitalist competitors. On the con-
trary, they were less effi cient, and their chronic and ever-increasing ineffi ciencies 
ultimately led to the downfall of communism in Europe. Nor did socialism prove 
to be morally superior to capitalism. True, it put more resources to work; but, as 
we shall see later in this chapter, it wasted far more productive resources (per unit 
of production) than did its capitalist competitors. The socialist system created ‘a 
vast separation’ between the state and the people, and brought about ‘not only a 
material but a drastic spiritual impoverishment of the population’ (Clark and Wil-
davsky 1990, 4). Most importantly for present purposes, socialism brought about 
an environmental crisis that, according to Jan Marcinkiewicz (1987, 42), ‘biologi-
cally threatened’ the very existence of the Polish nation.
In People’s Poland, as in all the Soviet bloc countries, the Party/state con-
trolled the vast majority of economic activities through Leninist central planning. 
Long- and short-term plans allocated investment resources and specifi ed produc-
tion targets. By design, the entire Party/state apparatus was tied in to the planning 
process. The economy was pyramidal in structure, just like the government and 
Party (conforming to the Leninist concept of democratic centralism, discussed 
in Chapter 4). Socioeconomic plans were imposed from the top down, but they 
were premised on information sent up from the bottom. Individual economic 
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actors (enterprises) and the administrative units that managed them (associations 
and ministries) reported to central planners on production levels and investment 
needs, and that information was used to design new plans or refi ne current plans 
to ensure optimal resource allocation and maximal production. Planners imple-
mented the plans by issuing ‘directives’ to administrative units and enterprises. 
The number of planning directives was subject to change; in different periods, 
enterprises had to comply with more or fewer planning criteria. However, central 
planning and resources allocation at all times remained pervasive features of the 
socialist economic system.
At the top of Poland’s economic pyramid were the Politburo of the PZPR and 
the Council of State which, through their plenary authority over the entire state 
apparatus, in effect governed the planning process. Primary legal authority for 
designing and implementing economic plans was located in the Council of Minis-
ters’ Planning Commission, which had the incredibly diffi cult, if not impossible, 
task of collecting and digesting information coming up from the various sectors 
of Poland’s complex and highly interdependent socialized economy. As the late 
Alec Nove (1986, 132) explained it, the planning process ‘requires multimillion 
instructions as to what to produce, to whom deliveries should be made, from 
whom inputs should be received, and when. All this must be made to cohere with 
plans for labor, wages, profi ts, investment fi nancing, material-utilization norms, 
quality, productivity for each of many thousands of productive units.’
Before the computer age it was inconceivable, even to staunch proponents 
of socialism, that planners could successfully perform the ‘multimillion’ calcula-
tions required for accurate planning. But by the 1960s, many, including the great 
theoretician of central planning, Oskar Lange (1969, 158), expressed confi dence 
that computer technology would not only make accurate planning feasible but 
render the market process obsolete ‘as a computing device of the pre-electronic 
age.’ Even in the age of computers, however, the ability to effectively plan a large 
and diversifi ed economy is doubtful. Time is a crucial variable in planning, and it 
is not at all clear that the multimillion bits of economic information could be col-
lected, fed into the computer and calculated within the useful life of the results. 
An analogy to weather forecasting may be instructive. Today’s computers are 
capable of predicting tomorrow’s weather for a specifi ed location with uncanny 
accuracy. However, weather forecasters are forced to sacrifi ce a certain degree of 
accuracy for the sake of utility. It would take more than 24 hours to input and com-
pute all the information needed for maximally accurate forecasts, but those fore-
casts obviously would be obsolete by the time they became available. The same 
problem must also plague efforts to plan an economy centrally (see Arnold 1990, 
259).4 Even if plans could be completely accurate, they never would be entirely 
‘scientifi c’ because they depend on economic policies, which inevitably implicate 
non-scientifi c value judgments. For example, as Lange (1938, 85) acknowledged, 
the selection of an economic investment rate is inevitably arbitrary and political 
(see also Feiwel 1971b, 20; 1971a, 333), though it is a critical variable in plan 
Chapter 5114
calculations. So planning can never be just a ‘technical’ process. And to the extent 
planning decisions unavoidably are political, the institution of central planning 
is inherently anti-democratic because planners impose their own production and 
consumption preferences on the whole of society (see Hayek 1944, esp. chap. 5).
Planning is also impeded by technological developments in products and pro-
cesses. With all of the world’s computers at their disposal, planners could never 
foretell technological developments that might alter optimal investment, cost and 
production levels over a given plan period (Bernholz 1987, 166). In fast-changing 
economic circumstances, where markets are quick to adapt, central plans are slug-
gish and unwieldy. Any change in one part of the plan requires changes to many 
others because production activities are highly interdependent.
These problems notwithstanding, Poland’s Planning Commission was sup-
posed to set output levels for all sectors of the economy for each plan period (one-
year, three-year or fi ve-year) based on information received from enterprises, 
associations and industrial ministries, and pursuant to policy directions issuing 
from the PZPR’s Politburo, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. As 
with the rate of investment, the planned level of output was as much a political as 
an economic decision. The consistent policy (throughout the Soviet bloc) of invest-
ing more in heavy industrial than in consumer-oriented production was a function 
of ideology and entrenched political interests rather than of economic ‘science.’
Planners allocated inputs and assigned output targets using what has been 
called the ‘Method of Material Balances’ (see Rutland 1985, 114–17). Unlike 
capitalist markets in which prices determine resource allocation and production, 
socialism’s Method of Material Balances assigns physical units of inputs and out-
puts without regard for value. Economists have long recognized the drawbacks of 
this method. To borrow a well-worn example, the output of a nail factory typically 
was based on gross weight of output. On this measure, it did not matter whether 
the factory produced millions of tiny nails or one gigantic nail, so long as the 
total weight was the same. More importantly, as we shall see shortly, planning by 
physical units rather than economic value impeded efforts to conserve resource 
inputs. The lack of a (non-arbitrary) pricing mechanism rendered the socialist 
economic system irrational-in-fact because planners found no alternative method 
of accounting for resource scarcity (see Arnold 1990, 249–50).
After the Planning Commission established output targets, its next task was to 
allocate investments among the various sectors, based on the total available sup-
ply of resources and planned production. This was also the phase of the planning 
process when central planners allocated funds for ancillary (‘non- productive’) 
activities, including environmental protection. Once resource allocation deci-
sions were made, the draft plan was submitted to the Council of Ministers for its 
approval, and, fi nally, to the Sejm for its rubber-stamp.5 
After the socioeconomic plan was completed and approved, the Planning 
Commission was responsible for its implementation and any necessary adjust-
ments during the plan period. As it happened, adjustments were continually nec-
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essary. Indeed, the frequency and intensity of ‘mid-course corrections’ suggest 
that Poland’s economy was not ‘planned’ in any meaningful sense. For this rea-
son, some commentators insist on referring to socialist economies as ‘adminis-
tered,’ rather than ‘planned’ (see, e.g., Zaleski 1984, 484; Wilhelm 1985, 118–19). 
Initial responsibility for plan implementation fell to the various economic 
ministries, under the direct supervision of the Council of Ministers. Each eco-
nomic ministry represented a different sector of production. In 1980, for exam-
ple, there were 14 branch economic ministries: Mining; Metallurgy; Electric and 
Atomic Energy; Chemical Industry; Domestic Commerce and Services; Light 
Industry; Machine-Building; Food Industry and Agricultural Purchases; Agri-
culture; Forestry and Timber; Construction and Building Materials; Administra-
tion, Local Economy and Environmental Protection; Foreign Trade and Maritime 
Economy; and Heavy and Agricultural Machinery. Other ministries, including the 
Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Labor, Wages and Social Affairs, and the Mate-
rial Economy Ministry, also had substantial responsibilities related to plan imple-
mentation, though they did not represent specifi c economic sectors. The number 
and structure of ministries changed frequently beginning in the 1960s, as the 
Party/state attempted (or feigned) various economic and administrative reforms. 
But the structure of economic decision making always remained highly central-
ized. The number of planning directives might grow or shrink, but the center 
always remained fi rmly in control.
The branch ministries with initial responsibility for implementing socioeco-
nomic plans were, in some cases, directly responsible for individual enterprises 
within their sectors of the economy. After receiving plan targets and investment 
allocations from the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers, they 
would assign specifi c production targets and allocate resources to each individual 
enterprise within their jurisdiction. More often, an intermediate level of manage-
ment, called an ‘association,’ stood between the enterprise and its ministry. An 
association was a legally recognized grouping of enterprises within a given indus-
try. This simply added another layer of bureaucracy in the planning process. The 
branch minister would allocate resources and production targets to the associa-
tions which, in turn, would allocate resource and production targets among their 
member enterprises. At that point, achieving the planned level of output became 
the paramount concern of individual enterprises. This did not mark the end of the 
planning process, however. As already noted, plans never survived the plan period 
intact, but were subject to almost continual revisions and modifi cations. Often, the 
plan did not achieve its fi nal form until the plan period was over.
Technological Determinism and Socialist Economic Development
The institution of central planning did not dictate any particular development strat-
egy. As already noted, decisions to allocate more resources to one sector of the 
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economy rather than another was not a technical question for planners but a politi-
cal and ideological question for the Party. Another principle of Marxism–Leninism 
known as ‘technological determinism’ drove an economic development strategy 
based on heavy industrial production that prevailed throughout the Soviet bloc.
Technological determinism was an outgrowth of Marx’s preoccupation with 
economic development as a primary determinant of societal relations. In the Cri-
tique of Political Economy, Marx (1971, 21) wrote that ‘[n]o social order ever per-
ishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed, 
and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material condi-
tions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself.’ On 
this theory, the level of productivity determines the prevailing system of socioeco-
nomic relations. Thus, feudalism gave way to capitalism only as its capacity for 
further development waned. And, according to Marx, capitalism paves the way 
for socialism by increasing productive forces to levels where scarcity is no lon-
ger an insurmountable problem. When the economy grows to the point at which 
it can provide enough for everyone, regardless of population size, the inequitable 
distribution of wealth under capitalism can no longer can be justifi ed objectively. 
Meanwhile, according to Marx, as new technology reduces the amount of nec-
essary labor in production, unemployment increases. The rate of profi t declines 
because machines, unlike the workers they replace, cannot be exploited for sur-
plus value. Firms unable to keep pace with the technological changes become 
uncompetitive and are forced from the market, leading to higher rates of unem-
ployment and the further monopolization of capital (see Clark and Wildavsky 
1994, 56). This fuels class struggle over control of the means of production, and 
the working class ultimately prevails. Thus, the high productivity of advanced 
capitalism leads to socialism, which, in turn, creates the necessary preconditions 
for even higher levels of production under stateless, confl ict-free communism.6 
Although Marx’s Russian interpreters necessarily rejected his view that only 
advanced capitalism provides the necessary preconditions for socialism,7 they 
wholeheartedly agreed with the importance he attached to economic develop-
ment. In their interpretation, the single most important factor in the course of 
human history—explaining human progress from feudalism, through capitalism, 
to  communism—is the development of productive forces. They condensed Marx’s 
entire materialist theory of history into ‘technological determinism,’ according to 
which the level of scientifi c and technological development delimits economic 
development, which, in turn, determines socioeconomic relations. Technological 
development becomes ‘the primary causal agent of social and political develop-
ment’ (Ziegler 1987, 8). Although this interpretation of Marx has been disputed, 
it is a logical extension of some of Marx’s own writings. For example, in Capital 
(1967, vol. I, 386), Marx argued that technology was a prerequisite to production: 
‘Just as a man requires lungs to breath with, so he requires something that is work 
of man’s hand, in order to consume physical forces productively. A water-wheel is 
necessary to exploit the force of water, and a steam-engine to exploit the elasticity 
Enforcement Problems II: Socialist Economics 117
of steam.’ And in The Poverty of Philosophy (1936, 92), Marx wrote that ‘[t]he 
hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the 
industrial capitalist.’ Marx apparently believed, as Alan Ryan (1987, 119) has put 
it, that ‘the course of history is the course of increasingly effective technology.’ 
And he ‘expected socialism to create (and not simply to utilize) the conditions of 
abundancy, by fully opening the sources of development of the productive forces, 
fi rst of all by spurring technical progress’ (Brus 1974, 167; emphasis added). 
Marx presumed (or predicted) that socialism would create more favorable con-
ditions for further technological progress, and this warranted his assertion that 
socialism would prove to be a more effi cient (as well as a more equitable) system 
than capitalism (see S. Gomułka 1986, 182). Marx’s infl uential Russian inter-
preters believed that technological determinism was both a precondition to and 
a consequence of economic development. Technical advances enabled economic 
development, which, in turn, led to progressive structural changes in the econ-
omy. At each successive stage of historical development, technological advances 
multiplied in number and magnitude—just as the rate of innovation under capi-
talism was unimaginable under feudalism, so, they argued, the rate of innovation 
under socialism would eclipse capitalist advances. 
Later in this chapter, we will see how experience contradicted the claimed 
technological superiority of socialism. For now, the important point is that the 
principle of technological determinism played a central role in the development 
of socioeconomic policy throughout the history of the ‘People’s Democracies,’ 
including People’s Poland. In all the countries constructed on the Soviet model, 
rapid industrialization, along with high rates of innovation and economic growth, 
were political and ideological priorities. From Lenin to at least Brezhnev and 
Gierek, socialist leaders displayed a myopic determination to overtake the capital-
ist economies of the West. To accomplish this, the Soviets instituted, fi rst in their 
own country and later throughout the bloc, an intensive industrialization strat-
egy that ‘relied on merciless exploitation (some would say shortsighted plunder-
ing) of the countries’ natural resources of land, water and minerals, on processing 
these resources in a rather wasteful way to produce poor quality products using 
methods of production that appear to have been signifi cantly more capital- and 
labour-intensive than need be’ (Brus 1974, 183). This extensive growth strategy 
was unsustainable; it rapidly depleted available supplies of both labor and natu-
ral resources. Economists in Poland and throughout the Soviet bloc recognized 
this problem by the mid-1960s, when they began calling for fundamental reforms 
in production patterns to conserve resources and improve dynamic effi ciency. In 
response, the Party/states attempted on several occasions (if only half-heartedly) 
to institute reforms. From the 1960s onwards, Poland’s economy constantly ebbed 
and fl owed between reforms and retrenchment. But the investment bias favor-
ing resource-intensive and environmentally stressful heavy industrial production 
remained throughout ‘a distinct characteristic of communist development strat-
egy’ (Brus 1974, 168). 
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The ‘Long History of Short Reforms’ in People’s Poland 
The history of People’s Poland was defi ned by crises: economic, political and 
ecological. The Communist Party changed leaders four times in its history, each 
time in the wake of public protests and riots. First, in 1956, following riots in 
Poznań, Władysław Gomułka came to power, replacing the Stalinist regime. In 
1970, following riots in the Baltic seaports, Gomułka was replaced by Eduard 
Gierek. The crisis that precipitated the rise of Solidarity in 1980 was so severe 
that it prompted successive leadership changes: Gierek’s immediate replacement, 
Stanisław Kania, ruled for only a few short months before being removed in favor 
of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who promptly overcame Solidarity’s immediate 
political challenge by declaring Martial Law. Brute force could not, however, 
surmount Poland’s structural economic crisis, which fi nally caused the system to 
collapse at the end of the 1980s.
Crises defi ned the economic, as well as the political, history of People’s 
Poland. Indeed, each political crisis was largely economic in origin. When work-
ers protested in Poznań in 1956, they demanded an increased standard of liv-
ing as well as an end to Soviet domination. The banners they carried proclaimed 
‘BREAD AND FREEDOM’ (Davies 1982, 584). The 1970 and 1980 protests that 
brought down Gomułka and Gierek, respectively, were direct responses to gov-
ernment price increases that eroded Poland’s already meager standard of living. 
Each crisis produced a new Party/state leader promising economic reforms to 
correct the ‘mistakes’ of the past and deliver prosperity. The chronology of major 
economic reform packages closely tracked the leadership changes: 1956–8, 1973 
and 1982 (see Jermankowicz 1988, 84–6).
The very fact that Poland’s leaders felt the need to make structural adjust-
ments every fi ve to ten years suggested that something was seriously amiss with 
the supposedly more rational and scientifi c socialist economic system. The vari-
ous reform efforts all shared the goals of increasing economic effi ciency, reducing 
waste and raising the standard of living. Complete failure was another common 
trait. None of the reforms had any kind of long-term positive effect on Poland’s 
economic performance. Indeed, it is a misnomer even to refer to them as ‘reforms,’ 
if we defi ne that term with Włodzimierz Brus (1988, 65) to require ‘a meaningful 
change in the operating principles of an economic system,’ as opposed to just any 
old modifi cation in the existing framework.
All efforts to reform Poland’s socialist economy failed for essentially the 
same reasons: they treated symptoms rather than the diseased system itself; they 
were piecemeal, when comprehensive changes were in order; they were blocked 
by the self-interested bureaucracy; and they were actually or in effect rescinded 
by the Party even before they could be implemented. Consider the remarkably 
consistent assessments of major and minor reform efforts from the 1950s through 
the 1980s by a varied group of distinguished economists: 
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John Michael Montias (1962, 304) on the 1956–8 reforms:
The record for the years 1957–59 reveals that the reforms were gradually eroded 
by the central bureaucracy; this trend was merely accelerated by the economic 
crisis of the summer of 1959 which impelled the government to retract some of 
the concessions granted in the preceding years.
Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski (1989, 62) on the 1968 ‘minor’ reforms:
The failure of most of the reform attempts was explained by the political 
resistance of the ruling elites; by the vested interests of the party and state 
bureaucracies, coupled with a reluctance on the part of the rank-and-fi le and 
the managers to trade security for stronger incentives linked to effi ciency; 
and fi nally by substantive diffi culties in devising and implementing a suf-
fi ciently consistent and workable reform project.
P. T. Wanless (1980, 50–2) on the 1973 reforms:
These reforms have proved no more successful than earlier attempts. Even 
before the economic diffi culties of 1975–76, the reforms can be criticized on 
various counts: the piecemeal introduction of the reforms; the lack of reforms in 
central planning; and the continued supervisory role of the economic ministries. 
. . . [A] combination of economic stress and political weakness at the time the 
reforms were introduced led to the reforms emerging in partial form, lacking 
certain essential elements.
Leszek Balcerowicz (1989, 48) on the 1982 reforms:
[I]t is clear that the system which evolved during the period 1982–1987 did 
not achieve the basic objectives stated in the reform proposal: a considerable 
increase in economic effi ciency and the elimination of chronic shortages. The 
basic reason for this failure is to be seen in the fact that the reform has not been 
suffi ciently comprehensive and radical. There have been many partial changes. 
. . . But the problem is that the basic features responsible for the poor perfor-
mance of the traditionally planned economy with respect to effi ciency and mar-
ket balance have remained, although sometimes in a weakened, modifi ed or 
disguised form.8
Jan Winiecki (1991, 23) on the 1987 ‘second-stage’ reforms:
By 1987 the failure of the latest round became glaringly visible even to the rul-
ing group. Consequently, the propaganda apparatus started a campaign for the 
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‘second stage’ of economic reforms and the bureaucracy prepared a blueprint 
of expected changes. However, the blueprint had all the marks of a counter-
reformation move. It was quite radical in its verbal encouragement for entrepre-
neurship, innovation, and enterprise autonomy, the role of prices in the economy, 
etc., but the fundamentally unchanged property rights structure and the proposed 
policy instruments leaving wide possibilities for both systematic and ad hoc 
interventions, made the ‘second stage’ very much like the fi rst.
The reforms all failed to improve effi ciency, reduce waste or raise the standard of 
living for most Poles. That is not to say they had no effects at all. Efforts to intro-
duce market mechanisms in a marketless economic system managed to combine 
the worst features of the capitalist and socialist systems: infl ation and shortages 
(see Kamiński 1991, 73). Rather than improving the economy’s performance, 
these reforms tended to exacerbate existing problems. Most importantly, none of 
the reforms (excepting the abandonment of forced collectivization in 1956 and the 
dismantling of central economic planning at the beginning of 1989) substantially 
altered the political-economic system. The 1982 reform, for example, reduced for 
a short time the degree of central control over economic activities, but enterprises 
remained dependent on the center for investment funds and subsidies (see Kornai 
1992a, 466; Eysymontt 1989, 34). When self-management reforms introduced a 
measure of democratic self-government within enterprises, single-party rule con-
tinued on the outside, and the Party/state, as owner of the means of production, 
retained ultimate decision-making power concerning the ‘self-managed’ enter-
prises (Kornai 1992a, 464). 
Simply stated, the reforms did not succeed because the system was unre-
formable (see Eysymontt 1989, 30; Prybyła 1988, 359). And the system could 
not be reformed because of entrenched interests within the PZPR and the state’s 
administrative hierarchy who were unwilling to give up political control and its 
perquisites for the sake of improved economic effi ciency (see Brus 1988, 76; 
 Feiwel 1971a, 345). As János Kornai (1992a, 525–7) has pointed out, real eco-
nomic reform aimed at increasing effi ciency would have required a radical shift 
from administratively controlled to market-set prices. But such a shift was never 
seriously attempted (at least not before 1988), partly because of lingering ideo-
logical commitments but mostly because any substantial reductions in administra-
tive control would have meant a loss of property rights (in other words, rents) and 
political power among the ruling elite (see Winiecki 1991, 16). As with its com-
mitment to environmental protection, the Party was interested in improving eco-
nomic performance only to the extent that its control over the economy was not 
threatened. Any proposed reforms that substantially reduced central Party control 
constituted a direct threat to Party authority, so were rejected as contrary to the 
advancement of socialism. In other words, the Party was in favor of reforming 
everything but itself. Its consistent attitude toward economic reform, fi rst enun-
ciated by Władysław Gomułka in the 1960s, was based on a contradiction: the 
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‘process of decentralization must be accompanied by the consolidation of central 
control, especially of fi nancial control’ (quoted in Montias 1962, 319).
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, Poland’s various economic reforms 
will be neglected, except insofar as they had direct signifi cance for environmental 
protection. For the most part, the socialist economic system will be presented as 
an unchanging edifi ce from the time of its imposition during the Stalinist period 
to its eradication at the end of 1988. This portrayal may not be completely accu-
rate, but it surely comes closer to reality than ‘the long history of short reform’ in 
People’s Poland (Holland 1988, 135).
5.2. Economic Stagnation and the Underenforcement 
of Environmental Law in People’s Poland
The Decline and Fall of Poland’s Socialist Economy
After strong post-war growth during the late 1940s and 1950s, Poland’s economy 
began to stagnate in the 1960s. In 1970, the new Party/state leader Eduard Gierek 
attempted to revive the economy with a reform program that promised to increase 
investment and consumption at the same time. Fully aware that the Party/state did 
not possess the stake money to pull off that feat, Gierek looked beyond Poland’s 
borders for fi nancial assistance, and he found willing partners in the West. At the 
beginning of the 1970s, Western commercial banks were fl ush; they had more 
money than they knew what to do with, so they decided to loan some to countries, 
including Poland, in the misguided belief that sovereign debtors could not go 
bankrupt. Poland began to borrow heavily from Western governments and com-
mercial banks, receiving US$6 billion in Western credits between 1970 and 1975. 
By the end of the 1980s, Poland was the world’s fourth-largest debtor country, 
owing more than US$40 billion to Western governments and commercial banks. 
The signifi cance of this debt for the subsequent history of People’s Poland can 
hardly be overemphasized; it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say 
that the loan offi cers at Citibank had as much to do with the downfall of commu-
nism in Poland as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher did.
During the fi rst half of the 1970s, Gierek’s scheme produced what was called 
an ‘economic miracle’ in Poland. The capital he borrowed contributed to substan-
tial increases in production, economic growth rates and the standard of living. But 
debt-fi nancing growth proved to be a disastrous gamble. In 1973–4, the OPEC 
oil embargo quadrupled the price of world oil, shocking the world economy into 
recession. In the West, trade defi cits and interest rates skyrocketed. As interest 
rates rose, the pool of cheap credits dried up. Meanwhile, Poland’s hard currency 
export earnings dwindled, as its relatively expensive and low-quality exports 
found fewer and fewer buyers in the shrinking world markets. By the end of the 
decade, the Party/state could not meet its foreign debt repayment schedules, and 
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its domestic economy was approaching collapse. All this at a time when Poland’s 
environmental problems were reaching crisis proportions. 
Poland’s socialist economy never really recovered before it was abandoned 
at the end of 1988. The economy staggered through the 1980s with economic 
growth averaging less than 1 percent annually. Table 5.1 provides real average 
and annual economic growth rates for Poland from 1965 to the end of 1988 (when 
socialist central planning was largely abandoned).
Poland’s Economic Decline and the Rate of Investment in 
Environmental Protection
Environmental law enforcement depends in the fi rst instance on fi nancial out-
lays. This truism explains almost completely how Poland’s economic travails 
obstructed environmental protection efforts. The most direct impact was on the 
rate of investment in environmental protection, which was hardly lavish to begin 
with. Even in times of relative prosperity, central planners allocated only a small 
percentage of national income for air pollution scrubbers, sewage treatment facili-
ties, pollution-monitoring equipment, and other environmental protection needs. 
For example, in 1971–5, when Poland’s economy was growing rapidly, environ-
mental investments averaged only 0.35 percent of gross national product (GNP) 
and only 1.1 percent of total investment outlays.
Table 5.1. Average and annual rates of GNP growth in People’s Poland,
 1965–88 (%)
1965–70
1971–75
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
3.0
5.7
4.1
2.8
3.7
–1.9
–2.6
–5.3
–0.6
4.6
3.4
1.1
2.8
–2.4
1.6
Sources: For 1965–75—Alton (1981, 391, table 19); for 1976–87—Fallenbuchl (1989, 
103, table 1); for 1988—US Central Intelligence Agency (1990, table C.15).
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When the economy stagnated, environmental projects were always among 
the fi rst budget items to be slashed. Socioeconomic planners considered them 
expendable luxuries, and most Polish citizens agreed that in tough times the 
country could not afford expensive environmental protection (see Życie 
Warszawy, Nov. 24, 1982, at p. 3). In accordance with this perception, the rate 
of investment in environmental protection closely tracked economic growth 
rates. This relationship is clearly refl ected by the data in Table 5.2. Up to about 
1987, the rate of investment in environmental protection rose or fell along with 
the rate of economic growth. But then the pattern suddenly changed. When the 
economy began to decline again in 1987, the rate of environmental investment 
continued to increase as a percentage of gross national product. This change 
may have been precipitated by economic studies from the mid-1980s showing 
that spending on environmental projects was not an expendable luxury but a 
critical necessity. 
Table 5.2. Rates of economic growth, environmental investments and sulphur 
dioxide air pollution emissions in People’s Poland, 1976–88
Economic 
growth rate
Environmental 
investment as % 
of GNP
Environmental 
investment as % 
of total investment
Sulphur dioxide 
emissions 
(% growth)
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
4.1
2.8
3.7
–1.9
–2.6
–5.3
–0.6
4.6
3.4
1.1
2.8
–2.4
1.6
0.40
0.45
0.38
0.35
0.28
0.20
0.25
0.40
0.50
0.54
0.74
0.80
0.80
1.2
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.0
1.2
1.4
2.2
2.5
2.8
2.8
3.5
3.5
10.8
1.2
7.9
NA
7.6a
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
–2.4
0.0
0.0
a. Two-year percentage increase.
Sources: Economic growth rates—Table 5.1; environmental investment as % of GNP—
Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry (1992b, 62, fi g. 
19); environmental investment as % of total investment—Ochrona Środowiska 1976–90; 
Ginsbert-Gebert (1991b, 46, table 6); sulfur dioxide emissions growth rates—1976–8, 
Wiadomości Statystyczne, No. 11, Dec. 1979, pp. 7–12, table 1; 1980, Ochrony Środowiska 
1989 xxv, table I; 1981–8, Institut Ochrony Środowiska (1991, table 22).
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In the 1980s, Antoni Symonowicz (1988) evaluated economic losses attrib-
utable to environmental pollution and resource waste, including all reasonably 
ascertainable losses to public health, architecture, industrial equipment, agricul-
tural produce and forests from pollution damage, as well as economic losses due 
to the ineffi cient use of natural resources. According to his studies, economic 
losses in 1980 resulting from waste and pollution amounted to approximately 
206 billion zlotys. In 1983, according to a different study (Górka and Poskrobko 
1987, 89), pollution and resource waste cost between 500 and 600 billion zlo-
tys, or 7–9 percent of national income. A 1985 study by economists from the 
Kraków Academy of Economics (discussed in Familiec et al. 1991, 49–50) esti-
mated nationwide ecological losses at 2,216 billion zlotys, more than 25 percent 
of national income. The economic costs were even higher in the more heavily 
polluted regions of the country. In Kraków, for instance, ecological damage for 
1985 was estimated at 34–35 percent of net production. The Kraków economists 
rightly concluded that the volume of economic costs from ecological damage 
constituted ‘a fi nal argument for active environmental protection’ (Familiec et 
al. 1991, 50). 
Apparently Poland’s central planners were paying attention because in the 
late 1980s the rate of environmental investment increased despite declining pro-
duction and income levels. It is important to note, however, that the actual rates of 
increase in environmental spending never came close to planned levels. Between 
1976 and 1980, ‘a bare 40 percent’ of planned outlays for environmental protec-
tion were actually expended (Życie Warszawy, Nov. 25, 1982). In 1987, actual 
environmental investments were 9 percent lower than stipulated in the annual 
socioeconomic plan; and in 1988, environmental expenditures fell 17 percent 
short of planned levels (Rusiński 1991, 37). These investment shortfalls exacer-
bated law enforcement problems, reducing, for example, the Party/state’s ability 
to monitor pollution activities. The State Environmental Protection Inspectorate’s 
monitoring program provided only about 5 percent of national environmental 
data; for the other 95 percent, the Polish government had to rely on notoriously 
unreliable enterprise self-monitoring. By way of comparison, state monitoring 
produces more than 50 percent of environmental information in Norway and the 
Netherlands (Rusiński 1991, 32). Funding shortfalls in People’s Poland also ham-
pered basic environmental research. For example, between 1975 and 1985 Polish 
researchers conducted regular epidemiological studies of the health impacts of 
pollution on children living near the Katowice Foundry. (As we learned in Chap-
ter 1, children throughout Katowice and Silesia suffer inordinately high rates of 
infant mortality, respiratory illnesses, lead poisoning, leukemia, birth defects and 
mental illness.) However, these studies were discontinued between 1986 and 1990 
solely for lack of funds (Jonderko 1990, 7).
The Party/state’s efforts to increase environmental expenditures in a stagnant 
or shrinking economy were laudable, but vain. Poland simply could not invest 
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enough in environmental protection to begin offsetting the economic harm caused 
by accumulating environmental degradation. It was like a dog chasing its tail, 
investing 0.5 percent of national income to fi ght a crisis costing between 10 and 
20 percent of national income. The rate of investment in environmental protection 
simply could not keep pace with the rate of environmental destruction caused in 
the (increasingly futile) pursuit of economic growth. Table 5.3 compares Poland’s 
rate of investment in environmental protection as a percentage of gross national 
product with investment rates in several other Communist and capitalist coun-
tries. Even compared with its socialist allies, Poland’s level of investment in envi-
ronmental protection appears meager. In fact, Poland did not reach the 1 percent 
investment level until 1991, two years after the fall of communism.9
5.3. The Extensive Nature of Economic Production 
under Socialism10 
Poland’s intertwined economic and ecological crises were neither fortuitous nor 
primarily the results of exogenous factors, such as fl uctuating world markets. 
They were rooted in the socialist economic system. This section focuses on the 
extensive nature of economic production under socialism.
Table 5.3. Average percentage of gross national product invested in 
environmental protection in Poland and other selected countries, 1971–85
1971–75 1976–80 1981–85
Bulgaria
France
Great Britain
Hungary
Japan
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.4
1.1
1.5
1.5
1.1
1.5
1.1
1.6
1.7
1.1
1.6
Poland 0.35 0.37 0.43
Romania
Soviet Union
Sweden
United States
West Germany
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.4
1.8
1.0
1.2
2.0
1.8
1.8
1.0
1.2
1.9
1.8
1.9
Source: Ginsbert-Gebert (1991b, 46, table 7).
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The Symbiotic Relation between Environmental Protection 
and Economic Growth
The relationship between economic growth and environmental protection is com-
plex and controversial. Environmentalists traditionally have blamed environ-
mental problems on economic development, while industrialists (as well as third 
world politicians) often criticize environmental regulation as an overly expensive 
and often unnecessary impediment to growth and development. But, increasingly, 
economic development and environmental protection are viewed as interdepen-
dent, rather than mutually exclusive, goals. Concepts such as ‘sustainable devel-
opment’ (see World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) and 
the ‘polluter pays principle’ (see Opschoor and Vos 1991) exemplify efforts to 
create development policies that combine economic growth with environmental 
protection. They implicitly entail the notion that long-term environmental protec-
tion is not possible without economic growth and vice versa.
It is easy to see that environmental protection requires economic growth. 
Environmental programs are, after all, very expensive. In the United States alone, 
environmental protection costs approximately US$115 billion annually (US Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency 1991, v–vii). Without funds to fi nance the investiga-
tion of environmental problems and the design, implementation, and enforcement 
of regulatory measures, a developing country has only two options: become 
severely polluted or prohibit all polluting activities. In reality, only the fi rst option 
exists; the second is illusory because a country that lacks funds for environmental 
protection never could afford to enforce a ban on polluting activities (assuming 
agreement could be reached on what constitutes a ‘polluting activity’ in the fi rst 
place).
Environmental degradation plagues countries at all levels of economic 
development, but is often most acute in poorer, less developed countries. Even 
completely unindustrialized countries often suffer from chronic environmental 
problems, such as poor sanitation, shortages of potable water, and deforestation 
(see Radetzki 1990, 8). The need for environmental protection thus precedes 
industrialization. But that need increases dramatically as economic development 
and industrialization proceed. In most countries, industrialization begins with 
transportation infrastructure and heavy industry (such as steel production). This 
type of development creates a high level of environmental stress. And the greater 
the level of environmental stress, the more important economic growth becomes 
for environmental protection. If the industrializing country’s economy manages 
to produce sustained growth along with the higher levels of environmental stress, 
then the government can afford to take effective steps to protect the environment. 
However, if the economy fails to produce real growth along with the pollution, 
then a serious problem arises—high levels of pollution and very little money with 
which to combat it. This, in a nutshell, was the situation of People’s Poland and 
the other countries of the former Soviet bloc.
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The symbiotic relationship between economic growth and environmental 
protection is supported by studies correlating growth in per capita income and 
environmental investment. As income rises, so does the propensity to allocate 
resources for environmental purposes (see Walter and Ugelow 1979; US Agency 
for International Development 1979; United Nations Center on Transnational Cor-
porations 1985; Shafi k and Bandaopadhyay 1992). As Marian Radetzki (1990) 
explains, rising per capita income spurs consumerism, which (at least in demand-
driven markets) causes a shift in production from environmentally stressful heavy 
industries to less stressful service industries to meet consumer preferences. In 
addition to their material desires, consumers (as voters) state preferences for qual-
ity of life, resulting in increased direct investment in environmental protection. 
Over time, the amount of environmental stress created per unit of production 
tends to decline because of a naturally occurring (at least in capitalist economies) 
shift from extensive to intensive patterns of production. 
In early stages of economic development, supplies of resources, including 
labor and natural resources, are plentiful. They have relatively low economic 
value, so they can be exploited with scant regard for waste. Economic growth 
will be produced by maximizing investments of these cheap ‘inputs.’ This type 
of growth is extensive. As economic development continues, available resources, 
including both labor and natural resources, become increasingly scarce. Conse-
quently, they become more expensive to use. As prices for inputs rise, produc-
ers will naturally tend to intensify production patterns (at least in the absence of 
cheap and suitable substitute inputs). Instead of maximizing sheer numbers of 
inputs, they will seek to maximize the productive output from each input, thereby 
improving dynamic effi ciency. In other words, they tend to practice conservation. 
One consequence of this shift to more intensive modes of production is that less 
stress is placed on the natural environment per unit of national income produced 
(Radetzki 1990, 14).
Empirical studies confi rm that economies tend to shift from extensive to 
(increasingly) intensive patterns of production (see, e.g., Malenbaum 1978). 
This shift is represented in Figure 5.1. The inverted U-shaped curve indicates 
that at early preindustrial stages of development, environmental costs are rela-
tively low (though perhaps not insignifi cant). They grow quickly as countries 
enter a middle stage of development dominated by heavy industrial activities, 
such as steel production and construction of transportation infrastructure (high-
ways and rail-lines). If effi cient, this production leads to high rates of per capita 
income growth, which, in turn, leads to a shift in demand away from heavy 
industrial production to the environmentally less stressful production of con-
sumer goods and services. In a recent study of the relationship between per cap-
ita income and four pollution indicators—urban air quality, oxygen demand in 
rivers, fecal contamination of rivers, and heavy metal contamination of  rivers—
economists Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger (1995, 369) reached the follow-
ing conclusion:
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[W]e fi nd little evidence that environmental quality deteriorates with economic 
growth. Rather, we fi nd for most indicators that economic growth brings an ini-
tial phase of deterioration followed by a subsequent phase of improvement. We 
suspect that the eventual improvement refl ects, in part, an increased demand for 
(and supply of) environmental protection at higher levels of national income. 
The turning points for the different pollutants vary, but in most cases they occur 
before a country reaches a per capita income of $8000. For seven of the four-
teen indicators we fi nd a statistically signifi cant positive relationship between 
environmental quality and income for a middle-income country with a per cap-
ita GDP of $10,000. Only in one case (fecal coliform) do we fi nd a signifi cant 
adverse relationship at this income level.
Grossman and Krueger (1995, 371) are quick to point out, however, that ‘there is 
no reason to believe that the process has been an automatic one.’ This is important 
to bear in mind as we turn our attention to the non-conforming relation between 
economic growth and environmental protection in the formerly socialist econo-
mies of Central and Eastern Europe.
Western studies of growth patterns were not lost on Party leaders in the for-
mer Soviet bloc. In People’s Poland, economic growth was designated an offi cial 
strategy for environmental protection. The Party/state cited Western studies link-
ing economic growth to environmental protection in support of its disingenuous 
claim that Poland ultimately would outgrow its environmental problems simply 
Figure 5.1. Environmental stress at different levels of economic development.
Source: Based on Radetzki (1990, fi g. 13A).
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by revving up its economy to Western levels and beyond (conversation with Dr. 
Tomasz Żylicz, Special Advisor to the Polish Ministry of Environmental Pro-
tection, Natural Resources and Forestry, July 10, 1993). Of course, that never 
happened, despite the fact that between 1950 and 1979 Poland’s economy grew 
(according to offi cial statistics based on the dubious model of material balances) 
at an average annual rate of 4.12 percent, almost 0.75 percent higher than the 
average rate of growth in the United States during the same period (Pryor 1985, 
76). But the effect of that growth on Poland’s natural environment was anything 
but benefi cial. As Poland’s economy grew, factor productivity and the condition 
of the natural environment both deteriorated. There are at least three plausible 
economic explanations for this.
First, despite comparable growth and environmental investment rates, the 
younger and smaller socialist economies could not buy as much environmental 
protection as the generally larger and more mature capitalist economies. Their 
percentage investment may have been the same, but their nominal investment was 
much smaller. In other words, they were taking proportional slices from smaller 
pies. This is borne out by statistics comparing nominal gross national product in 
the former Soviet bloc countries with the capitalist West (see Alton 1981, table 
11). 
Second, high rates of ‘hidden’ infl ation directly devalued environmental 
investment increases in the socialist economies, and indirectly impeded the use of 
environmental expenditures by reducing (through shortage) supplies of materials 
available for use in environmental protection (see Peterson 1993, 170). 
Third, structural features of the socialist economy prevented what is, under 
capitalism, a naturally occurring shift from extensive to intensive modes of pro-
duction. And the failure to make that shift, perhaps more than any other feature of 
the Communist political economy, was responsible for the massive and chronic 
environmental degradation experienced throughout the former Soviet bloc. 
The third reason is by far the most important. But a few comments are in 
order about the fi rst, which focuses on the size and maturity of the economy. It 
is true that the socialist economies were nominally smaller than the advanced 
capitalist economies, and they were less developed technologically. But that is not 
because they were younger or less developed, as posited in Rostovian ‘stages of 
growth’ theories (see Rostow 1990). By the 1970s, the socialist economies were 
among the most highly industrialized in the world. Poland ranked as the world’s 
tenth industrial power in total output (Sądowski 1976, 49). To what extent, then, 
were Poland’s lower national income fi gures legitimately attributable to its later 
economic development, rather than to systemic and ideological factors that, 
among other things, impeded the shift from extensive to intensive production pat-
terns? I do not propose an answer to that question. I raise it only to cast doubt on 
the claim that the poor environmental performance of socialist economies was 
strongly related to their stage of development. That claim is worth doubting for 
three reasons. First, factor productivity throughout the Soviet bloc was quite low 
Chapter 5130
even as compared with countries at similar levels of development (Brus and Laski 
1989, 29). More generally, empirical studies suggest that the nature or structure 
of the economic system, far more than the level of economic development, deter-
mines environmental performance (see, e.g., Bernstam 1991). Finally, the claim 
that environmental performance is determined by the stage of economic devel-
opment implies that economic growth may be a suffi cient, as well as necessary, 
condition for environmental protection. That implication could be used to support 
disingenuous claims that the socialist economies eventually would have outgrown 
their environmental problems in time. In fact, the experiences of the socialist 
economies—Poland’s in particular—belie the contention that economic growth 
and increased environmental investments are suffi cient conditions for effective 
environmental protection. 
The Extensive Pattern of Production under Socialism 
Whereas the explanation based on the stage of economic development is problem-
atic and controversial, the explanation based on the nature of economic growth 
is neither. Socialist economic development exemplifi ed the extensive pattern of 
production and its environmental consequences. The former Soviet bloc countries 
displayed a persistent and myopic determination to catch and then surpass the 
capitalist West’s level of economic development (see, e.g., Spulber 1964, 35). 
And the constant strategy for achieving this goal was to pump massive inputs of 
capital, labor and natural resources into large-scale heavy industrial development 
(see, e.g., Ofer 1988, 55). Meanwhile, the socialists paid scant attention to factors 
such as resource scarcity and productive effi ciency, initially for ideological rea-
sons (stemming from Marx’s labor theory of value—see Chapter 6, §6.4) and later 
because of entrenched political and economic interests (see Kramer 1973, 373).
Politically and economically dominated by the USSR, and with only lim-
ited access to Western capital and technologies, the socialist countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe had little choice but to follow the Soviet Union’s extensive 
strategy of economic growth. Decade after decade they invested ever higher num-
bers of inputs to achieve roughly the same economic growth levels as their West 
European competitors. Table 5.4 illustrates the relative extensivity of production 
in the former Soviet bloc compared with the European Community. Through the 
1980s, the socialist countries had to invest more than three times the energy and 
almost twice the water to produce the same amount of income as capitalist Euro-
pean countries. 
The relative extensivity of production in the Eastern European countries 
remained constant to the end of the socialist experiment. Unlike the capitalist 
economies, the socialist economies grew increasingly wasteful, that is, less inten-
sive, as time passed; less production, rather than more, was obtained from each 
input. Table 5.5 illustrates this by comparing relative productivity per input, over 
Enforcement Problems II: Socialist Economics 131
Table 5.4. Natural resources invested per unit of national product in 
socialist Europe and the European Community in the 1980s
Socialist countriesa EC countries
Energy intensity of GDP, TOE/$1,000b 0.77 0.23
Water intensity of GDP, m3/$1,000 153 82
a. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania.
b. TOE = metric ton of oil equivalent.
Source: Żylicz (1993b, table 1).
Table 5.5. Share of factor productivity in the growth of output: international 
comparison
Average annual rate of change
Country Period Output
[Factor] 
productivity
Share of factor 
productivity in 
growth of output
Socialist countries
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Soviet Union
Capitalist countries
France
Japan
United Kingdom
1960–75
1976–80
1981–88
1960–75
1976–80
1981–88
1960–75
1976–80
1981–88
1960–73
1973–79
1979–88
1960–73
1973–79
1979–88
1960–73
1973–79
1979–88
3.0
2.2
1.4
5.1
0.7
0.8
4.6
2.3
1.9
5.8
2.8
1.9
10.8
3.6
4.1
2.9
1.5
2.2
1.0
0.7
0.1
2.4
–0.6
0.2
1.2
0.5
0.5
3.9
1.7
1.5
6.6
1.8
1.8
2.2
0.5
1.96
0.33
0.29
0.07
0.47
–
0.40
0.26
0.22
0.13
0.67
0.65
0.75
0.61
0.43
0.43
0.76
0.60
0.95
Source: Kornai (1992a, 187, table 9.6).
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a three-decade period, for selected socialist and capitalist countries. The statistics 
show that factor productivity—production per unit of input—steadily contrib-
uted to economic growth in France, Japan and the United Kingdom, whereas in 
the socialist European countries factor productivity played a relatively small and 
declining role in economic growth. Further evidence is provided by Polish statis-
tics relating net output to material costs. Between 1960 and 1978, consumption of 
raw materials in Poland increased by 3.1 percent; and the rate of increase rose to 
5.2 percent between 1978 and 1981 (Marek and Kassenberg 1990, 45).
The increasingly extensive production patterns of the socialist economies had 
predictable consequences for the natural environment. The scale of waste in the 
Soviet Union and its satellite countries was unparalleled. For example, the Soviet 
mining industry typically extracted only the most accessible mineral deposits, and 
processed only the ores with the highest mineral content; the rest was dumped in 
slag heaps (Kramer 1973, 371). Table 5.6 shows the inordinately high percentage 
of mineral resources lost in the extractive process in the Soviet Union. Similarly, 
in People’s Poland, about 60 percent of recoverable coal was wasted. By way of 
comparison, in other countries with similar geological circumstances only about 
30 percent of recoverable coal is lost in the extractive process (S. Gomułka 1986, 
184). Overall, the material intensity of production in the socialist European econ-
omies was 55 percent higher than in capitalist countries (Staniszkis 1992, 91–2).
Excessive pollution was another by-product of the extensive pattern of pro-
duction. Obviously if one country has to burn more coal than another to achieve 
the same level of income production, it will produce more air pollution to achieve 
the same level of income production (assuming coal with similar properties, 
equivalent abatement technologies, etc.). Table 5.7 presents comparative statistics 
on the pollution intensity of GDP—the amount of pollution produced per unit of 
national income produced—for the formerly socialist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the European Community countries. The socialist countries 
produced 2.5 times the solid waste, discharged more than three times the waste-
water, and emitted more than twice the gas and 13 times the dust of European 
Community countries to produce the same amount of national income.
Given that economic growth in the socialist European countries was pur-
chased at comparatively great expense to the natural environment, it should not 
be surprising to fi nd that environmental protection in those countries was com-
paratively unsuccessful, even though their rates of economic growth were quite 
high. And while the extensive pattern of production took its toll on the environ-
ment, environmental degradation took its toll on the economy, costing between 
10 and 20 percent of national income. The economies of all the Soviet bloc coun-
tries stagnated in the 1970s and 1980s as inputs, including natural resources, 
grew increasingly scarce (see, e.g., Herer and Sądowski 1990, 126). The ques-
tion becomes why the socialist Party/states did not (or could not) cultivate more 
intensive modes of production. Earlier I suggested that the shift from extensive 
to intensive production patterns was naturally occurring, but it did not naturally 
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occur in People’s Poland or the other countries of the Soviet bloc for a variety of 
systemic reasons.
5.4. Systemic Impediments to Resource Conservation
In the 1960s, economists in Poland and throughout the Soviet bloc began calling 
for reforms to improve economic effi ciency and conserve investment resources 
in the socialist economic system (see Becker 1986, 23; Fallenbuchl 1973, 235). 
Their motivation was economic, rather than ecological. In the Soviet Union, for 
example, billions of tons of wasted resources were costing the national economy 
up to 6 billion rubles each year (Peterson 1993, 129). Numerous reforms designed 
to increase factor productivity were implemented, but they were uniformly inef-
fectual. Various system-specifi c features of the socialist economy obstructed them. 
In this section, I will review two of the most important impediments to increased 
conservation of natural resources (including clean air and water) under socialism: 
fi rst, the socialist pricing mechanism, under the infl uence of Marx’s labor theory 
Table 5.6. Percentage losses of natural resources in the extraction process in 
the USSR
Natural resource % loss
Coal
Potassium salts and oil
Non-ferrous metals
Mica
30
50–60
20
90
Source: Kramer (1973, 371, table 3).
Table 5.7. The pollution intensity of GDP in socialist European countries 
and the EC in the 1980s
Socialist Europea The EC
Solid waste, metric ton/$
Wastewater, cubic metres/$1,000
Gases, kg/$1,000
Dust, kg/$1,000
1.0
83
51
13
0.4
24
24
1
a. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania.
Source: Żylicz (1993b, table 1).
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of value, failed to account adequately for increasing (relative) resource scarcity; 
second, the socialist reward (wage and bonus) system did not provide adequate 
incentives for technological innovation, resulting in a 10–20-year environmental 
technology gap between the Soviet bloc and the capitalist West.
The Socialist Pricing Mechanism and Resource Scarcity
In addition to determining resources allocation patterns and output levels, the 
centralized socialist administration controlled prices for producer and con-
sumer goods. Prices were set to achieve a wide array of goals, ranging from the 
id eological—meeting Marx’s ‘average price of production’ standard—to the 
politically pragmatic—quieting popular discontent. Unfortunately (from the point 
of view of economic effi ciency), prices only rarely (and then coincidentally) were 
set at market-clearing levels. Most importantly, central planners paid virtually no 
attention to relative scarcity when setting prices. Their chronic and often inten-
tional undervaluation of inputs, especially natural resources, was substantially 
responsible for the steady decline in factor productivity.
In the socialist economic system, natural resources were provided to produc-
ers virtually free of charge (Peterson 1993, 16). As Robert W. Campbell (1991, 
117) has expressed it, environmental goods had ‘zero prices.’ This was, on one 
level, just another subsidy, softening the budget constraint for state-owned enter-
prises. But it was more than a mere subsidy. The policy of providing natural 
resource inputs free of charge had strong ideological roots in Marxist theory, spe-
cifi cally in the labor theory of value (discussed in detail in Chapter 6, §6.4), which 
became a cornerstone of the socialist economic system, governing the economics 
of natural resource use until the very end. So when Soviet economists began call-
ing for resource-use fees, they were opposed by conservative forces, including 
lawyers, who argued that natural resources, as socialist property, could not be 
bought and sold as commodities (see Goldman 1972a, 40). And the conservative 
forces prevailed. Into the 1980s, the offi cial view in the Soviet Union was that 
free use of land was ‘one of the greatest achievements of the October Revolu-
tion’ (DeBardeleben 1985, 244). This sentiment was refl ected in Soviet economic 
policy, codifi ed in legislation (see 1968 Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 51, Item No. 
485 and 1970 Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 50, Item No. 564), and exemplifi ed in 
Soviet industrial practice. For instance, when planners developed a hydroelectric 
project that would fl ood valuable agricultural lands, the cost of lost agricultural 
production from those lands was ignored (see Campbell 1991, 54). Similarly, 
when whole forests were felled, tons of rotting wood lay wasted because there 
were not enough trains to carry them to market; but this technically did not consti-
tute a cost to the Soviet economy (Komarov [pseud.] 1980, 70). Extraction costs 
were incurred, of course, but the value of the wood itself was not considered. The 
consequence of neglecting the scarcity value of timber was predictable: in the 
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Soviet Union during the 1980s, 40 percent of wood was wasted in the production 
process, amounting to 100 million cubic meters each year (Peterson 1993, 130). 
Pollution, likewise, was defi ned as cost free to society because it did not 
result in the production of goods from human labor. To borrow Peter Magg’s 
(1985, 359) vivid example:
the steel produced in a steel mill would be valued as the sum of the values of 
the coal and iron ore used as inputs plus the labor cost of the steelworkers. The 
coal and iron would be valued at the cost of their extraction. Yet, no value or cost 
would be attached to the destruction of farmland or scenery by open pit mining, 
to the exhaustion of the country’s best energy and mineral reserves, or to the pol-
lution of the air, water and land by the steel mill, since none of these resulted in 
the production of goods incorporating human labor.
Adherence to Marx’s labor theory of value was not absolute and uniform 
throughout the Soviet bloc, however. In the 1930s, the infl uential socialist eco-
nomic theorist Oskar Lange (1937, 138; 1935, 189) condemned the theory as 
obsolete and insuffi cient because it failed to account for the scarcity of resources 
other than human labor. East Germany, usually among the more doctrinaire of the 
Marxist–Leninist regimes, was the fi rst to impose nominal resource-use fees in 
the late 1960s (see DeBardeleben 1985, 242). As we learned in Chapter 2, Poland 
enacted its fi rst resource-use fees in the 1974 Water Law. Poland’s 1980 Environ-
mental Protection and Development Act then created the most extensive system 
of resource-use and pollution fees in the world. This constituted tacit repudiation 
of Marx’s labor theory of value and implicit recognition that, although natural 
resources might be provided free of charge, they could not be provided free of 
cost. 
Pollution and resource-use fees were poor substitutes for scarcity pricing but, 
of course, they were never intended as substitutes. As Joan DeBardeleben (1985, 
246) has noted, resource-use fees were never based on supply (i.e., relative scar-
city), demand and the marginal costs of development. For example, in People’s 
Poland the price of coal never even approached the marginal costs of produc-
tion. The predictable consequence was excessive coal burning (see Kabala 1990, 
62). The Polish Party/government occasionally raised the price of coal, but price 
increases were always combined with offsetting subsidies to users (see, e.g., Mon-
tias 1962, 289). This practice undercut any incentive users otherwise might have 
had to increase factor productivity. 
Technological Innovation and the Socialist Reward System
In his pioneering studies of economic growth, Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets 
investigated the shift countries make from extensive to intensive modes of pro-
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duction as their economies mature. The high rates of economic growth produced 
during middle levels of development, when heavy industrial production is domi-
nant, lead to high rates of growth in what Kuznets (1971, 322–3) called ‘the stock 
of useful knowledge.’ This includes knowledge of pure and applied sciences—
the kind of knowledge that spurs technological innovation. Innovation, in turn, 
results in increased factor productivity and shifts in production patterns, permit-
ting economic growth to continue even as supplies of available inputs, including 
natural resources, decline over time. Kuznets’s theory developed from his studies 
of economic growth and structure, over long historical periods, in a variety of 
countries. He reached the ‘inescapable conclusion’ that high rates of growth in 
per capita product during ‘modern economic growth’ are attributable primarily 
to increased factor productivity, rather than increases in inputs (specifi cally man-
hours and capital accumulation) (Kuznets 1966, 80–1). The tremendous increase 
in factor productivity needed to generate substantial rates of economic growth is 
provided by ‘the high and accelerated rate of technological change’—‘the hun-
dreds of minor inventions and thousands of improvements which by their cumula-
tive impact drastically reduce relative cost’ (Kuznets 1971, 307, 326). 
As Gur Ofer (1988, 22) has pointed out, the former Soviet bloc countries 
never conformed to Kuznets’s defi nition of modern economic growth. Kuznets 
(1971, 329) himself recognized the socialist economies as anomalies under his 
theory, and he explained them away by noting that growth in ‘useful knowledge’ 
and technological innovation are not automatic consequences of economic devel-
opment in every political-economic context; an important prerequisite is ‘a social 
and ideological framework within which science can prosper.’ The lack of a con-
ducive atmosphere for science in the former Soviet bloc explained for Kuznets 
why economic growth there was driven not by increasing factor productivity but 
by the continuous ‘forced draft of resources’ (Kuznets 1966, 84n35). A number of 
other scholars (e.g., Ammon and Cooper 1986, 1982; S. Gomułka 1986; Hanson 
and Pavitt 1987; Poznański 1987) have analyzed the political-economy of science 
and technological development in the former Soviet Bloc. Their fi ndings confi rm 
that the socialist economies were unable to generate the kinds of scientifi c and 
technical innovations needed for the shift to more intensive and, therefore, less 
environmentally stressful patterns of production. Indeed, they contradict the sup-
positions of Marxist writers that socialism would provide more, rather than less, 
conducive conditions for innovation (accord Stanisław Gomułka 1986, 54–5). 
They socialist economies lagged behind the West at each stage of the innovation 
process, from research to application to diffusion (Smith 1981b, 242). According 
to Soviet economists, technology development activities in their country took, on 
average, 50–100 percent longer than in the United States. Where Japan required 
only 3.6 years to put new technology into commercial use, it took the Soviets 6.4 
years (Linz 1992, 66). The time-lag was even greater for environmental tech-
nologies. For example, Soviet pollution-control technologies for the chemicals 
industry were ‘at least twenty years behind world standards’; while American air 
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pollution scrubbers were removing 85 percent of sulphur from emissions, the best 
Soviet technology could remove only 10 percent (Peterson 1993, 39).
In the entire Soviet bloc, according to Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz 
Laski (1989, 32), there was ‘not a single case of leapfrogging into frontier tech-
nologies like electronics, plastics, man-made fi bres, or new pharmaceuticals; the 
usual picture is that of following with a time lag’ (see also Kornai 1992a, 298–
300, table 12.6). The numbers bear out their observation. In the late 1970s, the 
OECD11 countries produced three times more domestic patent applications and 33 
times more foreign patent applications than the CMEA12 countries (S. Gomułka 
1986, 177–8).
The technology gap between East and West persisted despite the socialist 
‘fetish’ for technological development. As noted earlier, the socialist economic 
system was founded on the Russian Marxist concept of technological determin-
ism, according to which technology delimits economic development which, in 
turn, determines socioeconomic relations. Technological innovation, on this 
 theory, is an important precondition for the march from capitalism, through social-
ism, to communism. To that end, research and development (R&D) investments 
in the former Soviet bloc countries were always substantial. In the 1970s and 
1980s, R&D expenditures in the Soviet Union ranged between 4 and 5 percent of 
national income (Linz 1992, 65). This generated considerable technological prog-
ress, but typically not the kind that contributes to economic growth, for instance 
by reducing production costs. Like the rest of the Soviet economy, the science 
economy was characterized by high rates of investment and low rates of pro-
ductivity (Kornai 1992a, 183). Fully 86 percent of all Soviet innovations result-
ing from R&D investments yielded no economic return at all (Linz 1992, 66). 
The Soviets accomplished tremendous technological feats in military and space 
applications, but they had diffi culty producing the ‘hundreds of minor inventions 
and thousands of minor improvements’ to increase economic effi ciency.13 Soviet 
factories increasingly resembled museums of technological history. In the 1980s, 
for example, steel mills in Poland and the former Soviet Union still used grossly 
ineffi cient and highly polluting open hearth furnaces built in the nineteenth cen-
tury (see Peterson 1993, 13).
The reasons for the slow pace of growth-oriented technological innovation 
in socialist economies were largely systemic. The socialist property system cre-
ated a disincentive to innovate because all innovations became socialist property, 
and the innovator’s compensation was rarely worth the effort (see Linz 1992, 
74–5). Central planners exacerbated this problem by rewarding enterprise manag-
ers and workers only for fulfi llment of plan production targets, with little regard 
for effi ciency. 
Socialist enterprises, like capitalist fi rms, made investment and production 
decisions—including decisions to invest in cost-saving innovations—with an eye 
toward the bottom line. But the bottom line was very different under socialism. It 
had nothing to do with the fi rm’s ability to sell what it produced at a profi t; it had 
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everything to do with the fi rm’s achievement of plan production targets and its 
political clout with the central administration. As far as socialist enterprises were 
concerned, the bottom line was the bonus. Managers and workers received sub-
stantial bonuses—potentially amounting to more than half their annual incomes—
for fulfi lling physical plan production targets. The bonus was not, however, a 
profi t substitute. Unlike the profi t motive, the bonus motive created little incen-
tive to innovate, except to reduce supply shortages and speed production. Innova-
tions that might have reduced costs and conserved resources were irrelevant to 
the bonus. Planners rewarded production, period; the effi ciency or ineffi ciency of 
production was generally irrelevant. According to Józef Wilczyński (1972, 234), 
the central planning system emphasized ‘the quantitative fulfi lment and overful-
fi lment of targets, and the system of incentives was such that cost reduction and 
improvement in quality were largely ignored.’14 In fact, the reward structure cre-
ated disincentives to design and implement cost-saving innovations. Any techni-
cal or process change that delayed or impeded the achievement of production 
targets jeopardized the bonus. In other words, effi ciency improvements could not 
help, but could harm enterprises. Under the circumstances, managers quite ratio-
nally refused to implement innovations that would have reduced production costs, 
conserved resources and improved product quality (see Campbell 1991, 44–5). 
Enterprise managers also manipulated information in the planning process 
to avoid environmental protection duties. Central planners allocated resources to 
enterprises on the basis of the predicted costs of achieving plan targets, which 
included environmental protection goals as well as output levels. These cost pre-
dictions primarily were based on information provided by the enterprises, and 
managers rationally distorted information in order to maximize their allocations 
and minimize their targets. By overestimating environmental costs, they created a 
win–win situation: if they received all they asked for, it would constitute a wind-
fall profi t after making required environmental investments; if not, they would 
have a legitimate excuse for not making environmental investments and for fail-
ing to comply with any emissions limits specifi ed in their operating permits.15 
The production-based socialist reward system also disabled the most impor-
tant contributor to cost-saving innovations under capitalism: the buyer. In the 
capitalist economy, the market itself creates the chief incentives for innovation. 
Buyers purchase new products that fi ll their needs better than old ones; they select 
for quality; and they buy from the producers with the lowest prices, given the 
same level of product quality. Manufacturers in competitive markets innovate to 
create new products, to improve the quality of existing products and to lower 
production costs. These types of innovations increase competitiveness, leading 
to increased market share and higher profi ts. The socialist economy was, by con-
trast, a sellers’ market in which goods were produced and priced according to 
directions from above rather than demand from below. Buyers without access to 
alternative sources of goods (excluding the sizeable black market) or substitutes 
had no infl uence on product quality or price. If they simply refused to purchase 
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a product because of low quality or high price, the producer typically was unaf-
fected. An enterprise that met production targets was fully compensated even if 
no one bought what it produced, that is, regardless of profi t (see, e.g., Clark and 
Wildavsky 1990, 245).16 Consequently, there was no upward pressure to innovate, 
as there is in capitalist economies. 
The Party/state subsidized prices as well as costs. As a result, prices for avail-
able goods often did not accurately refl ect production (let alone social) costs. As a 
result, buyers did not receive the kinds of price signals necessary to make rational 
market decisions. It is unlikely, therefore, that buyers could have impelled inno-
vation even if they had been empowered to choose among competing products. 
5.5. Socialist Property Relations, Regulatory Confl icts of Interest 
and Soft Budget Constraints
The socialist property rights system (previously discussed in §5.1) vested in the 
Party/government nominal ownership of virtually all the means of production in 
Poland (excluding agriculture, which was left predominantly in private hands 
after the abandonment of forced collectivization in 195617). This created an insur-
mountable confl ict of interest with respect to environmental regulation: the Party/
government was supposed to regulate (for environmental protection) the same 
enterprises it owned and controlled. The predictable result was that environmental 
regulations were chronically underenforced. 
The Party/State’s Regulatory Confl ict of Interest 
As owner, the Party/state fi nanced, allocated resources to, set production param-
eters for, and determined wages and bonuses of managers and workers in all state 
enterprises. As regulator, the Party/state was supposed to enforce environmen-
tal rules against those very same enterprises. The implications of this confl ict of 
interest may appear obvious to us, but according to orthodox Marxist– Leninist 
theory there should have been no confl ict. The unifi cation of social forces under 
the common control of the workers—represented exclusively by their (self-
appointed) Party—supposedly constituted a profound improvement over the frac-
tious management of competing social forces under capitalism; environmental 
restrictions should have been much easier to impose on state-owned enterprises 
because industrial managers and environmental regulators were both agents of the 
same principal, the Party/government. As a Romanian government offi cial once 
put it, ‘our Socialist system . . . enables us to resolve pollution problems without 
confl ict. . . . The state represents the people’s interest in reducing pollution from 
industrial plants, and since the state owns the factories, the people are assured that 
adequate pollution measures are always taken’ (quoted in Leonard 1988, 210). 
Chapter 5140
Existing studies strongly suggest, on the contrary, that a little adversity 
between the regulat-or and the regulat-ed can be a very good thing. In the 1980s, 
the French jurist Laurent Cohen-Tanugi studied government regulations in France 
and the United States and found that regulations tend to be more successful where 
the regulator does not participate directly in the economic risks generated by its 
regulations, that is, where the state has no direct fi nancial stake or ownership 
interest in the regulated fi rms (Cohen-Tanugi 1985, 140–4; also see Jancar 1987, 
310–11). The separation of regulatory authority from ownership of the means of 
production results in more effective environmental regulation. In the absence of 
this separation, governments typically are unable to divorce their regulatory func-
tions from their ownership interests. This confl ict of interest tends to infl uence 
the content and enforcement of economic regulations, including environmental 
regulations. The result is less effective environmental protection. 
This was precisely the consequence in People’s Poland, and throughout the 
socialist world. As Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski (1989, 30) have writ-
ten, ‘[t]he Janus-faced state—as the presumed protector of the environment on 
the one hand, and the allocator of resources and the owner of the offending enter-
prises on the other—found itself in a schizophrenic position, without the possibil-
ity of effective use of even the habitual means of fi ghting environmental abuse 
(fi nes and the like).’
The Party/state’s confl ict of interest as owner and regulator took a number 
of forms. Enterprises in People’s Poland were, for all practical purposes, govern-
ment agencies (accord Malinowski 1984, 143; Madey and Rybicki 1971, 146). 
They were integral components of Party/state administration. Their primary mis-
sion was to implement Party/state socioeconomic policy, as expressed in cen-
tral plans. But they were more than mere economic producers; they also served 
important political and social functions. Enterprises served as the basic unit of 
rank-and-fi le Party organization. Indeed, most citizens who belonged to the PZPR 
did so through their place of work. Larger enterprises, in particular, provided 
social services for their employees, including housing, shopping facilities, sports 
clubs, local cultural centers, vacation resorts, schools and day care centers. All of 
this gave socialist enterprises a tremendous, literally governmental, presence in 
the lives of their employees. 
As agencies of government, state enterprises played a major role in economic 
and environmental policy making. That helps to explain why environmental fees 
and fi nes in People’s Poland tended to be set too low to deter non-compliance (as 
we saw in Chapter 3). Enterprises also exercised considerable political infl uence 
over environmental law enforcement. Although this is also true of private fi rms in 
capitalist economies, the infl uence of socialist enterprises was of a different order 
of magnitude. As Marshall Goldman (1972a, 188) has written, government offi -
cials and enterprise managers in the socialist system had ‘an identity of interests;’ 
both suffered when funds were diverted from ‘productive’ activities to ‘unproduc-
tive’ environmental protection efforts (including pollution control and resources 
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conservation). In capitalist economies, by contrast, the interests of fi rms and gov-
ernment are diverse. And this diversity serves to dilute the infl uence of industry 
on such issues as environmental law and enforcement.18
One question that arises when the state owns regulated enterprises is who 
regulates the regulator. One of the fi rst arguments for governmental regulation 
of environmental protection is that the state possesses far more coercive authority 
than private citizens or social organizations. Industrial concerns that could eas-
ily avoid or manipulate private claims can easily be made to comply with state 
mandates.19 If the state possesses the political will to regulate for environmental 
protection, it certainly has enough power to enforce it. And according to Cohen-
Tanugi’s theory, the state is much more likely to have the political will to enforce 
compliance with environmental regulations against fi rms it does not own. This 
has been confi rmed by comparative studies of countries with varying degrees of 
state control over economic production. In countries such as Spain and Mexico, 
with a high percentage of state-owned industries, governments historically have 
shown little inclination to enforce compliance with pollution-control regulations 
(Leonard 1988, 213). On the contrary, state ownership has created inducements to 
shield enterprises from public scrutiny and accountability. 
The Ukrainian writer Zhores Medvedev (1990a, 264–5), in a comparative 
study of nuclear energy regulations, found that the highest number of reported 
nuclear mishaps have occurred in the United States because it is ‘the country that 
is most open about nuclear-related accidents.’ Medvedev noted that most Ameri-
can nuclear power stations are privately owned but regulated by a government 
agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That governmental authority is sup-
plemented by non-governmental watchdog groups, including anti-nuclear, con-
sumer and environmental groups, making it very ‘diffi cult to cover up even minor 
mishaps.’ The state, as independent regulator, has the power and is more likely to 
have the political will to force private nuclear power plants to keep records, make 
reports and open facilities to public inspection. But in countries such as Great 
Britain and France, where the state owns and fully controls nuclear power plants, 
the state tends to use its coercive force to avoid detection and public scrutiny, pri-
marily by restricting the fl ow of information. This same problem also persists in 
the United States to the extent that the federal government owns nuclear facilities. 
Indeed, both sides of Medvedev’s thesis are nicely illustrated by reference to the 
American experience. 
Private nuclear plants in the USA are subject to stringent regulation by 
the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). By contrast, pub-
licly owned nuclear facilities, managed by the Department of Energy (DOE), 
are largely exempt from NRC licensing and enforcement. The DOE has often 
been accused of withholding information, falsifying documents and underreport-
ing threats (see Federal Contracts Reports, Aug. 27, 1990; Energy Daily, Apr. 
16, 1993). For example, when the US government’s Hanford nuclear reserva-
tion emitted 340,000 curies of radiation into the air above Washington and Ore-
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gon between 1944 and 1947, tens of thousands of exposed residents were never 
warned. They did not even learn of their exposure until 40 years later; the fi rst 
public disclosure came in 1986, and then only after environmentalists fi led a law-
suit to open classifi ed government records (see UPI, July 13, 1990). By contrast, 
the 1979 accident at the privately owned Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power 
plant in Pennsylvania was attended by massive media coverage, which led to a 
public outcry about nuclear safety, federal investigation of the accident and new 
nuclear safety regulations. As Dan Reicher (1993, 583–4) has written, ‘[t]he most 
signifi cant fallout from the TMI accident was institutional. . . . Since the acci-
dent there has not been a single new order for a nuclear power plant.’ However, 
Reicher (1993, 564–6) also argues that the government suffers from a substantial 
confl ict of interest even with respect to privately owned nuclear power because 
the federal government has been a major proponent of nuclear power since World 
War II. This position is borne out, for example, by Congress’s enactment of the 
1957 Price-Anderson Act (42 U.S.C. §2210), which greatly limited the fi nancial 
liability of energy companies for nuclear accidents. It seems clear, nevertheless, 
that the US government has policed private nuclear power far better than its own 
nuclear facilities. 
In countries where government ownership of polluting industries generates 
regulatory confl icts of interest, the question becomes whether there exists any 
independent authority with suffi cient coercive power to force the state to comply 
with its own regulations. The implicit assumption is that governments cannot be 
expected to regulate their own activities effectively. There is ample evidence to 
support this assumption from virtually all countries, including the United States. 
For example, as Thomas J. DiLorenzo (1992, 111) has noted, the US Department 
of Defense ‘now generates more than 400,000 tons of hazardous waste a year—
more than is produced by the fi ve largest chemical companies combined. To 
make matters worse, the Environmental Protection Agency lacks the enforcement 
power over the public sector that is possesses over the private sector’ (also see 
Bettigole 1994; Gelpe 1989). However, the problem is not completely intractable.
In some countries, governments have given up their monopolies on envi-
ronmental law enforcement. In the United States, for example, any private citi-
zen or non-governmental organization can use the judicial system to compel the 
government to comply with its own environmental regulations (see Wald 1992). 
Private individuals and groups have successfully exercised this authority on many 
occasions to, among other things, require the Army to comply with the National 
Environmental Policy Act,20 force the Navy to obtain a Clean Water Act discharge 
permit,21 and require the EPA Administrator to comply with statutory directives.22 
As a result, problems arising from regulatory confl icts of interest have been 
reduced (though never eliminated). It must be stressed, however, that this method 
of reducing regulatory confl icts can be effective only in states committed to the 
rule of law; the legal empowerment of citizens and non-governmental organiza-
tions is meaningless unless the government truly is subject to their power.23
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The formerly totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe could not, 
by defi nition, give up their monopolies on environmental law enforcement. To 
totalitarians, political (including, in this context, legal) power is a zero-sum game. 
Giving up substantial law enforcement powers to non-governmental organiza-
tions and private citizens would have entailed an unacceptable reduction in Party 
authority. More to the point, it would have required the Party/state to render itself 
legally accountable for environmental law enforcement. In other words, it would 
have required the institution of the rule of law. But that was unthinkable. 
Even in People’s Poland, where citizens and non-governmental organiza-
tions had limited legal authority to participate in environmental decision making 
(under the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act and the 1984 
Land-Use Planning Act), the Party/state could not be held accountable for imple-
menting its own environmental rules. Private citizens could challenge individual 
land-use decisions in the High Administrative Court; they could seek compensa-
tion for pollution damage in civil court; and offi cially recognized social (environ-
mental) organizations could participate in administrative permitting and land-use 
decisions. But no one could force the Party/government against its will to take 
action against environmental violators. Poland’s High Administrative Court had 
no jurisdiction to require administrators to promulgate or enforce environmen-
tal regulations. The Constitutional Tribunal, which was appointed in 1985 to 
assess the constitutionality of laws and the legality of regulations (1985 Dz.U. 
No. 22, item 98), likewise had no jurisdiction to order the Party/government to 
issue or enforce environmental mandates.24 Even if there had been some legal 
mechanism for non-governmental environmental law enforcement in People’s 
Poland, it would not have been effective because, in the end, the law did not 
rule in People’s Poland, the Party did. Given this political-economic fact of life, 
there is little else the Party/government could have done to avoid or substantially 
reduce its confl ict of interest as environmental regulator and nominal owner of 
the means of production. So there was no way for it to avoid or minimize the 
environmental consequences of that confl ict.
The Party/state’s confl ict of interest as owner and regulator of the means 
of production was replicated at the ministerial and lower levels of state admin-
istration where development responsibilities were frequently combined with 
environmental protection mandates. In the 1950s, the Forestry Ministry, which 
had primary responsibility for forest development activities, was charged with 
implementing the 1949 Nature Protection Act. The 1962 Water Law made indus-
trial ministries responsible for imposing water pollution control conditions on 
their own development activities. And in the 1980s, the lead agency for environ-
mental protection had economic development responsibilities that compromised 
its environmental mission: the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Water 
Management, instituted in 1983, was responsible for ensuring water supplies for 
industrial use and irrigation. At the regional level of administration, governors 
(wojewodowie) were responsible for both environmental law enforcement and 
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fulfi lling regional development plans, but their performance in offi ce was judged 
solely on their record of political obedience and plan fulfi llment. They had little 
to gain and potentially much to lose from strict environmental law enforcement; 
on the other hand, they stood to lose little or nothing from ignoring environmental 
mandates (see Jendrośka and Sommer 1994, 186–7). 
To this day in post-Communist Poland, the Ministry of Environmental Pro-
tection, Natural Resources and Forestry remains substantially responsible for 
water use, forest development and mining activities. As a result of these intra-
ministerial confl icts of interest, environmental responsibilities are still frequently 
compromised. As Olimpiad Ioffe and Peter Maggs (1987, 277) have noted, ‘the 
agency assigned both to exploit and protect a resource is unlikely to do a good job 
of protecting the resource against its own depredations.’25
Soft Budget Constraints in the ‘Shortage Economy’
The Party/state’s confl ict of interest as regulator and owner of the means of produc-
tion was refl ected in the budget constraint. Implicit in the ‘production for produc-
tion’s sake’ mentality of socialist economics was what the Hungarian economist 
János Kornai (1986a) calls the ‘soft budget constraint’. A fi rm’s budget constraint 
is hard or soft depending on its degree of economic independence and self- reliance. 
It is said to be (relatively) hard if the fi rm must profi t in the marketplace to survive, 
but ‘soft’ if the fi rm is (relatively) oblivious to profi ts and costs because its survival 
is determined not economically, but politically or administratively through the use 
of subsidies, tax breaks, relaxed environmental standards, etc. 
In the former socialist economies, budget constraints were chronically soft 
(despite occasional and inconsistent efforts to harden them). We already have 
seen that the bonus structure for enterprises was completely oblivious to prof-
its and losses; only physical production levels mattered. Given that, it is hardly 
surprising to fi nd that socialist enterprises rarely went out of business; those that 
did were comparatively small and unimportant to the national economy. The best 
guarantor of survival for socialist enterprises was not profi t, but size and politi-
cal infl uence. The larger an enterprise—the more jobs it provided and the more 
it produced—the greater its political clout and the higher its level of subsidiza-
tion. So every enterprise’s fi rst priority was to grow by using all the political 
clout it could muster to maximize its allotment of inputs from the center (Clark 
and Wildavsky 1990, 192–3). Socialist enterprises, which were large to begin 
with, grew larger. The larger they grew, the less effi cient they became (refl ect-
ing diseconomies of scale in production) and the more subsidies they required. A 
vicious cycle was created. In Poland, the least profi table industries—usually coal 
mining and food production—regularly received the largest annual ‘investment’ 
gains from the center. This led to the perverse result that the leading loss mak-
ers (and polluters) in the economy ended up with the highest fi nal ‘profi ts’ after 
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subsidies (Nuti 1990, 176). Indeed, in 1982 subsidies for ‘fi nancially troubled’ 
enterprises in Poland amounted to 44 percent of total enterprise profi ts, and ‘rep-
resented the largest single item in the governme nt’s civilian budget expenditures’ 
(Prybyła 1989, 198–9). Even profi tability was negotiable in the socialist economy 
(see Kamiński and Sołtan 1989, 381). So enterprises had little incentive to con-
serve investment resources, including natural resources; on the contrary, they had 
every reason to maximize their use.26 Resource inputs were available to producers 
virtually price free and, with every enterprise maximizing resource use, shortages 
of producer goods became a chronic problem. In the closely intertied socialist 
economy, shortages in one sector created production bottlenecks that reverberated 
throughout the entire economy.27 Enterprises rationally responded to production 
bottlenecks and input shortages by hoarding resource inputs, which led to further 
shortages and production bottlenecks. 
Shortages reinforced the goal of maximizing production, further exacerbat-
ing the Party/state’s regulatory confl ict of interest and increasing the leverage of 
industrial enterprises and ministries over environmental protectors in the Party/
state’s administrative hierarchy. Who would dare complain of pollution coming 
from a paper factory (to take a realistic example) in the midst of a toilet paper 
shortage? Of course, if some unthinking sanitation or environmental inspector did 
try to penalize or shut down the factory, the Party/state always could intervene 
and either curtail the action (for reasons of ‘higher necessity’) or compensate for 
penalties, that is, further soften the budget constraint. 
5.6. Conclusion
Given the various endemic obstacles to environmental law enforcement created 
by the socialist economic system, it is easy to understand why environmental 
protection was largely ineffective in People’s Poland. Indeed, we may well ask 
whether environmental protection could ever be successful in any socialist econ-
omy, at least if regulatory confl icts of interests and other inducements to soften 
budget constraints are as inevitable as they appear to be. I take up that question 
in earnest in Chapter 8. At this point, it is enough to recognize that the obstacles 
discussed in this chapter were structural. They were not intended or designed to 
obstruct environmental protection, but that was their effect. And they lend sup-
port to the argument that environmental protection failed in People’s Poland (and 
throughout the Soviet bloc) not because of negligence but primarily because of 
the Communist political-economic system. 
That system was, of course, premised on ideological principles of Marxism–
Leninism, some of which have been addressed in this and earlier chapters. Chap-
ter 6 takes a closer look at the ideological origins of communism in the writings 
of Marx, Engels and Lenin to see if they provide some clues as to why the system 
was so poorly suited to the task of environmental protection. 
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Notes
1. A few neo-Marxists, such as Jan Tinbergen (1969, 593–5), have argued that state 
ownership of the means of production is not a necessary attribute of socialism (also see 
Lerner 1970).
2. Polish theorists only began addressing this question in the 1970s (see Kożyra- 
Kowalski 1977).
3. It is interesting to note the symmetry between this Marxist view of the relationship 
between society and economy and the Marxist view of the relationship between society 
and nature. According to Marx, the history of economic progress has, in essence, been 
the struggle to reverse nature’s control over man. For more on this, see Chapter 6 (§6.1.).
4. James Gleick (1987) suggests that completely accurate long-range weather fore-
casting would be impossible even with a computer of unlimited processing power because 
of ‘chaotic’ interactions in the atmosphere. This also may have implications, of course, for 
socialist central planning.
5. Only fi ve-year and one-year plans had to be approved by the parliament. All other 
plans and plan revisions could be promulgated as regulations by the Council of Ministers.
6. On Marx’s historical materialist theory of production, see Cohen (1978, 206).
7. Indeed, some of Marx’s own writings (e.g., Marx and Engels 1978, 471–2; 1967, 
78–9, 44 3–4) seem to support the notion that socialism might be successfully established 
in countries at lower levels of economic development. 
8. The 1982 reforms were also hindered by the Jaruzelski regime’s contradictory 
efforts at ‘normalization’ (meaning the reestablishment of PZPR control) during Martial 
Law (see Bielasiak 1988, 103). 
9. For more on Poland’s post-socialist environmental protection efforts, see Chapter 7. 
10. This section and the next are revised versions of Cole (1995c). 
11. OECD stands for Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. 
It is a consortium of highly industrialized capitalist countries, including Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Finland, Germany (i.e., the former West Germany), Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since the fall 
of communism, three former Soviet bloc countries—Poland, the Czech Republic and 
 Hungary—have joined.
12. CMEA stands for Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, a group created in 
1949 to facilitate international trade and relations between Communist countries. Before 
its break-up in 1991, the CMEA included Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Yugoslavia was a 
‘limited participant.’
13. It may seem anomalous that Soviet military and space innovations had so few 
applications in the civilian economy, but it was predictable given the Soviets’ preoccupa-
tion with external and internal security and their economic system’s structural disregard 
for economic effi ciency.
14. But see Poznański (1980, 243), concluding that environmental protection require-
ments did induce enterprises to make some technical changes in production.
15. I am grateful to Tomasz Żylicz for pointing this out.
16. This is not to say that profi t was without consequence for enterprises. Profi ts 
were an important secondary source of investment funds (see Crane 1992, 62). However, 
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the very concept of ‘profi t’ is suspect in a system where prices are administratively deter-
mined; the earning of profi ts is no indication of economic effi ciency (see S. Gomułka 1986, 
167). As Jadwiga Staniszkis (1992, 41) has noted, ‘profi t is not a synonym for rational eco-
nomic action, even at a micro level.’
17. Even though most agricultural lands remained privately owned in Poland, it 
should be noted that agricultural production remained subject to Party/state planning and 
control. Party/state agricultural policy was designed to discriminate against private farmers 
and encourage their ‘voluntary’ socialization. However, these efforts were largely unsuc-
cessful (see Wilkin 1989).
18. In Chapter 7 (§7.5), I explain how the infl uence of economic enterprises over 
environmental protection has waned in post-Communist Poland because of privatization, 
increased competition and the imposition of harder budget constraints throughout the 
economy.
19. Historical analyses of private tort actions against polluters indicate how diffi cult 
it was for plaintiffs to obtain compensation for, let alone prevent, pollution damage (see, 
e.g., Dewees 1992).
20. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Weinberger, 610 F.Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1985).
21. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981).
22. See, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 411 F.Supp. 864 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), requiring the EPA to establish national ambient air quality standards for 
lead under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7408), after the Administrator found that lead 
emissions posed a pervasive threat to public health and welfare.
23. The importance of the rule of law for effective environmental law enforcement is 
discussed in Chapter 8 (§8.6).
24. On Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, see generally M. Brzezinski (1993a).
25. Of course, this problem is not system specifi c. One needs only consider the tra-
vails of the US Forest Service, in the Department of Agriculture, to realize that this confl ict 
of interest arises just as easily in the management of public resources in capitalist countries. 
On the normative implications of such regulatory confl icts of interest, see Chapter 8 (§8.4).
26. This obviously relates back to the discussion in §5.4 about systemic impediments 
to increased resource conservation under socialism.
27. On endemic shortages in the socialist economic system, see Kornai (1992a, esp. 
chaps. 11 and 12; 1980). Interestingly, Jozef Stalin may have been the fi rst to compre-
hend the phenomenon of the shortage economy. The following quote is attributed (in Pryor 
1973, 355n40) to Stalin: ‘in the capitalist countries . . . the errors of single capitalists, trusts, 
syndicates, or this or that capitalist group are corrected through the elementary force of the 
market. . . . No really important error, no considerable overproduction, no appreciable dis-
crepancy between production and . . . demand can occur in the capitalist countries without 
the mistakes, errors, and discrepancies being corrected by this or that crisis. . . . With us it is 
quite different. Every important disturbance in trade or in production, each error in calcula-
tion in our economy does not end with just a partial crisis, but affects the whole economy.’
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Many of the legal, political and economic contributants to the underenforcement 
of environmental law in People’s Poland discussed in preceding chapters had roots 
in Marxist–Leninist ideology; indeed, we have already touched on some important 
ideological issues in Chapters 3–5. The purpose of this chapter is to further eluci-
date ideological underpinnings of the socialist system that contributed to the fail-
ure of environmental protection in People’s Poland. The intent is not to lay ‘blame’ 
at the feet of some long-dead political theorist (who, after all, never claimed to be 
an environmentalist), but merely to draw legitimate connections between Marx’s 
ideas and the ecological consequences of their (actual) implementation. Without 
those connections, the analysis of institutional impediments to environmental law 
enforcement under socialism would be incomplete (see North 1984, 10).
The nature of the connection between Marxist theory and the Communist 
regimes of the former Soviet bloc has always been controversial. Some Marxist 
and neo-Marxist scholars have argued (and continue to argue) that the regimes of 
the former Soviet bloc were not ‘Marxist’ in any meaningful sense of that term; 
Marx’s theories, they contend, were fundamentally inconsistent with Soviet-style 
totalitarianism (see, e.g., Abel 1990). It seems clear, however, that Marx’s most 
infl uential Russian interpreters at least intended to implement and believed they 
were implementing Marx’s theories. As Martin Krygier (1994a, 139) has written, 
the Communist revolution in Russia ‘was not simply the victory of a group of 
power-hungry thugs, but of zealous, driven, often brilliant people deeply commit-
ted to implementing a body of ideas, which they knew as Marxism.’ Whether or 
not Marx was in any way ‘responsible’ for Soviet-style totalitarianism, Leninism 
and Stalinism were logical applications, if not the only logical applications, of 
Marx’s theories (see Kołakowski 1978a, 419). 
This chapter, in any event, concerns the contributions of Marxist theory to 
the failure of environmental protection in Poland and throughout Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union. Because Marxist ideology was universal and fun-
damental in all these countries, this chapter takes a somewhat broader approach, 
focusing on the entire region, rather than on Poland exclusively.1
Chapter 6
THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION: MARXISM AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT
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 6.1. Introduction
Marx, Engels and Lenin wrote little on specifi cally environmental matters, but 
much of what they wrote about economics, politics and law indirectly (and some-
times directly) contributed to the failure of environmental protection efforts in 
People’s Poland and the rest of the former Soviet bloc. This chapter analyzes 
four elements of orthodox Marxism related to environmental protection that were 
institutionalized throughout Central and Eastern Europe: (1) the Marxist attitude 
toward nature; (2) the concept of socialist property; (3) the labor theory of value; 
and (4) Marxist theories of law and state. 
The reader should bear in mind that the arguments and analyses in this chap-
ter are not about the theory of socialism. There are many different socialist theo-
ries. Marx’s was neither the fi rst nor the last; it was only one theory or, more 
accurately, one family of socialist theories. If socialism were an item of man-
ufacture, Marxism would be a vast, socially owned conglomerate with numer-
ous highly independent subsidiaries, each producing its own distinct brand. It is 
important,  therefore, to distinguish the Marxism of Marx from the Marxism of 
the Marxists (see Kołakowski 1978a, 182–218). My analysis is restricted to what 
has been called ‘orthodox’ or ‘classical’ Marxism: the Marxism of Marx, his col-
league Engels and, to a lesser extent, Lenin. Their Marxism was, in fundamental 
respects, intellectually incompatible with environmentalism and, as institution-
alized in Soviet-style communism, impeded effective environmental protection. 
This is not to say that one can no longer claim to be both a ‘Marxist’ (of some 
sort) and an environmentalist (see, e.g., Pepper 1993). But it would be a Marxism 
fundamentally different from Marx’s own. In other words, an environmentally 
friendly socialism or ‘eco-socialism’ is necessarily post-Marxian.
6.2. Marx, Engels and Lenin on the Relationship between 
Humans and Nature
Since the 1970s, historians, environmentalists and political commentators have 
shown intense interest in what Marx, Engels and Lenin thought about the rela-
tionship between humans and the natural environment. This is somewhat ironic 
because for Marx, Lenin and, to a lesser extent, Engels, the natural environment 
was not a particularly interesting subject, except insofar as it provided a neces-
sary basis for socioeconomic relations among people.2 Despite efforts by later 
Marxist writers, such as Howard Parsons (1977), to portray Marx and Engels as 
early environmentalists, it is clear that they were nothing of the kind. Parsons’ 
book catalogues virtually every writing by Marx or Engels that touches, however 
tenuously, on nature. Along the way, Parsons provides commentary, explana-
tions and apologies. His ardent desire to view Marx and Engels as early envi-
ronmentalists unfortunately leads him too frequently into untenable or incredible 
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interpretations. To take just one example, Parsons (1977, 55) quotes the follow-
ing language from a letter Engels wrote to his friend Pyotr Lavrov: ‘the idea of 
solidarity could fi nally . . . grow to a point where it will embrace all mankind and 
oppose it, as a society of brothers living in solidarity, to the rest of the world—
the world of minerals, plants, and animals.’ The fi rst problem with this passage 
as proof of Engels’ environmentalism is that the language was not Engels’ but 
Lavrov’s; Engels was quoting from Lavrov’s earlier letter to him (see Engels 
1975d, 369). That problem aside, Parsons’ interpretation of the passage strains 
credulity. He interprets Engels’ use of the word ‘oppose’ to mean ‘united with.’ 
Even if we accepted this interpretation, against all reason, it hardly would qualify 
Engels (or Lavrov) as an early environmentalist.3 In fact, the writings of Marx 
and Engels display a consistent economic/utilitarian and anthropocentric attitude 
toward nature. Several of their theories are implicitly or explicitly hostile to the 
environment. While recognizing that humans are part of nature, Marx and Engels 
describe the entire course of human history as an effort by ‘man’ to gain domin-
ion over nature and, thereby, become truly free. They foresaw that this would 
happen under communism.
The concept of human domination of nature recurs throughout their writings. 
In Volume I of Capital, Marx (1967, 514) wrote, ‘[i]t is the necessity of bringing 
a natural force under the control of society, of economising, of appropriating or 
subduing it on a large scale by the work of man’s hand, that fi rst plays the decisive 
part in the history of industry.’ Engels (1940, 306), in Dialectics of Nature, added 
that ‘it is precisely the alteration of nature by men, not solely nature as such, 
which is the most essential and immediate basis of human thought, and it is in the 
measure that man has learned to change nature that his intelligence has increased.’ 
This interaction between humans and nature occurs regardless of the means and 
relations of production, but Marx and Engels maintained that humans would gain 
complete dominion over nature only under socialism. In the Anti-Dühring (1975c, 
270), Engels wrote:
With the seizing of the means of production by society, production of commodi-
ties is done away with, and, simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the 
producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by systematic, defi nite orga-
nization. The struggle for individual existence disappears. Then for the fi rst time 
man, in a certain sense, is fi nally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, 
and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones. 
The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which have 
hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for 
the fi rst time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now 
become master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social action, 
hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of nature foreign to, and domi-
nating him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. 
Man’s own social organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed 
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by nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. The extra-
neous objective forces that have hitherto governed history pass under the control 
of man himself. (cf. Marx 1967, vol. III, 820)
These are not the words of a nature lover. On Engels’ view, the entire history of 
the human race is the struggle to overcome the external forces of nature that bind 
it, and to subordinate nature to serve human purposes. 
Unlike nineteenth-century preservationists, such as John Muir, Marx and 
Engels expressed no special reverence for nature, or contempt for human activi-
ties that altered it. Rather, Marx and Engels wrote in the language of mainstream 
nineteenth-century European intellectuals, reared in modernism, scientism and 
the Judeo-Christian value system. They displayed an immense faith in science 
and the conviction that humans had to subdue nature for their own purposes. 
This hardly distinguished them from capitalist writers of the same era who, 
like Marx, viewed contemporary man as homo-oeconomicus, driven by needs, 
wants and productive relations. Even Parsons (1977, 67) concedes that ‘Marx 
and Engels agreed with the capitalist “strategem” to “subdue” nature for “human 
requirements.’ ”
Lenin, like Marx and Engels, wrote little specifi cally about the natural envi-
ronment, but he certainly agreed that the primary purpose of nature was to serve 
human needs. His writings on the subject of natural resources development dis-
played, in the words of Zigurds Zile (1971, 85), a ‘rather crude economic utili-
tarianism,’ suggesting that ‘if one only digs, dams, drains, plants, breeds, and 
irrigates, he can satisfy humanity’s needs.’ Lenin embraced the Marxist notion 
that human history is the story of the struggle to, fi rst, grasp the laws of nature 
and, then, consciously and rationally manipulate nature for the benefi t of society. 
This conception of nature ‘justifi es classifi cation of animal and plant life into use-
ful and useless,’ as Zile (1971, 86) suggests; ‘[i]t can doom the wolf as nothing but 
trouble and elevate the carp and lamprey for their high protein yield.’
One could hardly pick up a Soviet publication on nature during the past 
half-century without reading a tribute to Lenin as the father of Soviet conserva-
tionism. However, this reputation was undeserved. Lenin’s actions, like his writ-
ings, showed that he was far less interested in preserving than in fully exploiting 
natural resources. Although it is true that several nature conservation laws were 
enacted during his lifetime, and relatively few for decades after his death (see 
Goldman 1972a, 16), the laws enacted while Lenin lived are better characterized 
as natural resources use laws, rather than nature preservation laws (see Zile 1971, 
95). Those that genuinely were preservationist merely restated, for the most part, 
pre-revolutionary statutes. And there is scant evidence that Lenin personally was 
involved with any of the legislation. The most that can accurately be said is that 
Lenin thought conservation a laudable goal so long as it did not hinder economic 
development (see Goldman 1972a, 18). This hardly distinguished Lenin’s utilitar-
ian view of nature from Marx’s.
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6.3. Property Relations in Natural Resources 
and the Means of Production
Marx’s property theory related to his conception of nature. Capitalism, by advanc-
ing the forces of production, takes society a long way toward subduing nature, but 
at great cost. Marx viewed capitalist social relations as inherently antagonistic, 
creating confl icts among people, and between people and nature. Communism, 
according to Marx’s theory, would provide ‘the genuine resolution of the confl ict’ 
(Marx 1964b, 135), fi rst and foremost by abolishing the primary determinant of 
capitalist socioeconomic relations: private property. By abolishing private property 
entitlements and the exploitative relations they create among people and between 
people and nature, communism supposedly would provide the necessary precon-
ditions for humans to work together in ‘solidarity,’ as Engels (quoting Lavrov 
1975d, 369) put it, in opposition ‘to the rest of the world—the world of minerals, 
plants, and animals.’ Freedom consists in ‘socialist man,’ Marx wrote (1967, vol. 
III, 820), ‘the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with 
Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by 
the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy 
and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of their human nature.’ 
Marx and Engels were concerned mostly with capitalism’s private property 
entitlements as they affected relations among people, but they also pointed to the 
negative environmental effects stemming from private ownership of the means of 
production. In The Condition of the Working-Class of England in 1844, Engels 
(1958, 110) wrote of life in the squalid quarters of the urban working poor, sur-
rounded by dung-heaps that poisoned the air and waters:
The way in which the vast mass of the poor are treated by modern society is truly 
scandalous. They are herded into great cities where they breathe a fouler air than 
in the countryside which they have left. They are housed in the worst ventilated 
districts of the towns; they are deprived of water because this is only brought to 
their houses if someone is prepared to defray the cost of laying the pipes. River 
water is so dirty as to be useless for cleansing purposes. The poor are forced to 
throw into the streets all their sweepings, garbage, dirty water, and frequently 
even disgusting fi lth and excrement. The poor are deprived of all proper means 
of refuse disposal and so they are forced to pollute the very districts they inhabit. 
(cf. Marx 1967, vol. I, 661–3)
Marx and Engels reviled the environmental failings of nineteenth-century capital-
ism’s private property-based regime. They intuited that the abolition of private 
property entitlements would end the squalor; pollution and other environmental 
problems would cease once natural resources were socially owned and managed 
not to maximize profi ts for the few but to maximize welfare for the masses. Nei-
ther Marx nor Engels ever made this claim explicitly, but it is implicit in their con-
Chapter 6154
demnations of the capitalist system. Aside from a few general statements about 
socialism’s capacity for reconciling people and nature (under human dominion 
of course), they made no claims about the specifi c environmental effects of the 
socialist system they advocated. Nevertheless, throughout the twentieth century, 
supporters of Marxist socialism have proclaimed socialist ownership of natural 
resources self-evidently more protective of the environment than any private 
property regime (see, e.g., Parsons 1977, 92; World Marxist Review, June 1972). 
It may have been self-evident in theory, but it was not borne out in practice. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, People’s Poland suffered from a chronic environ-
mental crisis as bad or worse than any in the experiences of the capitalist West, 
despite social ownership of most property, natural resources and the means of 
production. The same was true throughout the former Soviet bloc. The persistence 
of acute and chronic pollution problems in centrally planned economies vexed 
ardent socialists, whose attempts to explain them away grew increasingly dubi-
ous as the evidence of environmental destruction mounted. Into the 1970s, they 
routinely claimed that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe simply did not suffer 
from the environmental problems that plagued the capitalist West (see Komarov 
[pseud.] 1980, 116–17). When news began leaking out about environmental prob-
lems in socialist countries, Party/state offi cials and their Western supporters alter-
nately claimed that (1) the problems were ‘accidental’ and far less serious than 
environmental problems in the West (see Parsons 1977, 101; Ziegler 1987, 26); 
(2) the problems were fundamentally different in kind from environmental prob-
lems in the West because social ownership and rational central socioeconomic 
planning could quickly and painlessly resolve them (see Parsons 1977, 92; Gera-
simov 1975, 11), and (3) the environmental disorders in socialist countries were 
caused by international capitalism—the USSR and Eastern European countries 
were forced to industrialize rapidly and single-mindedly in order to deter attack 
and destruction from the West (see Parsons 1977, 91). The evidence, however, 
suggested otherwise. The chronic environmental problems of the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe were not different in kind from those of Western coun-
tries; if anything, they were more severe. Allegations of capitalist conspiracies 
aside, there was plenty of evidence of simple neglect and malfeasance. Examples 
abounded of environmental problems that, once discovered, were not quickly 
and painlessly remedied by rational central planning. Indeed, the combination of 
social ownership of the means of production and central socioeconomic planning 
may have created many more environmental problems than it solved. The destruc-
tion of the Aral Sea, in former Soviet Central Asia, provides a perfect illustration.
The Aral Sea is a large, shallow and saline lake in Central Asia. In 1960, it 
was the world’s fourth-largest lake by area, measuring 68,000 square kilometers. 
By 1987, it was only the sixth-largest lake in the world; its area had diminished 
by 40 percent, and its volume had fallen by 66 percent. The reason for the change 
was centrally planned irrigation. Soviet planners concluded that the fresh waters 
fl owing into the Aral Sea were more valuable for irrigation than for preserving 
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the region’s ecosystem, despite continued warnings from scientists of serious 
environmental repercussions. Over the course of three decades, beginning in the 
1950s, irrigation in the Aral Sea basin increased by more than 40 percent, from 5 
to over 7 million hectares, and water consumption doubled. As the sea receded, 
75 percent of its native fi sh species were lost, taking with them a formerly lucra-
tive commercial fi shing industry. The newly exposed bottom lands were high in 
salt content, which made them resistant to vegetation and susceptible to erosion. 
The winds blew up great dust storms, which deposited the toxic salt on valuable 
agricultural lands, killing crops. Meanwhile, the region’s climate changed so dra-
matically, becoming so much warmer and less humid, that area farmers could no 
longer grow traditional crops (see Pryde 1991, 221–5).
The destruction of the Aral Sea, like dozens if not hundreds of other large-
scale environmental catastrophes throughout the former Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe, belied the apologetics of socialist governments and their supporters. 
First of all, it was no accident. It resulted from the conscious decisions of socialist 
central planners guilty of the same kind of economic shortsightedness that caused 
so many environmental problems in the West. Once environmental problems 
appeared in the Aral Sea basin, central planning (combined with bureaucratic 
inertia) proved singularly incapable of ameliorating them. It is doubtful that plan-
ners believed they had to sacrifi ce the Aral Sea in order to boost production, so 
that the USSR could continue competing economically with the capitalist West. 
But even if they did, that hardly denotes an international capitalist conspiracy to 
destroy the Soviet Union. Decisions to divert waters from the Aral Sea evidently 
were based on domestic considerations stemming from the Soviet Union’s pre-
occupation with large-scale economic development to fulfi ll Marx’s promise of 
perpetual economic progress under socialism.
How could this have happened under centrally planned socialism? The prob-
lem was that Marx, Engels and many of their followers simply assumed that social-
ization of property rights would automatically improve environmental protection 
by facilitating scientifi c socioeconomic planning. What they did not consider, and 
what most economists understand very well today, is that social ownership of 
resources can actually make environmental problems worse. In Capital, Marx 
(1967, vol. I, 732–3) wrote of the ‘robbery of the commons’ under capitalism, but 
he apparently failed to consider the potential for even greater despoilation of the 
commons under social ownership. In theory social ownership means that every-
one owns and is responsible for preserving resources; but in practice it has meant 
that no one owns or is responsible for anything. More than 2,000 years ago, Aris-
totle (1941b, at 1262b34–35) wrote ‘that which is common to the greatest num-
ber has the least care bestowed upon it.’ Today this observation is known as the 
‘tragedy of the commons.’ In 1968, Garrett Hardin (1995) published his classic 
article by that title, which described the free-rider problem of ‘common’ property 
(by which he clearly meant non-property or res nullius4) resources. Hardin posits 
a pasture open to all herdsmen for cattle grazing. Assuming that each herdsman 
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is rational, they will seek to maximize their individual benefi ts from the pasture. 
Each will ask, ‘[w]hat is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?’ 
In other words, they will undertake a cost-benefi t analysis to determine whether 
adding an additional animal to their herd on the commons will provide a net gain 
or loss. The benefi t side of the equation is ‘a function of the increment of one ani-
mal.’ According to Hardin, ‘[s]ince the herdsman receives all the proceeds from 
the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.’ The cost side 
of the equation is ‘a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more 
animal.’ But these costs would not be borne solely by the herdsman who adds the 
additional animal; rather, they would be spread among all the herdsmen who use 
the pasture. Thus, ‘the negative utility for any particular decision-making herds-
man is only a fraction of –1.’ 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes 
that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his 
herd. And another; and another. . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each 
and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each 
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—
in a world that is l imited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. (Hardin 1995, 133)
Unregulated common ownership or non-ownership thus can lead to rational over-
use and even destruction of scarce natural resources. It also can lead to problems 
of pollution. According to Hardin (1995, 135), ‘[t]he rational man fi nds that his 
share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost 
of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we 
are locked into a system of “fouling our own nest,” so long as we behave only as 
independent, rational, free-enterprisers.’5
The environmental tragedies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
conformed to Hardin’s thesis. Indeed, the environmental history of socialism in the 
former Soviet bloc can be seen as one giant ‘tragedy of the commons’ (see Gold-
man 1972, 74). Although some Marxist scholars (such as Parsons 1977, 236) reject 
Hardin’s theory out of hand as a ‘[s]uperfi cial dismissal of Marxism,’ it is, in fact, 
neither superfi cial nor necessarily dismissive of Marxism. Hardin’s theory raises 
doubts about the ability of any society, including a Communist one, to regulate 
itself, but it does not proscribe common ownership of property (res communes); it 
only repudiates unregulated common ownership or non-ownership of property (res 
nullius). For Hardin, privatization is only one (though, perhaps, a preferred) solu-
tion to the tragedy of the commons; regulated common (public, social or group) 
ownership, for example through the use of entry and use restrictions, is another.
Given the ideological premises of communism, privatization was not a viable 
option for avoiding the ‘tragedy of the commons’ in socialist economies; govern-
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ment regulation was the only alternative. As we saw in Chapter 2, People’s Poland 
undertook serious and substantial legislative efforts to regulate the environment. 
But, as we saw in Chapters 3–5, those efforts failed to avert ecological tragedy; 
they were obstructed by various institutions of Communist political economy. 
At least some of those institutions were premised on other important features 
of Marx’s political-economic theories, particularly his labor theory of value and 
theories of state and law.
6.4. Marx’s Labor Theory of Value
The labor theory of value is a logical outgrowth of Marx’s utilitarian approach to 
nature—what distinguishes humans from other animals and brings about human 
mastery over nature is labor. As Engels (1940, 291) explained in Dialectics of 
Nature, ‘the animal merely uses external nature, and brings about changes in it 
simply by his presence; man by his changes makes it serve his ends, he masters 
it. This is the fi nal essential difference between man and other animals, and once 
again it is labour that brings about this distinction.’ In The Economic and Philo-
sophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx (1964b, 145) concluded that the entire history 
of the world is defi ned by human labor. Along with the social ownership of prop-
erty (natural resources and the means of production), the labor theory of value was 
central to Marx’s entire political-economic system, and a major source of Marx-
ism’s popular appeal to workers (Maggs 1985, 359). Marx fi rst outlined his labor 
theory of value in Capital to explain the exploitation of workers under nineteenth-
century capitalism. Although recognizing that material wealth is the product of 
both labor and the base materials provided by nature (Marx 1967, vol. I, 41–3; 
see also Marx 1973, 472), Marx maintained that only labor invested the product 
with real economic value; nature’s contribution, like capital’s, was economically 
insignifi cant. In volume I of Capital, Marx (1967, 603) wrote, ‘[i]n the extractive 
industries, mines, &c., the raw materials form no part of the capital advanced. 
The subject of labour in this case is not a product of previous labour, but is fur-
nished by Nature gratis, as in the case of metals, minerals, coal, stone, &c.’ Later, 
in volume III (1967, 745), he added, ‘[n]atural elements entering as agents into 
production, and which cost nothing, no matter what role they play in production, 
do not enter as components of capital, but as a free gift of Nature to capital, that 
is, as a free gift of Nature’s productive power to labour, which, however, appears 
as the productiveness of capital, as all other productivity under the capitalist mode 
of production.’ The same sentiments appear implicit in Marx’s Grundrisse (1973, 
706): ‘Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, 
self-acting mules, etc. These are products of human industry; natural material 
transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation 
in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the 
power of knowledge objectifi ed.’ 
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Marx was not the fi rst, of course, to posit a labor theory. In his Second Trea-
tise of Government (1963, 1–12), John Locke wrote,
Land which is wholly left to Nature, that hath no improvement of Pasturage, Till-
age, or Planting, is called, and indeed is, waste; and we shall fi nd the benefi t of 
it amount to little more than nothing. . . . Labour makes the far greatest part of 
the value of things, we enjoy in this World; And the ground which produces the 
material is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of it. 
. . . Tis Labour . . . which puts the greatest part of Value upon Land.
But Locke’s labor theory is different from Marx’s. From Locke’s perspective, 
labor creates ‘the greatest part of Value’—perhaps as much as nine-tenths or even 
ninety-nine hundredths—but not quite all the economic value of a thing. Locke 
did not maintain, in contrast to Marx, that natural resources and capital contrib-
uted nothing to economic value. More importantly, Locke did not intend his labor 
theory as a complete theory of economic value; his claims about the relative con-
tribution of labor to value are ‘subsidiary’ to his efforts to justify private rights 
in property by virtue of labor-mixing (Christman 1994, 51). Marx obviously had 
a very different (virtually opposite) end in mind for his labor theory of value; 
and unlike Locke’s labor theory, Marx’s was intended to determine (completely) 
exchange value. This distinction turns out to be critical from the point of view of 
environmental protection.
Marx’s labor theory of value had implications for the economic concept of 
scarcity. For economists, natural resources have value because they exist in lim-
ited supplies, which are depleted over time by demand; the greater the rate of 
demand, the faster the supply is depleted. But, according to economic theory, 
as the supply of a certain resource falls, its value (denoted in markets by price) 
increases, reducing the rate of demand and, thereby, preventing (in theory at least) 
resource exhaustion. But by claiming that only human labor creates economic 
value, Marx implicitly rejected the economic theory of scarcity; under the labor 
theory of value, either resources could not be scarce or their scarcity could not 
make any difference in their (economic) valuation. 
Marx’s repudiation of scarcity value is not just implicit in his labor theory of 
value; it is also explicit in his attempts to refute Thomas Malthus’s theory of the 
economic effects of population growth.6 For Marx, the environment and natural 
resources were constants. Any differentiation in social or economic value—for 
instance, the belief that gold was more valuable than lead—was mere commod-
ity ‘fetishism’ (Marx 1967, vol. I, 71–5). Marx was right, of course, to recognize 
that social convention and culture infl uence economic valuation, but he was either 
naïve or disingenuous to suppose that there was nothing more to it. Clearly if 
gold were not scarce to begin with, that is, if supplies of gold were everywhere 
large enough to satisfy all potential demand, gold would have no economic value 
regardless of convention and culture; no one would be willing to pay anything 
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for it, so no market for gold would develop. Nor would there been a need for 
legal rules to protect property rights in gold. As with all natural resources (at least 
those that are useful in production and for which markets can be created), gold 
receives its economic value in the fi rst place from its physical scarcity. But, as 
Charles Ziegler (1987, 10) has written, the notion of scarcity simply does not ‘fi t 
into Marx’s framework.’ Marx presumed that central planning and high rates of 
technological innovation under socialism would ensure an adequate supply of air, 
water, land and minerals for any size population. 
We saw in Chapter 5 (§§5.1 and 5.4) that Marx’s faith in technology was 
excessive. This was partly because of his denial of scarcity value. Scholars today 
realize what Marx apparently ignored: ‘technology alone cannot sustain an econ-
omy if erosion of the natural resource base deprives it of the materials required 
for meeting human needs’ (Caldwell 1990, 307). More to the point, technology 
cannot be expected to alleviate problems of scarcity in a political economy, like 
Marx’s, that fails to value scarcity in the fi rst place. In the former Soviet Union, 
People’s Poland and the rest of the Eastern Europe, there was insuffi cient eco-
nomic incentive to innovate in response to increasing (relative) resource scarcity. 
And, as we have seen, the economic and environmental consequences of that fail-
ure to innovate were disastrous.
As a cornerstone of Marxist economic theory, the labor theory of value 
attained a dominant position in the socialist countries. The result, as several 
authors have noted (for instance, Maggs 1985, 359–60; Kramer 1973, 364–73; 
Komarov [pseud.] 1980, 40; S. Gomułka 1986, 103), was massive waste and 
wanton destruction of the natural environment. Many ideologues in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe nevertheless maintained almost until the very end of 
the Communist era that ‘nature has no value until human labor is added’ (see 
DeBardeleben 1985, 212–13). Consequently, as we saw in Chapter 5, the real 
costs of resource waste and environmental degradation were ignored in determin-
ing offi cial costs and prices. To the extent that natural resources used in produc-
tion were provided free of charge under the labor theory of value, industry had no 
incentive to conserve them (Ziegler 1987, 35–6). In addition, pollution and other 
environmental costs of production were externalized; they were not refl ected in 
the prices of goods. So enterprises had no economic incentive to avoid waste, 
conserve resources or limit pollution (see, e.g., Goldman 1972a, 110). The free 
use of resources was neither a tacit policy nor a ‘legitimizing cloak for other 
motivations’ (DeBardeleben 1985, 260), but a specifi c and express goal of natural 
resources legislation in the former Soviet bloc.7
6.5. Marxist–Leninist Theories of Law and the State
Marx’s labor theory of value and other economic principles certainly were not the 
only reasons for the failure of environmental protection under socialism. As previ-
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ous chapters have shown, the dominant political, economic and legal institutions 
bear a large measure of the blame for wasting natural resources and polluting the 
environment. Laws were poorly drafted and laxly enforced (when enforced at 
all). Planners and bureaucrats jealously guarded administrative turf and clung to 
environmentally destructive practices and methods of analysis that secured their 
authority. Most importantly, the party in power acted fi rst and foremost out of 
concern for its continuing ‘leading role.’ The lack of political and legal account-
ability on the part of Party/state authorities and their tight grip on the fl ow of 
environmental information were major factors in the failure of environmental pro-
tection in People’s Poland and throughout the former Soviet bloc.
No doubt many of the political, social and legal institutions of Soviet-style 
socialism would have disappointed Marx and Engels. They might have been 
shocked by the oppressions committed in Marx’s name. More to the point, had 
Marx lived in Stalin’s USSR, he might well have been among the victims of those 
oppressions. Nevertheless, the political, social and legal institutions of the former 
socialist countries all had some basis in Marxist theories of state and law. To some 
extent, Marx’s theories legitimized the practices.
The Marxist–Leninist Concept of Law
Throughout the twentieth century, scholars have debated whether there is or 
even can be a Marxist theory of law (see Tay and Kamenka 1985, 217). Marx 
and Lenin were legally trained, and each wrote fairly extensively, if thinly (see 
Krygier 1994a, 154), about the law—mostly about its failings under capitalism. 
Neither believed law to be an independent determinant of social relations; it was 
merely part of the ideological ‘superstructure’ erected upon the economic ‘base’ 
of society. 
In his earliest writings, Marx actually displayed a certain reverence for the 
law. For example, in his 1842 Debates on Freedom of the Press (1975b, 166), he 
wrote:
Laws are in no way repressive measures against freedom, any more than the law 
of gravity is a repressive measure against motion, because while, as the law of 
gravitation, it governs the eternal motions of celestial bodies, as the law of falling 
it kills me if I violate it and want to dance in the air. Laws are rather the positive, 
clear, universal norms in which freedom has acquired an impersonal, theoretical 
existence independent of the arbitrariness of the individual. A statute-book is a 
people’s bible of freedom.
However, as Marx’s political-economic theories matured, he either abandoned 
this liberal bourgeois view of law or failed to reconcile it with the more instru-
mental view of law he espoused later works.8 In his 1859 Contribution to the 
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Critique of Political Economy (1971, 20–1), for example, Marx wrote that legal 
relations were ‘rooted in the material conditions of life. When the economic foun-
dation changes, the entire immense superstructure is sooner or later transformed.’ 
In Marx’s base and superstructure model, the economic foundation determines 
social relations. Legal (and other ideological) institutions are erected upon the 
economic base to reinforce the prevailing order. So legal relations are neither 
autonomous nor objective. The law’s natural and inevitable purpose is to rein-
force the power of the ruling class.9 Marx illustrated this in Capital (1967, vol. 
III, 89–90) with stories of capitalists plying their infl uence in bourgeois parlia-
ments, manipulating legislation to support their interests, and defying laws that 
diminished their profi ts. The notion of a ‘rule of law,’ applying equally to rich 
and poor, powerful and powerless, was for Marx a dangerous myth propagated to 
obstruct the rise of class consciousness (see Collins 1982, 139). Law had little, if 
anything, to do with justice. As Engels argued in The State of Germany (1975a, 
29), ‘equality before the law’ meant only ‘equality in spite of the inequality of 
rich and poor—equality within the limits of the chief inequality existing—which 
means, in short, nothing else but giving inequality the name of equality.’ For Marx 
and Engels, then, law was an inherently coercive instrument of power. As James 
L. Hildebrand (1972, 47–8) has noted:
In Marxian theory, law is viewed as an emanation of the ‘state’ and is therefore 
fundamentally determined by economic relations. . . . Since the state is the prod-
uct of the struggle of classes, dominated by the ruling class, law is viewed as a 
political means for maintaining the economic interests of the ruling class. Law 
is an ideological superstructure of society, constructed upon the economic basis, 
which refl ects the materialistic outlook of the ruling class. Law is not oriented to 
the idea of ‘justice;’ rather it is a means of dominance and a tool of the exploiters 
or ruling class who use it in their own interests.
On occasion, the law might be used against the interests of the ruling class. Marx 
(1969–70) suggested in The Class Struggles in France, 1948–50 that there were 
moments when the workers could achieve real, if limited reform through the legal 
process that the bourgeoisie had set up for its own protection. But, he maintained, 
the law in bourgeois society never could serve as a neutral determinant of social 
relations. Engels at fi rst was completely pessimistic about the usefulness of law as 
a mechanism of social reform. In The Condition of the Working-Class in England 
in 1844 (1958, 257–8), he argued that the law, as a creation of the bourgeoisie, 
ultimately benefi ts only that class:
The middle classes certainly are all in favour of the sanctity of the law. That is 
not surprising. They have made the law; they approve of it; they are protected 
by it and they gain advantages from it. The bourgeoisie appreciates that, even 
although some particular enactment may injure their interests, the whole body of 
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laws protects their interests . . . . [T]he worker knows from long and bitter expe-
rience that the law is a rod which the bourgeoisie has in readiness for him. The 
worker has no confi dence in the law and, if at all possible, he avoids it.
By 1890, however, Engels apparently had come to share Marx’s more optimistic 
view that bourgeois law might prove to be a useful, even decisive tool in the hands 
of the proletariat. In a letter to J. Bloch (1969–70, 487), he wrote:
The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the 
 superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its consequences, con-
stitutions established by the victorious classes after a successful battle, etc.—the 
forms of law—and then even the refl exes of all these actual struggles in the 
brains of the combatants, political, legal, philosophical theories, religious ideas 
and their further development into systems of dogma—also exercise their infl u-
ence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate 
in determining their form.
So, did Marx and Engels believe in the positive value of law? The answer is 
unclear. There was no resolution of the apparent inconsistency between Marx’s 
base and superstructure model and the idea that legal and political institutions 
could positively infl uence economically determined social relations. Even con-
temporary neo-Marxist scholars sometimes interpret orthodox Marxism as taking 
a generally cynical approach to laws that appear to be against the interests of the 
ruling class. Hugh Collins (1982, 75), for example, has noted:
[t]he . . . suggestion that some legal rules cannot be explained on a class basis 
at all, for example that laws prohibiting rape and assault further the interests 
of other kinds of groups or perhaps benefi t everyone equally, is often casually 
dismissed as naive or the product of false consciousness. It is said that the domi-
nant ideology portrays such laws as universally valuable in order to legitimate 
their authority, while in fact they form part of the general state apparatus for the 
oppression of subordinate classes.
On this view, simple legislation never could resolve society’s problems because 
they are rooted in the economic base of the system. To eradicate them, the entire 
system has to be changed. Merely changing the law has the same effect as treating 
the symptoms of an illness: the patient might feel better for a short time, but he 
would not be cured, and his illness might even be prolonged.
In The Communist Manifesto of 1847–8 (1978, 490–1), Marx and Engels 
expressed confi dence that the entire legal and political structure of the state would 
collapse soon after the workers’ revolution radically altered the economic base 
of society. But in his later writings, Marx conceded that the transition period to 
communism might be protracted and that, in the interim, bourgeois law might 
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prove useful or even necessary ‘for proletarian purposes, until relative abundance 
was created and people formed new social habits’ (Tay and Kamenka 1985, 224). 
However, Marx never created a positive theory of what bourgeois law would 
become along the socialist road to communism (see Pashukanis 1951b, 270–1). 
Following Marx, Lenin conceded that bourgeois legal institutions would have to 
be maintained after the revolution in order to secure the road to communism.10 
But, unlike Marx, Lenin showed no philosophical trepidation about the role of law 
in a socialist state. The pragmatic Lenin realized that law could be just as effective 
a tool for repressing enemies of the new social order as it was for repressing work-
ers under bourgeois capitalism. Hugh Collins (1982, 91) has written that Lenin’s
legal system was a coercive organization which issued orders backed up by 
threats in the form of criminal codes. Together with the remainder of the state 
apparatus the law ensured that the wishes of the dominant class were carried out. 
Legal rules were in the basic form of commands addressed to the masses to do 
or to abstain from doing something, and the signifi cance of the law in a society 
depended entirely upon its potential to affect behaviour by threats of sanctions.
In State and Revolution (1932, 23), Lenin wrote, ‘[t]he proletariat needs state 
power, the centralised organisation of force, the organisation of violence, both 
for the purpose of crushing the resistance of the exploiters and for the purpose of 
guiding the great mass of the population—the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie, 
the semi-proletarians—in the work of organising Socialist economy.’ Lenin held 
no illusions that the law would become an instrument of real justice under social-
ism; on the contrary, his skepticism about legality exceeded Marx’s. For Lenin, 
the law was simply a tool to be used in the revolution. A patina of legality could 
bolster the new regime’s international legitimacy, but be quickly discarded as the 
needs and goals of the revolution dictated (see Tay and Kamenka 1985, 234, 236–
7). Following Lenin, the Soviet jurist Yevgeny Pashukanis (1951b, 279) argued 
that socialist legislation must ‘possess maximum elasticity;’ ‘we cannot fetter our-
selves,’ he wrote, ‘by any sort of system.’ For Pashukanis, as for Lenin, the law 
necessarily occupied ‘a subordinate position with reference to policy.’ 
Given Marx’s instrumental view of law and Lenin’s contempt for and cyni-
cal use of legality, it is not at all surprising that scholars, lawyers and judges in 
socialist states had persistent diffi culties reconciling Marxist–Leninist legal theo-
ries with increasingly formalistic legal procedures and practices. As Hugh  Collins 
(1982, 139) has pointed out, ‘to be a Marxist and a lawyer promises to be a con-
tradictory or schizoid experience.’ Socialist lawyers have searched incessantly 
for some balance between Marxist–Leninist legal theories and practical realities; 
between historical materialism and pragmatism; between bourgeois legality and 
the ongoing revolution, leading to stateless and classless communism.
But what does all of this have to do with environmental protection in the 
formerly socialist countries of Europe? The answer has been foreshadowed in 
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earlier discussions concerning law enforcement, particularly in Chapter 4. The 
inconsistencies of Marxist law, especially its ambivalence about legality, severely 
hampered environmental protection efforts in the socialist countries. We saw in 
Chapter 3 that most of the environmental laws in People’s Poland were mere 
declarations, without specifi c standards or penalties. Such ‘details’ were left to 
planners, ministers, managers and other Party/state offi cials. And, true to  Marxist–
Leninist theory, administrators felt free to ignore or avoid environmental regula-
tions in cases where enforcement would have been economically or politically 
inconvenient. In actuality, the environmental regulations of the socialist countries 
were not ‘laws’ at all, as liberal societies understand the term, but mere abstrac-
tions or ideals to be achieved gradually, if at all, from one fi ve-year plan to the 
next (see Komarov [pseud.] 1980, 21). As a result, environmental protection (or 
the lack of it) in socialist countries had relatively little to do with what the laws 
said or did not say. As Peter Maggs (1985, 363) has written:
The environmental protection measures taken in the Soviet Union depend not 
upon the language nor upon the enthusiasm with which they are enforced, but 
upon the decision of state planning offi cials to order the construction, installation 
and operation of pollution control equipment and upon the incentives planners 
create to implement their orders. Thus, to fi nd the applicable law of environmen-
tal protection in the Soviet Union is to look fi rst at the internal guidelines of the 
State Planning Committee and second at the incentives and sanctions provided 
to ensure that environmental protection plans are fulfi lled.
Legislative enactments thus had less ‘legal’ effect than the political and economic 
decisions of Party/state functionaries. This was true both in fact and by defi nition. 
In the 1930s, the Soviet Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences defi ned the 
term ‘law’ ‘in complete accord with the Marx–Lenin methodology’:
Law is the aggregate of the rules of conduct expressing the will of the dominant 
class and established in legal order, as well as the customs and rules of com-
munity life confi rmed by state authority, the application whereof is guaranteed 
by the coercive force of the state to the end of safeguarding, making secure and 
developing social relations and arrangements advantageous and agreeable to the 
dominant class. (Vyshinsky 1951, 336–7)
In Soviet society, the workers were said to be the dominant class. In reality, of 
course, it was their self-appointed ‘vanguard,’ the Communist Party. And, as the 
Marxist–Leninist defi nition of law ordained, the laws refl ected that party’s inter-
est. Charles Ziegler (1987, 95) has noted that in the Soviet Union, laws were 
enacted in accordance with Party preferences (1) to serve as general state policy 
statements, vaguely guiding (but not compelling) the actions and decisions of 
state agencies and individual citizens, and (2) to educate the citizens in the ‘spirit 
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of communist ideology.’ Like all laws in socialist Eastern Europe and the USSR, 
environmental legislation primarily served a coercive political function, rather 
than a substantive environmental protection function.
Was this necessarily a function of Marxism–Leninism, or might the absence 
of the ‘rule of law’ in the former Soviet bloc be attributable to other factors, such 
as cultural history? The ‘rule of law’ certainly was not common currency in pre-
revolutionary Russia and Eastern Europe. But, in this respect, Polish history is 
exceptional. As early as the sixteenth century, Poland had a well-developed par-
liamentary system of government that guaranteed civil and religious liberties 
including some, such as habeas corpus, that were not guaranteed elsewhere in 
Western or Eastern Europe for another 200–400 years (see, generally, Wagner 
1988). Even if traditional cultural values did infl uence the conceptions of law in 
other East European countries, the Communists’ instrumental view of law was, 
nevertheless, consistent with the teachings of orthodox Marxism. 
The Dictatorship of the Proletariat
Marx implicitly rejected the ‘rule of law’ concept in his conception of a ‘revolu-
tionary dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Marx 1938, 18, italics in original). The 
concept of ‘dictatorship,’ Marxist or otherwise, implies a merger of legal author-
ity and political power that is incompatible with the rule of law. This is nicely 
illustrated by an infamous event that took place in the Soviet Union shortly after 
the Bolshevik Revolution, an event that for decades has been cited as proof of 
Lenin’s ardent commitment to nature protection. A man called Vever was caught 
felling trees, which was in fact his job, near Lenin’s summer home on the Gorky 
government estate. Lenin had Vever arrested and summarily sentenced to one 
year in prison. As Ze’ev Wolfson has written (Komarov [pseud.] 1980, 63), this 
story accurately refl ects the ‘fundamental property’ of the Soviet system of jus-
tice: ‘power and the law are in the same hands.’ Ironically, the moral Wolfson 
draws from the Vever story is the same lesson that Marx drew, more than a century 
earlier, from a remarkably similar episode, when the German Landstag debated a 
law revoking the peasants’ customary right to gather wood in the forests. Marx at 
that time concluded that control over the state and the law should not be merged 
in the dominant class (see Kołakowski 1978a, 122). Apparently, he did not con-
sider the merger of law and power inappropriate when it came to the proletarian 
dictatorship.
In The Communist Manifesto (1978, 500), Marx and Engels called for the 
workers to rise up, overthrow the capitalists and establish the revolutionary dic-
tatorship of the proletariat to lead society to communism. Marx never precisely 
defi ned his use of the term ‘dictatorship,’ and that failure itself may have con-
tributed to totalitarianism in the former Soviet bloc countries. Nevertheless, it 
is fairly clear from the context of his theory of politics and power that Marx 
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did not use the term in contradistinction to democratic rule. In fact, he viewed 
proletarian dictatorship as a more democratic regime than so-called democratic 
capitalism partly because it was a means for instituting full democracy under 
stateless communism. While Marx’s conception of ‘dictatorial democracy’ may 
appear oxymoronic, it makes sense within Marx’s theory of politics and the 
state. According to Marx’s theory, all states are class-based dictatorships. If there 
were no classes (defi ned in the domination or repression of one by another), the 
state would be unnecessary and disappear. Therefore, ‘every state is a dictator-
ship in content’ (Ehrenberg 1992, 52). On this view, the label ‘dictatorship of 
the proletariat’ is just a euphemism for the workers’ state, while the label ‘lib-
eral democratic republic’ is a euphemism for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. 
Once we recognize that all states are dictatorial by nature, the question becomes 
why a society should prefer any given state, including the workers’ state. Marx 
says it is not a matter of preferring the state that is not coercive since all states, 
as such, are naturally and unavoidably coercive; rather what makes one state 
preferable to another is the aim of the coercion. The dictatorship of the proletar-
iat is said to be preferable to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie because it is, by 
nature, more democratic. For Marx, the ‘liberal democracies’ were democratic 
in name only; in reality, they constituted a tyranny of the minority (the owners 
of the means of production) over the majority (the producers). The workers’ 
state would simply reverse the order. It would be a tyranny of the majority over 
the small minority of capitalists (Ehrenberg 1992, 52). And that tyranny should 
be only temporary because, as the new socialist state would be so much more 
productive than the preceding system, all class antagonisms would sooner or 
later disappear, and democracy then would be fully extended; the socialist state, 
its purpose fulfi lled, would disappear with the advent of communism. So, as 
Joseph Femia (1993, 70) has pointed out, for Marx ‘communism’ was a virtual 
synonym for ‘democracy.’
This apparently Utopian strain in Marx’s theory of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat notwithstanding, there is some evidence that Marx intended the word 
‘dictatorship’ quite literally. He never said that a workers’ dictatorship would be 
less repressive or coercive than other forms. He foresaw that the coercive pow-
ers of the state would be needed to consolidate the proletariat’s gains and to repel 
counterrevolutionary efforts that might recur until all class antagonisms were 
extinguished (see Ehrenberg 1992, 5–6). Marx was also enough of a realist to 
understand that the working class at large could not effectively operate the coer-
cive apparatus of state authority. As John Ehrenberg (1992, 154) has noted, Marx 
and Engels both identifi ed the proletariat’s struggle for power with ‘the struggle 
of its party for exclusive political domination’ (see also Femia 1993, 123). They 
supposed that a vanguard party would wield dictatorial power as a means of estab-
lishing real democracy, though this supposition obviously required a great deal of 
optimism (perhaps overoptimism) about human nature. Certainly it was more than 
Marx’s rival, the anarchist Nikolai Bakhunin, could bear. In Statism and Anarchy, 
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Bakunin (1971, 331) presciently predicted that ‘as soon as [the workers] become 
the rulers of the representatives of the people, [they] will cease to be workers and 
will look down at the plain working masses from the governing heights of the 
State; they will now no longer represent the people, but only themselves and their 
claim to rulership over the people.’11 Indeed, almost from the very start, the chief 
motivation for Communist Party activities in the ‘People’s democracies’ was not 
the achievement of full democracy in communism, but the perpetuation of power 
and its perquisites (see Vavroušek 1990, 13). 
The history of Soviet-style totalitarianism proved Bakhunin right, of course, 
but was he inevitably right about Marx’s theory? Was the concept of ‘dictatorial 
democracy’ an oxymoron, or were Lenin and Stalin to blame for abusing Marx’s 
theory? The answer is, of course, debatable. But when Lenin (1960–70, 216) 
wrote that ‘[d]ictatorship means unlimited power based on force, and not on law,’ 
this was not logically inconsistent with Marx’s view, expressed earlier, that dicta-
torial use of the state’s coercive powers would be necessary following the prole-
tarian revolution. Marx apparently had few misgivings about tyrannical means so 
long as they furthered the democratic end, and that end was refl ected in the social 
basis, rather than the legal basis, of class rule (see Ehrenberg 1992, 108). Since 
Lenin claimed power on behalf of the workers (and the peasants), his dictatorship 
presumably would have satisfi ed, at least initially, Marx’s criteria (though Marx 
later might have come to regard it as a failure of democracy).
However Marx might have assessed Lenin and Stalin’s implementation of 
the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR, there is no doubt that it had serious 
implications for environmental protection. These implications may have been 
unintended, and they may (or may not) have been related to the nature or aim of 
the dictatorship. From a historical perspective, however, it is clear that dictato-
rial rule, with is concomitant lack of governmental accountability and limited 
public participation in decision making, impeded effective environmental protec-
tion. In many cases, the totalitarian instinct for self-preservation simply prevented 
Party/governments from taking any action against pollution because, as Ze’ev 
Wolfson has noted (Komarov [pseud.] 1980, 108), such steps could have led to 
‘major changes in the system of power.’ As discussed in Chapter 4 (§4.2), taking 
action on the environment might have required reductions in industrial output and 
employment that would have undermined the legitimate claim to power of the 
so-called ‘workers’ ’ parties (see Jancar 1987, 123). Environmental problems con-
sequently tended to be marginalized, when they were not ignored entirely. Even 
good faith efforts to protect the environment were hindered by the Party/states’ 
confl icts of interest as regulators and owners of regulated industries.
We also saw in Chapter 4 (§4.5) how the ‘proletarian’ democracies 
undermined environmental protection efforts by their close control over the fl ow 
of environmental information; that is, by censorship of the press. In his early 
years, Marx was an outspoken advocate of a free press. In his 1842 Debates on 
Freedom of the Press (1975b, 166), he wrote:
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The essence of a free press is the characterful, rational, moral essence of free-
dom. The character of the censored press is the characterless monster of unfree-
dom; it is a civilised monster, a perfumed abortion.
Or does it still need to be proved that freedom of the press is in accord with 
the essence of the press, whereas censorship contradicts it?
A free press was for Marx an important attribute of the ‘moral state’ (1975a, 120). 
Censorship, on the other hand, was based on an immoral premise that under-
mined the moral basis of the state: ‘Laws against frame of mind are based on an 
unprincipled frame of mind, on an immoral, material view of the state. They are 
an involuntary cry of a bad conscience’ (Marx 1975a, 120–1). ‘Censorship,’ Marx 
wrote (1975b, 159), ‘converts a struggle over principles into a struggle of prin-
ciple without power against power without principle.’
It is not clear, by the way, whether Engels shared Marx’s veneration for a 
free press; his writings display ambivalence. On the one hand, in The State of 
Germany (1975a, 28–9), written in 1845–6, Engels wrote that ‘the liberty of the 
press is, of itself, a middle-class privilege, because printing requires money, and 
buyers for the printed productions, which buyers must have money again.’ But 
a generation later, in The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers’ 
Party, Engels (1975b, 77) expressly recognized that freedom of the press was 
indispensable for the workers’ movement. 
Despite Marx’s principled defense of freedom of the press, he planted the 
seeds of the very ‘immoral’ censorship he deprecated when he called for a prole-
tarian dictatorship. Empirically, censorship has resulted whenever dictatorial rule 
(whatever its social basis) has been combined with state ownership of the means 
of production. Moreover, it is not entirely clear that Marx would have opposed 
any and all uses of censorship by the revolutionary workers’ movement. Com-
munist governments frequently justifi ed censorship on the grounds that it was 
necessary to preserve the proletariat’s hold on power; negative press about the 
‘workers’ state’ might have fueled counterrevolutionary efforts. It is diffi cult to 
see how Marx could have rejected that argument, given what he wrote about the 
proletariat’s legitimate use of coercive state powers to consolidate its gains and 
prevent counterrevolution.
Regardless of the possible political and ideological justifi cations, the Com-
munist governments controlled the fl ow of information through the law and by 
their ownership of the means of production. In doing so, they displayed the very 
‘anti-state frame of mind’ that Marx had written about and, as he had predicted, 
their censorship fueled a struggle between principle without power and power 
without principle. It is the ultimate testimony to the strength of principle that, in 
the end, power was defeated.
As we saw in Chapter 4 (§4.5), the Communist governments for decades 
withheld information about environmental conditions in order to avoid 
troublesome political pressure at home and to score propaganda points in the 
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Western press. Environmental statistics were, as Ze’ev Wolfson wrote (Komarov 
[pseud.] 1980, 17), ‘the property of the government, just like the earth, the rivers, 
and the forests and their denizens of animals.’ In Poland, beginning in the late 
1970s, the press grew more open in its consideration of environmental issues, 
but information remained privileged. Polish citizens could learn something about 
environmental problems and how the Party/government was reacting to them, but 
further investigations usually were blocked (see Jancar 1987, 259, 270). The fl ow 
of environmental information was even more restricted in other Soviet bloc coun-
tries. In the former Soviet Union itself, as late as 1989, the press complained about 
limitations on access to information concerning accidents affecting the environ-
ment: ‘Amongst others, we still cannot fi nd out information about accidents and 
fi res at energy and building installations at the Ministry of Energy of the USSR, 
about equipment being put out of action when this entails material losses, human 
victims or even non-catastrophic contamination of the environment’ (Izvestiya, 
Apr. 26, 1989, quoted in Z. Medvedev 1990a, 288). The Soviet government to the 
very end retained fi rm control over the fl ow of information.
The 1986 explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exemplifi ed how, 
even in the age of glasnost, the Soviet press was ‘free’ to publish only that infor-
mation the government deemed appropriate. As Zhores Medvedev (1990a, 64) 
has written, ‘the Chernobyl catastrophe . . . was born of secrecy,’ and ‘many of 
the mistakes and miscalculations which were made afterwards and which signifi -
cantly increased the human and economic cost were also the result of secrecy.’ 
The explosion and subsequent meltdown and radiation release at Chernobyl 
occurred on Saturday, April 26, 1986. The fi rst ‘brief’ public report of the acci-
dent in the Soviet Union was not published until Monday, April 28, and then only 
because of pressure from the Swedish government, which had detected the acci-
dent (from the radioactive cloud hovering over Scandinavia) and established its 
source (Z. Medvedev 1990a, 56). For ten days following the accident, the Soviets 
maintained a ‘news blackout,’ only occasionally releasing terse statements that 
treated the incident—among the world’s worst nuclear accidents and the costli-
est industrial accident in world history—as ‘minor’ (Z. Medvedev 1990a, 57, 
65, 289). The primary reason for the news blackout was to prevent the domestic 
population of the Soviet Union from realizing that the socialist government was 
‘helpless’ to prevent the accident and control its effects. The government had 
not prepared for such a massive nuclear accident because it was supposed to 
be impossible in the Soviet Union (see G. Medvedev 1991, 101). In the words 
of one Chernobyl offi cial, ‘the accident wasn’t in the plan’ (quoted in Z. Med-
vedev 1990a, 52). Throughout the episode, the press was fed a steady diet of 
misinformation. When accurate reports, based on data collected by American 
and West European intelligence services, appeared in the Western press, Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev called them ‘an unrestrained anti-Soviet campaign 
with mountains of lies, most dishonest and malicious lies’ (Pravda, May 15, 
1986, quoted in Z. Medvedev 1990a, 70). This same sentiment appeared virtually 
Chapter 6170
every time some Western news organization reported on environmental problems 
anywhere in the socialist world.12
Almost to the very end of the socialist era in Eastern Europe, unfettered 
press coverage of environmental issues remained unacceptable because it tended 
to expose Party/state offi cials to the informal political accountability that public 
scrutiny brings. A free environmental press was at odds with the Communist Par-
ties’ main goal: maintenance of power.
6.6. Conclusion: From Marxism to Eco-Socialism
Old myths die hard, and that is certainly true of the myth of Marx as an early 
environmentalist. Marx was not an environmentalist. Some of his ideas directly 
or indirectly contributed to the failure of environmental protection in People’s 
Poland and throughout the former Soviet bloc. It was not just a matter of misinter-
pretation, either; at least in some cases, there clearly were problems with Marx’s 
theories. This is most obviously true of his labor theory of value, which, by deny-
ing that natural resources have any real economic value (but only use value), 
directly obstructed efforts to conserve resources and reduce pollution. We should 
not be surprised, however, that some of Marx’s theories turned out to be environ-
mentally harmful. Marx was, after all, a creature of his times. Despite his inten-
tion to create a political-economic theory that would witness and explain the end 
of history, his ideas refl ected the period and culture in which he lived (see Raskin 
and Bernow 1991, 92). As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Marx’s ideas 
had many traits in common with nineteenth-century capitalism, including faith in 
boundless technological and economic progress and an anthropocentric/utilitarian 
view of nature. Marx’s views and nineteenth-century capitalism were both fi rmly 
rooted in Judaeo-Christian worldview (see DeBardeleben 1985, 80). 
Over the past century, capitalist economic systems have evolved considerably. 
Although capitalist economists continue to quote Adam Smith (much as contem-
porary socialists continue to look to Marx), hardly a ‘free’ market exists anywhere 
in the world today. As Karl Popper (1966, 140) wrote in 1945,  ‘laissez-faire has 
disappeared from the face of the earth.’ The countries of the industrialized West 
have long since abandoned the free-wheeling capitalism of the nineteenth cen-
tury with its Social Darwinist overtones. The market’s ‘invisible hand’ has been 
sheathed in a thick glove of regulation designed to alleviate at least some of its 
grosser iniquities. This is true especially in the fi eld of environmental protec-
tion, where even the staunchest proponents of free markets, such as Milton Fried-
man (Friedman and Friedman 1980, 214), have acknowledged a legitimate role 
for (limited) government intervention and regulation. Capitalism today—what 
 Popper (1966, 335n9) called ‘interventionism’ or ‘democratic interventionism’—
bears little resemblance to the capitalism of Marx’s time—which Popper referred 
to as ‘unrestrained capitalism.’
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There is no reason to expect that Marx’s socialist theories would be any more 
relevant today than nineteenth-century capitalist notions. If anything, we might 
reasonably expect Marx’s ideas to have proved more fragile and, less amenable 
to alteration and adaptation than capitalism, for his was a jealous, even theo-
logical ideology that, unlike capitalism, purported to resolve comprehensively 
the ills of civilized (European) society. His conception of socialism claimed to 
be both scientifi c and historically inevitable. The sheer weight of these claims 
may have made it more diffi cult for Marxism to adapt to new political or cultural 
circumstances.
Marxism has not, however, remained stagnant in the century since Marx’s 
death. His theories have been subject to continual interpretation and reinterpre-
tation as followers have sought answers to questions Marx never considered (as 
with the continuing quest to enunciate a coherent and internally consistent social-
ist concept of law), and practice at least occasionally has forced theory to heel (as 
with the eventual complete repudiation of the labor theory of value). However, 
contemporary Marxists seem always to be constrained by the need to ‘legitimize’ 
their claims by reference to the writings of Marx and Engels. As with the Bible,13 
many groups with diverse agendas have found something in Marx to cling to—a 
sentence, a phrase, an implicit theme. As Leszek Kołakowski (1978a, 3) suggests, 
they all may be entitled to call themselves ‘Marxists,’ but at some point Marx and 
Marxism part company.
Ecology is one clear point of divergence. That Marxist theory is fundamen-
tally at odds with environmentalism is a view shared by liberals and many so-
called ‘eco-socialists,’ such as Rudolf Bahro (1982) and Andrew McLaughlin 
(1990). Eco-socialists reject central tenets of both Marxist socialism and capital-
ism, calling for a wholly new ideology based not on markets or class confl ict but 
on the needs of the biosphere. They discard fundamental precepts of orthodox 
Marxism, such as the labor theory of value, the aspiration to material abundance 
based on ever-increasing levels of technological sophistication, and the historical 
materialist view of the relationship between people and nature. In so doing they 
reject, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, the economic, class-based foundations 
of Marxism (see Routley 1981, 241). Paul Raskin and Stephen Bernow (1991, 90) 
have written that ‘the ecological critique of Marxism is fundamental.’ 
Marxism stresses confl ict within the mode of production—the contradictions 
between the relations and forces of production and among social classes. Ecol-
ogy stresses the confl ict between the human enterprise and the natural environ-
ment. Put starkly (and too simply), the debate is about which set of confl icts 
should be viewed as more fundamental: class against class or humanity against 
nature.
From the perspective of social ecology, Raskin and Bernow continue (1991, 
90–1), ‘Marxism has become obsolete.’ 
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Too narrow in its theoretical framework, too committed to the primacy of class 
relations, and too imbued with nineteenth-century imagery or progress through 
the technological domination of nature, conventional Marxism has become irrel-
evant at best. At worst, it is seen, along with capitalism, as promoting dangerous 
modes of development around the globe.
What eco-socialists retain of Marxism—social ownership and central planning—
rests on an almost entirely new program: to create an ecologically sustainable 
steady-state society. This program is unapologetically Utopian, and its merits 
are debatable.14 Nevertheless, eco-socialist theory has certain signifi cance for an 
environmental critique of Marxism. Specifi cally, it shows that Marxist theory is 
fundamentally incompatible with environmentalism. 
Notes
1. This chapter is a revised version of Cole (1993).
2. Engels (1940, 291–2) recognized, at least, that nature is not simply a passive mate-
rial base for human activities: ‘[l]et us not, however, be very hopeful about our human con-
quest over nature. For each such victory, nature manages to take her revenge.’ But Engels 
never developed an ecological theory (see Parsons 1977, 24). He subscribed, with Marx, 
to the view that human domination of nature was both necessary and natural, going so far 
as to assert that the struggle against nature constitutes the basis of human thought. Indeed, 
Engels (1975c, 106) defi ned ‘freedom’ in terms of human control over external nature.
3. Parsons is not alone in viewing Marx and Engels as early environmentalists.  Donald 
C. Lee (1980, 3) argues that Marx’s theories promote ‘a rational, humane, environmentally 
unalienated social order,’ which existing socialist states simply have failed, so far, to imple-
ment. Even that pillar of capitalism, the Wall Street Journal (Nov. 25, 1991, at 1), has 
annointed Marx as an early environmentalist.
4. Property-rights scholars who are not legally trained often confuse property cat-
egories. Hardin (who is a biologist) referred to ‘common’ property (res communes) when 
he clearly meant to describe non-property or open access property (res nullius). (On the 
important distinctions between ‘common property’ and ‘open access,’ see Bromley 1991, 
29.) Hardin’s confusion is understandable, however, since ‘open access’ resources often are 
referred to as ‘common pool’ resources or simply as ‘commonses.’ In any case, Hardin’s 
terminology does not get in the way of his analysis, which, on my reading, is fairly neutral 
as between individual ownership and public or social ownership. 
5. Hardin’s use of the term ‘private-enterprisers’ may be misleading. Given Hardin’s 
belief in privatization (‘or something formally like it’) as a solution to the ‘tragedy of the 
commons,’ he clearly does not mean to indict economies based on private property. Hardin 
evidently believes that privatization would stem the destruction of resources by internal-
izing the costs (as well as the benefi ts) of use. But he fails to acknowledge that even indi-
vidually owned property could be exploited to the point of destruction, if time horizons are 
suffi ciently short, discount rates suffi ciently high, and substitute investment possibilities 
suffi ciently plentiful (see Clarke 1973a, 1973b). I discuss some normative implications of 
this analysis in Chapter 8 (§8.4).
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6. On Marx’s dispute with Malthus, see generally Meek (1953) and Kołakowski 
(1978a, 413–4).
7. In light of the problems created for environmental protection by Marx’s labor 
 theory of value, I argue in Chapter 8 (§8.5) that scarcity pricing is prerequisite of effective 
environmental protection.
8. Marx’s supporters continue to grapple with the problem of reconciling Marx’s ear-
lier statements about law with his later dismissal of law as a secondary ideological compo-
nent of the state, determined by economic relations (see Cain and Hunt 1979).
9. Lenin (1932, 40) and Engels (1958, 514–15) wrote in a similar vein (also see Tay 
and Kamenka 1985, 231).
10. This concession to bourgeois legality has created a permanent predicament for 
Marxist legal scholars. If they accept orthodox Marxism’s instrumental view of law as an 
institution for class oppression, then clearly the law can have no place after the Communist 
revolution abolishes class distinctions and antagonisms. But if they reject the ‘withering 
away’ of law as unacceptably Utopian, as Lenin did, then they admit by implication that the 
law is, in some important respect, autonomous, so that legal institutions cannot be viewed 
as mere ideological constructs upon the base of economic relations. As a consequence, the 
entire base and superstructure model of historical materialism falls apart (see Collins 1982, 
70). This paradox has ‘been among the factors leading to the intellectual disintegration of 
Marxism as a coherent system of thought’ (Tay and Kamenka 1985, 218). Contemporary 
neo-Marxist scholars, such as Christine Sypnowich (1990), have continued the effort to 
construct an acceptable and internally consistent theory of socialist law. The fact remains, 
however, that any theory of socialist law that posits law as an autonomous feature of social 
relations deviates in important respects from orthodox Marxism. And, after all, the present 
study is not about what legal theories are possible under Marxism, but about the theories of 
law that Marx and his most infl uential colleagues and followers actually held. 
11. Kołakowski (1978a, 256) credits Bakhunin with being the fi rst to infer Leninism 
from Marxism. The implication is that, even if Marx did not imagine socialism as a des-
potic system, despotism was nonetheless a natural and predictable consequence of revolu-
tionary dictatorship.
12. See the discussion in Chapter 4 (§4.5) of the Polish government’s offi cial response 
to unauthorized publications of environmental information. 
13. This biblical allusion is hardly novel (see Toynbee 1946, vol. I, 400). Kołakowski 
(1992, 13) maintains that the comparison of Marxism to religious faith is ‘apt only in part,’ 
because, in his view, Marxism represents more of a ‘parody of religion, than a religion 
proper.’
14. Liberals and neo-Marxists alike have condemned eco-socialist theories as hope-
lessly Utopian. From a liberal perspective, eco-socialism, like all Utopian schemes, tends 
toward despotism. I have more to say about this in Chapter 8 (§8.6). Neo-Marxists assert 
that the eco-socialist goals can be realized only within a Marxist (or, more accurately, neo-
Marxist) framework, focusing on the environmentally destructive features of capitalism, 
such as private property and the profi t motive (see Pepper 1993).
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7.1. Introduction
When communism collapsed in 1989, Poland’s fi rst post-Communist govern-
ment, led by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, inherited a combined eco-
nomic and ecological crisis of immense proportions.1 At the beginning of 1990, it 
initiated an unprecedented political-economic transformation designed to estab-
lish liberal democratic institutions and a market-based economic system. These 
reforms were generally expected to promote improved environmental protec-
tion, for example by hardening budget constraints on polluters.2 But there were 
also fears that free markets might aggravate existing environmental problems 
and spawn new ones, if the Polish government did not implement a deliberate 
and forceful policy of environmental protection (see, e.g., Nowicki 1993, 173–5; 
Żylicz 1993b, 11). 
Looking back half a decade later, even the most optimistic proponents of 
systemic change appear to have underestimated the benefi cial effects for environ-
mental protection of Poland’s jump to the market. Pollution levels have fallen by 
more than 40 percent, while Poland’s economy has achieved the highest growth 
rate in all of Europe. By 1994, economists were referring to Poland’s economy 
as ‘Europe’s tiger’ (see, among others, The Economist, Apr. 16, 1994; Australian 
Financial Review, Nov. 3, 1993; Financial Times, Oct. 6, 1995; Sunday Times, 
June 11, 1995). At the same time, the environmental group Greenpeace dubbed 
Poland the ‘Green Tiger of Europe’ (see PAP News Wire, Sept. 6, 1995; The War-
saw Voice, Oct. 30, 1994). 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how Poland has managed to impress 
Wall Street and Greenpeace at the same time. It focuses on the dynamic rela-
tionship between environmental policies and systemic reforms, such as privatiza-
tion of the means of production, the development of competitive markets and the 
establishment of a constitutional Rechtsstaat (‘law state’). The analysis begins in 
§7.2 with a brief description of the revolutionary changes that have taken place 
in Poland since 1989. Section 7.3 then describes the dramatic environmental 
improvements that have accompanied those changes. In §7.4, I rebut the wide-
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spread misperception that those improvements are merely transitory symptoms 
of economic recession. A review of economic growth, industrial production and 
environmental protection statistics up to 1994 shows that pollution levels have 
continued to fall, despite the fact that Poland’s economic recession ended in 1992. 
Environmental policies and systemic reforms combined to reduce pollution emis-
sions and spur resource conservation. To some extent, improvements in environ-
mental policies have been driven by Poland’s maturing environmental movement. 
Section 7.5 examines the growth and infl uence of that movement. Section 7.6 
points to lingering problems for environmental protection in Poland: parts of the 
country remain highly polluted; Poland’s environmental laws and policies still 
suffer from gaps and weak spots; perhaps most signifi cantly, the current gov-
ernment, which is dominated by former communists and their allies, has shown 
little interest in environmental protection and has slowed the pace of the systemic 
reforms that have driven environmental improvements since 1990. Nevertheless, 
there is reason for optimism about the future of environmental protection in Poland 
mainly because of the Polish government’s desire for inclusion in Western politi-
cal, fi nancial and security structures, including the European Union. Whether that 
will spur suffi cient environmental protection in Poland rather depends on one’s 
subjective determination of what constitutes adequate environmental quality. At 
least in a democratic Poland, the voters and consumers will have the ultimate say.
7.2. Poland’s Political-Economic Transformation
The Death of the Second Republic and Birth of the Third  
Poland was the fi rst Communist country to begin transitioning to market democ-
racy. The biggest changes occurred in stages between January 1, 1989 and Jan-
uary 1, 1990. First, in December 1988, the Sejm enacted a Law on Economic 
Activity (1988 Dz. U. No. 41, item 324) that radically altered economic institu-
tions in People’s Poland. This marked the fi nal economic reform effort of the 
Communist era, and it in effect ended the socialist experiment in Poland. When 
it took effect on January 1, 1989, the new law opened markets by immediately 
releasing most sectors of the economy from central economic planning and cen-
tralized resources allocation. Despite the radical changes it made to Poland’s eco-
nomic institutions, the 1988 Law on Economic Activity has received very little 
attention from the scholars and journalists who have been following Poland’s 
political-economic transformation. They have focused almost exclusively on the 
1990 Balcerowicz Plan of ‘shock therapy’ economic reforms (named after Leszek 
Balcerowicz, Vice-Premier and Finance Minister in Poland’s fi rst Solidarity-led 
government). In fact, it was the 1988 Law on Economic Activity that provided the 
biggest shock. That law, not the Balcerowicz Plan, brought virtual laissez-faire to 
Poland, precipitating hyperinfl ation, unemployment and economic recession. The 
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1988 Law on Economic Activity was also responsible for certain environmen-
tal problems that mistakenly have been attributed to the Balcerowicz Plan. For 
example, critics have blamed the Balcerowicz Plan for deregulating hazardous 
waste imports to Poland (see Manser 1993, 101–2). But that problem clearly was 
caused by the 1988 Law on Economic Activity, which, in the course of deregulat-
ing most economic activities, inadvertently repealed existing regulations on waste 
imports, including permit requirements and dumping restrictions, thereby open-
ing Poland’s borders to hazardous waste shipments. Garbage began fl owing into 
Poland in January 1989, a full year before the Balcerowicz Plan went into effect. 
To its credit, the Sejm quickly recognized and responded to the problem with an 
amendment to the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act (EPDA), 
closing the borders to hazardous wastes only four months after the 1988 Law on 
Economic Activity opened them (see Radecki 1992b).3 Before, during and after 
the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan in January 1990, the Polish government 
rigorously enforced that ban. According to reports published by the State Envi-
ronmental Protection Inspectorate, in 1990 importers attempted to bring 18 mil-
lion tons of illegal waste into Poland, but only about 60,000 tons actually made it 
across the border. In 1991, the Polish government reported that out of 3.7 million 
tons of waste destined for Poland, none made it into the country (Żylicz 1994a, 
97). In 1992, Polish border guards intercepted 1,332 improper waste shipments 
from the West (Washington Post, Mar. 23, 1994). These numbers must be taken 
with a grain of salt, however. Outright bans are never completely enforceable; it 
is quite likely that some small illegal waste shipments crossed (and still cross) 
Poland’s borders undetected. The important point, however, is that Poland’s waste 
import problems were caused not by the Balcerowicz Plan, but by the Communist 
Party/state’s fi nal efforts to reform the economy.
As Poland’s economy faltered in the late 1980s, the Party/state came under 
increasing pressure to reform Poland’s political and governmental structures. 
Waves of strikes throughout 1988 forced the government into formal negotia-
tions with Solidarity, the independent trade union outlawed since 1981. Those 
negotiations culminated in April 1989 with the famous ‘Round Table’ accords, 
which set the stage for political reforms, including the end of single-party rule 
in Poland. The accords called for semi-free parliamentary elections, which were 
held in June 1989. The elections were only ‘semi-free’ because 65 percent of the 
seats in the lower house of parliament (the Sejm) were reserved for candidates 
backed by the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the elections were viewed as a 
referendum on Communist Party rule in Poland, and the results were stagger-
ing: Solidarity-backed candidates won every seat open to them in both houses 
of parliament, except for one in the newly established upper house (the Senate) 
won by an independent candidate. Even more humiliating for the Party was the 
failure of many of its unopposed candidates to win election. Election rules under 
the ‘Round Table’ accords specifi ed that all candidates, including those running 
for uncontested seats, had to be elected by a majority of votes cast; Polish voters 
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defeated unopposed Party candidates simply by crossing out their names on the 
ballot. The June 1989 elections exposed to the whole world the illegitimacy of 
Communist rule in Poland.
 Two months after the elections, the Party-led government collapsed and the 
Party itself disintegrated. In September 1989, the fi rst Solidarity-led coalition 
government took offi ce, and Poland’s ‘Third Republic’ was born. But even after 
the Communists were vanquished, many of their institutions, including huge and 
ineffi cient state-owned enterprises, the 1952 Constitution and the nomenklatura, 
persisted. Much of the real work of political-economic transformation remained 
to be done. It began in December 1989 with the enactment of the ‘December 
Amendments’ to the 1952 Constitution (1989 Dz. U. No. 75, item 444). Those 
amendments defi ned the new Polish Republic as a democratic state based on the 
rule of law (art. 1), repealed article 6, which had based Poland’s economic sys-
tem on the ‘socialized means of production,’ and amended article 7 to protect and 
fully guarantee private property rights. As amended, article 7 included a ‘takings’ 
provision, modeled on the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution; 
expropriation is permitted ‘only for a public purpose and for just compensation’ 
(art. 7).4 These amendments provided a (minimal) constitutional foundation for 
the market economy that emerged in Poland at the beginning of 1990.
Poland’s Jump to the Market: The Balcerowicz Plan of 
Economic Reforms
The enormous political changes of 1989 intoxicated many Poles, anesthetiz-
ing them, though only partially and briefl y, to the painful economic situation in 
which they lived. When the fi rst Solidarity-led government of Prime Minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki came to power, Poland’s economy was in dire straits (see 
Cole 1991, 217–19). Gross national product, which had fallen by 1.6 percent in 
1988, was falling even faster in 1989; by 1990, the annual rate of decline was 
expected to reach 3 percent (United States Central Intelligence Agency 1990, 
table 1). National income did not come close to matching expenditures, so that 
by 1989 the defi cit amounted to 30 percent of Poland’s total budget (see New 
York Times, Oct. 23, 1989). Poland’s budget defi cit was largely due to foreign 
debt burdens—by 1989, Poland owed foreign governments and international 
banks US$40 billion, making it the world’s fourth-largest debtor nation (see 
Portes 1981, 4–10; New York Times, Apr. 23, 1989). But the main causes of defi -
cit were government price supports and subsidies to ineffi cient industries. To 
cover those expenditures, the government printed worthless money, sparking 
hyperinfl ation. Up to the end of 1989, the prices of basic commodities rose by 
‘more than 50 percent per month, and in some cases by several hundred percent’ 
(see New York Times, Sept. 12, 1989). In July 1989, aggregate costs increased 
by 10 percent over the preceding month and by 85 percent over the fi rst seven 
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months of 1988; food deliveries were down 20 percent from the previous year; 
industrial deliveries fell by an average of 11 percent from 1988; and total avail-
able housing, already in short supply,5 fell by 5 percent (Financial Times, Aug. 
30, 1989). Producers routinely withheld commodities from market, anticipating 
further price increases from hyperinfl ation, which also continually devalued the 
wages of working Poles. Annual disposable income, which had been declining 
throughout the 1980s, fell below US$100 in 1989 (United States Central Intel-
ligence Agency 1990, table C–14). Government price controls did not help at 
all, merely making more affordable on paper what did not exist on store shelves. 
According to a report prepared for the US House of Representatives (United 
States House of Representatives, House Committee on Small Business 1989, 
8) in 1989, 60 percent of Polish wage earners could not make ends meet. As 
1989 ended (just before the Balcerowicz Plan took effect), infl ation in Poland 
reached an astronomical annualized rate of 3,200 percent (Hajduk 1994, 72n13).6 
Poland’s economic crisis did not afford the Mazowiecki government the lux-
ury of time in developing a strategy to transform the political-economic sys-
tem. Immediate action was required to stem hyperinfl ation, stabilize the currency 
and curtail shortages of food and other necessities. As a fi rst move, in October 
1989 the National Bank of Poland devalued the zloty by 15 percent against the 
US dollar. Two months later, on December 17, 1989, then-Vice- Premier Leszek 
 Balcerowicz introduced his ‘shock therapy’ program to a parliament still domi-
nated by former members of the defunct Communist Party.
The Balcerowicz Plan was designed, fi rst and foremost, to curtail runaway 
infl ation and convert the Polish economy to a market base. It sought to accomplish 
this by immediately slashing all state subsidies by one-half, decontrolling prices 
for most consumer goods, limiting wage increases to reduce infl ationary pres-
sures, and reducing government infl ation compensation from 100 to 80 percent. 
The program also sought to establish a fully convertible currency, and included 
provisions, not immediately implemented, for restructuring industries and priva-
tizing state-owned enterprises. 
This is not the place for a detailed assessment Poland’s so-called ‘shock ther-
apy’ program, but it is worth clarifying some widespread misconceptions. First, 
contrary to what some critics have written (such as Manser 1993, 12, 41–2, 151), 
the Balcerowicz Plan was intended to institute not a laissez-faire economy in 
Poland, but a modern welfare state complete with social security, state fi nanced 
unemployment compensation and environmental regulations. The Balcerowicz 
Plan did not end state subsidies; it merely cut them in half; it did not end govern-
ment infl ation compensation for pensioners and wage earners, but merely reduced 
the level of compensation by 20 percent. These changes, although vitally impor-
tant for curbing hyperinfl ation, only marginally reduced the Polish government’s 
social commitments. In fact, between 1989 and 1992 (i.e., during the initial imple-
mentation period of the Balcerowicz Plan), state spending on social security actu-
ally doubled as a percentage of GDP to 18 percent (see Polish News Bulletin, 
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Aug. 10, 1993), and environmental investments nearly doubled (see Table 7.7 on 
p. 198). These are hardly the trends one would expect to see from a government 
intent on establishing laissez-faire. 
The Balcerowicz Plan did not magically cure Poland’s economic problems, 
but no one really expected that it would. As Balcerowicz himself admitted in 
an April 1990 interview, ‘[r]ecovery cannot occur quickly. It is a process. It is 
important that it should begin’ (quoted in Gazeta International, Apr. 26, 1990). 
At the outset, his austerity program made life even more diffi cult for most Poles. 
In the fi rst 24 hours after the Balcerowicz Plan was launched on January 1, 1990, 
the price of coal rose 600 percent, electricity costs quadrupled, the price of gaso-
line doubled, food prices skyrocketed, and even the price of a simple bus ticket 
rose by 250 percent (see New York Times, Jan. 8, 1990, Jan. 2, 1990). By the end 
of 1990, Poland’s GNP had declined (on paper) by 12 percent and industrial pro-
duction had fallen by 24 percent (see Table 7.1). But these depressing statistics 
must be taken with several grains of salt. For one thing, according to Andrew 
Berg (1994, 398–9) of the International Monetary Fund, Poland’s actual GDP 
decline in 1990 probably was closer to 5 percent than the offi cial estimate of 12 
percent because:
the entire statistical and information-collecting apparatus of the state was geared 
towards measuring physical output in large state enterprises, exclusively by 
obtaining information from every enterprise as an adjunct to the planning appa-
ratus. With liberalization, information-collecting agencies were overwhelmed 
and, at least initially, were unable to measure the growth in output from the hun-
dreds of thousands of new small private fi rms, especially given the new interest 
in tax evasion.
But even if analysts had been better able to track the growth in output, com-
parisons of post-Balcerowicz Plan economic performance with pre-Balcerowicz 
Plan economic performance still would be inherently problematic. The market-
clearing prices instituted by the Balcerowicz Plan simply are not comparable with 
the ‘fi ctitious prices’ established arbitrarily by economic planners before 1990. 
As Wacław Wilczyński (Polish News Bulletin, June 22, 1993) has written, ‘it is 
groundless to treat 1989 prices as a suitable reference for surveying changes in 
the economy.’ It makes better sense to look at levels of consumption and sav-
ings. Between 1989 and 1992, real savings doubled and consumer sales in Poland 
rose 5.8 percent after adjusting for infl ation. In addition, the number of cars on 
Polish roads increased dramatically, and the sale of gasoline remained constant 
despite steeply rising prices. By 1992, there were more television sets per capita 
in Poland than in Italy, Portugal, Ireland or Greece. And by 1993, the number of 
inhabitants per Warsaw apartment had fallen to half of what it had been in the 
late 1980s. Thus, according to Wilczyński, ‘[n]othing corroborates a thesis on 
the recent across-the-board pauperization of society’ under the Balcerowicz Plan. 
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Other supposed consequences of that plan, such as infl ation and unemploy-
ment, were largely inheritances from the previous system. According to Zbigniew 
Fallenbuchl (1993, 14), the rampant infl ation that accompanied ‘shock-therapy’ 
reforms at the beginning of 1990 was ‘a corrective increase,’ the conversion of 
a hidden into an open infl ation. Communist governments had hidden infl ation 
through the use of price controls, which, as already mentioned, kept prices low 
but precipitated constant supply shortages. It was not uncommon for consumers to 
spend long hours in line waiting for goods that were only rumored to be available. 
By freeing prices, the Balcerowicz Plan exposed this hidden infl ation. ‘It elimi-
nated shortages and other market distortions, and helped to adjust demand to the 
existing limited supply.’ Similarly, according to Fallenbuchl (1993, 14, quoting 
Janusz Beksiak), the initial rise in unemployment, which reached 6 percent at the 
end of 1990 (16 percent at the end of 1994), was not caused by the reforms; it was 
‘an inheritance from the old system, not a pathology of the new one.’7 Unemploy-
ment offi cially never existed in People’s Poland; according to the logic of socialist 
legality, it could not exist because it was unconstitutional. But, in fact, unemploy-
ment did exist in the form of overemployment—several employees were assigned 
a task that could have been done by just one. Socialism’s hidden unemployment 
also was refl ected in low rates of labor productivity. As Polish workers used to 
say, You pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work. 
Whether the Balcerowicz reforms caused or merely exposed Poland’s eco-
nomic recession of 1990–92, the suffering experienced by many Poles during the 
initial months of transition was very real. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
economic reforms and their consequences is more complex than many observers 
have acknowledged. They cannot be adequately treated outside their systemic and 
historic contexts. Specifi cally, the Balcerowicz Plan must be assessed in light of 
the preexisting problems of socialism. The same is true, as we shall see later, of 
the impact of political and economic reforms on environmental protection.
The Balcerowicz Plan managed to achieve all of its primary objectives with 
surprising speed. Shortages of food and other goods vanished in a matter of 
days. The word ‘hyperinfl ation’ was not seen or heard after February 1990. 
By May, the infl ation rate stood at only 4 percent (New York Times, June 7, 
1990).8 Just as quickly the zloty had become fully convertible on the internal 
market, and throughout 1990 it held its own against the American dollar (New 
York Times, July 14, 1990). Perhaps most importantly for present purposes, the 
 Balcerowicz Plan substantially hardened budget constraints throughout most 
sectors of the Polish economy. One common method for measuring the hardness 
of the budget constraint is to correlate pre-tax and pre-subsidy business profi ts 
with post-tax and post-subsidy profi ts. As we saw in Chapter 5, under socialism 
the industries with the lowest pre-tax profi ts (or highest losses)—usually coal 
mining and food production—often ended up with the highest ‘profi ts’ after tax 
subsidies. The Balcerowicz Plan ended this practice. Between 1989 and 1991, 
the correlation between pre- and post-tax profi ts for a sample of 1899 large 
Chapter 7182
industrial enterprises ‘rose dramatically and signifi cantly’ from .38 to .71 (Berg 
1994, 393).
The Balcerowicz Plan was the decisive fi rst step in Poland’s ongoing efforts 
to construct a modern market democracy. Since 1990, economic policies have 
ebbed and fl owed with political and social tides, but progress has remained 
remarkably steady. Poland’s economy started to grow in 1992, and since then 
growth has increased each year. In 1993 and 1994, Poland’s economic growth 
rate was among Europe’s highest; in 1995, it reached 7 percent; and economists 
predicted that economic growth would average 4.9 percent for the last fi ve years 
of the century (see Polish News Bulletin, Feb. 16, 1996; EIU Country Forecasts, 
Sept. 6, 1995). Meanwhile, consumers who used to line up for hours, waiting 
for whatever goods were available, suddenly had choices of producers, brands, 
stores and quality. And although large-scale privatization of Poland’s state-owned 
enterprises has proceeded at a snail’s pace, the privatization-from-below of small-
scale industrial, commercial and retail businesses has driven economic growth 
in Poland. By 1995, private fi rms were contributing 56 percent of Poland’s gross 
national product; they produced 38 percent of industrial output and accounted for 
60 percent of national employment (Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1995). 
All this is not to say that Poland’s political-economic transformation is com-
plete. A good deal of restructuring remains to be done. Thousands of state-owned 
enterprises still await privatization; Poland’s banking and fi nancial institutions 
require intensive reorganization and modernization; Poland’s tax system is unsta-
ble; various industrial sectors, such as mining, require fundamental restructuring 
simply to survive in competitive world markets; and the legal framework for a 
market economy remains underdeveloped. Poland’s economy circa 1996 still is 
best described as a transitional market economy (see Fallenbuchl 1993).
7.3. Systemic Transformation, Economic Recession and 
Environmental Protection in Post-Communist Poland
Whereas much has been written since 1989 about political-economic reforms 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Slay 1994; Sachs 1993; Rychard 
1993; S. Gomułka 1994; Clague and Rausser 1992), accounts of post-Communist 
environmental restoration and protection efforts have been scarce and generally 
inadequate. In 1993, Roger Manser (1993, 15, 17) wrote of the ‘failure’ of envi-
ronmental protection in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe: ‘In spite of 
curbing some of the excesses of communism’s pollution economy, the nascent 
market economy has so far failed to bring fundamental improvements and in the 
future is likely to reinforce old threats as well as create new ones.’ A New York 
Times reporter similarly concluded, in a 1994 article, that ‘[t]he onset of capital-
ism has not cleaned the region’s foul air, soil or water. . . . What’s more, capitalism 
is bringing its own problems—more traffi c pollution, less public transportation, 
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more plastic foam, more clashes between environmentalists and the peddlers 
of consumerism’ (New York Times, Nov. 3, 1994). Similar stories appeared in 
the Polish press. The August 1994 issue of the Polish weekly Wprost carried an 
alarming cover story, entitled ‘Death in the Air,’ about the growing problem of air 
pollution. The article’s author never bothered to mention that air pollution emis-
sions in Poland declined by more than 40 percent between 1990 and 1994 (see 
Table 7.1). But, of course, good news does not sell magazines. 
More diffi cult to understand is why the same misperceptions have infected 
the academic literature. For instance, Joan DeBardeleben (1995, 3–4), a noted 
scholar of environmental protection in Central and Eastern Europe, recently con-
cluded that environmental problems now ‘pose even greater hazards than earlier’ 
for a whole host of reasons: resources for combatting pollution are scarcer; inter-
national cooperation among former socialist allies has been replaced by economic 
and ‘environmental competition and confl ict’; and ‘regulatory mechanisms have 
deteriorated, rather than improved.’ In addition, ‘[p]ervasive corruption, resource 
shortages, and technological decline make even previously-existing structures 
for pollution control less effective.’ Meanwhile, environmental concerns are 
‘low on the scale of priorities’ because of immediate economic problems. Like 
other analysts who share her pessimistic view of post-Communist environmental 
protection in Central and Eastern Europe, DeBardeleben explains away inconve-
nient facts about dramatic pollution reductions as mere transitory symptoms of 
economic recession. Another noted expert on environmental protection in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, Barbara Jancar-Webster (1995, 59), argues in a similar 
vein:
In the opinion of environmental professionals, governments do not consider 
the environment a fi rst priority. With an apathetic public, there is no popular 
domestic force pushing legislatures or executives to take action, and there is 
little money to carry out improvements. All predictions foresee a worsening of 
environmental conditions in the 1990s before the economic situation will have 
suffi ciently improved so that governments can turn to the environment.
But the facts do not support these gloomy assessments and predictions,9 at least 
not in Poland’s case.
Since 1990, environmental conditions in Poland have improved signifi cantly, 
and not solely or predominantly as a result of economic recession. Deliberate 
environmental policies have made a major contribution to pollution reductions 
and increased conservation. And those policies have been facilitated by sys-
temic reforms, most notably the institution of the rule of law and the imposition 
of substantially hard budget constraints throughout the economy. The signifi -
cant environmental improvements resulting from this combination of improved 
environmental policies and systemic reforms are structural; they have not been 
reversed by Poland’s return to economic growth. 
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Evidence of Structural Environmental Improvements in Poland 
Pollution levels in Poland declined dramatically after the introduction of the Bal-
cerowicz Plan in January 1990. Table 7.1 highlights Poland’s annual rates of eco-
nomic growth and pollution emissions from 1990 to 1995 (the last year for which 
environmental statistics are available). By 1994, aggregate industrial pollution 
had fallen by 40 percent (PAP News Wire, June 5, 1994). As already noted, some 
analysts (including Jendrośka and Sommer 1994, 187; DeBardeleben 1995b, 4) 
viewed these pollution reductions merely as by-products of Poland’s economic 
recession. Roger Manser (1993, 75) predicted that a return to economic growth 
would quickly reverse the emissions declines. But other analysts rightly main-
tained that the recession was only one factor, and maybe not even the most impor-
tant one. Poland’s preeminent environmental economist, Tomasz Żylicz (1994d, 
81n3), pointed out that the pollution reductions had to be ‘due to economic 
restructuring, and improved enforcement’ because they exceeded ‘what could be 
explained in terms of GDP decline.’ The journalist Eugeniusz Pudlis wrote (in The 
Warsaw Voice, Oct. 3, 1993) that the Polish government’s ‘deliberate’ environ-
mental policies deserved more credit than the recession for lower pollution levels. 
And in a May 1994 interview, Poland’s Chief Environmental Protection Inspector, 
Andrzej Walewski, declared that data collected by the Inspectorate ‘prove’ that 
pollution reductions have resulted from ‘investment in environmental protection, 
and improved discipline among ecological installation users’ (quoted in The War-
saw Voice, May 1, 1994).
Table 7.1. Percentage change in GDP, industrial production and air 
pollution emissions in Poland, 1990–5
 
GDP
Industrial 
production Dust
Carbon
 oxides
Nitrogen
 oxides
Sulphur 
dioxide
1990 –12 –24 –23 –17 –18 –21
1991 –7 –12 –21 –28 –6 –8
1992 2 4 –26 –15 –8 –10
1993 4 7 –13 –21 0 –3
1994 5 13 –12 0 0 –3
1995 7 9 –18 –12 1 –5
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest point.
Sources: GDP and industrial production fi gures, 1990–1993—Bossak (1994, 34, table 3; 
53, fi gure 1); Polish News Bulletin, Jan. 23, 1995 and Feb. 16, 1996. Pollution emissions—
GUS (1997, 1996, 23, table 1; 1995, 23, table 1; 1991, 123, table 4.1). 
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Data provided in Table 7.1 show that Poland’s economic recession ended 
in 1992, when gross national product increased by approximately 2 percent, and 
industrial output was 4 percent higher than the previous year. In 1993, the econ-
omy grew by 4 percent (the highest economic growth rate in all of Europe) and 
industrial output rose by 7 percent. Since then, Poland’s economy has contin-
ued to grow at an average annual rate of 6 percent, and industrial production has 
increased each year by an average of 11 percent. 
This impressive economic recovery made it possible fi nally to test the alleged 
connection between the recession and lower pollution levels. Had the recession 
been the sole or even the predominant cause of reduced emissions, as many have 
claimed, we logically would have expected to see pollution emissions increasing 
along with production levels beginning in 1992. But that has not happened. In 
1992, emissions of major air pollutants declined by an average of nearly 15 per-
cent from 1991 levels (despite the 4 percent hike in production). Interestingly, that 
was the same percentage emissions reduction Poland experienced in 1991 (from 
1990 levels), when the economy was still shrinking (by 7 percent). Between 1992 
and 1995, as Poland’s economy grew by 18 percent and industrial production 
increased by 35 percent, emissions of major air pollutants fell by an average of 9.1 
percent. As air pollution emissions have fallen, so have water pollution discharges 
in Poland. During the recession in 1990 and 1991, discharges fell by 14 percent 
(from 1989 levels); when Poland’s economy started growing again in 1992 and 
1993, water pollution continued to decline by 8 percent (from 1991 levels) (GUS 
1991, 25, table 1; 1995, 22, table 1). And the rate of resource consumption has 
fallen along with the pollution levels. In 1993, industry and consumers used 2.4 
percent less water than in 1992, 19.5 percent less than in 1989 (Business News 
from Poland, Sept. 30, 1994). Meanwhile, according to Tomasz Żylicz (1994a, 
99), ‘1990 was the fi rst year after the World War II that harvests in Polish forests 
were down-sized to the sustainable level.’
These statistics belie the contention that pollution reductions were solely or 
predominantly tied to Poland’s economic recession. Other factors, most nota-
bly Poland’s deliberate environmental policies, have contributed substantially to 
environmental improvements since 1989. And those policies have been facilitated 
by various systemic reforms. 
7.4. Environmental Policies, Systemic Reforms 
and Pollution Reductions
The ‘Round Table’ Environmental Protocol 
The history of post-Communist environmental law and policy in Poland actually 
began before the Communists gave up power. The ‘Round Table’ accords, signed 
in April 1989 by the Jaruzelski regime and the Solidarity opposition, included an 
Chapter 7186
important environmental protokol, which called for the appointment of a special 
commission of legal experts to overhaul Poland’s failed system of environmental 
regulation by the end of 1990. The protocol specifi ed six provisions to be included 
in new comprehensive environmental legislation: (1) freedom of access to envi-
ronmental information; (2) the right freely to conduct and publish environmental 
research; (3) the right to sue to protect the environment; (4) the establishment, 
in each community, of a freely elected environmental ombudsman authorized to 
inspect and collect information from local government agencies and polluting 
enterprises; (5) annual publication of reports on the state of the environment; and 
(6) exclusion of all environmental information from the state secret laws (Proto-
kol Podzespołu d/s Ekologii Okrągłego Stołu 1989). Most of the specifi c mandates 
of the environmental protocol have yet to be instituted by statutes or regulations. 
Nevertheless, the mere inclusion of environmental issues in the historic ‘Round 
Table’ negotiations was an important step toward environmental law and policy 
reform in Poland. 
A New Environmental Policy for a New Government
When Solidarity took over from the Communists in September 1989, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, in his fi rst public statement as prime minister, discussed the need 
to transform environmental protection along with the political-economic sys-
tem (Gazeta Wyborcza, Sept. 14, 1989). As his government prepared to launch 
the Balcerowicz Plan of economic reforms, it also began working on adminis-
trative and legislative reforms for environmental protection. Before the end of 
1989, all environmental and nature protection responsibilities were consolidated 
within a single new ministry, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural 
Resources and Forestry (1989 Dz. U. No. 73, item 433), which set about develop-
ing a national policy to restore and protect Poland’s environment into the twenty-
fi rst century. Its new National Environmental Policy (NEP) was published a year 
later (November 1990), and received parliamentary approval in May 1991 (Min-
istry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1991). The 
NEP was based on fundamental principles of environmental protection, includ-
ing ‘sustainable development’ and ‘the polluter pays principle.’ It established 
short-term (3–4-year), mid-term (3–10-year) and long-term (25–30-year) goals 
to be achieved through a combination of market mechanisms and administra-
tive regulations. The immediate short-term goal was to eliminate environmental 
hazards posing imminent threats to human health. Over the mid-term, the NEP 
sought to reverse declining environmental trends by ratcheting-up Polish envi-
ronmental standards to Western levels. This goal was designed, in part, to satisfy 
a critical precondition for Poland’s eventual membership in the European Union. 
The NEP’s long-term goal was to implement sustainable development practices 
throughout the Polish economy. 
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An Old Law in the New System
While the Environment Ministry was busy preparing its new National Environ-
mental Policy, the Mazowiecki government appointed an independent Environ-
mental Law Reform Task Force, as called for in the environmental protocol to 
the 1989 ‘Round Table’ accords, to prepare comprehensive new environmental 
legislation. The Task Force prepared several drafts of an ‘omnibus’ environmen-
tal law, but none of them proved to be satisfactory. Eventually, the Task Force 
concluded that the goal of completely reformulating Poland’s system of environ-
mental law was overly ambitious and perhaps unnecessary; existing laws could 
be improved suffi ciently by amendment, rather than replacement (see Jendrośka 
1992, 534). Consequently, Poland’s 1980 Environmental Protection and Devel-
opment Act (EPDA) has survived the transition structurally intact, though it has 
been amended seven times (so far) since 1989 (1989 Dz. U. No. 26, item 139; 
1989 Dz. U. No. 35, item 192; 1990 Dz. U. No. 34, item 198; 1990 Dz. U. No. 39, 
item 222; 1991 Dz. U. No. 77, item 335; 1991 Dz. U. No. 101, item 444; 1993 Dz. 
U. No. 40, item 183). The most important of these amendments banned hazardous 
waste imports,10 strengthened Poland’s environmental impact assessment proce-
dures for new economic developments, and established an innovative new Envi-
ronmental Protection Bank (Bank Ochrony Środowiska) to provide low-interest 
loans for environmental protection projects. Some analysts (e.g., Jendrośka 1990, 
21) have criticized these ‘piecemeal’ reforms, claiming that the EPDA, as a relic 
of the old system, should be completely replaced by legislation better adapted to 
the new political-economic climate. It is certainly true that the 1980 law remains 
defi cient in several respects (some of which are described in Cole 1995a, 338–41), 
and replacement legislation is in the works.11 But in some respects the old law is 
actually better suited to the new system than it was to the old. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Poland’s 1980 statute was among the world’s earliest 
environmental laws to rely primarily on market mechanisms—resource-use and 
pollution fees—for environmental protection (1980 Dz. U. No. 3, item 6, parts V 
and VII).12 Its various regulatory standards, fees for resource use and pollution 
emissions, and non-compliance fi nes are today among the world’s highest and 
most extensive (see Summers 1994). The EPDA mandates charges for just about 
every major economic activity that uses or pollutes any environmental medium, 
including air pollution emissions, water use and pollution discharges, timber har-
vesting, waste storage and disposal, use of agricultural lands for non-agricultural 
purposes, and use of automobiles in areas under special environmental protec-
tion, such as National Parks (1980 Dz. U. No. 3, item 6, art. 86). In Chapter 3 
(§3.3), I mentioned that Poland’s broad application of pollution and resource-use 
fees substantially predated the move toward economic means of environmental 
protection throughout the rest of the industrialized world. It was a truly progres-
sive approach to environmental protection, or would have been but for the fact 
that market mechanisms require markets to be effective. As we saw in Chapter 5, 
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the Polish Communists were trying to stimulate pollution control and conserva-
tion with prices in an economic system where prices were essentially meaning-
less because resources and rewards were allocated according to production levels 
rather than profi t, competitive markets virtually were non-existent, and polluters 
were insulated from price stimulation by endemic soft budget constraints stem-
ming from the Party/state’s regulatory confl ict of interest. Using prices to control 
pollution in Poland’s socialist economy was something like using water to control 
an electrical fi re.
Poland’s systemic transformation to an economy based on private property 
and free markets, while still incomplete, has already substantially ameliorated 
this problem. The government’s regulatory confl ict of interest has been reduced. 
As previously noted, in 1995 private fi rms contributed 56 percent of Poland’s 
gross national product, produced 38 percent of industrial output and accounted 
for 60 percent of national employment (Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1995). Bud-
get constraints throughout this growing private economy are substantially hard. 
Private fi rms in post-Communist Poland operate in competitive markets, where 
performance determines survival. They naturally are inclined to limit the costs 
arising from ineffi cient production as well as regulatory costs. Under the circum-
stances, pollution charges can be expected to induce changes in production and 
pollution patterns, assuming fees are set at levels that alter fi rms’ marginal cost 
calculus. In Poland’s case at least, that assumption is warranted. According to 
a recent study, emissions charges for dusts and effl uent charges for sewage in 
nine industrial sectors of the Polish economy now approximate or exceed aver-
age abatement costs (Poskrobko and Cygler 1993, 200–1).13 As Tables 7.2 and 
7.3 disclose, it is now cheaper for fi rms in those sectors to reduce pollution emis-
sions than to pay the fi nes.14 And in a policy that proves Poland’s environmen-
tal charges are not intended simply as a source of revenues for the government, 
environmental penalties may be suspended for polluters who pledge to invest in 
environmental protection equipment or process changes within fi ve years. If they 
keep their pledge, the penalty is extinguished; if not, the penalty is doubled (see 
Rzeczpospolita, Feb. 17, 1995).
Regulated fi rms in Poland increasingly are fi nding that environmental invest-
ments can pay dividends. For example, a pharmaceutical plant near Warsaw 
recently invested 60 million (old) zlotys to reduce its ammonia use by more than 
half; this one process change increased annual net profi ts by about 300 million 
(old) zlotys (The Warsaw Voice, Jan. 8, 1995).15 A coke-chemical complex near 
Zabrze implemented a change in its coking gas process at a cost of 3.5 billion (old) 
zlotys; this investment is expected to pay for itself in energy savings over 10 years 
(The Warsaw Voice, Jan. 8, 1995). And engineers from the Electro-Mechanical 
Factory in Leszno designed a method for reducing waste by-products from chro-
mate treatment; the new method costs 36.5 million (old) zlotys to implement, but 
its pay-back period is only 2.1 months (The Warsaw Voice, Jan. 8, 1995). It is worth 
stressing that these are voluntary process changes designed to improve profi tability 
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by, among other means, reducing production costs and exposure to environmental 
liability; they were not mandated by the State Environmental Protection Inspec-
torate or any other government agency. Most importantly, they indicate that price 
stimuli (under the 1980 EDPA) are internalizing production costs in Poland’s new 
market economy by inducing fi rms to alter their production habits voluntarily. 
The same phenomenon has been observed to a more limited extent in agricul-
ture. Although that sector enjoys softer budget constraints than the rest of Poland’s 
private economy, many agricultural subsidies have been slashed or abolished. For 
instance, the Polish government no longer underwrites fertilizer and pesticide 
Table 7.2. General structure of expenses for environmental protection in 
nine sectors of the Polish economy, 1990 and 1991 (%)
Type of cost 1990 1991
Abatement costsa 62.2 38.7
Ecological chargesb 37.8 61.3
a. Includes all environmental protection costs not associated with pollution charges, 
including the costs of installing, running and maintaining pollution control equipment.
b. Including environmental fees and fi nes under the 1980 EPDA, as amended.
Source: Poskrobko and Cygler (1993, 200, table 1).
Table 7.3. Percentage cost increases for environmental protection in nine 
Polish industries from 1990 (mean values) to the fi rst term of 1991
Industry
Abatement 
costsa
Ecological 
charges
Remaining 
environmental 
protection costs
Total costs of 
environmental 
protection
Fuels–mining 152.0 612.0 207.6 342.4
Power 160.7 942.8 633.3 516.8
Metallurgy 140.5 453.8 151.1 258.5
Electrical–metal 171.4 329.0 157.0 215.5
Chemical 199.6 331.0 236.0 275.4
Mineral 169.6 405.9 165.3 223.6
Wood–paper 196.8 420.5 177.3 315.9
Light industry 167.4 428.0 180.4 332.7
Food processing 142.0 268.8 100.0 243.4
a. Includes all costs associated with reducing pollution emissions. 
Source: Poskrobko and Cygler (1993, 201, table 2).
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use (see Brocka-Pałacz 1994, 58). As a result, between 1988 and 1993, farmers 
reduced their (over)use of general (NPK) and calcium-based inorganic fertilizers 
by 63 and 32 percent, respectively; pesticide use fell by 66 percent(calculated 
from GUS 1995, 54, tables 18 and 19; 1990, 14, tables 17 and 18). This entails 
obvious benefi ts for the environment (especially surface water quality) and public 
health, so long as it does not result in food shortages.16 
As we might predict, budget constraints remain softer for enterprises still 
owned by the state, but they are harder than they used to be. State-owned enter-
prises that used to avoid environmental fees and fi nes with ease are now being 
forced to pay up. From 1990 to 1991, government revenues from pollution and 
resource-use charges increased by a factor of 13 (Manser 1993, 117). By 1993, 
Poland’s various environmental funds were ‘annually collecting and spending 
15–20 times more in real terms than in 1990’ (Wajda 1993, 19; but see PAP News 
Wire,  Apr. 7, 1994). As a consequence, even the largest, most heavily subsidized 
state-owned enterprises have become relatively cost conscious (at least as com-
pared with the 1980s). Consider, for example, Poland’s energy industry. In a 
recent World Bank-sponsored study of the effects of environmental charges on 
that industry (Czaja et al. 1994, 47), economists from the Oskar Lange Academy 
of Economics in Wrocław found that increased fees have ‘caused’ pollution reduc-
tions and increased conservation efforts. The data provided in Table 7.4 show that 
between 1989 and 1991, Polish power plants signifi cantly reduced the pollution 
intensity of their activities, reducing per unit emissions by 20 percent on average. 
These improvements cannot be explained by economic recession because they are 
not tied to production levels. Rather, the researchers concluded that the reductions 
were due to the heightened cost consciousness of power plant managers result-
ing from increased emissions charges, higher per unit energy costs, and hardened 
budget constraints.
So, as Stanisław Wajda and Jerzy Sommer (1994, 190) have concluded, 
Poland’s environmental fees and fi nes have fi nally become ‘what they should 
be—a heavy burden for polluters.’ Further proof of this comes from the political 
battle that took place in 1992, when the Polish government announced dramatic 
fee increases for air pollution emissions (1991 Dz. U. No. 125, item 558) (those 
Table 7.4. Pollution intensity of electricity generation in Poland, 1989–91 
(tons/GWh)
Air pollutant 1989 1990 1991
SO2 15.1 12.6 12.0
NOx 3.5 3.0 3.2
Dusts 5.5 4.6 3.8
Source: Fiedor et al. (1993, 94, table 15).
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changes are shown in Table 7.5). Affected enterprises—mostly state-owned 
 dinosaurs—exerted their residual political muscle to roll back the charges, and 
in late 1992 the government caved in to their demands, slashing pollution fees by 
up to 90 percent (1992 Dz. U. No. 79, item 400; also see Polish News Bulletin, 
Nov. 19, 1992). Fortunately that was not the end of the story. Polish environmen-
talists predictably were outraged. Their protests were joined by private fi rms and, 
most surprisingly, a few state-owned enterprises (such as the Jaworzno III power 
plant) that had already invested heavily in environmental improvements—the fee 
reductions greatly devalued their investments while rewarding enterprises that 
had done nothing to reduce pollution (see Zechenter 1993, 121). Together, this 
collection of strange bedfellows persuaded the government to reverse its decision 
and reinstate the higher fees (as shown in Table 7.5) (1993 Dz. U. No. 9, item 
44; also see Polish News Bulletin, Jan. 27, 1993; Reuter Textline/ Rzeczpospolita, 
Feb. 1, 1993). The fact that this fi ght took place at all, let alone its outcome 
(with the environmental side prevailing), indicates how much budget constraints 
have hardened since 1989, at least for many economic actors. And those hard-
ened budget constraints have, among other benefi ts, splintered previously unifi ed 
industrial interests. 
Besides higher fees, polluters are also subject to higher fi nes for violating 
environmental standards. The data in Table 7.6 show that between 1990 and 
1993, the collection of non-compliance fi nes in Poland increased by a factor of 
12, despite an equally dramatic decline in the ratio of collected to assessed pen-
alties during the same period. The majority of uncollected fi nes are owed by the 
fi nancially strapped (state-owned) mining sector which in 1991 alone racked up 
environmental penalties amounting to 4 trillion zlotys (approximately US$300 
million) (see PAP News Wire, Apr. 7, 1994; Polish News Bulletin, June 14, 1993). 
Table 7.5. Changes in emissions fees for selected air pollutants (zlotys/kga 
and approximate US$ values)
Date of imposition Lead Sulphur dioxide Benzene Fluorine
Jan. 1, 1991 36,000
($3.79)
680
($0.07)
1,800
($0.19)
3,600
($0.38)
Jan. 1, 1992 500,000
($38.46)
1,100
($0.08)
1,000,000
($76.92)
3,000
($0.23)
Oct. 1992 (retroactive 
to Jan. 1, 1992)
50,000
($3.85)
770
($0.05)
100,000
($7.69)
2,100
($0.16)
Jan. 1, 1993 500,000
($31.25)
1,100
($0.07)
1,000,000
($62.50)
3,000
($0.19)
a. Prices are denominated in old zlotys.
Source: Manser (1993, 94, table 5.6).
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The Ministry of Industry, under pressure from mining concerns, attempted to have 
the charges rescinded, but the Ministry of Environmental Protection refused (Pol-
ish News Bulletin, June 14, 1993). The charges have become debts owed by the 
mines to the Polish government. However, a current plan for restructuring the 
mining industry calls for a substantial reduction in accumulated debts, including 
unpaid environmental charges (Polish News Bulletin, Apr. 4, 1995). This refl ects 
the continuing impetus to soften budget constraints for state-owned enterprises. 
But the mining industry’s compliance problems also refl ect a legitimate policy 
dilemma. Regardless of the level of environmental charges, polluters can be 
expected to improve their environmental performance only if they possess suffi -
cient capital to invest in pollution-control equipment or process changes. Poland’s 
mining industry apparently lacks the capital either to abate emissions or to pay 
environmental charges. Under the circumstances, the state has only three options: 
(1) close down the industry, (2) soften its budget constraints (i.e., forgive the envi-
ronmental fees and fi nes) so that the industry can continue operating at existing 
(unlawful) pollution levels, or (3) subsidize environmental improvements at the 
mines. The fi rst option is unthinkable, and the second just barely thinkable. Only 
the third option seems a realistic alternative.
Environmental Liability and Privatization: Work in Progress
While hardened budget constraints throughout most of Poland’s economy have 
facilitated improved environmental protection, privatization of Poland’s mam-
moth, pollution-belching state enterprises has proceeded at a snail’s pace, plagued 
by fi nancial scandals and political/ideological debates over the state’s proper role 
in the economy. As of December 1994, only 36 percent of the more than 8,000 
state-owned enterprises in Poland had been privatized or were in the process of 
privatization (see United States General Accounting Offi ce 1995, 46–59).17 Para-
doxically, many ‘privatized’ fi rms in Poland are not privately owned. One privati-
zation track in Poland is called ‘commercialization.’ Commercialized enterprises 
Table 7.6. Environmental fi nes, 1990–3
 Collected fi nes
(billion zlotys) Percentage of assessed but uncollected fi nes
1990 17.9 32
1991 95.0 59
1992 140.7 78
1993 215.4 84
Source: GUS (1995, 379, table 21). 
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are subject, like private companies, to Poland’s Commercial Code, but they 
remain wholly owned by the State Treasury. In other words, enterprises privatized 
on the commercialization track are really not privatized at all (see Polish News 
Bulletin, Aug. 26, 1994). More than 500 state-owned enterprises have been sub-
ject to this form of ersatz privatization. It is the preferred approach of the current 
Polish government, which is comprised of former Communist Party members and 
their Peasant Party allies. A large-scale Mass Privatization Program, which was 
initially planned in 1991, did not get off the ground until the middle of 1995; and 
even after its implementation some 5,000 enterprises remain owned by the state 
(see Polish News Bulletin, Aug. 26, 1994).
Environmental issues arise frequently in the process of privatization; many 
industrial sites in Poland are contaminated, and most industrial enterprises are 
heavy polluters. However, when privatization fi rst began, the Polish government 
had no policy for dealing with environmental issues, including allocating liabil-
ity for past contamination. The Privatization Ministry initially addressed envi-
ronmental protection issues only when potential Western buyers raised them, 
and then on an ad hoc basis. Scholars and environmentalists (among others, 
 Kruszewska 1993; Stodulski and Starczewska 1993; Bell and Kołaja 1993) criti-
cized this approach and called for the institution of regular procedures for con-
ducting environmental audits and allocating liabilities. In fact, the Privatization 
Ministry had (and still has) no legal authority to conduct environmental audits 
or allocate environmental liabilities (see 1990 Dz. U. No. 51, item 298). Since 
1992, however, a process for introducing environmental considerations into the 
privatization process has been evolving within the Polish administration. In May 
of that year, the Privatization Ministry and the Environmental Protection Ministry 
established an Interministerial Environment Unit (IEU) responsible for develop-
ing policies and procedures for resolving environmental issues in privatization 
(Porozumienie między Ministrem Ochrony Środowiska, Zasobów Naturalnych 
i Leśnictwa a Ministrem Przekształceń Własnościowych w sprawie powołania 
międzyresortowego zespołu do spraw uwzględnienia zagadnień ekologicznych i 
usprawnienia procesów własnościowych, 1992; also see East European Business 
Law, May 19, 1992). Since its inception, the IEU has had a substantial positive 
impact on the resolution of environmental issues arising in privatization transac-
tions. According to Susan Cummings (1994, 605–8), an American attorney who 
has worked for Poland’s Privatization Ministry and served on the Interministerial 
Environment Unit, the IEU has improved communications between the Privatiza-
tion Ministry and the Environmental Protection Ministry, developed a consistent 
policy with respect to environmental issues in privatization, and introduced inno-
vative procedures for resolving those issues (including the creation of contractual 
clauses providing for conditional indemnifi cation from liability and cost-sharing 
between investor and state). In addition, the IEU has helped to educate the Priva-
tization Ministry on environmental issues, increasing its awareness and ability to 
account (economically) for environmental problems in privatization transactions.
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Despite these process improvements, we might argue that the Polish govern-
ment should have foreseen the environmental implications of privatization at the 
outset of the systemic transition; certainly some issues and controversies might 
have been avoided. But it is important to bear in mind that there was no preex-
isting blueprint for Poland’s political-economic transformation; no country ever 
before has attempted such a broad privatization of the means of production. We 
should not be surprised or overly dismayed by the Polish government’s failure 
to foresee every issue, no matter how signifi cant. It is more important that the 
government has recognized and responded effectively to problems as they have 
arisen; that is how the reform process evolves and progresses. The Polish govern-
ment’s response to environmental protection concerns in privatization has been 
pragmatic. Some environmentalists would prefer a more radical approach. Roger 
Manser (1993, 105), for one, has called for the imposition of retroactive environ-
mental liability on investors purchasing state properties, noting correctly that this 
is the law in many Central and East European countries. Indeed, under Poland’s 
1990 Privatization Act, the privatized fi rm assumes all of the rights, duties and 
liabilities, including environmental liabilities, of the state-owned enterprise (1990 
Dz. U. No. 51, item 298, art. 8, sec. 2). However, neither the privatization law 
nor any other statute expressly prohibits the alienation or contractual allocation 
of environmental liabilities. Therefore, they probably fall within the general free-
dom of contract provision of Poland’s 1964 Civil Code (1964 Dz. U. No. 16, 
item 93, art. 72; also see Wajda and Sommer 1994, 180). In any case, negotiat-
ing environmental liabilities has become an accepted practice in Poland, and that 
certainly is the best policy. A contrary rule that would automatically and irrevo-
cably impose retroactive environmental liability on buyers in privatization would 
be unfair and ineffi cient. Such a rule would have made sense under socialism, 
when enterprises literally were administrative agencies, and ‘ownership’ transfers 
constituted little more than administrative reforms; in every case, the ‘buyers’ 
and ‘sellers’ were both agents of the same principal, the Party/state. However, 
in Poland’s new  political-economic system, buyers in privatization often have 
no ties to the previous ‘owners’ who caused the contamination, and so it would 
be substantially unjust to impose liability on them (see Boyd 1994, 65). More 
than unjust, it would be pointless. The practical effect would be to discourage 
potential buyers of state-owned properties (especially in cases where the envi-
ronmental liabilities approximate or exceed total enterprise assets). So the entire 
privatization process would simply grind to a halt. That would be disastrous for 
environmental protection in Poland, where private fi rms, subject to hard budget 
constraints, are leading the environmental and economic recovery. Indeed, the 
analysis in Chapter 5 suggests that the greatest threat to continuing environmental 
improvements in Poland may be the perpetuation of large and ineffi cient state-
owned enterprises, subject to governmental confl icts of interest and soft budget 
constraints (see Czaja et al. 1994, 42, asserting that the acceleration of privatiza-
tion in the electric power industry should contribute to environmental protection). 
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This has important implications for ‘commercialization’ and other forms of ersatz 
privatization that would maintain state ownership and control indefi nitely.
Improved Environmental Law Enforcement in Post-Communist Poland
In the fi rst part of the transition period (from 1990 to 1992), Poland’s parliament 
was quite active in the fi eld of environmental protection. In addition to amend-
ing Poland’s 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act, it enacted 
and amended a number of other important environment-related statutes. In 1991 
alone, the Sejm enacted a new preservation-oriented nature protection law (1991 
Dz. U. No. 114, item 492),18 a maritime administration law with oil spill preven-
tion and clean-up provisions (1991 Dz. U. No. 16, item 73), amendments to the 
forest protection law that mandated ecologically sustainable forest management 
(1991 Dz. U. No. 101, item 444), and new enabling legislation for the State Envi-
ronmental Protection Inspectorate (1991 Dz. U. No. 77, item 335).19 The Inspec-
torate law, in particular, has had a momentous impact on environmental protection 
in post-Communist Poland. It was designed to improve environmental monitoring 
and law enforcement, long considered the weakest links in Poland’s environmen-
tal protection regime (see Jendrośka 1992, 533; 1993a, 351), by increasing the 
authority and independence of the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate.
Prior to 1991, the Inspectorate was a small and almost powerless agency 
attached to the Environmental Protection Ministry. Its 400 poorly paid, poorly 
equipped and poorly trained employees were charged with monitoring environ-
mental compliance at some 43,000 polluting enterprises nationwide. But they had 
almost no power actually to enforce the law against violators. As Jerzy Jendrośka 
(1993a, 352) has written, the Inspectorate was an environmental ‘watchdog 
without teeth.’ But then the 1991 Law on the State Environmental Protection 
Inspectorate gave that watchdog sharp new dentures. The new law empowered 
the Inspectorate to impose non-compliance fi nes, shut down dangerous pollut-
ers and ban the import or sale of environmentally harmful raw materials, fuels, 
machinery and technologies. Inspectors can impose environmental mitigation 
measures on new plants, which cannot begin operations until they are certifi ed 
in compliance. And the Inspectorate now exercises oversight authority over all 
environmental monitoring in Poland; it sets the standards for all other monitor-
ing agencies and laboratories. Consequently, monitoring procedures that used 
to be haphazard have become consistent. The Inspectorate operates a national 
database for environmental information collected by regional monitoring agen-
cies and laboratories; and it serves as a clearinghouse providing environmental 
information to other government agencies, non-governmental organizations and 
the public. Finally, the 1991 law ensured improved funding and staffi ng so that 
the Inspectorate could carry out its new and expanded responsibilities. Today, 
the agency employs 3,000 environmental inspectors operating out of 50 offi ces 
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(including the Warsaw headquarters and a branch offi ce in each of Poland’s 49 
wojewódstwa [administrative regions]).20 
The increased power of the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate has 
led directly to improved environmental monitoring, compliance and enforcement 
in Poland since 1991. For example, among the near-term priorities of the Envi-
ronmental Ministry’s National Environmental Policy (1991) was to reduce emis-
sions from Poland’s 80 largest polluters, which collectively were responsible for 
an estimated 80 percent of all industrial pollution (see Rzeczpospolita, Feb. 17, 
1995). Pursuant to that program, by 1993 the Inspectorate had issued more than 
3,000 decyzji requiring polluters on the ‘list of 80’ to install pollution-control 
equipment; it completely shut down 7 plants; it closed parts of 25 plants, and it 
temporarily halted production at 22 others. These actions have resulted in sub-
stantial pollution reductions. According to information from the Chief Inspec-
tor’s offi ce, dust emissions from cement plants on the list declined by 60 percent; 
lead and copper emissions from foundries on the list fell by 60 and 32 percent, 
respectively; and carbon dioxide emissions from listed power plants decreased 
by 40 percent (see Bureau of National Affairs, International Environment Daily, 
May 28, 1993). By 1995,, the volume of wastewater effl uent discharged by listed 
factories had declined by about 37 percent, and toxic waste by about 42 percent 
(Rzeczpospolita, Feb. 17, 1995). These signifi cant pollution reductions are not 
temporary by-products of economic recession but the direct effects of deliber-
ate environmental law enforcement activities. As of 1995, 14 plants had been 
removed from the original list of 80—3 of them had gone out of business, while 
the other 11 had reduced their pollution emissions to such an extent that they no 
longer qualifi ed for the ‘list of disgrace’ (Rzeczpospolita, Feb. 17, 1995). 
The greatest testament to the increased power and effectiveness of the State 
Environmental Protection Inspectorate comes from those who now seek to dis-
mantle it. In a recent meeting with central administrators, regional (voivodship) 
authorities and city ‘presidents,’ acting on behalf of their own provincial eco-
nomic interests, called for the abolition of the Inspectorate (see Biuletyn Niecodzi-
enny BORE, May 31, 1995). This seems unlikely to happen, but the point is that 
no one would bother with the Inspectorate were it not having a signifi cant impact. 
Of course, the Inspectorate would not be having a signifi cant impact, regard-
less of its increased statutory authority, were it not for systemic reforms, most 
notably the institution of a constitutional Rechtstaat (literally ‘law state’) in 
Poland. As we saw in Chapter 4, during the socialist era, environmental statutes, 
like all laws, were mere policy instruments that the Party/state simply disregarded 
(under the vacuous constitutional doctrine of ‘socialist democracy’) whenever 
they proved inconvenient. That no longer is the case. There has been a profound 
change in Poland’s legal culture that has received far too little attention. 
One good example of how much the legal culture has changed is the fi ght 
over environmental protection equipment at Warsaw’s Okęcie II airport. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 4 (§4.2), in the mid-1980s (before the fall of communism) War-
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saw city offi cials entered into an agreement with a West German-led consortium 
to build a new international airport. The 1980 EPDA required the airport, as a new 
development project, to install all environmental protection equipment deemed 
necessary by the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate. Inspectors ordered 
the airport to install sewage treatment and incineration plants, noise monitors and 
acoustic barriers. However, in an agreement that typifi ed the status of law under 
Communism, Warsaw city offi cials summarily waived the environmental rules. 
This was done behind closed doors, without any public comment. And, of course, 
at that time, the Inspectorate had no independent authority to enforce compliance 
with its own orders. So Okęcie II was built without the required environmental 
installations. However, by the time the new airport was ready to open in 1992, the 
 political-economic system had changed; the law was no longer subordinate to pol-
itics and the airport’s non-compliance with environmental requirements was head-
line news all over Poland (see The Warsaw Voice, July 5, 1992; Super Express, 
June 29, 1992; Gazeta Wyborcza, June 29, 1992). The regional environmental 
protection inspector from Warsaw threatened to prevent the airport from opening 
(see Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 25, 1992). The Chief Inspector ultimately decided 
that the airport could open, but only if the airport authorities agreed to retrofi t all 
of the originally required environmental protection equipment within 18 months 
(see Reuter Textline/Rzeczpospolita, June 29, 1992). His decision was later rati-
fi ed in the High Administrative Court (see PAP News Wire, May 21, 1993). Thus, 
the law was substantially (if imperfectly) enforced. The story of Okęcie II shows 
that the law in post-Communist Poland is becoming a real source of social con-
trol; politicians, administrators and managers can no longer simply ignore it.
Investing in Environmental Protection 
Environmental spending in Poland has increased greatly since 1989, primarily 
because of increased collections of environmental fees and fi nes. Table 7.7 shows 
that Poland’s rate of investment in environmental protection throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s closely tracked the performance of the economy. As we saw in Chapter 
5 (§5.2), when Poland’s economy stagnated or declined (as it did through much of 
the 1980s), environmental projects always were among the fi rst budget items cut. 
Socioeconomic planners considered them expendable luxuries, and most Polish 
citizens agreed that in tough times the country could not afford expensive envi-
ronmental protection. To the end of Poland’s socialist ‘experiment,’ environmen-
tal protection investments never even approached 1 percent of GNP. 
As the data in Table 7.7 show, within two years after the fi rst Solidarity gov-
ernment took power, Poland’s environmental protection budget doubled. In 1991, 
Poland spent 1.1 percent of GNP on environmental protection. This marked the 
fi rst time that Poland ever ‘reached a relative level of environmental investment 
effort commensurate with what is spent per unit of GDP in the OECD countries’ 
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(Żylicz 1994a, 98). And it was an especially remarkable achievement considering 
Poland’s deep economic recession—in most countries, during periods of declin-
ing (real) per capita income, expenditures on ‘quality of life’ concerns such as 
environmental protection remain stagnant or fall (see Cole 1995c, 298–9). Poland 
managed to increase environmental investments despite the economic recession 
by legally divorcing collected environmental charges from general budget rev-
enues; environmental fees and fi nes were earmarked for environmental purposes 
only (see Jendrośka 1996b). 
Poland’s increased environmental protection budget provided direct fund-
ing for badly needed environmental improvements, especially sewage treatment 
Table 7.7. Economic growth and environm ental investments in Poland, 
1976–93
Economic growth
rate (%)
 Environmental investments
As % of GNP As % of total investment
1976 4.1 0.40 1.2
1977 2.8 0.45 1.4
1978 3.7 0.38 1.3
1979 –1.9 0.35 1.2
1980 –2.6 0.28 1.0
1981 –5.3 0.20 1.2
1982 –0.6 0.25 1.4
1983 4.6 0.40 2.2
1984 3.4 0.50 2.5
1985 1.1 0.54 2.8
1986 2.8 0.74 2.9
1987 –2.4 0.80 3.5
1988 1.6 0.80 3.5
1989 –1.0 0.80 2.9
1990 –11.6 0.70 3.7
1991 –7.0 1.10 5.4
1992 1.9 1.30 6.5
1993 4.0 1.30 6.4
Sources: Economic growth rates, 1976–87—Fallenbuchl (1989, 103, table 1); 1988–93, 
Bossak (1994, 34, table 3); environmental investment rates—GUS, Ochrona Środowiska 
(various years).
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plants. In 1989, 44 percent of Poland’s cities—including its two largest, War-
saw and Łódź, with a combined population of 2.5 million—were without opera-
tional sewage treatment facilities; fully 100 percent of their municipal wastes was 
dumped completely untreated into surface waters. Between 1989 and 1991, 866 
new sewage treatment plants were put into operation, increasing daily national 
treatment capacity by 2,467,000 cubic meters (Żylicz 1994a, 100, table 4). As a 
result, the amount of treated waste increased from 62 to 70 percent in the four-
year period from 1988 to 1991. Meanwhile, the amount of municipal and indus-
trial wastewater requiring treatment decreased by 700 million tons (Żylicz 1994a, 
101, table 6). In nominal terms, this meant that Poland dumped 130 million fewer 
tons of untreated sewage into surface waters in 1991 than in 1988. As more waste-
water treatment plants come on line, further improvements are expected. In 1993, 
341 more sewage treatment plants were completed (Polish News Bulletin, Sept. 
1, 1994), and hundreds more plants currently are under construction throughout 
Poland (PAP News Wire, Feb. 22, 1994). In addition to sewage treatment plants, 
funds from the environmental protection budget also have been used to install 
advanced pollution-control technologies at Poland’s two biggest air polluters, the 
Belchatów and Turów coal-fi red power plants. As a result of these investments, 
sulphur dioxide emissions from the two plants will be cut by 90 percent (The War-
saw Voice, Oct. 3, 1993). 
Environmental investments have increased at the local and regional levels of 
administration as well. Each region gets to keep 60 percent of the environmental 
fees and fi nes it collects for local environmental improvements (see Miłaszewski 
1993, 118). And these funds are being put to good use. For instance, in 1995, 
Wrocław (Poland’s fourth-largest city, with a population of half a million) mod-
ernized its 25 district heating boiler houses, cutting their aggregate air pollution 
emissions in half (Reuter Textline/Rzeczpospolita, Jan. 31, 1996).
In addition, Poland’s environmental protection budget now supports several 
independent fi nancial institutions for public and private environmental projects, 
including the National Fund for Environmental Protection (supported by collected 
environmental charges), the Eco-Fund (supported by a debt-for-nature swap 
arrangement with Poland’s sovereign ‘Paris Club’ creditors), and an Environmen-
tal Protection Bank (Bank Ochrony Środowiska) that provides low-interest loans 
for environmental improvement projects. At their founding, each of these institu-
tions was unique, the fi rst of its kind in the world. 
Poland’s parliament created the National Fund for Environmental Protec-
tion (National Fund) in articles 87 and 88 of the 1980 Environmental Protection 
and Development Act (EPDA) (1980 Dz. U. No. 3, item 6). The Fund receives 
40 percent of collected environmental fees and fi nes, which it invests in public 
environmental projects. In 1992, it invested a total of 12 trillion zlotys (about 
US$880 million), accounting for 40 percent of all environmental investments in 
Poland (Rzeczpospolita, July 13, 1993; also see Polish News Bulletin, July 13, 
1993). Among its various investments, the National Fund has fi nanced projects 
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near Nowy Targ and Pyrzyce to tap geothermal water deposits ‘large enough 
to heat a third of the country;’ and the Fund is currently fi nancing the produc-
tion of unleaded gasoline at the Gdańsk petrochemical enterprise (The Warsaw 
Voice, Jan. 29. 1995). The National Fund is widely viewed as ‘the most innova-
tive environmental fi nancing program in Europe.’ Indeed, when a delegation of 
Chinese offi cials recently traveled to the United States to learn more about fund-
ing environmental protection, American offi cials from the Export–Import Bank 
recommended that they study Poland’s National Environmental Protection Fund 
(Warsaw Business Journal, Jan. 19, 1996).
A separate Eco-Fund (Eko-Fundusz) was established in 1991, pursuant to 
Poland’s debt reduction agreement with the Paris Club of sovereign creditors. 
At the time, Poland owed the Club’s 17 member countries approximately US$32 
billion, and the debt reduction agreement signed in April 1991 called for a net 
debt reduction of 50 percent. On top of that agreement, Poland’s then-Prime Min-
ister Jan Krzystof Bielecki proposed a long-term debt-for-nature swap: if Paris 
Club members would forgive an additional 10 percent of Poland’s debt, the Polish 
government would devote proportionate resources to an internationally managed 
Eco-Fund that would fi nance internationally signifi cant environmental projects, 
such as projects to protect the Baltic Sea, preserve biological diversity and reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases and other transboundary air pollutants. This deal, 
if fully adopted, could yield an additional US$3 billion for environmental projects 
in Poland over 18 years, while signifi cantly reducing Poland’s foreign debt. So 
far, however, only the United States, Switzerland, France and Italy have agreed to 
participate in the Eco-Fund, bringing its total base operating budget to approxi-
mately US$450 million. In its fi rst year of operation, the Eco-Fund contributed 
145 billion zlotys or about 6.5 million 1993 USD to 18 projects, including sewage 
treatment plants, air pollution control equipment, forest preservation and national 
parks (The Warsaw Voice, July 18, 1993; Polish News Bulletin, June 18, 1993).
Poland’s Environmental Protection Bank is the fi rst commercial bank in the 
world established for the sole purpose of supporting environmentally sound proj-
ects. The idea originated in the 1989 ‘Round Table’ agreements, and the bank was 
chartered by parliamentary amendment to the 1980 EPDA. The bank’s founder, 
organizer and main shareholder is the National Fund for Environmental Protec-
tion, which earmarks a percentage of its earnings from collected environmen-
tal fees and fi nes to subsidize the bank’s low-interest loans. Loans provided by 
the bank have been used to build sewage treatment plants (e.g., near Warsa w, 
 Bydgoszcz and Płock) and to convert factories from electric to natural gas heat-
ing (see The Warsaw Voice, Jan. 24, 1993). Most impressively, the Environmental 
Protection Bank happens to be one of the most secure fi nancial institutions in 
Poland today. In 1992, it earned a gross profi t of 85 billion zlotys (over 6 mil-
lion 1992 USD), and ranked third in capital holdings among Poland’s private and 
cooperative banks (The Warsaw Voice, Feb. 21, 1993, Sept. 13, 1992). It now has 
10 branch offi ces throughout Poland.
Environmental Protection in Transition 201
Competition and Technological Innovation in the New Buyers’ Markets
Poland’s market reforms have provided long-awaited outlets for pent-up con-
sumer demand. As we saw earlier in this chapter, between 1989 and 1992 (i.e., 
during Poland’s deep economic recession), consumer sales increased by 5.8 per-
cent (after adjusting for infl ation); the number of cars on Polish roads increased 
dramatically, and demand for gasoline remained constant despite steeply rising 
prices. By 1992, Poland had more television sets per 1,000 inhabitants than Italy, 
Portugal, Ireland or Greece (Polish News Bulletin, June 22, 1993). 
For Poland’s environmentalists, this evidence of burgeoning consumerism 
is cause for grave concern. Some of that concern is legitimate; consumerism can 
generate great ecological stress. But it is not an unmitigated environmental evil. 
Indeed, consumerism is bringing tangible environmental benefi ts for Poland. Spe-
cifi cally, it is driving Poland’s economy away from more highly polluting heavy 
industrial production to the production of consumer goods and services; and that 
shift is reducing the total level of environmental stress produced by Poland’s 
economy.
It is an axiom of market economics that consumer preferences drive produc-
tion patterns. As consumers specify preferences for goods and services, produc-
tion shifts away from more environmentally stressful heavy industrial production 
(Radetzki 1990, 26). This trend is evident in post-Communist Poland. According 
to the World Economy Research Institute at Warsaw University (Brocka-Pałacz 
1994, 53–4), the 7 percent rise in industrial output Poland experienced in 1993 
was ‘chiefl y a matter of consumer demand.’ Retail sales that year increased by 11 
percent in real terms. The lion’s share of the growth was in the manufacturing, 
light industry and food-processing sectors. By contrast, output was stagnant in 
metallurgy and actually declined in the mining and energy sectors. It is also inter-
esting to note that virtually all of the growth in industrial production was recorded 
in Poland’s private economy. In 1993, private sector GDP grew by a whopping 13 
percent, whereas public sector GDP declined by 4.1 percent; in value terms, the 
private economy grew by 39 percent, while the public economy fell by 6 percent 
(United States General Accounting Offi ce 1995, 47, 128). There is no doubt that 
these consumer-driven changes away from heavy industrial production are good 
news for Poland’s natural environment. 
Consumerism also spurs environmentally benefi cial technological innova-
tion, as the fi ght for shares of competitive markets impels fi rms to improve qual-
ity and reduce costs by, among other means, increasing factor productivity (the 
productive output from each input unit of labor, capital and natural resources). 
The result is greater conservation of resources in production. As we saw in 
Chapter 5, this phenomenon, which has been observed in virtually all advanced 
capitalist economies, did not occur in Marxist socialist economies because they 
lacked competitive markets, scarcity pricing for resource inputs (other than labor) 
and adequate intellectual property rights (see generally Cole 1995c). In post- 
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Communist Poland, aggregate effi ciency indices have been improving steadily 
thanks largely to higher resource prices, hardened budget (and law) constraints, 
the institution of competitive markets, and the profi t motive. Between 1992 and 
1994, the labor intensity of Polish GDP declined by 5 percent; the capital inten-
sity of GDP fell by 6.7 percent; and, most importantly for environmental protec-
tion, the energy intensity of GDP dropped by 13.6 percent (Polish News Bulletin, 
May 16, 1995). 
As we learned in Chapter 5 (§5.4), the former Soviet bloc countries lagged 
decades behind the West in technological development, including for environ-
mental protection (see, among others, Peterson 1993, 47). For example, Polish 
environmental protection inspectors used to rely on hand-held ambient air qual-
ity monitors that were not uniformly calibrated (see Nowicki 1992, 211); they 
were vastly inferior to Western monitoring equipment. Today, Poland is bridging 
the technology gap with foreign technology transfers and domestic innovations. 
Poland’s environmental inspectors now utilize monitoring and laboratory equip-
ment that meets European Union standards (The Warsaw Voice, May 1, 1994). 
And it is not too wild an exaggeration to say that, in the past half-decade, Pol-
ish scientists have come up with almost as many technological innovations for 
environmental protection—including new coal cleaning technologies (see The 
Warsaw Voice, Nov. 21, 1993), a new alcohol-based gasoline (see Polish News 
Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1994), and a new nuclear-based emissions reduction technology 
(see Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 31, 1993)21—as in 40-plus years of (real exist-
ing) socialism. These and other technological improvements are contributing to 
increased factor productivity in post-Communist Poland. 
International Cooperation for Sustainable Development 
In February 1995, the Constitutional Commission of Poland’s Parliament 
approved language for article 5 of a new (yet to be adopted) constitution:
The Republic of Poland safeguards the independence and inviolability of its ter-
ritory, guarantees the human rights and liberties, ensures the security of its citi-
zens, safeguards the national heritage, and ensures the protection of the natural 
environment guided by the principle of sustainable development. (Quoted in Pol-
ish News Bulletin, Feb. 9, 1995)
This provision is consistent with the Environmental Protection Ministry’s 
National Environmental Policy (1991), which established the goal of achieving 
sustainable development throughout the Polish economy within 30 years. The 
concept of sustainable development is famously fuzzy; no one is quite sure what 
level or mode of development (if any) is sustainable. This serves to make the 
phrase ‘sustainable development’ a convenient reference point for empty politi-
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cal rhetoric.22 But the Polish government, at least, has backed up its rhetoric with 
some meaningful actions.
Poland has been active in pursuing international arrangements to promote 
sustainable development. It has established ‘euro-regions’ along its borders with 
Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Belarus, where joint environmen-
tal protection and conservation projects are planned (see, e.g., BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, Nov. 2, 1993; The Warsaw Voice, Apr. 4, 1993; PAP News 
Wire, Aug. 20, 1993). In April 1994, Poland and Germany signed an environmen-
tal treaty that, among other things, provides for joint monitoring, collaboration in 
environmental investigations, and information exchanges in the border regions. 
Most signifi cantly, the treaty gives Polish citizens the right to participate in public 
hearings concerning proposed developments and environmental projects on the 
German side of the border (The Week in Germany, Apr. 22, 1994). The Polish gov-
ernment also has initiated what is being called ‘the greatest cooperation project in 
environmental protection’ in all of Europe (PAP News Wire, Feb. 11, 1993): the 
‘Green Lungs of Europe.’ The idea is actually an extension of a pre existing pro-
gram, the ‘Green Lungs of Poland,’ initiated more than a decade ago by a forester 
and hiker from Białystok named Krzysztof Wolfram (now a member of Poland’s 
parliament). The goal of the international program is to ensure ecologically sus-
tainable development of a vast unspoiled region of Central and Eastern Europe, 
covering 760,000 square kilometers and including parts of seven  countries—
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Poland. In March 1992, 
environmental offi cials from those countries met in Poland to sign the ‘Wigry 
Declaration,’ which established the ‘Green Lungs of Europe.’ In February 1993, 
they signed the fi nal accord in Warsaw. Poland’s national commitment to the 
‘Green Lungs’ project is sizeable—50,000 square kilometers, comprising 18 per-
cent of the country’s territory. According to the agreement, all future economic 
development in the region must be ‘undertaken in harmony with nature, making 
it possible to preserve the natural environmental intact for future generations’ 
(The Warsaw Voice, Apr. 4, 1993). This commitment entails substantial politi-
cal and economic risks for the Polish government because the protected region 
already suffers from the highest rate of unemployment in the country.23 But it is a 
far-sighted and innovative program, extending far beyond traditional ‘end-of-the-
pipe’ environmental policies.
7.5. The Fragmentation and Maturation of Poland’s Independent 
Environmental Movement 
Some of the credit for Poland’s environmental improvements over the past half-
decade must go to its growing and maturing independent environmental move-
ment. As discussed in Chapter 2, the movement took root in People’s Poland 
at the beginning of the 1980s, during the dawn of Solidarity that preceded the 
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darkness of Martial Law. Tolerated by the Communist Party/state, groups such 
as the Polish Ecology Club managed to effect limited political change and infl u-
enced environmental policy. By 1988, Poland had an offi cially registered but 
poorly organized Green Party; and by 1989, there were approximately 200 non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs), groups and foundations in Poland con-
cerned wholly or partly with environmental policy (see Czajkowski 1990, 1–11; 
Gliński 1989, 31).
The Fragmentation of the Movement 
As the Communist system collapsed, Poland’s environmentalists, with years of 
political activity under their belts, appeared well positioned to play a prominent 
role in the new democratic Polish Republic. But the emergence of democratic 
pluralism in Poland revealed philosophical, political and social divisions among 
environmental groups, and between those groups and their former opposition 
allies. Those divisions always existed, of course, but during the 1980s they had 
been masked by an ‘us versus them’ mentality fostered by their united opposition 
to socialist totalitarianism (see Gliński 1992, 267). In the fi rst years after the end 
of communism, Poland’s environmental movement broke with other segments 
of the former opposition movement, including the Solidarity trade union and 
Farmers’ Solidarity, which represented the less- or non-ecologically motivated 
interests of workers and farmers, respectively. Divisions also developed within 
the environmental movement, as groups positioned themselves along Poland’s 
sociopolitical continuum. Many environmental groups, including the Polish Ecol-
ogy Club, splintered. After just two months of existence, Poland’s Green Party, 
which allegedly had been infi ltrated by the secret police (Gliński 1996, 199), split 
into ‘three mutually hostile groups’; consequently, it did not participate in the 
1989 elections (Gliński 1992, 267).24 It survived only as a ‘sofa party’ (partia 
kanapowa), a party so small that its entire membership could fi t on a single sofa 
(Gliński 1996, 209–11). 
Divisions within the environmental movement were magnifi ed by Poland’s 
systemic transformations. When the Mazowiecki government came to power in 
September 1989, environmental groups affi liated (or previously affi liated) with 
Solidarity had a unique opportunity not just to infl uence but to fashion environ-
mental law and policy. However, many environmentalists were ambivalent. For 
one thing, they retained a vestigial distrust of law and the state from 40-plus years 
of Communist rule. Many environmental groups scorned the new government’s 
focus on market-oriented economic reforms, which they viewed as a ‘voracious 
economization’ of the country (Gliński 1996, 109–211); to them totalitarian 
socialism and market capitalism were virtually equal in their menace to the natu-
ral environment. Some of these groups formed the core of a new anti-government 
protest movement, while others chose to divorce themselves entirely from politics 
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and government in order to live alternative lifestyles outside the mainstream of 
Polish society (Gliński 1993, 146–7; 1994, 148–9). 
There were, however, some environmental groups that supported market 
reforms as a practical necessity for improving environmental protection. Their 
members went to work within the government or tried to infl uence policy from 
without. Over the past half-decade, these groups have grown increasingly capa-
ble, professional and, not inconsequentially, infl uential. They have learned how 
to cooperate and consolidate their forces to gain maximum leverage to infl uence 
government environmental policy making. Their efforts have been facilitated 
by a ‘Service Offi ce for the Environmental Movement’ (SOEM), which acts as 
an information center for non-governmental environmental organizations (of all 
stripes) throughout Poland. SOEM provides professional and legal assistance, and 
facilitates contacts between Polish NGOs and compatible international organiza-
tions (see The Warsaw Voice, July 30, 1993).
The inability of Poland’s environmental movement to remain unifi ed after 
the fall of communism certainly is understandable. As the experience of Solidar-
ity itself shows, broad-based social movements typically do not remain united 
for long after their unifying catalyst—in this case, the Communist Party/state—
is removed (see generally Bugajski and Pollack 1989). So the fragmentation of 
Poland’s environmental movement probably was inevitable. Nevertheless, the 
sheer size of the movement—as of 1995 more than 700 environmental groups 
were operating in Poland, and that number swells to more than 1,000 if local envi-
ronmental clubs and branches of national organizations are counted—has empow-
ered Poland’s environmentalists to assert substantial, if inconsistent, infl uence 
over state environmental policy. And, despite its fragmentation, the movement 
has recognized the need for greater cooperation, as evidenced by well-organized 
and well-attended annual meetings of environmental groups that have taken place 
in Poland since 1990. There has been at least enough cooperation within the 
movement to foster successful protest actions and litigation designed to publicize 
and promote environmental issues.
Traditional Forms of Environmental Activism
In 1989 and 1990, environmental groups successfully protested against the coun-
try’s fi rst planned nuclear power plant at Żarnowiec (see Box 7.1). The support 
of Poland’s Greens was also instrumental in getting the ‘Green Lungs of Poland’ 
project off the ground (see Nagy et al. 1994, 254). 
Traditional environmental activism has not always proven successful, how-
ever. A series of protests in 1991 against a planned hydroelectric dam project at 
Czorsztyn failed to deter construction. But neither was it a complete failure. The 
protestors did persuade the government to supplement the dam project with funds 
to build a sewage treatment plant in the basin; the government even agreed not to 
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operate the dam until the sewage treatment plant was ready. In addition, the pro-
tests fostered public debate about the development project, and more generally 
contributed to public awareness of environmental issues. Finally, the Czorsztyn 
dam experience led at least one environmental group to change its approach; it 
began to supplement its direct protest actions with ‘more rational and moderate’ 
negotiations with political and administrative offi cials. The price of this, however, 
was even greater fragmentation and dissent within the movement (see Gliński 
1996, 148). 
Box 7.1. The Story of Poland’s Żarnowiec Nuclear Power Plant
Poland’s fi rst nuclear power plant was to be built in the small northern town 
of Żarnowiec. Construction began in 1982, and was expected to be com-
pleted in 1993. But, as with so many large-scale projects in the socialist econ-
omy, construction dragged on for several years. Progress was also hampered 
by the protests of environmentalists from the Polish Ecology Club and other 
groups, which gained strong public support especially following the 1986 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Soviet Ukraine. Government offi cials tried 
to play down the similarities between Chernobyl and the Żarnowiec plant, 
but without success. Nevertheless, the Party/state pushed forward with con-
struction. In 1989, the Żarnowiec plant was only about 40 percent completed, 
when it became a major topic of conversation at the ‘Round Table’ negotia-
tions between Solidarity and the Party/government. Public opinion polls at 
that time showed that 86 percent of those living in the plant’s vicinity were 
opposed to the project. When Poland’s fi rst post-Communist government 
took offi ce in September 1989, it declared a 10-year moratorium on nuclear 
power and immediately suspended construction at Żarnowiec. The govern-
ment later proposed to ‘liquidate’ the power plant and convert its existing 
facilities into a potato-processing plant and a brewery. In 1991, the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended 
that Poland introduce nuclear energy by the year 2005. But successive Polish 
governments have shown no signs of renewed interest in nuclear power. In 
fact, in June 1994, the government sold nuclear equipment designed for the 
Żarnowiec plant to Hungary, for use in a nuclear power training center.
Sources: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 19, 1986; Oct. 5, 1989; 
Feb. 20, 1989; Mar. 6, 1989; Nov. 3, 1995; U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 
8, 1986; Reuter Textline/Rzeczpospolita, Sept. 1, 1990; Polish News Bulle-
tin, Sept. 4, 1990; European Energy Report, Sept. 21, 1990; PAP News Wire, 
Feb. 16, 1993, June 28, 1994; The Warsaw Voice, Mar. 7, 1993.
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Legal Changes for Greater Public Participation in Environmental 
Policy Making
Poland’s more sophisticated environmental groups all along have used legal and 
political mechanisms to infl uence environmental policy. They have used law-
suits to stop polluters. For example, in 1989, a non-governmental organization 
in Łódź (Poland’s second-largest city, with a population of about 1 million) sued 
the local municipal transportation company for violating air pollution norms. 
The court ordered the company to install pollution-reducing fi lters on each bus 
(Gliński 1996, 148). Even more important for long-term environmental protection 
in Poland, environmentalists have lobbied successfully for changes in administra-
tive procedures that, in turn, have increased their access to infl uence environmen-
tal policy making. As we saw in Chapter 3 (§3.5), before the fall of communism, 
public rights to participate in environmental decision making were quite lim-
ited. Since 1989, the situation has been improving slowly. Public access remains 
restricted, but there have been several symbolic and a few real improvements. 
Among the symbolic improvements are provisions in the environmental proto-
col to the ‘Round Table’ accords, new constitutional amendments and provisions 
in the 1991 National Environmental Policy. The environmental protocol to the 
1989 ‘Round Table’ accords, signed by representatives of Poland’s last Commu-
nist government and the Solidarity opposition, called for the expansion of public 
rights to sue to protect the environment and complete public access to environ-
mental information, but these policies have not yet been legally enacted. Poland’s 
Constitution was amended in 1992 to extend citizens’ rights to (1) ‘participate in 
exercising social control, in consultations and discussions upon important issues 
concerning the development of the country,’ (2) ‘approach all organs of the State 
with complaints and grievances,’ and (3) have appeals heard ‘without delay and 
justly’ (1992 Dz. U. No. 75, item 367, art. 86).25 These new constitutional rights 
are not particularly meaningful, however, because State agencies still have com-
plete discretion to ignore citizens’ requests without judicial review (Nagy et al. 
1994, 238). Poland’s 1991 National Environmental Policy incorporated into its 
statement of principles a similar provision calling for greater public participation 
in environmental decision making and access to environmental information. This 
statement of principles carries even less—that is to say, no—legal force. Nev-
ertheless, these symbolic provisions concerning public participation in adminis-
trative decision making have induced the Environmental Protection Ministry to 
afford slightly more real public participation in its administrative processes.
Since March 1992, the Minister of Environmental Protection has held monthly 
meetings with representatives of the environmental NGO community. Both sides 
perceive some benefi t from these meetings. NGOs have an opportunity to infl u-
ence environmental policy directly, while the ministry can drum up support for its 
policies (see Gliński 1996, 153). Also in 1992, the Minister of Environmental Pro-
tection established a 75-member Environmental Impact Assessment Commission 
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(EIA Commission) to review proposed development projects that would create 
‘especially harmful’ environmental hazards. The EIA Commission is comprised of 
individuals from the ministry, academia and ecological organizations. Whenever a 
proposed project would have severe environmental impacts, the EIA Commission 
convenes a 15–25-member panel to review it. The panel announces its opinion at 
a public hearing, and then forwards it to the Minister of Environmental Protection, 
who has the fi nal say. The minister’s decision does not have to conform to or even 
consider the EIA Commission’s opinion—in other words, the Commission’s opin-
ion is advisory only—but the minister’s decision must be published in the Com-
mission’s Bulletin, which is open for public inspection (Nagy et al. 1994, 247–8). 
This adds some much needed transparency to the administrative decision-making 
process, helping to constrain politically (if not legally) ministerial discretion. 
The most promising development for increased public participation in envi-
ronmental decision making also happens to be the most recent: in May 1995, 
Poland’s parliament enacted a new law that expanded the jurisdiction of the High 
Administrative Court, making it easier for environmental groups to obtain court 
review of agency actions (1995 Dz. U. No. 74, item 368). Among its numer-
ous benefi ts, the new law permits environmental organizations to complain 
about agency actions even without participating (as parties) throughout the entire 
administrative process (see Jendrośka 1995, 6). This is a crucial change in the 
law. Prior to the 1995 Act, groups could not seek judicial review of administrative 
decisions unless they had participated from the outset of the administrative pro-
cess, which greatly hampered the ability of citizens’ groups to mount challenges. 
For example, when authorities proposed to develop a hazardous waste incinerator 
near Chojnów, local residents banded together informally; but as such they had no 
legal authority to participate as a party in administrative proceedings concerning 
the proposed incinerator. Only later did the Chojnów residents formally associ-
ate with the regional chapter of the Polish Ecology Club, which was authorized 
to intervene in administrative proceedings. But by that time the administrative 
proceedings already were well advanced. And because the residents had not par-
ticipated as a party from the beginning, the High Administrative Court refused 
to hear their complaints. Under the new law, the residents would have been per-
mitted to intervene as a party at any point in the proceedings. The new law also 
permits the High Administrative Court, for the fi rst time, to hear complaints con-
cerning administrative rules as well as adjudicatory decisions. According to Jerzy 
Jendrośka (1995, 6–7), this heralds ‘a major breakthrough in legal practice, open-
ing immense new possibilities for successful “green access to justice.’”
 
7.6. The Future of Environmental Protection in Poland
Poland’s record of environmental protection since the fall of communism is com-
mendable, especially considering the deep economic recession of 1989–1992. 
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Deliberate environmental policies of the Polish government, facilitated by sys-
temic reforms, have brought structural environmental improvements. But they 
have not yet ended the ecological crisis. Some regions of Poland remain severely 
contaminated.26 At the beginning of 1993, national air pollution levels were still 
six times higher than the European Union’s legal limit (Guardian, Mar. 6, 1993). 
Many of Poland’s larger cities, including Poznań, Szczeciń, Kraków and Łódź, 
still were without operational sewage treatment plants (The Warsaw Voice, Jan. 
31, 1993). As a result, many Polish waterways were so polluted that ‘you could 
develop fi lm’ in them (Guardian, Nov. 21, 1993). Poland’s industries were still 
annually producing millions of tons of hazardous wastes, most of which was 
dumped at sites with no protection against groundwater contamination (Pol-
ish News Bulletin, Oct. 21, 1993; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 11, 
1993). Meanwhile, public health continued to suffer. For example, in 1993, infant 
mortality in the heavily polluted region of Upper Silesia was 30 per 1,000 live 
births, twice the national average and fi ve times the average in countries belong-
ing to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(Guardian, Mar. 6, 1993). 
These facts simply confi rmed what most observers understood quite well in 
1989: cleaning up the environmental mess created during 40-plus years of (real 
existing) socialism would not be quick, easy or cheap. Six years into the transi-
tions, it is no surprise to fi nd that Poland still has a long way to go. As Tomasz 
Żylicz (1994d, 86) has admonished, there will be no ecological miracle in Poland. 
But acknowledging this obvious truth should not prevent us from recognizing that 
very real progress has been made. 
Environmental protection in Poland has improved signifi cantly since 1989. 
These improvements have not been reversed or curtailed by the resumption of 
economic growth. And although it is true that successive Polish governments 
since 1992 have shown little or no interest in environmental protection, there 
remain two overriding reasons to expect continued improvement. First, on August 
8, 1994, Poland applied for full membership in the European Union (EU), with 
the hope of joining by the year 2000 (see Reuter East European Report, Apr. 
8, 1994). As a precondition to membership, Poland must ‘harmonize’ its laws, 
including its environmental laws, with EU Directives (see Wajda 1994). Harmo-
nization will require more than simply enacting nice-looking laws. Mere paper 
changes unaccompanied by implementation and enforcement efforts are unlikely 
to impress current EU members; Poland will have to show continued actual prog-
ress in environmental protection (see Ryland 1995, 333). And just in case extra 
incentives are needed, the Polish government needs only consider the tremen-
dous economic costs of excessive pollution and resource waste, which during the 
1980s amounted to between 10 and 20 percent of annual GNP (see Radio Free 
Europe/Report on Eastern Europe, Oct. 5, 1990). For Poland, a stringent and 
costly environmental protection regime is likely to be much less expensive than 
doing nothing at all. Prudent environmental investments should yield substantial 
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economic returns. In 1995, Poland’s Finance Minister, Grzegorz Kołodko, implic-
itly acknowledged this point when he declared that stabilizing pollution emissions 
is just as important for Poland’s economy as stabilizing the zloty (PAP News Wire, 
Mar. 20, 1995). 
The question remains whether ‘harmonization’ with EU Directives is enough, 
given Poland’s serious environmental problems. Some have argued that Poland 
should pursue more ‘[r]adical environmental policies,’ including immediately 
closing down all ineffi cient (and dirty) state enterprises and setting raw materials 
prices at levels refl ecting the true social costs of their use (Manser 1993, 149–56). 
In theory, these suggestions are economically and environmentally attractive, but 
they are not feasible politically. Given the employment concerns of voters and the 
still potent political force of Poland’s trade unions, it would be political suicide 
for any Polish government even to suggest such draconian measures.27 Consider 
what happened in 1991, when the government attempted to close down the inef-
fi cient and highly polluting pig iron section of the Sendzimir steel mill in Nowa 
Huta; workers from the ‘Solidarity ’80’ trade union went on a hunger strike until 
the order was rescinded (see PAP News Wire, Dec. 29, 1991). In 1990, when the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection tried to introduce an ad valorem fuel tax of 
4 percent to be earmarked for the environmental protection budget, the Solidarity 
trade union issued the following statement: ‘While the union is for environmental 
protection, it will not approve any such burden laid on the impoverished society’ 
(quoted in Żylicz 1994a, 105). More recently, the Solidarity union defeated gov-
ernment plans to make the mining industry cleaner and more effi cient (see Pol-
ish News Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1994, Apr. 27, 1994). Although we might deplore the 
fact that Poland’s trade unions are fi ghting against environmental protection, their 
concern over the potential socioeconomic consequences of environmental poli-
cies is not illegitimate, especially considering that Poland’s environmental taxes 
are already among the world’s highest. Consider what the impact would be on the 
ordinary Pole’s quality of life if environmental fees were set at true social cost 
levels and all ineffi cient state enterprises were immediately closed. Are the ben-
efi ts of a quick and dramatic reduction in air pollution emissions worth the costs? 
Ordinary Poles already have suffered from successive resource price increases; 
at the beginning of 1992, coal prices in Poland were 18 times higher than they 
had been at the end of 1989, and gas prices for the average household were 80 
times higher (see Czaja et al. 1994, 27). And there are unavoidable trade-offs 
between environmental protection and employment. For instance, closing down 
the unprofi table mines in the Walbrych region, which already suffers from one 
of the highest unemployment rates in the country, would put an estimated addi-
tional 15,000 Poles out of work (see Czaja et al. 1994, 36–7; The Warsaw Voice, 
Sept. 12, 1993).28 It is certainly understandable that workers would protest against 
environmental protection policies that might cost their jobs. And it is far from 
clear that environmental concerns should trump labor concerns, notwithstanding 
Poland’s ecological crisis. 
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Like everyone else in Central and Eastern Europe, Poles want improved 
environmental protection, but how much? Consider if Polish cities improved air 
quality during the next decade or so to the level of, say, Los Angeles. Would this 
be cause for celebration or recrimination? Los Angeles, as everyone knows, has 
the worst smog problem in the United States; it is the only city in the country 
designated ‘extreme’ non-attainment for ozone (the primary constituent of smog) 
under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7511). But Los Angeles actually meets the 
federal smog standards more than 99 percent of the time (Washington Times, 
May 19, 1992). As those standards are set at levels to protect public health with 
‘an adequate margin of safety’ (42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1)), the health of Angelenos 
is presumably at some non-zero level of risk from smog less than 1 percent of 
the time. Consider, by contrast, the Polish city of Bytom, where public health 
is threatened by air pollution literally every hour of every day. According to a 
recent documentary on risk produced by public television station WGBH in Bos-
ton (1992), air pollution in Bytom on an average day is six times worse than in 
Los Angeles during a smog alert. Would Bytom’s residents consider it a disap-
pointing failure to achieve only the same levels of air pollution as Los Angeles? 
Given their extreme situation, we might suppose that they, more than others in 
Poland, would support draconian measures to reduce air pollution. But they too 
want to keep their jobs, homes and cars.29 What could possibly persuade them 
that breathing (marginally) cleaner air is more important  than earning a paycheck 
to support their families?
Although all Poles want improved environmental protection, there is little 
agreement on how much. This is not particularly surprising; after all, there is no 
scientifi c or sociopolitical consensus anywhere in the world on what constitutes 
adequate environmental quality. Perceptions of environmental risk and demands 
for environmental quality are often relative to other needs and concerns. Improv-
ing environmental protection is hardly the sole concern in post-Communist 
Poland. Whereas the needs of Polish society are vast and varied, resources are 
scarce. Ultimately, in a democratic Poland the people will decide with their votes 
and their pocketbooks how much environmental protection they desire.
Notes
1. This chapter is a revised and updated version of Cole (1995b). On Poland’s eco-
nomic crisis at the end of the 1980s, see, for example, Kondratowicz and Okolski (1991) 
and Clarke (1989). On Poland’s environmental crisis, see Chapter 1.
2. The budget constraint, which was discussed in Chapter 5 (§5.5), will be further 
discussed in relevant sections of this chapter.
3. Subsequently, in August 1993, Poland’s Minister of Environmental Protection 
issued a list of 106 categories of hazardous waste and toxic substances that could not 
be imported into Poland (see Pesticide Action Network North American Updates Service, 
Nov. 24, 1993).
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4. For assessments of the ‘December Amendments,’ see M. Brzezinski and Garlicki 
(1995a, 32–3; Gray 1993, 96).
5. In some parts of Poland, the waiting period for housing then exceeded 50 years (see 
New Yorker, Nov. 13, 1989).
6. Poland’s severe economic crisis at the end of the Communist era distinguishes it 
from Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia, and complicates the comparison of transi-
tion paths. As Leszek Balcerowicz (1994, 195) has explained, ‘[t]he initial economic condi-
tions do matter, as far as the pace and effects of the transition are concerned. Therefore one 
should frame assessments of the results of this process in the context of initial conditions.’
7. Actually, I suspect it was both. As already noted, there was ‘hidden’ unemployment 
under socialism. But some level of unemployment (so-called ‘structural’ unemployment) 
must be considered a pathology of market capitalism.
8. But the infl ation rate rose quickly again towards the end of the year after austerity 
measures were relaxed in response to intensifying public criticism and in view of impend-
ing presidential elections. Balcerowicz (1992, 170–1) later admitted that it had been a 
mistake to relax anti-infl ationary measures at that crucial juncture. Nonetheless, since the 
introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan, infl ation in Poland has never approached ‘hyper’ 
levels; in fact, it has declined fairly steadily. For 1994, the infl ation rate was around 35 
percent; in 1995, the rate fell below 30 percent. 
9. For a more balanced, but still overly negative account of post-socialist environmen-
tal protection efforts in Poland, see Zechenter (1993).
10. This was in response to the hazardous waste import problems discussed earlier.
11. On September 13, 1995, the Environmental Law Group of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences in Wrocław convened a conference to begin the process of designing a new com-
prehensive environmental law to replace the 1980 EPDA.
12. Part IV of the EPDA also included provisions for civil and criminal liability, but, 
in practice, these were of secondary importance (see Cole 1995a, 334–7).
13. The nine examined sectors were mining, power, metallurgy, electrical–metal, 
chemical, mineral, wood–paper, light, and food. Poskrobko’s and Cygler’s study has been 
criticized for focusing only on Poland’s largest polluters (Conversation with Bogusław 
 Fiedor, Chair, Department of Economics, Wrocław Academy of Economies, Wrocław, 
Poland, August 14, 1995). However, it would seem that, if emissions charges exceed 
abatement costs for the largest polluters, they certainly should exceed abatement costs for 
smaller polluters, who do not benefi t from the same economies of scale in pollution control 
as larger polluters.
14. But see Wprost, Aug. 21, 1995, claiming that ‘businesses were much better off 
paying for polluting the environment rather than preventing it,’ based on an unpublished 
report by Poland’s Supreme Chamber of Control. 
15. On January 1, 1995, the Polish zloty was redenominated; one new zloty was worth 
10,000 old zlotys (see Polish News Bulletin, Dec. 28, 1994; PAP, Jan. 2, 1995).
16. In fact, production of major food crops (grain, potatoes, rape and sugar beet) 
in Poland declined by about 15 percent between 1990 and 1993. However, according to 
analysts from the World Economy Research Institute at the Warsaw School of Economics 
(Brocka-Pałacz 1994, 58–60), this was due mainly to declining rates of demand for food-
stuffs. Of course, the declining rate of demand for foodstuffs would also explain some, but 
not all, of the reductions in fertilizer and pesticide use. On the environmental and economic 
effects of reducing pesticide use, see Pimental et al. (1991).
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17. These fi gures do not include the hundreds of thousands of small retail businesses—
hotels, restaurants and shops—that were quickly privatized under a separate ‘small priva-
tization’ program.
18. This law is discussed in Cole (1995a, 354–5).
19. The Sejm also enacted some allegedly anti-environmental legislation in 1991. 
Specifi cally, it deleted provisions of Poland’s foreign investment law that authorized the 
Foreign Investment Council to deny permits on environmental grounds (1991 Dz. U. No. 
60, item 253). However, as Elżbieta Zechenter (1993, 120n166) has noted, the Council 
retains authority to revoke the permits of foreign investors whose activities cause signifi -
cant environmental damage. She nonetheless concludes that ‘the 1991 FIL (Foreign Invest-
ment Law) appears to be symptomatic of the current trend to disregard environmental issues 
among the Polish legislators who have ‘more pressing concerns to attend’ given the current 
political situation.’ However, those same legislators apparently were not too preoccupied 
with other political concerns to enact the four pro-ecological statutes discussed here.
20. See Radecki (1992a) for a complete overview of the 1991 Law on the State Envi-
ronmental Protection Inspectorate.
21. The nuclear-based emissions reduction technology, in particular, has sparked great 
interest in the West and Japan. It involves the use of an electron beam fi red into damped 
gases laced with ammonia. The process reportedly can be easily retrofi tted even onto old 
plants at 30 percent lower cost than traditional emissions control technologies, and it con-
sumes much less energy. It will reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by 90 percent and nitro-
gen oxide emissions by 80–90 percent (Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 31, 1993).
22. As a Polish economist recently explained it to me, the primary meaning of ‘sus-
tainable development’ is sustainable research for scholars.
23. For more on the ‘Green Lungs’ program, see The Warsaw Voice, Apr. 4, 1993; 
Greenwire, Feb. 9, 1993; Bureau of National Affairs, International Environment Daily, 
May 12, 1993; PAP News Wire, Feb. 11, 1993; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 
16, 1993.
24. The Green Party (and three other green parties organized just prior to the elec-
tions) did run in the 1991 elections, but lost badly because of poor campaign strategies and 
a lack of support from the environmental movement (see Gliński 1996, 212–25).
25. For a translation of the Polish Constitution, including recent amendments, see 
International Institute for Democracy (1995).
26. At the same time, we should bear in mind that the majority of Polish territory is 
not signifi cantly polluted. Indeed, Poland contains some of the most pristine areas left in 
all of Europe, many of which are protected as national parks, nature reserves or landscape 
parks. Poland also is home to fi ve world biosphere reserves (see, e.g., The Warsaw Voice, 
Apr. 2, 1995).
27. On the employment concerns of Polish voters, see Polish News Bulletin, Feb. 15, 
1994.
28. The trade-off between jobs and environmental protection is more pronounced in 
Poland than many other countries for economy-specifi c reasons (see International Labour 
Organization 1989).
29. But see Hughes (1992, 70), arguing that the perceived trade-off between jobs and 
pollution reductions in Eastern Europe is illusory.
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8.1. Introduction
In the last chapter, we saw that environmental protection has improved markedly 
since Poland began the transition to market democracy. This supports the view, 
elaborated in earlier chapters, that the failure of environmental protection under 
socialism was systemic, that is, caused by various legal, political, economic and 
ideological institutions and organizations of (real existing) socialism. That surely 
was not their purpose, but that was their effect. Since the fall of communism, as 
old institutions have been replaced by new ones, the improvement in environmen-
tal protection (particularly in environmental law enforcement) has been dramatic.
The analysis suggests that there may be institutional preconditions to success-
ful environmental protection. The purpose of this chapter is to adduce, in brief, 
some of those preconditions. I am mindful, however, that the analysis has focused 
predominantly (though not exclusively) on the experiences of a single country. 
Extrapolating from Poland’s case to draw broad normative implications about 
political-economic prerequisites for environmental protection requires additional 
justifi cation, which I attempt to provide in §8.2. In addition, the suggestion of 
legal, political, economic and ideological preconditions for successful environ-
mental protection presumes an adequate and accepted measure for determining 
environmental success or failure. Section 8.3 addresses the conceptual problems 
of judging, in any objective way, the success or suffi ciency of an environmental 
protection regime. Poland’s predominantly negative experiences with environ-
mental protection under socialism cannot tell us what combination of political, 
economic and legal institutions would ensure suffi cient environmental quality. At 
best, they imply that certain institutions (or types of institutions) may be neces-
sary because without them environmental protection is likely (if not certain) to 
fail. In §8.4–8.6, I outline three institutions that Poland’s case suggests are neces-
sary (though not suffi cient) for minimally effective environmental protection: (1) 
a property rights structure that minimizes regulatory confl icts of interest by disag-
gregating the interests of polluters and government regulators; (2) a pricing mech-
anism that values resource scarcity, thereby inducing economic actors to conserve; 
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and (3) an institutionalized rule of law ideology that supports environmental regu-
lations. Finally, the book concludes in §8.7 with an assessment of prospects for 
an environmentally friendly socialism in light of these institutional prerequisites.
8.2. Extrapolating from the Polish Case
Drawing normative conclusions from a single-country case study is presumptu-
ous, but maybe warranted if the case is fairly representative. The systemic failure 
of environmental protection in People’s Poland was fairly representative of the 
Soviet bloc as a whole. The Soviet Union and its Central and East European satel-
lites shared common ideological commitments and political-economic structures; 
their histories of environmental regulation, while not identical, were roughly 
similar, and none had even minimal success in protecting the environment.1 This 
work’s systemic analysis of environmental protection in People’s Poland would 
broadly fi t any of the other former Soviet bloc countries (compare DeBardele-
ben 1985; Goldman 1972a; Ziegler 1987; Jancar 1987). There were, of course, 
differences in culture, history and institutions that undoubtedly had signifi cance 
for environmental protection; the Communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe were not nearly homogeneous. But even their differences tend to justify 
extrapolating from the Polish case. 
As noted in the Introduction, People’s Poland combined a relatively weak 
version of Soviet-style communism with Eastern Europe’s most well-developed 
system of environmental protection. This should make Poland the best case for 
assessing the failure of environmental protection under socialism. If environmen-
tal protection failed for systemic reasons in People’s Poland, those same reasons 
must substantially explain the failure of environmental protection in other former 
Soviet bloc countries.
8.3. The Ambiguous Goal of ‘Effective’ Environmental Protection
The normative prescriptions offered in this chapter are intended to stand as 
 political-economic prerequisites for effective environmental protection anywhere. 
But that raises an important preliminary question: What constitutes ‘effective’ 
environmental protection? A facile answer is that an environmental protection 
regime is ‘effective’ if it achieves its stated goals. But on that test, any country 
could ensure ‘effective’ environmental protection simply by setting its goals low 
enough.2 To have any real utility, the measure of effectiveness must refer not only 
to the attainment but also to the suffi ciency of environmental protection goals. 
The question then becomes: What constitutes suffi cient environmental quality? 
As I have written elsewhere (Cole 1995b, 319; 1995c, 296), that question has no 
objective answer. There is no scientifi c or social consensus on what constitutes 
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suffi cient or adequate environmental quality; we may not even know it when we 
see it. Still, there does seem to be some fact of the matter concerning environ-
mental protection; at least, we seem to recognize when it is not effective enough.
Environmental protection in People’s Poland may have been an objective 
failure, that is, a failure by any standards. But determining objective success 
seems a much trickier (if not impossible) task. Take the United States, for exam-
ple. It is easy to argue that American environmental regulations have been com-
paratively successful; there is nothing at all controversial in asserting, at least, 
that they have been far more successful than environmental regulations in the 
former Soviet bloc. But to say they have been objectively successful—implying 
the achievement of a clearly suffi cient level of environmental quality—is another 
matter. Critics from all points on the political spectrum blast away at real or per-
ceived failings of American environmental policy: environmental rules are too 
stringent or not stringent enough; insuffi ciently enforced or overly enforced; not 
cost effective or too constrained by economic considerations. Objective success 
cannot be claimed except, again, in the lesser sense that subjectively determined 
goals have been achieved.
Because the quest for an objective measure of environmental success seems 
fruitless, this chapter focuses on what is realistically determinable: minimal and 
comparative effectiveness in environmental protection. With respect to these mea-
sures, the negative lessons from People’s Poland have something to teach us; they 
may even show how programs that already are minimally or substantially effec-
tive can be improved. Still, we need to be cautious in drawing inferences from 
Poland’s case. Specifi cally, we must distinguish inferences that are supported by 
Poland’s experiences from those that are merely permitted or not contradicted by 
them.3 
Finally, I do not claim that the institutional prerequisites discussed in this 
chapter are enough to ensure even minimally effective environmental protection. 
It is perfectly conceivable that a country might institute all of the prescriptions 
discussed here but still fail to protect its environment because of a lack of politi-
cal will, insuffi cient fi nances, or both. It makes more sense, I think, to view the 
institutional suggestions in this chapter as means of avoiding known pitfalls for 
environmental protection. Efforts to protect the environment are more likely to be 
effective—or, stated even more cautiously, less likely to be ineffective—in coun-
tries that guard against regulatory confl icts of interest, adopt pricing mechanisms 
that account for relative resource scarcity and establish the rule of environmental 
law over politics. 
8.4. Property Rights and Regulatory Confl icts of Interest
In Chapter 5 (§5.5), we saw how regulatory confl icts of interest hampered envi-
ronmental law enforcement in People’s Poland. The Party/state, as owner of the 
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means of production, subverted the regulations it promulgated and was obliged, 
as regulator, to enforce. This same confl ict of interest persists to greater or lesser 
extents in all countries, but it can be minimized by (1) privatizing polluters and 
resource users, (2) decentralizing environmental law enforcement powers, and 
(3) disseminating environmental information among government agencies, non-
governmental organizations and the public at large.
The Utility of Adversity: Private Polluters and Public Regulators
As we saw in Chapter 5, Poland’s regulatory confl ict of interest stemmed from the 
Party/state’s ownership of the very enterprises against which it was supposed to 
enforce environmental regulations. The predictable result was lax to non-existent 
enforcement. Intuitively, this problem should be soluble by privatizing regulated 
industries.
When the state privatizes the means of production, it gives up its direct fi nan-
cial stake in their economic performance. It retains an indirect interest, of course, 
to the extent it relies on tax revenues and economic growth. But in a private econ-
omy, the state is not primarily responsible for, or substantially affected by, the 
individual performance of each and every fi rm. And it does not participate directly 
in the economic risks imposed on those fi rms by its environmental regulations. All 
other things being equal, the government should be more willing and better able 
to enforce those regulations. 
Privatization of the means of production, as a method of improving environ-
mental law enforcement, is also supported by János Kornai’s theory of budget 
constraints (discussed in Chapter 5, §5.5). Soft budget constraints were endemic 
to the socialist economic system; enterprise survival depended not on profi ts 
earned in the market but on gross material output and political criteria, such as 
employment levels. The central administration allocated resources and rewards 
for maximal, rather than effi cient, production. This rendered enterprises oblivi-
ous to price signals—including environmental fees and fi nes—that otherwise 
might have induced them to conserve resources and reduce pollution emissions. 
Kornai’s theory implies that privatization and marketization should substantially 
harden budget constraints. Privatized fi rms operating in competitive markets must 
attend to costs and profi ts. They naturally will incline to eliminate productive 
ineffi ciencies. And they should be sensitive to price signals, including environ-
mental charges; any fi rm that ignores them should fi nd itself at a competitive dis-
advantage. Of course, states can (and sometimes do) soften budget constraints on 
private fi rms (the prime American example being the bail-out of Chrysler in the 
1970s), but budget constraints are, without exception, harder in market economies 
than in administered economies. This was confi rmed in Chapter 7, where we saw 
that budget constraints have hardened in Poland’s transitional economy thanks to 
privatization (mainly from below) and the establishment of competitive markets. 
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Privatization and marketization also have contributed to the improvement 
of environmental regulation in post-Communist Poland. Under socialism, enter-
prises were, for all practical purposes, government agencies. As such, they par-
ticipated in developing and implementing government environmental policy, with 
the predictable result that environmental regulations tended to be lax, ambiguous 
and poorly enforced. In post-Communist Poland, fi rms no longer are agents of 
the government, and their infl uence over environmental policy has waned. This is 
not to say that fi rms in market democracies do not infl uence government policy, 
but their infl uence is comparatively slight primarily because they are subject to 
greater political and economic competition. We saw evidence of this in Chapter 
7 (§7.4), when industrial concerns in post-Communist Poland tried to roll back 
environmental fee increases. They were successfully opposed by a unique (in 
Poland’s experience) aggregation of environmentalists, private fi rms and state-
owned enterprises. Companies that had already invested heavily in environmental 
protection (in order to reduce their exposure to regulatory costs) naturally objected 
to fee reductions that would have devalued their investments, while providing a 
signifi cant market advantage to competitors that had done nothing to reduce pol-
lution emissions. The institution of competitive markets thus has served to disag-
gregate industrial interests, so that Polish industry no longer presents a united 
front on (or against) environmental policy.
Privatize Economic Producers and Resource Users, but Not Necessarily 
Natural Resources 
In the United States, economists known as ‘free market environmentalists’ have 
argued that the environmental failure of socialism proves that natural assets 
(including commodities such as oil and non-commodity resources such as air) 
would benefi t from privatization (see, e.g., Stroup and Goodman 1992, 427). They 
claim that forests, parks, wilderness areas and other resources currently under 
public ownership (in the United States as well as in the former socialist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe) would be better cared for under private (more spe-
cifi cally individual or corporate) ownership and management. This argument may 
or may not have merit, but the history of environmental protection in People’s 
Poland does not support it. 
The Polish Party/state owned and managed all natural resources, including 
nature reserves and national parks, but without suffering the same regulatory con-
fl icts of interest that were endemic to Party/state ownership of economic pro-
ducers and resource users.4 To be sure, some Party/state-owned resources were 
mismanaged and damaged, especially those located in fallout areas for indus-
trial pollution. But, as we saw in Chapter 1 (§1.5), many national parks and 
nature reserves, especially those located in the northeastern part of the country, 
were not substantially damaged by pollution or ruthlessly (over)exploited for 
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their development potential. Today, Poland’s national parks and nature reserves 
include some of the most pristine places left in all of Europe. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (1995, 88), an organization not known 
for its socialist leanings, recently concluded that ‘[t]he environmental legacy of 
central planning in Poland is not all negative. . . . In 1991, while 11 percent of 
Poland was considered to be “severely environmentally threatened,” 27 percent 
was in natural or close to natural state’ (emphasis in original). The Polish environ-
mental economist, Tomasz Żylicz (1995a, 64–5), explains:
because the communist industrialization concentrated in areas of traditionally 
high intensity of production, vast regions remained largely underdeveloped. 
These regions and their almost intact natural capital represent an asset which is 
becoming increasingly scarce in Europe . . . about 8.5 percent of the area of the 
country remains relatively unscathed by development. Commercial forests and 
farms operating within sustainable and ecologically accepted principles include 
about 19 percent of Polish territory. Hence over a fourth of Poland represents an 
asset that many areas of Europe no longer have.
 Although Poland’s experiences do not support the claim that public (or state) 
ownership of natural resources per se creates regulatory prob lems, it does sup-
port lesser claims about regulatory problems that can result from ambiguous 
and inconsistent resource management policies. When a state lodges control of 
resources (such as national forests) in a single agency or ministry, with instruc-
tions to administer the resource for ‘multiple uses’ (including mining, timber, 
wildlife, recreation) that are not compatible, or for multiple values (including 
environmental, aesthetic, economic) that are incommensurable,5 administrative 
problems are bound to arise (see Blumm 1994). Indeed, the free market envi-
ronmentalist literature is fi lled with horror stories of regulatory mismanagement 
resulting from ‘multiple use’ mandates (see Anderson and Leal 1991). But when 
state-owned resources are subject to clear and consistent management policies, 
administrative problems are unusual. One rarely reads about government mis-
management in publicly owned wilderness areas, for example, where preservation 
mandates are not compromised by development mandates.6 This is because the 
agencies responsible for wilderness areas operate under clear and consistent rules 
that only infrequently generate internal administrative confl icts. 
This is not to say that ‘multiple use’ management is inherently bad pol-
icy; it may even be the best policy for resources amenable to various produc-
tive and non-productive uses. The real problem may lie in its implementation. In 
the United States, as well as in Poland, multiple use management responsibili-
ties traditionally reside in a single government agency.7 This creates an internal 
administrative confl ict as the agency seeks to promote economic development 
and environmental protection at the same time. Production mandates tend to over-
whelm environmental protection mandates, especially when the agency’s budget 
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depends on revenues generated by its development decisions. This is not the place 
to speculate about solutions to the administrative problems of ‘multiple use’ man-
agement, but one implication may be that management responsibilities should be 
split between two or more agencies, each with a singular productive or protec-
tive mandate. One clear advantage of this is that the budget for the agency with 
protective responsibilities would not depend upon development decision mak-
ing (as is currently the case, for instance, in the US Forest Service). The idea 
of reducing mismanagement through segregating protection and development 
responsibilities has not been lost on free market environmentalists. It is implicit, 
for example, in Richard Stroup and John Baden’s (1982) suggestion that the gov-
ernment appoint a wilderness endowment board, with a single narrowly defi ned 
mission to protect and enhance environmental values of unique environmental 
assets, such as wilderness areas. However, this solution leaves open the ques-
tion of how inter-agency management disputes would be resolved. It may be that 
regulatory confl icts of interest and resulting ineffi ciencies are simply among the 
costs unavoidably entailed by the selection of a multiple use management regime. 
If those costs are unacceptably high, then multiple use must be forsaken for some 
form of dominant or singular use regime. In this context, it should be noted that 
privatization would, for all practical purposes, constitute a shift from multiple 
use management to dominant use management; only the preferences of a private 
owner, rather than government bureaucrats, would determine the dominant use.
Free market environmentalists suggest that mismanagement of multiple 
use resources is inevitable under state ownership because bureaucrats are moti-
vated not to maximize social welfare, but only to maximize their own power and 
resources (see Anderson and Leal 1991, esp. ch. 5). On the other hand, it would 
strain credulity to suppose that private owners might actively manage natural 
resources for their non-economic values after investing large sums of money to 
acquire them. But let us assume for the sake of argument that they might. We 
would still be left with the question of how to privatize state-owned resources. 
To free market environmentalists, the answer is easy: sell them to the highest 
bidders.8 But as with all allocation methods, this market-based approach creates 
winners and losers, which means that it is bound to be politically controversial. 
Consequently, the selection of a privatization method is no simple matter. History, 
both in Poland and in the United States, bears this out.
In Poland, privatization (of the means of production) has been an integral com-
ponent of the transition to market democracy. However, as discussed in Chapter 7 
(§7.4), privatization (from above) in Poland took a long time to get off the ground, 
and has progressed very slowly because of constant political disputes about the state’s 
proper role in the economy and the appropriate privatization mechanisms, as well 
as allegations of corruption. By the end of 1994, privatization had virtually ground 
to a halt, with several thousand large enterprises still under state ownership. Is there 
any reason to expect that Poland (or the United States for that matter) could privatize 
national parks and other resources without encountering similar diffi culties? 
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The history of resource privatization in the United States hardly provides more 
hope for effi cient privatization. The US government has been in the business of 
privatizing natural resources virtually since its inception. Sometimes it has sold land 
and other resources to the highest bidders. But on many occasions it has allocated 
resources according to non-market (i.e., political and administrative) criteria. Fol-
lowing the Revolutionary War, for example, Congress ‘forsook the profi t motive 
when it rewarded Revolutionary War veterans and refugees with bounty warrants or 
scrip entitling them to select lands from the Military Reserves in Ohio’ (Coggins et 
al. 1993, 56). Throughout the nineteenth century, federal homesteading laws, such 
as the 1862 Homestead Act (43 U.S.C. §§161 et seq., repealed in 1976, 43 U.S.C. 
§§1701 et seq.), gave away millions of acres of land for nothing or next to it. The 
robber-barons of the same era did not pay market value for their railroad land grants; 
the allocation mechanism in their case is best described as cronyism.9 To this day, 
the federal government gives away valuable mineral resources for only the tiniest 
fraction of their market value;10 it leases public land for grazing at below-market 
prices (see Wilkinson 1992, 81); and it sells timber from some (but not all) National 
Forests at prices that do not even cover the costs of administering the program (see 
Repetto 1988). In each of these cases, the federal government allocates property 
rights on political, rather than market, criteria. Those who criticize these programs 
for being ineffi cient often miss this important point: they are not designed to be 
effi cient. To the extent that the Forest Service engages in below-cost timber sales 
for example, at least part of its express purpose is to subsidize communities that rely 
on the timber industry for their economic survival (see Repetto 1988, 373–6). Thus, 
below-cost timber sales (and many other non-market allocations of publicly owned 
resources) are just another vehicle of government largess, like welfare, school lunch 
programs, tobacco subsidies and tax deductions for charitable donations. One can, 
of course, disagree with the policy of subsidizing discrete groups with allocations 
of public resources, but then that changes the argument from whether government 
management unavoidably is ineffi cient to whether government management should 
(or should always) be effi cient (on some defi nition of the term ‘effi cient’). Free 
market environmentalists implicitly argue that resource management should always 
be effi cient, but should effi ciency be the only, or even the predominant, goal in all 
cases? As Colin Clark (1973a, 1973b) has shown, ‘effi cient’ resource management 
can sometimes lead to resource extinction. Specifi cally, where discount rates are 
high, growth rates are low, and available substitute investments offer higher rates 
of return, the ‘effi cient’ management decision may be to use up or extinguish the 
resource. Clark’s study concerned blue whale populations, and he concluded that 
‘extermination of the entire population may appear as the most attractive policy, 
even to an individual resource owner.’ Thus, the assumption that individual owners 
will always conserve resources does not hold in economic theory, let alone in prac-
tice (consider, as an empirical example, the Oklahoma ‘dustbowl’). Privatization, 
the profi t motive and ‘effi cient’ management do not guarantee resource conservation 
any more than public ownership guarantees resource depletion and despoilation. 
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Even if economic effi ciency were taken as a proxy for proper resource man-
agement and private ownership was found to be more effi cient than public owner-
ship, that still might not justify the privatization decision in all cases. Privatization 
itself can be costly, and those costs need to be factored in before determining the 
relative merits of private versus public ownership of natural resources in indi-
vidual cases. As we have seen, governments do not act solely (and sometimes 
not at all) from economic motives; politics, justice and morality always are fac-
tors. When a government decides to privatize publicly owned resources, it has a 
variety of allocation mechanisms to choose from and it does not always select a 
market-like competitive bidding process. Different allocation mechanisms lead 
to different allocations, favoring different economic and political interests. So 
we certainly should expect those interests to lobby, before the fact of privatiza-
tion, for the allocation method(s) they prefer. We could not reasonably expect, 
then, that Poland, the United States or any other democratic country would be 
able to privatize natural resources without running into exactly the same kind of 
costly political squabbles that have plagued Poland’s efforts to privatize its means 
of production. Supporters of privatization of publicly owned natural resources 
have not adequately assessed the likely costs (economic and non-economic) of 
privatization arising from alternative allocation mechanisms. Terry Anderson and 
Donald Leal (1991, 167) concede that ‘[p]roperty rights are costly to defi ne and 
enforce.’ Yet they have not attempted to estimate the cost of privatization.11 With-
out that information, how are we to conclude, as a matter of reason rather than 
mere faith, that the outcome would be more effi cient than under the status quo of 
public ownership and management? After all, ‘[i]t is possible to create a system 
which is so costly to implement that it overwhelms the benefi ts to be gained from 
control’ (Hanna, Folke, and Máler 1995, 18; also see Runge 1984).
Regulating the Regulators: Public Participation in Environmental 
Policy Making and Enforcement
When the state suffers from a regulatory confl ict of interest, as People’s Poland 
did, environmental law enforcement is likely to suffer unless enforcement power 
is decentralized. Some independent agent(s) must be empowered to enforce the 
environmental laws against polluters and against the state itself. In People’s 
Poland, as we learned in Chapter 3 (§3.5), private citizens and environmental 
groups had little authority to enforce environmental laws against polluters, and 
none at all to enforce them against the Party/government. But in most advanced 
market democracies, legislatures have decentralized regulatory power, for example 
by authorizing so-called ‘citizen suits.’ A typical provision is found in §304 of 
the American Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7604(a)), which authorizes ‘any person’ 
(broadly defi ned) to bring a civil action in federal district court against (1) the 
United States government or its agencies for violating emissions standards or 
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administrative orders, (2) government administrators for failing to perform non-
discretionary duties under the Act, and (3) any person (again broadly defi ned) who 
is polluting without a permit or is in violation of permit conditions.12 The citizen 
suit has proven to be a powerful tool for the private enforcement of public law. 
Individual citizens and environmental groups have sued polluters to enforce com-
pliance with regulatory standards, and government administrators for failing to 
perform non-discretionary statutory duties (see Miller 1987; Boyer and Meidinger 
1985). Citizen suits have also thwarted sporadic efforts to undermine federal law 
enforcement, as in 1981 and 1982, when the Reagan administration slashed the 
budget of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Those budget cuts forced 
the agency to reduce its staff of enforcement attorneys from 200 to 30 (Feller 1983, 
554), greatly reducing its ability to identify, monitor and prosecute non-complying 
polluters. The number of EPA enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act, for 
example, fell from 184 in 1979 to just 47 in 1982 (Naysnerski and Tietenberg 1992, 
114). Individual citizens and environmental organizations fi lled the void, however, 
taking on the role of private attorneys-general to enforce the federal environmental 
laws. Between 1970 and 1978, when governmental enforcement of environmental 
laws was robust, a total of only 25 citizen suits were fi led; after the Reagan budget 
cuts decimated the agency’s enforcement capabilities, the number of citizen suits 
exploded, from 41 in 1982 to 266 in 1986 (Naysnerski and Tietenberg 1992, 114). 
Today, in post-Communist Poland, citizens and environmental organizations 
have greater authority to enforce environmental laws than they had under com-
munism (see §7.5). Indeed, they may have even more power than environmental 
NGOs in other European Rechtsstaats, including Germany. But that still may not 
be enough. As Susan Rose-Ackerman (1995) has shown in her admirable book 
comparing environmental law in Germany and the United States, German citi-
zens and environmental organizations have relatively little legal leverage over 
regulators. Unlike their American counterparts, for example, German environ-
mentalists cannot force government regulators to comply with non-discretionary 
statutory mandates. If a German administrator fails to promulgate an emissions 
standard as required by a certain statute, private citizens have no administrative or 
judicial recourse. This lack of public access to environmental policy making and 
enforcement in Germany led Professor Rose-Ackerman to conclude, rightly in my 
view, that the American approach is ‘more conducive to good policy and is more 
democratically legitimate’ (Rose-Ackerman 1995, 66). This is not to say that the 
German system of environmental protection has been ineffective, or even that it 
has been less effective than the American system.13 However, to the extent that 
the American system permits citizens to more closely regulate the regulators, we 
might say that it is more likely to be effective (or less likely to prove ineffective) 
over the long run. Certainly, Poland would be better off following the American 
rather than the German model, given its history of regulatory confl icts of interest 
and the still slow pace of privatization, which is likely to keep thousands of enter-
prises under state ownership and control for years to come.
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Access to Environmental Information
Regardless of which model Poland chooses, its citizens will not be in a position 
to exercise their legal rights unless they have access to useful information about 
environmental conditions, regulatory standards and violations (see Futrell 1993, 
90). The collection and dissemination of environmental information is a prereq-
uisite to effective environmental law enforcement, whether the enforcer is a state 
agency, an NGO or an individual citizen. This lesson is clear from Chapter 4’s 
(§4.5) discussion of the effects of state censorship on the fl ow of environmental 
information and environmental law enforcement. 
In People’s Poland, the public was woefully underinformed about general 
environmental conditions and polluting activities. There were several reasons for 
this, the fi rst being inadequate information collection. Poland’s system of envi-
ronmental monitoring and information collection may have been better developed 
than those of other Soviet bloc countries, but it was not nearly adequate. As noted 
in Chapter 4 (§4.4), environmental inspectors were poorly trained and equipped; 
monitoring procedures were haphazard; monitoring equipment was substandard 
and not uniformly calibrated. Most environmental information came from the 
polluters themselves, and it was every bit as reliable as the economic information 
they supplied to socioeconomic planners—which is to say, completely unreliable. 
Poles could, of course, collect a certain amount of useful environmental 
information with their own senses; it was relatively easy to smell a poisoned 
stretch of river. Even then, efforts to identify and prosecute those responsible 
often were hampered by the incompetence of Party/state investigators. 
Poor environmental monitoring and reporting in People’s Poland was a com-
bined consequence of technological, political and economic factors. First and 
foremost, environmental monitoring requires sophisticated equipment and well-
trained personnel, both of which cost money. But in People’s Poland, funds were 
always in short supply (especially for environmental protection purposes). In 
post-Communist Poland, environmental funding problems have been alleviated 
by international assistance and a larger domestic environmental protection bud-
get (afforded by increased collections of environmental fees and fi nes, resulting 
primarily from hardened budget constraints). And the environmental information 
obtained from monitoring today is more reliable because a larger percentage of it 
comes from state monitoring, rather than enterprise self-monitoring. 
One environmental information problem persists, however, in post- 
Communist Poland: censorship. In the socialist era, the Party/state regularly cen-
sored environmental information under state secret laws. As we saw in Chapter 
4 (§4.5), this was chiefl y a consequence of the Party/state’s regulatory confl ict 
of interest as owner and regulator of polluting enterprises; the Party/state had 
a direct fi nancial stake in avoiding environmental law enforcement against the 
enterprises it owned and controlled. The solution to that problem, as already noted, 
is to structure property rights so that the interests of polluters and government 
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regulators are dis-aggregated, for example by privatizing resource users. But 
privatization and marketization in post-Communist Poland have not, so far, led 
to increased public access to environmental information. On the contrary, public 
access actually has been reduced in some respects. Information about individual 
polluters, which the Party/state used to publish regularly, today is embargoed out 
of professed concern for privacy and trade secrets (see Polish News Bulletin, Dec. 
23, 1992). To make matters worse, in 1994 the Polish government (dominated by 
former Communists and their allies from the Peasant Party) proposed a sweep-
ing new censorship law, specifying 71 ambiguously worded categories of state 
secrets, including: 
Materials of the Council of Ministers concerning the appraisal of the strategic 
potential of the state and strategic government orders and their implementation;
Research and development projects of particular importance to the eco-
nomic interest of the state, ordered by supreme state authorities;
Information concerning technical, technological, and organizational arrange-
ments whose disclosure could jeopardize important economic interests of the 
state. (Quoted in Polish News Bulletin, Sept. 16, 1994)
Any of these ‘bottomless pits’ could easily have swallowed most environmental 
information. Under the draft law, bureaucrats would have had unfettered discre-
tion to decide what information should be kept secret; the draft law contained no 
provision for judicial review. Anyone found guilty of publicizing censored infor-
mation would have faced imprisonment for up to ten years (Polish News Bulletin, 
Sept. 16, 1994). According to the Helsinki Human Rights Foundation, this draft 
law was even more restrictive than the old censorship law dating from the period 
of Martial Law (Polish News Bulletin, Sept. 21, 1994).14 Not surprisingly, Polish 
journalists, members of the pro-reform opposition in parliament, and the Solidar-
ity trade union rabidly opposed the bill. But Poland’s ruling coalition defended it 
on grounds refl ecting habitual ways of thinking. Then-Sejm Speaker (later Prime 
Minister) Józef Oleksy stated that the law was necessary because the media’s ‘dis-
avowal of Parliament has damaged the public imagination concerning the dignity 
of this institution’ (quoted in PAP News Wire, Sept. 22, 1994). Another legislator, 
Jerzy Dziewulski, defended the law by stating, ‘[y]ou journalists can’t have greater 
rights than the police’ (quoted in New York Times, Sept. 18, 1994). The lower 
house of parliament (the Sejm) approved the law on September 15, 1994 (Polish 
News Bulletin, Sept. 16, 1994). President Lech Wałęsa threatened to veto the bill, 
but it never reached his desk. The weight of public opinion led the upper house 
of the parliament to reject the bill almost unanimously on October 7, 1994; the 
vote was 74 to 5 (Reuters, Oct. 7, 1994). Subsequently, the leader of the former-
Communist forces that had introduced the legislation, Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
(now president of Poland), did a complete about-face and announced that his Party 
would no longer support the measure (Business News from Poland, Oct. 14, 1994). 
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Polish environmentalists, meanwhile, have been working in the opposite 
direction to increase public access to environmental information. The Wrocław-
based Polish Environmental Law Association, under contract with the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry, recently drafted a new 
comprehensive environmental protection law that would (among other things) 
prohibit the censorship of, and guarantee citizens access to, virtually all environ-
mental information. Unfortunately, given the current composition of the Sejm, this 
draft law’s chances for parliamentary approval are rather slim. But in view of the 
need to regulate the regulators, some kind of Freedom of Environmental Informa-
tion Act (with appropriate limitations for legitimate trade secrets, etc.) certainly 
would enhance environmental law enforcement. 
8.5. Valuing Scarcity
The lack of scarcity pricing was a systemic problem for environmental protec-
tion under Marxist socialism. Throughout most of the history of People’s Poland, 
land, air and water were provided to economic users virtually free of charge. 
As we saw in Chapter 6, this policy was ideologically motivated. According to 
Marx’s labor theory of value, natural resources had use value but no real eco-
nomic value because they were not products of human labor; to price them, as 
capitalist economies did, was mere commodity ‘fetishism.’ It was only in the mid-
1970s that the Polish Party/state began to deviate from Marx’s labor theory. First, 
the 1974 Water Law imposed a nominal charge on water use (consumption and 
pollution). Then the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act intro-
duced a price schedule for most economic uses of most natural resources. These 
charges were intended to induce resource conservation among economic users, 
but they failed to signifi cantly affect the rate of resource use and pollution for 
several reasons. The fees were not based on supply (relative scarcity), demand 
and the marginal costs of development. Consequently, it was impossible to deter-
mine how much (if any) conservation a given price would yield. The Party/state 
was shooting blindfolded at rapidly moving targets. To the extent environmental 
fees successfully induced any conservation at all, it was sheer luck. Even then, the 
impacts were blunted by endemic soft budget constraints. As we saw in Chapter 5, 
price increases routinely were offset by subsidies for resource users. This relates 
back, of course, to the Party/state’s confl ict of interest as environmental regulator 
and owner of resource users/polluters. Resolving that confl ict (by privatizing the 
means of production and hardening budget constraints) is a prerequisite to insti-
tuting effective scarcity pricing.
Since competitive markets and (relatively) hard budget constraints have been 
introduced in post-Communist Poland, scarcity pricing of resources has become 
a more effective means of inducing conservation and pollution control. Fees for 
using and polluting natural resources have increased—in some cases by a factor 
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of ten (see Table 7.3 in Chapter 7). And those charges are on top of market prices 
for commodity resources, such as coal and oil, that have risen in some cases by 
more than 1,000 percent since 1989 (see Czaja et al. 1994, 27). Firms (including 
state-owned enterprises) have responded by reducing resource use (per unit of 
production) and, consequently, pollution emissions (see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7). 
This constitutes a structural improvement in environmental protection resulting 
from a combination of policy instruments—in this case, increased environmental 
charges—and systemic changes—the introduction of competitive markets, harder 
budget constraints and scarcity pricing.
This is not to say that scarcity pricing alone can ensure suffi cient environ-
mental quality. It never has. No country’s resource charges even approximate the 
(estimated) social cost level. Tomasz Żylicz (1993a, 37) has written that Poland’s 
resource-use and pollution charges, which already are among the world’s highest, 
would have to be increased by a factor of eight to come close to the social cost 
level. And his estimate did not even attempt to quantify and incorporate non-
economic values, which arguably must be included to identify the appropriate 
scale of environmental charges at varying rates of resource supply and demand.15 
For reasons specifi ed in the concluding section of Chapter 7, it would be politi-
cally unfeasible for the Polish government to raise already high resource prices 
to social cost levels. And as an economic matter it would price most (if not all) 
Polish resource-based products out of world markets since other countries do not 
price their resources accordingly. 
Another issue related to scarcity pricing concerns the national income 
accounting system which countries use to quantify national income and production 
(GDP). As we saw in Chapter 5 (§5.3), the socialist economies regularly outpaced 
the Western capitalist economies in economic growth, at least (and probably only) 
on paper. However, their costs of producing growth were far higher. The socialist 
economies produced growth extensively, that is, by maximizing resource inputs. 
This resulted in relatively and absolutely high rates of resource depletion and pol-
lution emissions. But because resource depletion, pollution emissions and atten-
dant damage were not counted as costs to the economy (let alone to Polish nature, 
society and culture), they had no statistical effect on national income (although 
they inevitably had a real effect). Poland’s economic growth statistics were arti-
fi cially infl ated by the intentional exclusion of real environmental costs, so much 
so that the recorded increases in national income likely masked real decreases in 
welfare.16 The problem of accounting for resource depletion and environmental 
damage also plagues capitalist economies, but to a lesser extent. In the United 
States, for example, the national income accounts exclude the real costs of envi-
ronmental degradation and resource depletion mainly because of computational 
diffi culties (see Cairncross 1995, 106). As a result, pollution damage generates 
statistical growth, while infl icting real costs on the economy. For example, when 
people become sick from air pollution, that contributes to production in the health 
care industry; and it further contributes to GNP by creating problems for envi-
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ronmental industries to clean up. From the perverse perspective of the national 
income accounts, more pollution is better than less. This result is ameliorated, 
however, in market economies by the institution of scarcity pricing. Even though 
scarcity is not factored into the national income accounts, it is refl ected in the 
prices fi rms must pay to acquire resources. As resource inputs grow increasingly 
scarce over time, the price for those inputs rises, and fi rms in competitive markets 
respond by, among other things, increasing factor productivity (i.e., the amount of 
production squeezed out of each input). Consequently, rates of resource consump-
tion and pollution decline (on a per unit basis), regardless of the fact that those 
trends do not (directly) enhance GDP growth. 
The failure to incorporate the costs of environmental degradation and resource 
depletion in computations of national income nevertheless skews perceptions of 
the costs and benefi ts of environmental protection, often making environmental 
measures appear more costly than they really are. This plays into the hands of 
critics of environmental policy, who point to slower GDP growth as ‘proof’ that 
regulations are too costly. For instance, in 1991, a Harvard economist reportedly 
told a tax policy group that environmental regulations would cost the American 
economy 3 percent of GNP annually by the year 2005, mainly by consuming 
capital stock that otherwise could be invested in ‘productive’ activities (Bureau of 
National Affairs Daily Report for Executives, Sept. 13, 1991). But this says less 
about the social costs and benefi ts of environmental policy than it does about how 
GNP is computed. It certainly cannot be taken as proof that environmental regu-
lations create a net loss in social welfare because, again, GNP is not a proxy for 
social welfare.17 Fortunately, the United Nations, the OECD and individual coun-
tries are working on methods for incorporating environmental costs and benefi ts 
into the national income accounts (see, e.g., Prince 1993). Those efforts will, it is 
hoped, lead to more accurate assessments of the costs and benefi ts of environmen-
tal protection, giving sorely needed content to the, as yet, vacuous slogan ‘sustain-
able development’ (see Cole 1996).
8.6. The Rule of (Environmental) Law
For environmental protection to be effective, environmental laws must be both 
enforceable and actually enforced (on this distinction see Chapter 3, §3.1). Above 
all, this means that environmental regulations must have the force of law; they can-
not be subordinated to political expediency or the arbitrary power of government 
offi cials, bureaucrats or industrial managers, as was the case in People’s Poland 
(see Kozłowski 1993, 152). Although this may seem obviously true, it raises two 
signifi cant questions. First, can environmental law enforcement be insulated from 
political and economic expediency? This question, at bottom, concerns the mean-
ing and utility of the rule of law concept. Second, assuming environmental law 
enforcement can be insulated from political and economic expediency, to what 
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extent should it be? This question implicitly recognizes that law enforceability 
and enforcement are variable, and asks what level of each is required for (mini-
mally) effective environmental protection. 
The Rule of Law: Fact, Myth and Aspiration
The normative assertion that environmental law should rule over politics entails 
a commitment to the rule of law concept. This commitment requires elaboration 
because, for reasons that are diffi cult to fathom (especially in light of analysis 
from Chapter 4), the rule of law concept remains stubbornly controversial.18 Much 
of the controversy, however, stems from ideological commitments that obstruct 
a realistic assessment of its utility and, perhaps, necessity as an organizing prin-
ciple for democratic society. The rule of law is valuable not because it is some 
magical neutral principle that solves all political and economic confl icts justly and 
effi ciently, but simply because there is no acceptable alternative. If not the rule of 
law, then the rule of what or, more appropriately, of whom? A good Marxian (or, 
as likely these days, a post-modernist, radical libertarian or anarcho-capitalist) 
might respond that this question presents a false choice because the rule of law 
itself is only a myth concocted to mask the rule of the capitalist class (or the rule 
of special interests); the only real choice is between contending persons or parties 
(see, e.g., Cain and Hunt 1979, ix–xi). There is some truth in this radical critique 
of the rule of law, but it is not the whole truth. The rule of law is not just a myth; 
there is some fact of the matter.19 But to understand that fact-of-the-matter, we 
need to have a clear idea of what the rule of law concept concerns and what it 
does not concern.
First, we must distinguish between the rule of law and legal rules. The rule of 
law does not entail a belief that legal rules are neutral, apolitical or even just. In 
fact, the rule of law does not imply much of anything about the normative content 
of the laws; as H. L. A. Hart (1961, 157) has pointed out, a general rule of equal 
application can be quite compatible with unjust legal rules. The history of the rule 
of law concept extends to sixth-century BCE Athens, when Solon gave the people 
‘equal laws for the noble and the base,’ which provided ‘not so much control of 
public policy as the certainty of being government legally in accordance with 
known rules’ (Hayek 1975, 7–8).20 Like the Greek concept of eunomia (but unlike 
isonomia, which provides for substantial political equality), the modern rule of 
law specifi es little if anything about the normative content of laws, but only the 
relationship between those laws, power and politics. The French political theorist 
Blandine Kriegel (1995, 63) has summed up that relationship this way: 
politics becomes an object of law, and political rights are juridifi ed, just as indi-
vidual rights are. The deviation from Roman Law is clear: no longer is the divi-
sion of things law’s sole object but rather constraints on power and limitations 
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on human uses of things and of other human beings. Law is no longer the coin of 
a politics of strength, and force and power are no longer to be regarded as brute 
facts. They are all henceforth subjected to law, while law itself becomes a power, 
a force. The state adopts the rule of law. To make politics an object of law is 
impossible without the subjection of power itself to the law, the juridifi cation of 
proprietors as well as of property, of the powerful as well as of power.
The rule of law concept, thus, is a constraint (though not an absolute one) on 
political discretion (compare Raz 1979, 224). It entails an ethical injunction that 
the laws be consistently applied and enforced, without regard to parties, classes or 
personalities. And it is this implicit ethical commitment that distinguishes the rule 
of law, as a practical matter, from the arbitrary rule of persons or parties. It offers 
an enforceable expectation that the lawmakers and their favorites will be bound 
by the same rules that apply to others similarly situated;21 to the extent that this 
expectation is not enforceable, the state simply fails to adhere to the rule of law. 
The enforceable expectation is what I take to be the fact-of-the-matter of the 
rule of law. It allows us to observe and even measure the extent to which laws 
are enforceable and actually enforced, including against the rulers themselves.22 
There may be no bright line of enforceability and actual enforcement to distin-
guish societies that adhere to the rule of law from those that do not. But we can 
judge the extent to which societies are achieving (or failing to achieve) the (never 
completely attainable) rule of law goal. Most importantly, to the extent they fail, 
the problem is not that the rule of law concept is somehow fl awed, but that the 
law does not rule enough. So when a state fails to live up to the rule of law, the 
solution is not to abandon the rule of law concept as a myth, but to demand greater 
adherence to it. And when a state’s laws are unjust, the answer is not to abandon 
the rule of law, but to demand different, more just laws. As E. P. Thompson (1975, 
266) put it in his famous passage from Whigs and Hunters: 
[w]e ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath 
this law. But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon 
power and the defense of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems to 
me an unqualifi ed human good.23
Alexandr Zinoviev (1979, 574–5), among many others, specifi es a second 
condition for the rule of law. In addition to requiring equality under the law, he 
argues that the rule of law invokes a principle of legality, according to which no 
one should be prosecuted for any act that has not previously been declared, by 
legitimate (i.e., legally prescribed) procedures, to be illegal. However, this require-
ment would appear to require the conclusion that the United States and the states 
of the British commonwealth are not rule of law states to the extent that their com-
mon law courts often declare what is illegal only upon passing judgment (see Den-
ning 1949). But if there are any rule of law states existing in the world, the United 
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States, Canada, Britain, New Zealand and Australia surely are among them. We 
might conclude with Michael Oakeshott (1983, 155) that there is such a thing as 
the rule of law, but no existing states conform to it. But then we would be forced to 
adduce some new concept to explain the very real distinction between states where 
politics and power rule without constraint and states where politics and power 
have been substantially subordinated to the law. It hardly seems worth the trouble, 
especially when considering that the familiar rule of law concept is capable of 
serving as both the unattainable goal and the measure of relative attainment.
The Enforceability and Enforcement of Environmental Law
Even if a state generally adheres to the rule of law, its environmental laws may not 
be effective if they are either unenforceable or unenforced. To be enforceable, the 
laws must provide suffi ciently unambiguous standards (or directions for setting 
standards), specify responsibilities and establish penalties for responsible parties 
who fail to comply with the standards or directives. Actual enforcement depends 
largely on factors outside of the laws themselves, most notably political will and 
state fi nances. However, as we saw earlier in this chapter (§8.4), legislation itself 
can affect prospects for actual enforcement. For instance, citizen suit provisions 
enhance  actual enforcement as well as the enforceability of environmental laws 
by expanding the universe of agents authorized to enforce the laws and by provid-
ing rewards for their enforcement efforts. Such provisions increase the likelihood 
that the laws will be actually enforced. Their very inclusion within legislation is 
evidence of political will to enforce the laws.
As a normative matter, a law that is either unenforceable or not actually 
enforced might as well not exist.24 On the other hand, something less than per-
fect enforceability and enforcement must be suffi cient because, in the fi rst place, 
perfection is unobtainable. In the second place, the rule of law demands not that 
laws be completely insulated from political considerations but that they be clear 
and generally applicable, regardless of the persons or parties involved. Third and 
fi nally, even if environmental laws could be insulated from practical political and 
economic considerations, they probably should not be. The purpose of environ-
mental law, after all, is to solve (or resolve) problems that never are purely legal, 
but always combine social, political and economic considerations. Applying legal 
rules rigidly to such problems may not always yield the best results; some amount 
of fl exibility is desirable for reasons of justice, effi ciency and, in some cases, both. 
This is just Aristotle’s familiar point about the need to temper law with equity in 
order to promote justice. But this does not indicate any fault in the law or with the 
legislator because the law, by its nature, must be general. And general legal rules 
cannot be expected to fi t each case precisely (Aristotle 1941a, 1137b9–37b24). 
Aristotle’s notion of equity is not irreconcilable with the rule of law. As Lawrence 
B. Solum (1994, 145) has written:
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The practice of equity by a virtuous judge does not ignore the genuine impor-
tance of achieving regularity, publicity, and generality in the law. Fidelity to the 
letter of the law is part of the virtue of judicial integrity, but respect for legal rules 
is not the whole of judicial excellence. There are situations in which a judge with 
practical wisdom will perceive that adherence to the spirit of the law requires a 
departure from its letter. Sometimes justice and the rule of law require the prac-
tice of equity. (Emphasis added)
Having ruled out the desirability (indeed, the possibility) of either zero or per-
fect enforceability and enforcement, we must at least inquire (even if we cannot 
answer) what level of enforceability and enforcement is necessary for minimally 
effective environmental protection. Perhaps the only practical way is to assess 
the impacts the laws are having at existing levels of enforceability and enforce-
ment. If they are not measurably improving environmental quality or avoiding 
environmental degradation, then current levels of enforceability and enforcement 
are insuffi cient. How much of an impact they should be having depends, to some 
extent, on each country’s specifi c environmental, fi scal and policy circumstances. 
Any more abstract defi nition of suffi cient enforceability and enforcement prob-
ably would be about as meaningful as the slogan ‘sustainable development’ in 
current usage—which is to say, not very meaningful.
In Chapter 3, I concluded that the environmental laws of People’s Poland 
were suffi ciently ‘enforceable’ (to the extent any laws subject to the Leninist doc-
trines of ‘socialist democracy’ and ‘socialist legality’ can be said to have been 
enforceable), excepting certain statutory provisions that failed to specify respon-
sible parties, standards and/or penalties. Poland’s Council of Ministers and vari-
ous agencies with environmental protection responsibilities complied, for the 
most part, with the statutory directives by promulgating strict and clearly enforce-
able standards. The main problem in People’s Poland, as pointed out in Chapters 
4 and 5, was lax to non-existent enforcement. The Polish government failed to 
provide a suffi cient level of law enforcement to ensure (minimally) effective envi-
ronmental protection. In post-Communist Poland, most of the political, economic 
and ideological causes of lax enforcement have been reduced or eliminated. Con-
sequently, as we saw in Chapter 7, environmental law enforcement has substan-
tially improved since 1989. 
This is not to say that Poland’s environmental laws now are perfectly 
enforceable and enforced; that clearly is not the case. The most important issue, 
however, is whether Poland has achieved a suffi cient level of enforceability and 
enforcement for effective environmental protection. The statistical improvements 
described in Chapter 7 at the very least suggest that Poland is moving in the right 
direction. Poland’s environmental laws are now having a signifi cant and measur-
able positive impact on pollution emissions and overall environmental quality. 
Some Polish environmentalists complain that the environmental laws are 
still being sacrifi ced to political and economic expediency, pointing to the case 
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of Warsaw’s Okęcie II airport. As we saw in Chapter 7 (§7.4), the airport was 
permitted to open in 1992, even though it was in violation of environmental rules 
that required the installation of environmental protection equipment before open-
ing. The Chief Environmental Protection Inspector compromised by allowing the 
airport to open on the condition that airport authorities would retrofi t all required 
environmental protection installations within 18 months. Environmentalists 
alleged that this compromise sacrifi ced the legal rules for the sake of political and 
economic interests. That is true to some extent; the law was not enforced to its last 
letter, and to the extent that this was for reasons of political and economic expedi-
ency, we might conclude that the rule of law was violated. But it is equally clear 
that the purpose of the legal rule ultimately was fulfi lled. Environmental protec-
tion equipment was retrofi tted at Okęcie II. And the importance of that can hardly 
be overemphasized. In the fi rst place, the outcome of the case certainly would 
have been different under Communist Party rule; in People’s Poland, the State 
Environmental Protection Inspectorate had no enforcement power, and the courts 
were unlikely (to say the least) to countermand a decision of Warsaw Party/city 
offi cials. Even more importantly, the Okęcie II case does not establish a precedent 
for future economic developments to avoid environmental protection require-
ments. On the contrary, it creates an incentive for them to comply in full from the 
start because it almost always is cheaper to design in environmental installations 
rather than retrofi t them later. Had the developers of Okęcie II known before-the-
fact that a court would order them to retrofi t environmental equipment within 18 
months after opening, they surely would have installed the necessary equipment 
in the fi rst place. In the fi nal analysis, environmental protection in Poland was 
improved as a result of the Okęcie II case. 
The Eco-Totalitarian (Non-)Alternative 
As we saw in Chapter 4 (§4.2), the Polish United Workers’ Party ruled as a 
totalitarian regime, unconstrained by the rule of law. It is important to recognize, 
however, that this entailed no necessary implications for environmental protection. 
Operating according to the principles of socialist democracy, democratic centralism 
and the nomenklatura system, the Party theoretically could have asserted as much 
(or as little) control as it desired (or thought necessary) over any area of social 
concern, including environmental protection. And that control might have been 
exercised either positively or negatively; that is, the Party might have acted either 
to protect or destroy the natural environment. As we saw throughout Chapters 4 
and 5, the Polish Communist Party maintained policies that resulted in less envi-
ronmental protection than the law apparently required. But, in theory, it might 
have instituted policies providing more environmental protection than the law 
required. A totalitarian regime might, after all, be founded on an ecological ideol-
ogy. Indeed, some writings of the ecology movement seem to promote a platonis-
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tic (totalitarian) republic, ruled by ecologist-kings (rather than philosopher-kings) 
(see, e.g., Ophuls 1977, 159–63).
My purpose here obviously is not to condone eco-totalitarianism (or any 
other form of totalitarianism), but simply to make the point that totalitarianism is 
not logically or theoretically inconsistent with environmentalism or environmen-
tal protection. Conceivably such a society could attain quite high levels of envi-
ronmental protection even in the absence of the rule of law, assuming those who 
govern have the will and the means to implement and enforce pro-environmental 
dictates. Indeed, at fi rst glance it appears that eco-totalitarians should have an eas-
ier time implementing their environmental policies than democratic leaders, who 
always are constrained by political competition, public opinion and the potential 
fallout from unpopular policies. It should be far easier, for example, for a dictator 
to shut down polluting factories and institute draconian environmental protec-
tion measures. Theoretically, all the dictator needs is the political will (which 
is assumed in the case of an eco-totalitarian regime) and the public fi nances to 
implement and enforce the rule. The real world, of course, is more complicated 
than this. And there are reasons to doubt whether totalitarian regimes (or other 
states not adhering to the rule of law) could adequately protect their environments 
over long periods of time. First of all, totalitarian regimes are never fully insulated 
from political and economic pressures that could erode their commitment to eco-
logical preservation. As Hannah Arendt (1973, 306) and others have pointed out, 
totalitarians typically seek to minimize opposition by cultivating mass support. 
This is amply demonstrated in the history of People’s Poland, where every sin-
gle leadership change was precipitated by public unrest.25 So, an eco- totalitarian 
regime might be forced to compromise on its ecological values. Moreover, as a 
matter of practical economics, it is unrealistic to assume that a pro-ecological 
totalitarian steady-state would be able to produce enough revenue to enforce its 
environmental dictates against dissenters. Environmental protection, after all, is 
very expensive. In the absence of suffi cient fi nance to support the state’s coer-
cive apparatus, ecologist-kings would be forced to rely on the inherently less reli-
able enforcement mechanisms of ideological, social and moral suasion.26 From a 
political perspective, Roger Congleton (1992) argues that totalitarians are likely 
to produce less environmental protection than democratic regimes because they 
have uncertain career paths, shorter time horizons, relatively lower risk aversion 
and higher marginal costs of pollution control. But Congleton neglects the ideo-
logical dimension, which is crucial to understanding the politics of environmental 
protection, especially in an eco-totalitarian regime (see North 1984, 10). Never-
theless, an ideological commitment to environmental protection may not always 
prevail over other practical considerations for the totalitarian, such as mainte-
nance of power.
There is growing empirical evidence that environmental protection tends to 
be more successful in democratic states. Indeed, the failure of environmental pro-
tection throughout the Communist world—in contrast to the, at least, modest suc-
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cess of environmental regimes in the democratic states of Western Europe and 
North America—may provide the most compelling evidence to date. Even if we 
conclude cautiously that the environmental case for democracy remains under-
determined, there are strong reasons (many of which are discussed in Payne 1995) 
for suspecting a positive correlation between democracy and ecology. First, envi-
ronmental information is more readily accessed in democracies that guarantee 
free speech and freedom of the press, and this facilitates environmental education. 
Democratic states also permit and even encourage open debate about environmen-
tal problems and policies. And those debates can infl uence the state’s environmen-
tal protection regime. However, such institutions are antithetical to totalitarianism. 
Given the weight (slight though it may be) of historical experience, combined with 
the sound theoretical reasons for expecting democracies to provide more environ-
mental protection than less open forms of government, it appears doubtful that 
eco-totalitarianism would be a feasible, let alone preferable, alternative.
8.7. Is There a ‘Capitalist Imperative’ 
for Environmental Protection?
The various institutional prescriptions set forth in this chapter—from private prop-
erty rights in the means of production to scarcity pricing and the rule of law—
characterize advanced capitalist democracies. The analysis generally supports the 
claim, advanced by Martin Lewis (1992) among others (including Mikhail Berns-
tam 1991), that there is a ‘capitalist imperative’ for environmental protection. The 
argument is not that capitalism is environmentally benign, but that it provides an 
institutional framework within which environmental protection efforts can suc-
ceed. This may be true, but the argument proves too little. 
Lewis shows only how capitalist institutions adjust to achieve environmental 
protection goals. But to prove the thesis of a capitalist ‘imperative,’ he must also 
show that only capitalist institutions are capable of making the necessary adjust-
ments.27 To that end, Lewis (1992, 163–6) points to the failure of environmental 
protection under real existing socialism. He is quite right about that failure, but 
wrong to suppose that it proves a ‘capitalist imperative’ for environmental pro-
tection. The environmental failure of real existing socialism hardly proves that 
environmental protection would not succeed under any and all conceivable social-
isms; neither does the analysis in this book prove that. However, the failure of 
environmental protection under (real existing) socialism in Poland and through-
out the ex-Communist world raises serious questions for Marxian, non-Marxian 
and post-Marxian advocates of socialism for environmental protection. The big-
gest question may be whether and how future socialist states might avoid the 
institutionally generated impediments to environmental protection that plagued 
earlier socialist states. More specifi cally, how might socialist property institutions 
and central planning be structured to avoid (in practice as well as in theory) the 
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regulatory confl icts of interest that hampered environmental protection efforts in 
previously existing socialist states? How might a non-market economy be struc-
tured to supply the kind of budget discipline needed to coerce resource users and 
polluters into conserving resources and limiting emissions? And, in the absence 
of competitive markets, how might future socialist societies spur technological 
innovations for environmental protection? Finally, who would be able to enforce 
the environmental laws against non-compliers if the state, as owner and regulator 
of the means of production, decided not to? These questions place a heavy burden 
on proponents of neo-, non- and post-Marxian eco-socialism. At the very least, it 
seems that an environmentally feasible socialism would have to be founded on 
principles and institutions quite different from those of the orthodox  Marxist–
Leninist model.
Notes
1. On the environmental problems of other former Communist countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, see, among other works, Carter and Turnock (1993), Alcamo 
(1992), Peterson (1993), Feshbach and Friendly (1992), National Geographic (June 1991), 
Vavroušek (1990), Komarov ([pseud.], 1980), International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (1990), French (1990), Goldman (1972a).
2. This was not the problem in People’s Poland where environmental quality goals (in 
the form of ambient standards) were quite stringent. The problem in Poland was that no 
progress was made toward achieving them; in fact, Poland’s environmental laws did not 
succeed even in stemming the progress of degradation.
3. The importance of this distinction is highlighted in the discussion of property rights 
in §8.4.
4. To be fair, I should point out that free market environmentalists are not particu-
larly interested in improving regulatory enforcement. In addition to privatizing natural 
resources, they would deregulate environmental protection, leaving it to the workings of 
the free market and the common law (see, generally, Anderson and Leal 1991). 
5. For an interesting discussion of incommensurability problems in environmental 
protection, see Sunstein (1993). Richard Epstein (1995) argues that incommensurability 
problems should not deter society from maintaining policies that maximize utility. But, 
as far as I am aware, no one has raised the incommensurability problem to promote the 
abandonment of utility maximization as a goal. The incommensurability problem really 
concerns the measurement of utility. How do we calculate utility (or welfare) given diverse 
factors that are evaluated in different terms or even different languages? How do we (or can 
we) measure the ‘value’ of endangered species or the ‘cost’ of their extinction in assess-
ing policies that affect them? Do we simply consider their presently estimated economic 
costs, which would be tantamount to assigning zero prices to non-market goods? Or do we 
also factor in non-economic aesthetic or moral values? If so, how are those non-economic 
values factored in? Conversely, how do economic values factor into policy decisions based 
primarily on non-economic goals? 
6. Of the dozens of tales of government mismanagement recounted in Anderson and 
Leal (1991), not one concerns resources, such as wilderness areas, that are subject to single 
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or dominant use (as opposed to multiple use) management. In another study, John Baden 
and Dean Lueck (1984, 41–2) found that the opportunity cost in preserving most wilderness 
lands is ‘zero,’ and that the bureaucratic bungling is avoided by the requirement of ‘pas-
sive management.’ Nevertheless, Baden and Lueck claim that public ownership ‘leaves the 
future of the wilderness on very shaky ground.’ The ‘real threat,’ they argue, ‘could come 
from governmentally mandated exploration and mining in the event of politically induced 
constraints on the supply of strategic minerals.’ It is unclear, however, whether privatiza-
tion would reduce the threat of exploration and mining, especially if the wilderness lands 
were privatized according to a competitive bidding system, which would advantage well-
endowed mining companies over environmental groups. 
7. For instance, the US Forest Service, in the Department of Agriculture, is respon-
sible for managing National Forests for multiple uses, including timber, mining, recreation 
and wildlife (see, e.g., the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §528). In 
Poland, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry is, in 
various ways, responsible for resource use and development, as well as preservation.
8. The free marketeers claim that non-profi t environmental groups are rich enough to 
compete against for-profi t corporations in acquiring property rights to public lands. They 
point out that the 13 largest environmental groups in the United States possess a combined 
annual budget of over US$400 million (Anderson and Leal 1991, 94). However, as William 
Funk (1992, 514) has pointed out, two oil companies, Exxon and Mobil, earn more than that 
in a single day—US$493 million a day on Funk’s estimate, which is based on combined 
annual gross revenues from sales of more than US$180 billion. So initial endowments are 
far from equal. And it is hardly surprising that those who profi t from exploiting natural 
resources on public lands have more money with which to purchase further resources (for 
exploitation) than those who ‘profi t’ from preserving resources. This refl ects a built-in bias 
of the market-based allocation system the free-marketeers promote. Of course, that is not 
the only available mechanism for allocating publicly owned resources.
9. This is not to say that the railroad land grants were ineffi cient or unprofi table to 
the nation. Some commentators have argued that the United States government, and the 
public-at-large, received good value for the railroad land grants (see, e.g., Wilner 1981). 
Be that as it may, it remains clear that the government allocated land to the railroads not by 
market criteria but by political and even personal considerations.
10. In 1995, for example, the federal government was forced, under the terms of the 
1872 General Mining Law, 17 Stat. 91, to convey more than US$3 billion worth of publicly 
owned minerals to the ASARCO Corporation for a grand price of US$1,745. That comes 
to only 0.000058 percent of market value (Bureau of National Affairs, National Environ-
ment Daily, Dec. 5, 1995). On the 1872 General Mining Law, see generally Leshy (1987).
11. Critics of free market environmentalism, such as James E. Krier (1992, 332–3) 
and William Funk (1992, 513–14) have focused much-needed attention on the allocative 
problems entailed by privatization. And property rights economists are only beginning to 
develop models of transaction costs in privatization (see Jung et al. 1995).
12. Certain procedural limitations apply. For example, citizen plaintiffs must give 60 
days’ notice to the EPA Administrator, the state where the alleged violation occurred, and 
the alleged violator before fi ling suit (42 U.S.C. §7604(b)). 
13. If there is a shortcoming in Rose-Ackerman’s book, it is that she does not adduce 
any empirical information to support her conclusion that broader public participation rights 
are ‘more conducive to good policy.’ If that statement is true, we should be able to predict 
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that, in the long run, Germany would have lower environmental standards and more lax 
enforcement than other countries with broader public participation rights. 
14. The 1981 Censorship Law was repealed in 1990 (1990 Dz.U. No. 29, item 173).
15. Some would maintain (as Ricardo and Malthus did) that resource supplies can 
only decline. This certainly is true as a physical matter—there is only a fi nite amount of 
land and other resources on or in the earth—but not as an economic matter. Economic scar-
city always is relative to the rate of demand and the dynamic effi ciency of the economy. 
Especially under conditions that facilitate technological innovation for resource conserva-
tion, the ultimate physical barrier to growth can be avoided. That does not mean, of course, 
that physical scarcity can be ignored. Indeed it is the recognition of that scarcity that drives 
resource prices and spurs efforts to increase factor productivity, for example by technologi-
cal innovation (see Arrow et al. 1995). This is what makes possible the counterintuitive, 
but fortuitous, result that most (commodity) resources are less (economically) scarce today 
than they were a century ago (see Simon 1981).
16. The environmental journalist Frances Cairncross (1995, 98–9) has noted that the 
purpose of GDP is merely ‘to measure transactions that pass through the market’; it is not 
an indicator of net social welfare or quality of life. Unfortunately, GDP often is taken as a 
proxy for net social welfare, including by critics of environmental policies. 
17. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between environmental regula-
tions and productivity, see Haveman and Christainsen (1981); also see Cole (1996).
18. For recent examples of attacks (from different perspectives) on the rule of law, 
see, for example, Hasnas (1995) and Mootz (1993).
19. Arguably, the rule of law would still be a useful, even critical, myth for democratic 
societies were it entirely mythical. All cultures, after all, are founded upon myths. Even 
the culture of science, which supplies the most concrete ‘facts’ of contemporary Western 
civilization, is founded ultimately on (very useful) myths (see Popper 1963). 
20. Hayek mistakenly refers to the Solonian reforms by the term isonomia. The cor-
rect term (indeed, Solon’s own term for his reforms) was eunomia. Isonomia fi rst appeared 
several decades later to describe the Cleisthenian reforms, which went well beyond Solon’s 
reforms in providing for substantial political equality (including equal access to political 
offi ce and equal opportunity to participate in policy making) as well as equality before the 
law. Indeed, the word isonomia became virtually synonymous with the (later appearing) 
term demokratia (see Vlastos 1953, 1971). Nevertheless, Hayek was on the right track in 
defi ning the rule of law on the basis of general application rather than normative content. 
However, in other writings, Hayek (1960) seemed to take a broader view of the rule law, 
something closer to isonomia than eunomia. 
21. What it means to be ‘similarly situated’ is, of course, contestable. There is no fool-
proof formula for determining the class of similarly situated persons for all legal rules. At 
the very least, the rule of law requires the best effort to apply the rules as consistently and 
even-handedly as possible, allowing for legitimate distinctions. 
22. Interestingly, companies that measure investment risks abroad utilize a Rule of 
Law index. The International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) Rule of Law index measures, 
among other things, the extent to which a given country has ‘a tradition of depending on 
physical force or illegal means to settle claims.’ The ICRG implicitly defi nes the Rule of 
Law more broadly than I do. In fact, the ICRG’s Rule of Law variable used to be labelled 
‘law and order tradition,’ a title more appropriate to the panoply of institutional consider-
ations it refl ects. It is nonetheless interesting to see how the international business commu-
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nity has seized upon the rule of law concept as a practical and measurable factor indicating 
a state’s commitment to a certain relationship between law, politics and power (see Keefer 
and Knack 1994, 6, 23). 
23. If I understand Thompson correctly, his critics, including Morton Horwitz (1977), 
miss the point when they complain, for example, that the rule of law cannot be ‘an unquali-
fi ed human good’ because ‘[b]y promoting procedural justice it enables the shrewd, the 
calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own advantage.’ Horwitz’s 
criticisms prove at most that the rule of law is not a suffi cient condition for social justice. 
But Thompson’s reference to ‘shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath the 
law’ clearly indicates that he did not consider the rule of law a suffi cient condition for a just 
society; he only thought it a necessary condition. That is what makes it, in his words, ‘an 
unqualifi ed human good.’
24. Of course, laws may also serve non-normative purposes. They may articulate a 
society’s goals and aspirations. Thus, for example, section 101 of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §4331) of the United States is completely unenforceable but 
articulates a national environmental ethic symbolizing a clear (if limited) commitment to 
environmental protection and resource conservation. 
25. In 1956, worker riots in Poznań contributed to the elevation of Władysław 
Gomułka as Party First-Secretary. In 1970, when Gomułka attempted to raise food prices 
during the Christmas holidays, workers rioted, and he was replaced by Eduard Gierek, 
who immediately rescinded the price increases. Gierek was deposed a decade later, after 
his efforts to raise prices in 1980 led to strikes in Warsaw and Radom, and ultimately to 
the emergence of the Solidarity movement in Gdańsk. He was replaced temporarily by 
Stanisław Kania, who proved unable to quell the public unrest. Kania was soon replaced 
by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who did not attempt to placate the unrest, but stifl ed it by 
declaring Martial Law in December 1981 (see Davies 1982, ch. 23; 1984, chs. I, VI, VII; 
Leslie et al. 1980, ch. 11 to Epilogue).
26. This would be especially problematic if the eco-totalitarian country operated with 
competitive markets because ‘fi rms under the pressure of competition can be assumed 
to pay attention to arguments without a legal or economic content only when their costs 
of reducing pollution are negligible’ (Bohm and Russell 1985, 454). But then, an eco- 
totalitarian country without competitive markets would have its own problems with 
environmental protection, given soft budget constraints and slow rates of technological 
innovation that seem endemic to centrally planned or administered economies.
27. I am assuming here (and I believe it is a fair assumption) that Lewis really means 
democratic capitalism when he uses the term ‘capitalism.’ Much of his argument for a 
capitalist imperative certainly seems to presume democratic political institutions, as well 
as capitalist economic ones.
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I. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Poland
1922 Dz.U. No. 102, item 936 Ustawa wodna z dnia 19 września 1922 r. (Water 
Law of Sept. 19, 1922).
1934 Dz.U. No. 31, item 274 Ustawa o ochronie przyrody z dnia 10 Marca 
1934 r. (Nature Protection Act of Mar. 10, 1934).
1944 Dz.U. No. 4, item 17  Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia 
Narodowego z dnia 6 września 1944 r. o 
przeprowadzeniu reformy rolnej (Decree of the 
Polish Committee of National Liberation of Sept. 
6, 1944 on the Execution of Land Reform).
1944 Dz.U. No. 15, item 82  Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia 
Narodowego z dnia 12 grudnia 1944 r. o 
przejeciu niektórych lasów na własność Skarbu 
Parístwa (Decree of the Polish Committee of 
National Liberation of Dec. 12, 1944 on taking 
over some forests as property of the State 
Treasury).
1947 Dz.U. No. 64, item 373 Dekret z dnia 1 października 1947 o planowej 
gospodarcze narodowej (Decree of Oct. 1, 1947 
on national economic planning)
1949 Dz.U. No. 25, item 180 Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 1949 r. o ochronie 
przyrody (Nature Protection Act of April 7, 1949).
1950 Dz.U. No. 14, item 130 Ustawa z dnia 20 marca 1950 r. o terenowych 
organach jednolitej władzy państwowej (Law 
of Mar. 20, 1950 on the local organs of state 
authority).
1950 Dz.U. No. 41, item 371 Rozporządzenie Ministra Gospodarki Komu-
nalnej z dnia 2 września 1950 r. w sprawie 
określenia warunków, jakim powinny 
odpowiadał ścieki wpuszczane do zbiorników 
wód powierzchniowych i do ziemi (Regulation 
of the Minister of Public Utilities of Sept. 2, 
1950 concerning the defi nition of conditions 
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relating to waste water discharges to open 
reservoirs and the ground).
1950 M.P. No. 1–132, item 1646 Zarządzenia Ministra Leśnictwa z dnia 
20 listopada 1950 r. w sprawie zynności 
konserwatora przyrody, nadleśniczego 
państwowego, kierownika parku narodowego 
i dyrektora parku narodowego w dziedzinie 
ochrony przyrody (Regulation of the Forestry 
Minister of Nov. 20, 1950 on the nature 
protection duties of the nature conservator, state 
forest inspector, national park managers, and 
national park directors).
1952 Dz.U. No. 33, item 232 Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, 
Uchwalona Przez Sejm Ustawodawczy w dniu 22 
lipca 1952 r. (Constitution of the Polish People’s 
Republic of July 22, 1952).
1952 M.P. No. A–27, item 376 Zarządzenie Ministra Leśnictwa z dnia 4 stycznia 
1952 w sprawie prowadzenia rejestrów tworów 
przyrody poddanych pod ochroną (Regulation of 
the Forestry Minister of Jan. 4, 1952 concerning 
the management of registers for natural 
formations subject to nature protection).
1952 Dz.U. No. 16, item 99 Rozporządzenie Ministra Leśnictwa z dnia 17 
marca 1952 r. w sprawie zakresu działania i 
organizacji wojewódzkich komitetów ochrony 
przyrody (Regulation of the Forestry Minister of 
March 17, 1952 concerning the scope and activity 
of the district committees for nature protection).
1952 Dz.U. No. 44, item 300 Dekret z dnia 20 października 1952 r. o prawie 
Łowieckiem (Decree of Oct. 29, 1952 on the 
hunting law).
1952 Dz.U. No. 45, item 307 Rozporządzenie Ministra Leśnictwa z dnia 
4 listopada 1952 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia 
gatunkowej ochrony zwierząt (Regulation of 
the Forestry Minister of Nov. 4, 1952 on animal 
species protection).
1957 Dz.U. No. 31, item 130 Ustawa z dnia 28 maja 1957 r. o utworzeniu 
urzędu Ministra Żeglugi i Gospodarki Wodnej 
(Law of May 28, 1957 on the governmental 
institution of the Ministry of Navigation and 
Water Management).
1959 Dz.U. No. 15, item 81 Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych 
z dnia 18 lutego 1959 r. o trybie wybieranie 
i odwoływania osób wchodzących w 
skład Kolegiów Karnoadministracyjynch 
przy prezydiach rad narodowych oraz 
przewodniczących składó orzekajacych tych 
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Kolegiów (Regulation of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of Feb. 18, 1959 on procedures for 
selecting and removing persons comprising the 
criminal-administrative lay courts attached to 
the Presidia of the People’s Councils, and the 
chairmen at the judicial panels of these lay courts).
1960 Dz.U. No. 29, item 163 Ustawa z dnia 14 czerwca 1960 r. o otworzeniu 
Centralnego Urządu Gospodarki Wodnej i 
przekształceniu urządu Ministra Żeglugi i 
Gospodarki Wodnej w Urząd Ministra Żeglugi 
(Law of June 14, 1960 establishing the 
Central Offi ce of Water Management and the 
reorganization of the Ministry of Navigation 
and Water Management into the Ministry of 
Navigation).
1960 Dz.U. No. 30, item 168 Ustawa z 14 czerwca 1960 r. Kodeks 
postępowania administracyjnego (Law of June 
14, 1960. Code of administrative procedure).
1961 Dz.U. No. 5, item 33 Ustawa z dnia 31 stycznia 1961 r. o ochronie wód 
przed zanieczyszczeniem (Law of Jan. 31, 1961 
on protection of water from pollution).
1961 Dz.U. No. 7, item 47 Ustawa z dnia 31 stycznia 1961 r. o planowaniu 
przestrzennym (Law of Jan. 31, 1961 on land use 
planning).
1962 Dz.U. No. 34, item 158 Ustawa z dnia 30 maja 1962 r. Prawo wodne 
(Law of May 30, 1962. Water Law).
1964 Dz.U. No. 16, item 93 Kodeks cywilny (Civil Code)
1966 Dz.U. No. 14, item 87 Ustawa z dnia 21 kwietnia 1966 r. o 
ochronie powietrza atmosferycznego przed 
zanieczyszczeniem (Law of April 21, 1966 on 
protection of the air from pollution).
1966 Dz.U. No. 42, item 253 Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 13 
września 1966 r. w sprawie dopuszczalnych 
stężeń substancji w powietrzu atmosferycznym 
(Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 
Sept. 13, 1966 concerning the permissible 
concentrations of substances in the atmosphere).
1966 M.P. No. 40, item 200 Uchwała nr 198 Rady Ministrów z dnia 12 lipca 
1966 r. w sprawie ochrony użytków rolnych 
(Resolution no. 198 of the Council of Ministers 
of July 12, 1966 concerning protection of 
agricultural lands).
1966 M.P. No. 50, item 247 Uchwała nr 301 Rady Ministrów z dnia 6 
września 1966 r. w sprawie rekultywacji i 
zagospodarowania gruntów przekształconych w 
związku z poszukiwaniem i eksploatacją kopalin 
(Resolution no. 301 of the Council of Ministers 
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of Sept. 6, 1966 concerning the recultivation and 
farming of lands recultivated in connection with 
mining activities).
1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94 Kodeks Karny (Penal Code).
1970 M.P. No. 4, item 35 Uchwała nr 18 Rady Ministrów z dnia 31 
stycznia 1970 r. w sprawie ochrony lasów przed 
ujemnymi wpływami szkodliwych pyłów i 
gazów wydzielanych przez zakłady przemysłowe 
(Resolution of the Council of Ministers of Jan. 
31, 1970 concerning protection of forests against 
the negative effects of dusts and gases emitted by 
industrial works).
1971 Dz.U. No. 12, item 114 Kodeks wykroczeń, ustawa z dnia 20 maja 1971 
r. (Petty Offenses Code, statute of May 20, 1971).
1971 Dz.U. No. 27, item 249 Ustawa z dnia 26 października 1971 r. o ochronie 
gruntów rolnych i leśnych oraz rekultywacji 
gruntów (Law of Oct. 26, 1971 on protection and 
reclamation of agricultural and forest lands).
1972 Dz.U. No. 11, item 77 Ustawa z dnia 29 marca 1972 r. o utworzeniu 
Urządu Ministra Gospodarki Terenowej i 
Ochrony Środowiska (Law of Mar. 29, 1972 
establishing the Ministry of Local Economy and 
Environmental Protection).
1972 Dz.U. No. 11, item 79 Ustawa z dnia 29 marca 1972 r. o zniesieniu 
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